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Volume XXIV

Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean

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Preface

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts that contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

a. To avoid publication of matters that would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.

b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.

c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.

d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.

e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification–in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government.

The Center, in coordination with geographic bureaus of the Department of State, conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

Ronald D. Landa prepared the compilations on the Soviet Union and East-West Exchanges; Aaron D. Miller those on Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. Charles S. Sampson provided initial planning and review. John P. Glennon oversaw final preparation of the volume through the declassification process. Vicki E. Futscher performed the technical editing under the supervision of Rita M. Baker. Max Franke prepared the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379

Records maintained by Charles E. Bohlen, 1942–1970.

Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1953–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1956–1958, maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1955–1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Daily Summaries: Lot 60 D 530

Master set of the Department of State classified internal publication *Daily Secret Summary* and *Daily Top Secret Summary* for the years 1953–1958, maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

EE Files: Lot 57 D 514

National Security Council documents relating to Soviet and satellite vulnerabilities, maintained by the Office of Eastern European Affairs.

EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233

Files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs for the years 1945–1957.

GTI Files: Lot 58 D 610

Files relating to Turkey, September 1949–May 1958, maintained by the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

GTI Files: Lot 58 D 765

Files relating to Turkey, December 1946–October 1958, maintained by the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

GTI Files: Lot 59 D 4

Classified and unclassified economic files relating to Turkey, 1956, maintained by the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

GTI Files: Lot 59 D 36

Files relating to Greece and Cyprus, 1955–1956, maintained by the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

GTI Files: Lot 60 D 39

Files relating to Greece and Cyprus, 1955–1958, maintained by the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

GTI Files: Lot 61 D 96

Files relating to Turkey, 1956–1958, maintained by the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

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Miscellaneous files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for the years 1946–1957.

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Miscellaneous files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for the years 1950–1957.

INR–NIE Files

Files of National Intelligence Estimates, Special Estimates, and Special National Estimates retained by the Directorate for Regional Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

INR Files: Soviet Affairs

Master set of the classified Department of State monthly publication, "Soviet Affairs," December 1948–May 1959, maintained by the Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

IO Files

Master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the Department of State, comprising the official U.N. documentation and classified Department of State records on United States

Policy in the U.N. Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, and various special and ad hoc committees for the period from 1946 to currency.

OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385

Master set of the administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

P Files: Lot 61 D 318

Files of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State for Public Affairs, 1954–1959, accessioned by the Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, as part of FRC 64 A 867.

P/PG Files: Lot 60 D 605

Files of the Policy Plans and Guidance Staff, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1952–1959, accessioned by the Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, as part of FRC 72 A 248.

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Subject files containing OCB and NSC documents retired by the Policy Plans and Guidance Staff in the Bureau of Public Affairs.

PPS Files: Lot 65 D 101

Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda and related correspondence for the year 1954 of the Policy Planning Staff.

PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the year 1955.

PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the year 1956.

PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the years 1957–1961.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 174

Exchanges of correspondence between President Eisenhower and heads of foreign governments, excluding the UK, France, Germany and the USSR, for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments for the years 1953–1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149

Chronological record of memoranda of conversations with foreign visitors for the years 1956–1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75

Chronological collections of the minutes of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation and the Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation and the Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167

Serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State for the years 1947–1963.

SOV Files: Lot 69 D 162

Subject files of the Bilateral Political Relations Branch of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs on various aspects of Soviet-U.S. relations, 1943–1966.

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

Top secret records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the period 1951–1959 and selected problem files on the Middle East for the period 1954–1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

USIA/IAE Files: Lot 60 D 439

Files of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, U.S. Information Agency, 1955–1957, accessioned by the Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, as FRC 63 A 190.

USIA/IAE/E Files: Lot 64 A 536

Miscellaneous files of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, U.S. Information Agency, 1955–1961, accessioned by the Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, as FRC 64 A 536.

USIA/IBS Files: Lot 59 D 242

Files kept in the Office of the Director, International Broadcasting Service, U.S Information Agency, covering all phases of the Voice of America for the years 1948–1957. These files are part of Federal Records Center Accession 63 A 190.

USIA/IOP/G Files: Lot 70 D 398

Alphabetical subject files containing Policy Guidance records as maintained by the Policy Guidance Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, U.S. Information Agency, for the years 1952–1967. These files are part of Federal Records Center Accession 72 A 5121.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Eisenhower Library, CFEP Chairman Records

Records of the Office of the Chairman, United States Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Joseph M. Dodge and Clarence B. Randall), 1954–1961.

Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1952–1959. Dulles was Secretary of State, 1953–1959.

Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers

Papers of James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President, 1953–1961.

Eisenhower Library, President's Appointment Books

Daily appointment books of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961.

Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up

Project "Clean Up" collection. Records of Gordon Gray, Robert Cutler, H. Roemer McPhee, and Andrew J. Goodpaster, 1953–1961.

Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records

Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Robert Cutler, Dillon Anderson, and Gordon Gray), 1952–1961.

Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary Records, 1952–1961

Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary (Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell), 1952–1961.

Eisenhower Library, Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, maintained by his personal Secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: the Name Series, the Dulles–Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, the Administration Series, and the International File.

Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey

Princeton University, Dulles Appointment Book

Daily appointment books of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, 1953–1959.

List of Abbreviations

AA, anti-aircraft
ACEN, Assembly of Captive European Nations
AF of L, American Federation of Labor
a.i., ad interim
AKEL, Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou (Progressive Party of the Working People) (Cyprus)
AMA, American Military Advisor
AMAG, American Military Assistance Group; American Mission for Aid to Greece
AMAS, American Military Assistance Staff
ASME, American Society of Mechanical Engineers
AT, anti-tank; Atlantic Treaty
BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation
BIS, Bank of International Settlements
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
BP Baghdad Pact; International Business Practices Division, Office of International Trade and Resources, Department of State
CA, circular airgram
CAS, controlled American source
CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
CEMA, Council for Economic Mutual Assistance
CFEP, Council on Foreign Economic Policy
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIO, Congress of Industrial Organizations
CoCom, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group
Contel, consulate telegram
CP, Communist Party
CPSU, Kommunisticheskaya Partia Sovetskogo Soyuza (Communist Party of the Soviet Union)
CY, calendar year
DA, Department of the Army; Soviet designation for long-range aviation
DDR, Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)
Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
Depcirctel, Department of State circular telegram
Depintel, Department of State instruction telegram
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DFS, direct forces support
DKEL, Dimokratikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou (Democratic Party of the Working People)
DOD, Department of Defense
DP, Democratic Party; Deutsche Partei (German Party); displaced person
DRN, Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
DS, Department of State
Dulte, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary Dulles to the Department of State
E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
ECE, Economic Commission for Europe
ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
EDA, Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera (United Democratic Left)
EDC, European Defense Community
EDST, Eastern Daylight Savings Time

EE, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EOKA, Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cyprus Fighters)
EPEK, Ethniki Proodevtiki Enosis Kendrou (Progressive Union of the Center)
EPON, Ethniki Panelliniki Organosis Neon (National Panhellenic Youth Organization)
EPU, European Payments Union
ERE, Ethniki Pizopastiti Enosis (National Radical Union)
ES, Executive Session; Ellinikos Synagermos (Greek Rally)
ESKE, Eniaion Syndikalistikon Kinima Ellados (United Labor Movement of Greece/United Syndicalist Movement)
EUCOM, European Command
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EURATOM, European Atomic Energy Community
EXIM, Export-Import Bank
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FE, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
FN, Division of Financial Affairs, Department of State; Federation Nationale
FOA, Foreign Operations Administration
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
FP, Freedom Party
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State
G–2, U.S. Army Intelligence Division, Intelligence section of the general staff of a large unit
GA, General Assembly of the United Nations
Gadel, series indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GC, General Committee
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GNA, Greek National Assembly
GNP, gross national product
GOE, Government of Eygpt
GOG, Government of Greece; Government of Germany
GOT, Government of Turkey
GTI, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs; Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; Department of State
H, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
HMG, Her Majesty's Government
IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICA, International Cooperation Administration
Icato, series indicator for ICA telegrams
IDEA, Ieros Desmos Ellinon Andikommouniston (Sacred Bond of Greek Anticommunists); Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon (Sacred Bond of Greek Officers)
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
ITR/TAD, Trade Agreements and Treaties Division, Office of International Trade and Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
JAMMAT, Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
JUSMAG, Joint United States Military Advisory Group
KKE, Kommounistikon Komma Ellados (Greek Communist Party)
KVP, Kasernierte Volks Polizei (Garrisoned People's Police)
KYP, Kendriki Ypiresia Pliroforion (Greek Central Intelligence Service); Kypriaki Ypiresia Pliroforion (Cyprus Information Service)
LDU, Liberal Democratic Union
LS, Division of Language Services, Department of State
MA, military attaché

MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
ME, Middle East
MEDO, Middle East Defense Organization
MEEOC, Middle East Emergency Oil Committee
METO, Middle East Treaty Organization
MI/6, United Kingdom Intelligence Service
MID, series indicator for telegrams from the Military Attaché in Greece
MOD, Ministry/Minister of Defense
MSC, minesweeper, coastal
MSI, minesweeper, inshore
MSP, Mutual Security Program
MVD, Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del (Ministry of Internal Affairs) Soviet Union
NAC, North Atlantic Council; National Advisory Council
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC, National Broadcasting Company
NCO, non-commissioned officer
NDGS, National Defense General Staff; Greek Supreme National Defense Council
NE, Near East
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State; Nea Elliniki Aristera (New Greek Left)
NEP, new economic policy
niact, night action; communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NSC, National Security Council
NSCID, National Security Council Intelligence Directive
O, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
OCB, Operations Coordinating Board
ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization
OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OIR, Office of Intelligence Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
ORM, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State
OSP, offshore procurement
OSS, Office of Strategic Services
P, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
Paks, Pakistan
P.L., public law
PM, Prime Minister
POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (pipeline)
Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council
PPF, Patriotic People's Front (Hungary)
R, Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State
RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
reftel, reference telegram
RFE, Radio Free Europe
RHAF, Royal Hellenic Air Force
RPP, Republican People's Party (Turkey)
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Office of the Secretary of State
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Command, Europe
SCA, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences to the Department of State
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Forces, Europe
SOF, status of forces
SYG, Secretary General
TASS, Telegrafnye Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)
TE, technical exchange; table of equipment
TEA, National Defense Battalion, paramilitary force operating jointly with Greek National Army Reserve
Tedul, series indicator for telegrams from the Deparment of State to Secretary Dulles
tel, telegram

TL, Turkish Lira
TO & E, Table of Organization and Equipment
Topol, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council
TOPRAK, Turkish Government Purchasing Agency for agricultural equipment and products
Tousfo, series indicator for telegrams to the Foreign Operations Administration
U/MSA, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of State
U/OP, Operations Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary of State
UB, Urzad Bezpieczenstwa (Security Office)
UN, United Nations
UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Affairs, Department of State
UP, United Press
urtel, your telegram
USAF, United States Air Force
USARMA, U.S. Army Military Attaché
USCGS, U.S. Coast Guard ship
USCINCEUR, U.S. Army Commander in Chief, Europe
USDel, United States Delegation
USDOCOSOUTH, U.S. Documents Officer, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
USDOCOSOUTHEAST, U.S. Documents Officer, Allied Forces, Southeastern Europe
USEP, United States Escapee Program
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIBS, United States International Broadcasting Service
USIS, United States Information Service
USNMR, United States National Military Representative
USOM, United States Operations Mission
USOM/T, United States Operations Mission/Turkey
USRO, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations; United States Regional Organizations
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations
VFC, Volunteer Freedom Corps
VOA, Voice of America
VOKSI, Russian All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries

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List of Persons

Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, and until May 1955, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Aldrich, Winthrop W., Ambassador to the United Kingdom until February 1957

Allen, George V., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs until July 1956; Ambassador to Greece, October 1956–November 1957; thereafter Director, U.S. Information Agency

Anderson, Dillon, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security Affairs, April 1955–September 1956; thereafter Consultant to the President

Anderson, Robert B., Deputy Secretary of Defense until August 1955; Special Emmissary of the President, January to March 1956; Secretary of the Treasury from July 1957

Armour, Norman, Jr., Staff Assistant, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, until May 22, 1955; thereafter Adviser for Political and Security Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations

Armstrong, W. Park, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence until May 1957

Averoff-Tossizza, M. Evangelos, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs from May 1956

Barbour, Walworth, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until November 1955; Minister-Counselor, Embassy in the United Kingdom, November 1955–February 1956; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission

Barnes, Robert G., Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, June–July 1955; Director, August 1955–March 1956; thereafter Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs

Baxter, William O., Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until August 1956

Bayar, Celal, President of Turkey

Beam, Jacob D., Director, Office of East European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, March–October 1955; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, October 1955–June 1957; Ambassador to Poland from August 1957

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr., Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August 1955–September 1957; thereafter Political Counselor in Austria

Bernau, Phyllis, Secretary to the Secretary of State

Berry, James Lampton, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, October 1955–August 1956; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs

Birgi (*see* Nuri Birgi)

Blake, Robert Orris, International Relations Officer, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, until August 1957

Bohlen, Charles E. (Chip), Ambassador in the Soviet Union until April 1957; Ambassador in the Philippines from June 1957

Bowie, Robert R., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until August 1955; Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning and Department of State Representative on the National Security Council Planning Board, August 1955–October 1957

Brewster, Herbert D., Officer in Charge of Turkish Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State

Brownell, Herbert, Jr., Attorney General of the United States

Brundage, Percival, Director, Bureau of the Budget, from April 1956

Bulganin, Nikolai Aleksandrovich, Soviet Minister of Armed Forces until February 1955; thereafter Chairman of the Council of Ministers and member, of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Burdett, William Carter, Jr., Officer in Charge, Egypt and Anglo-Sudan Affairs, Department of State, until October 1955; Deputy Director, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, October 1955–October 1956; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, October 1956–November 1957

Butterworth, W. Walton, Minister of Embassy in the United Kingdom until January 1956; thereafter U.S. Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community

Cabell, General Charles P., Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Caccia, Sir Harold Anthony, British Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until November 1956; thereafter Ambassador to the United States

Canelopoulos, Panayotis, Greek Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense until October 1955

Cannon, Cavendish W., Ambassador to Greece until July 1956

Capehart, Homer E., Republican Senator from Indiana

Cavalierato, Phedon A., Counselor of the Embassy of Greece in the United States until 1957

Cochran, H. Merle, Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund

Collins, General J. Lawton, U.S. Representative to Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO, until 1956; Director and Vice-Chairman, President's Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief, 1956–1957

Coulson, John E. (Sir John from March 1957), British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until October 1955; Minister of the Embassy in the United States, October 1955–September 1957

Courtney, Raymond, Consul at Nicosia

Crain, Mary G., Staff Officer, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from January 1955; Second Secretary and Vice Consul, Embassy in Athens, from March 1956

Cutler, Robert, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security Affairs until April 1955 and from January 1957

Dillon, C. Douglas, Ambassador to France until January 1957; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Dodge, Joseph M., Special Assistant to President Eisenhower and Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy until July 1956

Draper, William H., Jr., former Chief of the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations, at Paris

Dulles, Allen W., Director for Central Intelligence

Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State

Eden, Sir Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until April 1955; Prime Minister, April 1955–January 1957

Eisenhower, Dwight David, President of the United States

Elbrick, C. Burke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, March 1956–February 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Erim, Nehat, Special Adviser on Cyprus to the Turkish Prime Minister

Erkin, Feridun Cemal, Turkish Ambassador to the United States until June 1955

Erskine, General Graves B., Director, Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Esenbel, Melih, Deputy Secretary General for Economic Affairs of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Exintans, Georges, Greek Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until 1956 and Minister without Portfolio in the government of Premier Papagos until October 1955

Fechteler, Admiral William M., Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in Southern Europe, until July 1956; consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and member of the committee studying security matters, July–December 1956

FitzGerald, Dennis A., Deputy Director for Operations, Foreign Operations Administration (International Cooperation Administration after July 1955)

Flemming, Arthur S., Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, until February 1957

Foster, Andrew B., Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Franco Bahamonde, General Francisco, Caudillo of the Empire, Spanish Chief of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Prime Minister, and Head of the Falange Party

Frederika, Queen of the Hellenes

Furnas, Howard, Intelligence Research Officer, Department of State until September 1957; thereafter member, Policy Planning Staff

George, Walter F., Democratic Senator from Georgia; Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee January 1955–January 1957; Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, January–August 1957

Gleason, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

Glendinning, C. Dillon, Deputy Director, Office of International Finance

Goodpaster, Colonel Andrew J. (Brigadier General from January 1957), Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower

Görk, Haydar, Turkish Ambassador to the United States, June 1955–September 1957

Gray, Gordon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, July 1955–February 1957; Director, Office of Defense Moblization, from March 1957

Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich, Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs until February 1957; thereafter Foreign Minister

Gruenther, General Alfred M., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, until November 1956

Hagerty, James C., Press Secretary to President Eisenhower

Harding, Field Marshal Sir John, Chief of the Imperial Staff until 1955; Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Cyprus, from September 1955

Henderson, Loy W., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration from January 1955; Head, U.S. Delegation to the Suez Committee, August–September 1956; Officer in Charge, Hungarian Refugee Operations, from December 1956

Hensel, H. Struve, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until June 1955

Herter, Christian A., Consultant to the Secretary of State, January–February 1957; thereafter Under Secretary of State and Chairman, Operations Coordinating Board

Hollister, John Baker, Consultant to the Secretary of State, May 1955–July 1955; Director, International Cooperation Administration, July 1955–July 1957

Holmes, Julius C., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until May 1955; Consul General at Tangier, May 1955–July 1956; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from July 1956; Deputy Representative to the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament from July 1957

Hoover, Herbert C., Jr., Under Secretary of State and Chairman, Operations Coordinating Board, until February 1957

Howe, Fisher, Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, until March 1956; therafter Director of the Executive Secretariat

Hughes, Rowland R., Director, Bureau of the Budget, until April 1956

Humphrey, George M., Secretary of the Treasury until July 1957

Iksel, Settar, Turkish Ambassador to Greece

Ismay, Baron Hastings Lionel, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until April 1957

Jackson, C.D., Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, February 1953–March 1954

Jackson, William H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, September 1955–January 1956; Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, January–September 1956; Acting Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, September 1956–January 1957

Jernegan, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs until October 1955; Minister-Counselor of Embassy in Italy from October 1955

Jones, Owen T., Counselor of the Embassy in Greece until July 1956; thereafter Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs

Kaganovich, Lazar, Deputy Chairman Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and member, Presidium, Central Committee, Communist Party Soviet Union, until February 1956

Kalijarvi, Thorsten V., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until March 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, March–September 1957; thereafter Ambassador to El Salvador

Karamanlis, Constantine, Greek Prime Minister from October 1955 and Minister of Defense, October 1955–February 1956

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone A., British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until February 1957

Knight, Ridgway B., Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, May 1955–September 1957

Kohler, Foy D., Counselor, Embassy in Turkey, until October 1956

Konev, Ivan Stepanovich, Commander-in-Chief, Warsaw Pact Armed Forces

Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs until April 1955; Minister of State from April 1955, Deputy Prime Minister from August 1955, and Defense Minister, September–November 1955; Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 1955–June 1956

Lacy, William S.B., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for East-West Exchanges until 1957

Lay, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
Lennox-Boyd, Alan, British Secretary of State for the Colonies
Leverich, Henry P., Deputy Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Liatis, Alexis S., Chief of the Diplomatic Cabinet and Director of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Lincoln, Francis F., Officer in Charge Economic Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
Lloyd, Sir John Selwyn Brooke, British Minister of Supply until April 1955; Minister of Defence, April–December 1955; thereafter Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Lodge, Henry Cabot, U.S. Permanent Representative at the United Nations
Luce, Clare Boothe, Ambassador to Italy until December 1956
Lyon, Frederick B., Minister-Counselor, Embassy in Turkey

MacArthur, Douglas, II, Counselor of the Department of State until December 1956; Ambassador to Japan from February 1957
McCardle, Carl W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until March 1957
McGuire, E. Perkins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Macmillan, Harold, British Minister of Defense until April 1955; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, April–December 1955; Chancellor of the Exchequer, December 1955–January 1957; thereafter Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury
McSweeney, John Morgan, Adviser, Security Council Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, until July 1955; Senior Political Adviser, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, July 1955–April 1956; thereafter First Secretary, Embassy in Italy
Maffitt, Edward P., First Secretary, Embassy in Italy, until June 1956
Makarios III, Archbishop and Ethnarch of Cyprus
Makins, Sir Roger M., British Ambassador in the United States until October 1956; Joint Permanent Secretary of the Treasury from October 1956
Malenkov, Georgi Maksimilianovich, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers until February 1955
Markezinis, Spyros, founder and leader of the Progressive Party in Greece
Melas, George V., Greek Ambassador to the United States
Menderes, Adnan, Prime Minister of Turkey
Merchant, Livingston T., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until May 1956; thereafter Ambassador to Canada
Merrill, Frederick T., Director, East-West Exchanges Staff, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, from July 1956
Mićunović, Veljko, Yugoslav Ambassador to the Soviet Union from March 1956
Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich, First Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, 1955
Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Soviet Foreign Minister until May 1956
Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard Law (Viscount Montgomery of Alamein), Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe
Murphy, Robert D., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, Prime Minister of Egypt; President from June 1956
Nixon, Richard M., Vice President of the United States

Norstad, General Lauris, Air Deputy, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, until November 1956; thereafter Supreme Allied Commander in Europe

Nuri Birgi, M., Secretary General, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until June 1957; Ambassador in the United Kingdom from June 1957

Nutting, Sir Harold Anthony, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Representative to the United Nations General Assembly and to the Subcommittee of the United Nations on Disarmament until November 1956

Overby, Andrew N., Assistant Secretry of the Treasury until 1957

Pallis, Lieutenant General Stylianos, Military Attaché, Embassy of Greece to the United States, until spring 1956

Papagos, Marshal Alexandros, Prime Minister of Greece until October 1955

Papandreou, George, Leader of Komma Philetefiheron (Liberal Party) in Greece

Paul I, King of the Hellenes

Peake, Charles Brinsley Pemberton, British Ambassador to Greece

Penfield, James K., Deputy Chief of Mission in Austria until August 1955; thereafter Counselor

Perkins, George W., U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, March 1955–October 1957

Phleger, Herman, Legal Adviser, Department of State, until April 1957

Plastiras, General Nikolas, former Prime Minister and General of the Greek Army

Porter, Brigadier General R.W., Jr., Military Adviser to the Director, Foreign Operations Administration, until April 1955; Commanding General, Third Armoured Division, U.S. Army, Europe, July 1956–December 1957

Prochnow, Herbert V., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, November 1955–November 1956

Radford, Admiral Arthur M., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff until August 1957

Randall, Clarence B., Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for Foreign Economic Policy and from July 1956, Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy

Rhodopoulos, Constantines, President of the Greek Parliament until 1956

Richards, James P., Democratic Representative from South Carolina; member, House Foreign Relations Committee, until January 1957; thereafter Special Assistant to President Eisenhower

Robertson, Reuben B., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, August 1955–April 1957

Rockefeller, Nelson A., Special Assistant to President Eisenhower until December 1955; Chairman, President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization until 1957

Rockwell, Stuart W., National War College until 1956; Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, from July 1956; Director from August 1957

Rountree, William M., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, from August 1956

Russell, Francis H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, September 1955–October 1956

Salt, Barbara, First Secretary, British Embassy in Washington

Sarper, Selim, Turkish Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Scott, Walter Kenneth, Director, Executive Secretariat, until 1955; Deputy Director for Management, International Cooperation Agency, from August 1955

Seager, Cedric H., Regional Director for Near East, South Asia, and African Operations, International Cooperation Agency, from May 1955

Shepilov, Dmitrii Trofimovich, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 1956–February 1957

Snyder, Lucille, Officer, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until September 1956; thereafter Second Secretary and Consul, Embassy in Greece

Spaak, Paul Henri, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs until May 1957; thereafter Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Staats, Elmer B., Executive Secretary, Operations Coordinating Board

Stassen, Harold E., Director of the Foreign Operations Administration until June 1955; Special Assistant to President Eisenhower from March 1955 and U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and Sub-Committee from August 1955

Stephanopoulos, Stephanos, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs until October 1955

Stevens, Francis B., Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until July 1956

Stevenson, Adlai, Democratic candidate for President, 1956

Stoessel, Walter, International Relations Officer, Department of State, until 1956; detailed to White House, March–June 1956; First Secretary and Consul, Embassy in Paris, from June 1956

Stephanopoulos, Stephan, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs until October 1955

Theotokis, Spyridon, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 1955–May 1956

Thompson, Llewellyn E., U.S. High Commissioner to Austria until May 1955 and Ambassador to Austria until July 1957; thereafter Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Thurston, Ray L., Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until March 1955; Counselor, Embassy in Greece, March 1955 to September 1956; detailed to International Cooperation Agency, October 1956–September 1957

Timmons, Benson E.L., III, First Secretary of Embassy in France and Director, Foreign Operations Mission, until July 1955; Minister for Economic Affairs, July–September 1955; thereafter Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State

Togliatti, Palmiro, Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party

Toon, Malcolm, Political Officer, Mission in Berlin; Consul in Berlin from August 1955; Deputy Director, East-West Exchange Staff, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, from July 1956

Tsaldaris, Constantine, former Prime Minister of Greece

Twining, General Nathan F., Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, until July 1957; thereafter Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Venizelos, Sophocles, Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Leader of the Elliniki Dimokratiki Aristera

Walmsley, Walter N., Jr., Minister-Counselor, Embassy in the Soviet Union, until October 1956; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Warren, Avra M., Ambassador to Turkey until February 1956

Warren, Fletcher, Ambassador to Turkey from March 1956

Waugh, Samuel C., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until August 1955; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, August–October 1955; thereafter President and Chairman of the Board of Directors, Export-Import Bank

White, General Thomas D., Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, until 1957; Chief of Staff from July 1957

Whitney, John Hay (Jock), Ambassador to the United Kingdom from February 1957

Wiggin, Charles D., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States from July 1956

Wilcox, Francis O., Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, until September 1955; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Williams, Murat W., First Secretary, U.S. Mission in Berlin, June 1955–April 1956; Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, May–July 1956; thereafter Deputy Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs

Willis, George H., Director of the Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

Wilson, Charles E., Secretary of Defense until October 1957

Wisner, Frank G., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

Wolf, Joseph J., Adviser for NATO Affairs, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; Acting Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, March 1955–October 1957

Wood, Chalmers B., Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until October 1957

Young, Hilary, Head, Southern Department, Foreign Office of the United Kingdom

Young, John Parke, Chief, International Finance Division, Office of International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, from November 1955

Young, Kenneth T., Jr., Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, January 1955–April 1956; thereafter Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs

Zaroubin, George N., Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich, Soviet Minister of Defense, February 1955–October 1957

Zorlu, Fatin Rüstü, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister until August 1955 and Minister of State until November 1955; Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, April–November 1955; thereafter Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Soviet Union

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION [1]

1. Editorial Note

On January 3, 1955, the Department of State announced that the United States Government had extended existing travel regulations "for Soviet citizens stationed in the United States to include all Soviet citizens in possession of valid Soviet passports other than Soviet citizen officers and employees of the U.N. Secretariat while their conduct is a responsibility of the Secretary-General of the United Nations." The regulations established closed areas in the United States comparable to those closed to travel by Americans and other foreigners in the Soviet Union. For texts of the announcement and the note presented on January 3 to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, along with five enclosures specifying the areas closed to Soviet citizens, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 31, 1955, pages 193–197.

On January 19, the Department of State announced the institution of regulations governing photography and sketching in the United States by Soviet citizens, which the Department said were comparable to those the Soviet Union instituted on February 11, 1954, regarding photography and sketching by foreign citizens in the Soviet Union. For texts of this announcement, and the note presented that day by the Department to the Soviet Embassy, see *ibid.*, pages 198–199.

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[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 954 ff.

2. Memorandum of Discussion at the 234th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 27, 1955 [1]

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

At the beginning of the meeting of the National Security Council, Mr. Cutler passed out copies of an analysis indicating the greatly increased number of meetings of the NSC and of actions taken by the Council in the Eisenhower Administration as compared to its predecessor. Mr. Cutler observed that this was an indication that "the workman is worthy of his hire" and was proof of how hard the Council had worked for President Eisenhower. He said, however, that the Secretary of State had commented on this analysis by stating that a quantitative study of the National Security Council threw no light on the quality of its membership and their actions. Amidst laughter, the President turned to Secretary Dulles and said, what you mean is that this analysis merely shows that we are now more verbose. (More laughter.)

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence first pointed out to the Council stresses and strains which had recently become visible in the Moscow scene. There was now occurring the largest call-back of Soviet Ambassadors abroad to Moscow since the death of Stalin. This would indicate quite a diplomatic pow-wow. To judge from their identities, the Ambassadors would probably concentrate their discussion on the London–Paris pacts [2] and West German rearmament. They might also discuss the situation with respect to Formosa and the Pacific, but they had been summoned to Moscow prior to the issuance of the President's statement to the Congress respecting Formosa. [3]

Another significant fact regarding developments in the Soviet Union was the summoning into session of the Supreme Soviet early in February, a full month ahead of the normal time when that body convened. Significance might be attached to this fact despite the rubber-stamp quality of the Supreme Soviet.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on January 28.

[2] Reference is to the agreements of the Nine-Power and Four-Power Conferences at London, September 28–October 3, 1954, and at Paris, October 20–23, 1954; see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1294 ff. and 1404 ff.

[3] For text of this message, transmitted by the President on January 24, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 7, 1955, pp. 211–213.

In addition, continued Mr. Dulles, there still was considerable publicity in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* regarding the degree of emphasis to be placed by the Soviet Government on increasing the production of consumers goods, as opposed to emphasis on heavy industry.

Discussing the content of some of this publicity, Mr. Dulles pointed out that *Pravda* had been plugging heavy industry, whereas until recently *Izvestia* had championed greater production of consumers goods. This had now ceased, and the *Pravda* line had apparently won out. In connection with this victory it was possible to attach some significance to the removal of Mikoyan as Minister of Internal Trade of the USSR.[4] While there were no indications that Mikoyan had been purged or otherwise disgraced, his removal from his trade post could be an indication that the role of heavy industry was again coming to the fore in the Soviet Union to the disadvantage of the recent emphasis on the production of consumers goods.

A final straw in the wind was the restoration to grace of Andreyev,[5] an old Bolshevik who had been in discard for some considerable time. It was possible to interpret his reappearance in authority as a sop to Malenkov and a slap at Khrushchev. In any case, concluded Mr. Dulles, all these indications may point to a return by the Soviet Union to a harsher line, as opposed to the recent stress on co-existence and a "soft" policy.

[Here follow discussion of the political situation in Iran, relations between Burma and mainland China, and the situation regarding the Chinese offshore islands, and a briefing by Admiral Radford on recent United States military moves in the Formosa area.]

2. Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities (NSC 5505; Annex to NSC 5505; NSC 5501, par. 26–c; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 26, 1955)[6]

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council at very great length and in very great detail with respect to the reference report, reading verbatim

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[4] Mikoyan's resignation as Soviet Minister of Trade was announced on January 25. He retained his position as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

[5] A.A. Andreyev had been deposed from the Politburo in 1952.

[6] NSC 5505, "Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities," January 18, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5505 Series) NSC 5505 is essentially the same, with some minor revisions, as NSC 5505/1, Document 4.

NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy," dated Jan. 6, 1955, is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.

Lay's memorandum of January 26 transmitted to the Council a copy of Radford's memorandum of January 25 to the Secretary of Defense containing the views of the Joint Chiefs on NSC 5505. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Soviet Vulnerabilities)

many of the key paragraphs and referring explicitly to the dissents in the present draft as well as to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At the conclusion of his briefing, certain minor splits in the text were discussed and dealt with by the Council. Mr. Cutler then invited attention to paragraph 4–c, which read as follows:

"c. Thereby convincing the Communist rulers that aggression will not serve their interests, that it will not pay. So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear-air retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR."

For reasons, said Mr. Cutler, that he could not understand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to delete paragraph 4–c. While Mr. Cutler believed that this paragraph was not vital to the understanding of the proposed political warfare strategy set forth in NSC 5505, he would have imagined that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have desired to include this paragraph, the more so since its thought was integral to subparagraphs 4–a and –b which preceded it. He accordingly asked Admiral Radford if he would explain the position taken by the Chiefs.

Admiral Radford said that personally he didn't care at all whether paragraph 4–c was or was not included. Indeed, he had not himself taken part in the discussion of this paper with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Beyond that, he added that he was altogether confused by all these wordy papers regarding the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities, indicating the view that such papers as these were of very doubtful value to the National Security Council.

Mr. Cutler explained to Admiral Radford that NSC 5505 and its ancillary reports had been intended to provide guidance in the precise field of exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities, a field in which the need of guidance had been felt for a number of years. Thereafter Mr. Cutler went on to explain what the Planning Board recommended as a suitable Council action on NSC 5505. (This proposed action is set forth in the "Note by the Executive Secretary" at the beginning of NSC 5505.[7]) In the course of summarizing the Planning Board recommendation for Council action, Mr. Cutler said that he wished to propose a slight modification in the recommended Council action, which change had resulted from a conversation he had had the previous evening with Mr. Nelson Rockefeller and Director Hughes of the Bureau of the Budget. (The slight modification suggested by Mr. Cutler amounted to assigning coordination of the

[7] Not printed.

implementation of NSC 5505 to a new committee headed by Mr. Rockefeller, rather than to a subcommittee of the Operations Coordinating Board.)

Mr. Hughes pointed out that, working independently of Mr. Cutler, both he and Mr. Rockefeller had come to the same conclusions as Mr. Cutler respecting the best means of effectively implementing this political warfare strategy. Mr. Allen Dulles indicated that the revised proposal was a "perfectly feasible" way of proceeding, while Mr. Hughes said that his long-awaited report on a mechanism for coordinating within the Executive Branch economic, psychological, and political warfare and foreign information, was almost ready for consideration by the National Security Council. [8]

Mr. Cutler then asked the Secretary of State for any comment he wished to make on NSC 5505.

Secretary Dulles said that he found it difficult to deal confidently with the vast number of abstractions which inevitably arose in such a report as this. Even if he didn't really understand the abstractions, and particularly the splits in abstractions, he said he was prepared to admit that these abstractions could be very important. Accordingly, he said he would "pass" at this point in the game.

Mr. Cutler attempted once again to explain the heart of the political warfare strategy proposed in this paper, and indicated that the "heart" of it was to be found in subparagraphs 3–c and 3–d, which he insisted expressed a really significant idea, and which subparagraphs he read again to the Council. . . . Secretary Dulles conceded that at least he could understand this concrete manifestation of the theoretical strategy.

Dr. Flemming said that he tended to share the feeling expressed by the Secretary of State on NSC 5505. While he would be willing to vote for approval of the report, he would not be sure exactly what he was proposing to recommend. He would therefore suggest clarifying language for insertion between subparagraphs c–(1) and c–(2) of the Note by the Executive Secretary. After reading his proposed new language, Dr. Flemming said it would provide the Council with a much clearer idea of the direction in which this political strategy was moving, by giving the Council a chance to look at specific illustrative measures and programs.

Mr. Cutler indicated a lack of sympathy with Dr. Flemming's proposal, and again apologized to the Council for his apparent inability to explain the contents of NSC 5505 more clearly. He tried once again by suggesting that the heart of this paper consisted of a

[8] Reference is to Hughes' report to the President on March 3 and the establishment by the President on March 10 of a Planning Coordination Group (PCG) headed by Nelson Rockefeller.

set of guiding principles for the exploitation of Soviet and satellite vulnerabilities, laid down for the guidance of Mr. Rockefeller's committee in its task of formulating programs and seeing that these programs were carried out. . . . Finally, said Mr. Cutler, it was plain to him that we did not want a lot more paper work to come out of Mr. Rockefeller's committee. Once in their hands, NSC 5505 would promptly enter the area of operations.

The President said that discussion of this paper was taking place in the context of the cold war. While of course we needed paper programs, we could not keep on planning indefinitely for the future. We must have prompt action. He personally could see nothing particularly wrong with NSC 5505. It was in general following the right line. The United States was not in a position to state that it would promote revolution in the Soviet Union. What we must try to do is win "these guys" over. Accordingly, he believed it was right to give this paper to the Rockefeller group and have them report to the Council from time to time by way of informing the Council of what the Special Committee had been doing. The progress reports should by all means be specific, and the President was sure that Mr. Rockefeller was precisely the right man to chair this committee to implement NSC 5505.

The Vice President said . . . . Was he therefore correct in supposing that the strategy set forth in NSC 5505 would not necessarily rule out resort to revolutionary methods if they seemed likely to be successful? Mr. Cutler answered that such methods would not necessarily be ruled out if they were likely to achieve success.

The President then went on to say that if the Council did approve the present report it should not expect the new Special Committee merely to carry out this policy slavishly, but to report to the Council on other unforeseen possibilities, as well as proposed measures that had turned out wrong. In response to the President, Mr. Cutler pointed out that NSC 5505 called for a continuous review of the strategy which it proposed. He added that he would get together with Dr. Flemming in order to agree on a wording for his proposed change in the Council action on NSC 5505. Governor Stassen pointed out with emphasis that the established pattern of progress reports by the Operations Coordinating Board covered exactly what Dr. Flemming had in mind in suggesting this change.

Secretary Dulles and Mr. Allen Dulles both stated that they did not wish the guidance provided by NSC 5505, on the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities along evolutionary rather than revolutionary lines, to destroy all possibility of seizing opportunities for exploiting a different type of strategy if such opportunities clearly presented

themselves. Mr. Cutler replied that this possibility was not excluded in NSC 5505.

Secretary Wilson then added that he had a few notes on this paper, from which he would like to speak to the Council. He said that he was "thoroughly sold" on having the implementation of NSC 5505 placed in the hands of this small group headed by Mr. Rockefeller; but he hoped that they would use their best judgment in meeting various specific situations. In general, he had found NSC 5505 "a little too wordy and verbose". As he saw it, there were several differing situations to be observed throughout the world: the situation in the USSR, in the European satellites, in Communist China, in the satellites of Communist China, and among "weak allies" of the U.S. elsewhere. If he were carrying out this task he would operate quite differently in these different areas. Obviously the USSR and Communist China represented "touchy ground". Before carrying out any operations in these areas we should do our best to realize the probable reaction. Other areas were less sensitive. Secretary Wilson also believed, he said, that no additional reports along the lines of NSC 5505 were really necessary, except a list of concrete courses of action which the U.S. could follow in these various areas.

The President said that he shared much of Secretary Wilson's view, which agreed with his that some one person must constantly follow and be responsible for the actions designed to carry out the strategy set down in the present report. The President then added that it was his view that paragraph 4–c should not be deleted. Admiral Radford repeated the view that he couldn't see that inclusion or deletion of the paragraph made any significant difference. Governor Stassen complained that the last sentence of paragraph 4–c seemed to him a little overconfident in tone. Secretary Dulles agreed with Governor Stassen, and said he was particularly inclined to question the accuracy of the view that the Soviets would not initiate general war or actions risking general war, in view of the Chinese Communist reaction toward the President's statement to the Congress respecting U.S. policy in the Formosa area.

The President said he believed that the Soviets were undoubtedly doing all they could to involve the United States in Asia and in a general war with Communist China. Secretary Dulles added that this was why he was so inclined to doubt the validity of the last sentence in paragraph 4–c.

With considerable emphasis, Admiral Radford said he wished to point out to the Council that he had been involved for many months in all the major studies and plans which had been formulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Never, however, in all this long time, had the Joint Chiefs of Staff planned a U.S. land offensive on the

mainland of Communist China. For the life of him, he could not understand why, in the event of a general war between the United States and Communist China, all the worst difficulties would not be on the Chinese rather than on the U.S. side. The great problem of the Chinese in such a war was to "get at us if we don't choose to be got at." The only direction in which the Chinese Communists could mount an aggressive offensive on land would be toward the south or in Korea. Accordingly, the general theory that a war with Communist China would involve the United States militarily to very great depths was simply incomprehensible to him.

Secretary Humphrey said that this was all very well, but would Admiral Radford explain to him how, if we got into a war with Communist China, you would end it. Admiral Radford replied that he failed to see how the Russians could be anything else but losers if the United States got into a general war with Communist China. The Chinese Communists would have very little offensive capability against us which we could not counter with the exercise of comparatively little military power. It would, accordingly, be a mistake, really, for the Russians to try to involve the U.S. in war with Communist China.

With regard to Admiral Radford's view as to such a mistake by the Russians, Secretary Dulles said that the Admiral's analysis did not take account adequately of the political advantages which the Soviets might well gain in Europe if we should get into a war with Communist China. Admiral Radford quickly admitted that he was speaking from a military point of view and had not taken these other factors into account. Secretary Dulles went on to enlarge on the very great difficulties that Sir Anthony Eden was facing in the British Parliament in his efforts to back up the new U.S. policy regarding the offshore islands, in the face of the combined opposition of Messrs. Attlee and Bevan. This showed, said Secretary Dulles, that the big danger resulting from a war between the U.S. and Communist China was not to be found in the realm of military action, where he agreed with Admiral Radford's analysis. The great danger of such a war was the possibility that it would alienate the allies of the United States and might indeed block all our best-laid plans for Western Europe.

Admiral Radford went on to say that his own analysis of the situation induced him to believe that Russia and China were bluffing, and that we would succeed in calling their bluff if we proceeded along the lines of the recent decision respecting the defense of Formosa and certain of the offshore islands. The Russians are perfectly well aware that operations of the kind that could occur in carrying out this new policy might give rise to a situation in which the Russians themselves could become involved in a general war.

Since he believed that the Russians did not wish to become so involved, he believed that they were bluffing.

Secretary Wilson said that he, on the other hand, was inclined to look at the situation much as Secretary Dulles did. While he approved the recent move by the President regarding Formosa and the offshore islands, we might presently find out in fact whether the Soviets and Chinese were really bluffing. On the other side of the picture, continued Secretary Wilson, if he had the job of killing a rattlesnake he would try to cut off his head rather than his rattles. There was another aspect of this cold war situation, said Secretary Wilson, that also continually bothered him. He believed that in many of the underdeveloped areas of the world the ordinary run of people were likely to make more progress under a Communist regime than under the traditional types of dictatorships. This was a troublesome fact, but he nevertheless believed that the common people of China were getting along just as well under the present regime as ever they had under the war lords of the old days.

Apropos of the exchange between Admiral Radford and Secretary Dulles, the President said he himself doubted whether the Russians would permit themselves at this time to become involved in a general war. He also doubted if any such general war could be ended in a week or ten days. Perhaps the Russians felt the same way as he did. Nevertheless, if they continued apparently to egg on the Chinese Communists, there must be some good reason for it.

Governor Stassen said that his explanation as to why the Soviets were apparently egging on the Chinese Communists was as follows: The Soviets may fear that if the Chinese Communists permit themselves to be involved in friendlier relations with the Western world, the Soviets may not be able to control the Chinese so effectively. If this were so, the most desirable course of action for the United States was to try to separate the Chinese and the Russians.

Admiral Radford observed that while it was true that the Russians had had ups and downs in their policy toward Europe since 1945, they had made steady progress since that year in their program to subjugate the Far East. The only way to put an end to this steady progress and to secure peace and stability in Asia, was to carry out faithfully the policy which the President had announced to the Congress last week.

Governor Stassen expressed great skepticism as to the likelihood that the Chinese Communists would make serious attacks on Formosa or on the offshore islands which the United States would assist in defending. If this proved to be the case, and after a certain amount of noise the Chinese Communists subsided and took to peaceful ways, this was the moment for the United States to try to broaden our trade with Communist China and to explore other possibilities of opening

up contact with them designed to wean them away from their alliance with the Soviets.

The Vice President, speaking of paragraph 4–c which had given rise to this discussion, said that perhaps the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with this paragraph was that it was too confident in its assumption that the Communist rulers would act like normal people. Communists simply do not react normally. Accordingly, said the Vice President, he was skeptical of the possibility of inducing evolutionary change in the Soviet Union or in the satellites if we believed that the strategy set forth in the present report would ever change the minds and the hearts of the Communist rulers.

Mr. Cutler suggested that paragraph 4–c be deleted as not being necessary to the sense of the paper as a whole.

The National Security Council: [9]

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the statement of policy contained in the reference report (NSC 5505) in the light of the Annex to NSC 5505 and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum.

b. Noted the "Report on the Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities" (Annex to NSC 5505), dated November 30, 1954, prepared by a Special Committee appointed by the Chairman of the NSC Planning Board, in agreement with the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, and the "Summary" thereof, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, contained in NSC 5505.

c. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5505, subject to the following changes:

(1) *Paragraph 3–f*: Include the bracketed phrase, revised to read as follows: "in so far as this can be done prior to such change without impairing the carrying out of these principles."; and delete the footnote relating thereto.

(2) *Paragraph 3–h*: Delete, including the footnote relating thereto. [10]

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[9] Paragraphs a–e constitute NSC Action No. 1314, approved by the President on January 27, 1955. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 148)

[10] Paragraphs 3–f and 3–h of NSC 5505 read as follows:

"f. Because substantial change in basic conditions in the USSR or the Satellites (including the imminent threat or initiation of general war) might render these principles inappropriate, they should be continuously reviewed. In order to be prepared to meet any such substantial change, the U.S. should continue to develop and maintain capabilities which would be required in the event of such change, [in so far as this can be done without impairing the carrying out of these principles.]"

"[h. Application of the principles set forth in subparagraphs a through e above does not preclude experimentation with such overt anti-regime measures as might be applicable to substantially changed circumstances. The U.S. can take apparently contradictory lines of action, provided it avoids solidifying the conviction that the U.S. is determined to overthrow the whole system by direct intervention.]"

The following footnote was inserted in the source text after the two bracketed portions: "The Defense member and the JCS Adviser propose deletion."

(3) *Paragraph 4*: Insert an additional third sentence, to read as follows: "It is to be emphasized that no political warfare strategy can in any sense substitute for adequate military, political, and economic programs designed to strengthen the Free World."

(4) *Paragraph 4–c*: Delete.

d. Recommended that the President designate, as the coordinating agency for the statement of policy in NSC 5505, a Special Committee chaired by the Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller, and composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence (who may be represented in day-to-day operations by deputies appointed by them), and with the participation as appropriate of representatives of the Department of Justice, the Foreign Operations Administration, the U.S. Information Agency, and other interested departments and agencies, for the purpose of:

(1) Reviewing current programs and developing new programs to carry out the statement of policy contained in NSC 5505, and ensuring coordination of actions taken thereunder.

(2) Making periodic progress reports to the National Security Council; including evaluations of the adequacy of the policy in relation to existing or anticipated conditions, and the need for any modifications in the policy, together with illustrative examples of current and projected programs.

e. Referred the "Report" in the Annex to NSC 5505, and the "Summary" in NSC 5505, noted in b above, to the Special Committee referred to in d above, to use as background material relevant to carrying out its assignment.

Note: NSC 5505, as amended, approved by the President as a basic guide to all appropriate executive departments and agencies in exploiting discontents and other problems in the USSR and the European satellites, in conformity with paragraph 26–c of NSC 5501, which paragraph states one element of the general strategy contained in NSC 5501. NSC 5505, as amended and approved, subsequently circulated as NSC 5505/1 and transmitted to the Special Committee referred to in d above as the coordinating agency, together with the Annex to NSC 5505 pursuant to the action in e above.

[Here follow items 3–4.]

S. Everett Gleason

3. National Security Council Report [1]

NSC 5502/1 *Washington, January 31, 1955.*

STATEMENT OF POLICY ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIAN ANTI-SOVIET POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

General Considerations

Composition and History of the Emigration

1. Within the free world today exists a considerable emigration of former Soviet or Russian citizens, numbering over 1 million, widely dispersed individuals, varying greatly in age and experience. These émigrés represent wide divergences in political, social and national backgrounds. The overwhelming majority, although to varying degrees interested in Russian problems, are not politically active and are more concerned with the difficult problems they face in adjusting themselves to the foreign environment of exile. A minority, sometimes referred to as "the political emigration", is passionately interested and dedicated to the general proposition of the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime.

2. The existence of a large Russian emigration living abroad in exile is not a new phenomenon. In particular, the 19th century witnessed a large and fluid emigration centered particularly in western Europe, whose members were either forced or voluntary exiles from Czarist Russia. Scattered among the larger cities of Europe, and even to a certain extent in the United States, these émigrés pursued their mission of overthrowing czarist autocracy in the atmosphere of idealism and intrigue, theoretical speculation and frustration, violent activity and apathetic despair which is characteristic of the environment of exile. But from this 19th century emigration sprang many of the divergent political parties, ideals and leaders, which played important and often tragic roles in the 20th century revolutions and civil war which eventually ended with Bolshevik seizure of power throughout Russia.

3. The present emigration resembles in many ways its 19th century predecessor as well as other Russian emigrations even further removed in history. Generally, however, it dates its existence from the Bolshevik revolution and the subsequent civil war. As a result, within its ranks it has collected a great variety of conflicting

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Soviet Vulnerabilities. Top Secret. Circulated to the members of the Council as an enclosure to a note from Lay, dated January 31, which noted that its implementation would be coordinated by the Special Committee established pursuant to NSC Action No. 1314–d, i.e., the Planning Coordination Group chaired by Rockefeller.

political tendencies ranging from a few remaining older monarchists to survivors of the various Russian "White" armies, Social-Democratic and Social-Revolutionary exiles who opposed both former groupings, down through subsequent political movements newly formed and reformed in exile without ever having had a root in the political life of Russia. The emigration itself, since 1917, has been periodically injected with new blood through the continuous addition of exiles who have fled ever since the establishment of the Soviet regime. In the latter category, the most important recent addition is a very large group of refugees representing former German-held Soviet prisoners and forced labor who did not wish to return to Russia following the war, together with former members of the Russian Vlasov army which fought on the German side in the final stages of World War II.

4. For purposes of this paper the Soviet emigration is understood to be limited to persons coming from the area included within the 1939 boundaries of the Soviet Union. Specifically, this definition excludes émigrés from the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), which are in a separate category by virtue of the fact that the United States Government has never recognized their incorporation into the Soviet Union and continues to receive their diplomatic representatives. Relations with the Baltic emigrations therefore come within the purview of the Free Europe Committee, not the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism.

5. The political history of the emigration since 1917 has not been a happy one. In the aggregate it has been characterized by failure. Cut off from the actual experience of Soviet life, deprived of adequate means of communication or the material ability to affect Russian life, the various attempts of different disunited émigré groupings to bring about either by revolution or other means the overthrow of the Soviet government, or accurately to predict the course of events within the Soviet Union, have met with failure. If the small politically active parties and organizations of the émigrés could themselves unite, or if they could succeed in uniting the mass of the emigration itself behind them, it is obvious that their influence and usefulness in the free world struggle with Soviet communism would be enhanced. The emigration's capability to achieve its final objectives—liberation in various forms—would not be significantly changed, however. The future of the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet regime itself, depends on factors and forces outside the control of the emigration. This fact is realized by most of the emigration, and they in turn envisage liberation as usually coming about as the result of a war between the Soviet Union and the West. Some would frankly wish to hasten this event; all wish to position themselves in a manner favorable to the successful pursuit

of their particular political objectives in the event of such a conflict. As a result, the emigration represents in a real sense a present-day cold war ally of some value, but many deficiencies, and a potential ally in the event of war of greater, but equally indeterminate, value.

6. At the present time no particular unity or cohesion characterizes either the mass of the emigration or the small and fragmentary politically active groups which try to speak in its name. Although such cohesion and unity is desirable, and periodic attempts are made in this direction, it is improbable that much success will be achieved in the foreseeable future in this respect. It would appear that not only are the real divisions of ideology and interest too great among the émigrés but that the very environment of exile in itself renders such unity impossible, to judge from past history.

The Nationalities Problem

7. Within the present emigration are apparent two generally opposed broad groupings: one composed of political parties which claim to speak in the name of the non-Russian nationalities, the other composed of organizations purporting to speak for the Russian nationality, although at the same time frequently claiming to reflect the views of the peoples of the Soviet Union as a whole. Each of these two divisions is itself divided and fragmented into smaller groups representing divergent and conflicting political traditions and beliefs, ranging from extreme rightist concepts to Social-Democratic and other leftist philosophies. The overriding issue, however, which divides the emigration into these two fairly distinct camps is the question concerning the manner in which the nationality problem will be solved within the borders of the present Soviet Union, following liberation. Although both Russian and nationality groups adhere to various principles and formulas of self-determination for all the peoples of the Soviet Union they are in fact sorely divided on this question and may be expected to remain so for the foreseeable future. In essence, the non-Russian nationalities' representatives favor, and desire U.S. support for, the independent existence as national states of the various national groups within the USSR, although occasionally envisaging some type of loose federation. There is a significant number of non-Russians, however, who do not identify themselves with such "separatist" ambitions. In general, political groups representing Russian, as distinguished from other nationalities, question both the desirability of, and the will for, separate national existences on the part of the non-Russians within the Soviet Union, although envisaging some form of autonomy as probably necessary and desirable for the nationalities.

8. Most elements within each of the two broad groupings are eager and anxious to aid in liberation whether by means of propaganda directed toward the peoples of the Soviet Union or other more activist means. They are equally anxious to gain official U.S. support, material and moral, for their particular solution to the problem of the future organization and government of the Soviet Union. To further their ends, they have frequently attempted to inject their views into domestic United States politics, with some success, both in the sense of urging greater efforts on the part of the U.S. Government to support émigré undertakings for revolution in general, and to support one or the other side of the two opposing camps—Russians and Nationalities in particular. To oversimplify, the nationality émigrés would desire U.S. support now for the concept of independent, separate national states for the Nationalities, including diplomatic recognition for their governments in exile along with practical measures in propaganda and other means to further this objective. The Russian émigrés warn, on the other hand, that the United States would thus incur the enmity of the Russian people and solidify support for the Soviet regime either in time of peace or war, thus strengthening rather than weakening Soviet communism.

Relation between U.S. Objectives toward the Emigration and toward the USSR

9. The United States has traditionally upheld the principles of freedom and self-determination for all peoples to establish governments and other institutions of their own choosing as soon as they are prepared to manage their affairs in an orderly, peaceful and stable manner. These fundamental political ideas are the expression of the American belief that the security and welfare of individuals, as well as states within an international society, are best preserved by such systems of government. In a limited sense, therefore, the United States does indeed regard sympathetically the concept of "liberation" of the peoples of the Soviet Union from the present despotic system of government—if by force of circumstances this becomes feasible in terms of U.S. and free world security interests. But in the light of present-day U.S. security interests, it is neither feasible nor desirable that the U.S. either consider, or run the risk of, initiating war to support such an objective.

10. It is widely held within the emigration that the Soviet regime carries within it the seeds of its own decay and destruction. Tensions, strains and vulnerabilities may lead, particularly if exploited by the free world, either to the violent overthrow, or radical change by other means, of the Soviet regime. It is important to realize that while the emigration furnishes both a means for studying and influencing these vulnerabilities, the more dispassionate

study and experimentation which has thus far been undertaken by the United States Government in this direction does not as yet indicate enough evidence to support the overly optimistic hopes and ambitions of the émigrés in this respect. Some of the beliefs and assertions of the nationality émigrés regarding support for independent States among nationality minorities within the Soviet Union are a case in point. The best evidence to date indicates that there are in fact considerable minority discontents within the Soviet Union. Some, perhaps a majority, of these discontents are no different in kind or quality than the general dissatisfactions felt by Russians as well concerning life under the Soviet regime. Of a different nature are discontents among the nationalities directed against the Russians. These feelings are complex and not subject to finite evaluation. Careful study indicates, however, that such sentiments do not find a significant expression in a desire for independent national existences. Often the desire is simply for better relations of equality with the Russians. Thus, those real discontents within the minorities of the Soviet Union, which the U.S. should indeed exploit, differ greatly in motivation and content from the discontents which nationality émigrés out of contact with their homeland are apt to attribute to groups living under the Soviet regime. This does not mean that the United States must either neglect the continuous investigation, or positive experimentation with appropriate courses of action in this direction, but suggests rather the caution with which such activities must be pursued until better evidence is available on which to base U.S. supported activities.

11. During the next five years it is unlikely that short of war the stability or effective authority of the Soviet regime can be either overthrown or seriously threatened by the action of forces outside the leadership or by a struggle for power within the ruling hierarchy. The regime will probably be able to maintain the largely invulnerable omnipotence of the State with the concomitant ability to control public opinion and render popular discontent impotent. Accordingly, cold war operations of the type which may be promoted by the U.S. and undertaken by émigrés, aimed to create disaffection or opposition within either the broad strata of the Soviet population or specific groups, cannot be expected to influence these characteristics to the point of stimulating major change. Such activities, the most important of which are sponsored by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, are, however, of major importance. Although evaluation of their effectiveness is difficult, they already appear to have achieved results of significance. In the long term, the ideas and information thus transmitted to the peoples of the Soviet Union aids in preconditioning them to alternative forms of political and social life more in their own interest, and in

ours. Stated another way, the objective of such anti-Soviet political activities is to create support for alternative forms of Soviet governmental structure and behavior which would both better satisfy the natural aspirations of the Soviet peoples as well as the interests of U.S. and free world security. In the short term, such activities may have significant results in fostering defection and in creating doubt in the minds of Soviet leaders concerning the loyalty of both individuals and groups within Soviet society. . . .

12. . . . A real alternative which must be kept open for development and exploitation is that gradual change in Soviet behavior and belief which may be brought about more by the growing strength and cohesion of the free world and its ability successfully to resist and deter Soviet aggression than by any other means. Some anti-Soviet activities, either by émigrés, or supported . . . by the U.S., might within the context of growing free world strength help such a process, although it must be noted that the attainment of such objectives would by and large not be consistent with the objectives of the emigration. On the other hand, the indiscriminate fomenting of unrest within the Soviet Union on a broad scale might have the opposite effect and be a contributing factor to an increase in Soviet intransigeance and the risk of a general war launched by the Soviet Union.

U.S. Posture toward the Emigration

13. In the balance, therefore, it may be said that it is in the interest of the United States . . . to give limited aid during the present period of the cold war to émigré or other related anti-Soviet activities within the context here described, and provided sufficient U.S. control can be exercised in order that there be no conflict with other U.S. policies and objectives. . . .

14. It is not desirable that the United States, in an official and overt manner, formulate at the present time its objectives towards the future of either a "liberated" or defeated Russia. It is neither in our interest, due to our objective of bringing about a change in Soviet behavior favorable to U.S. and free world security, nor within our capabilities, due to the inconclusive nature of present evidence concerning basic political factors within the Soviet Union. The nationalities problem is again a case in point. In the event of general war, a rapid and successful conclusion of hostilities might, under certain circumstances, be furthered by U.S. promises of support of independence for the nationalities. On the other hand, it is certain that such a U.S. position would influence unfavorably important groups both within and without the Soviet leadership who otherwise might take actions in the U.S. interest. Furthermore, it is even less

clear whether in a nebulous post-war world the minority nationalities would be capable of maintaining separate national States, and whether such a dismemberment of Russia would be in the U.S. interest. . . . In this respect, cooperation with, assistance to, and education of the emigration in American political ideals and methods, will be useful undertakings. . . .

15. The emigration also provides a valuable means at the present time of carrying forward those studies necessary for investigation of the problems of a future non-Soviet Russia, and an organization such as the American Committee presents a useful place for the conduct of some of the necessary U.S. study of these problems. In the event of general war and the possible defeat and removal of the Soviet regime, it may be neither desirable nor feasible for the United States to assume a large degree of responsibility in readjusting the inevitable political, economic and social dislocations resulting from the war; but it is nevertheless probable that in such an event any number of U.S. actions and inactions with regard to the Russian scene will play an important, and perhaps decisive, role in determining the future forms of society and government which might arise there. Should this be the case, the number of choices and decisions which would confront the United States would be myriad and complex, necessitating clarity and effectiveness in U.S. policies in order to influence individuals and events in a manner favorable to U.S. and free world security.

Policy Conclusions

16. The United States should pursue, to the extent deemed feasible under evolving military and political conditions, a policy of non-predetermination and self-determination with respect to the future forms of government, territorial arrangements and status of nationalities or minorities within the present Soviet Union, while avoiding specific U.S. commitments or the assumption of responsibility as to the detailed means by which this policy might be carried out.

17. Consistent with this policy, the United States should support, . . . anti-Soviet émigré groups from the Soviet Union and other similar activities, in order to further the following objectives:

a. To exploit demonstrable or potential present-day Soviet vulnerabilities in order to bring about a change in governmental behavior which will further U.S. security and preservation of peace. Such exploitation should be accomplished primarily by (1) promoting the elimination of those totalitarian-aggressive Soviet practices and policies which now threaten the security of free peoples and which violate the fundamental rights of the Soviet peoples, and (2) furthering the development by the peoples of the Soviet Union of govern-

ment institutions and practices which, in the conduct of domestic and foreign relations, will protect fundamental human rights of all citizens and permit Russia to become again a peaceful member of the international community.

b. To provide human resources and experience which can be utilized in reducing Soviet power, or otherwise influencing and changing Soviet behavior, in the event of general war.

c. To create and maintain, where feasible, doubt in the minds of the Soviet leadership concerning the reliability of the Soviet peoples, including minority nationalities, in the event of general war.

d. To develop capabilities for producing a change in the Soviet state structure, or behavior, during or following a period of general war, along lines of development which would contribute to the attainment of U.S. security objectives while satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the USSR.

e. To demonstrate the traditional American belief that the fundamental aspirations and interests of all peoples are best secured through a free union of self-governing nations within the world community.

Courses of Action

18. Continue . . . to support . . . anti-Soviet émigré organizations and activities as appear capable of contributing to present and possible future U.S. purposes in both cold and hot war conditions.

19. Continue comprehensive study of the various alternative situations which might exist within the Soviet Union following either radical change or general war, and the corresponding policies and courses of action which it might be in the U.S. interest to follow.

20. As appropriate, attempt to secure non-partisan Congressional understanding and support for the present U.S. policy of non-predetermination and self-determination.

4. National Security Council Report [1]

NSC 5505/1 *Washington, January 31, 1955.*

EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES

1. NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy", [2] outlines the following general strategy:

"26. . . . [3] U.S. policies must be designed to affect the conduct of the Communist regimes, especially that of the USSR, in ways that further U.S. security interests and to encourage tendencies that lead them to abandon expansionist policies. In pursuing this general strategy, our effort should be directed to:

"a. Deterring further Communist aggression, and preventing the occurrence of total war so far as compatible with U.S. security.

"b. Maintaining and developing in the free world the mutuality of interest and common purpose, and the necessary will, strength and stability, to face the Soviet-Communist threat and to provide constructive and attractive alternatives to Communism, which sustain the hope and confidence of free peoples.

"c. Supplementing a and b above by other actions designed to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc regimes:

"(1) By influencing them and their peoples toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which, while in their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the U.S.; and

"(2) By exploiting differences between such regimes, and their other vulnerabilities, in ways consistent with this general strategy."

"27. To carry out effectively this general strategy will require a flexible combination of military, political, economic, propaganda, and covert actions which enables the full exercise of U.S. initiative.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5505 Series. Top Secret. Circulated to the Council under cover of a note from Lay dated January 31, which noted that the President had designated the Special Committee chaired by Rockefeller as the coordinating agency, which was to make periodic progress reports to the Council, "including evaluations of the adequacy of the policy in relation to existing or anticipated conditions, and the need for any modifications in the policy, together with illustrative examples of current and projected programs." In addition to the Statement of Policy, NSC 5505/1 included a Summary of the Report by the Special Committee on Soviet Vulnerabilities, dated November 30, 1954, and a copy of a memorandum from John K. Gerhardt, the JCS Adviser, to the NSC Planning Board, dated January 6, 1955, giving his views on the Summary of the Special Committee's Report. Neither the Summary of the Report nor Gerhardt's memorandum is printed.

[2] See footnote 6, Document 2.

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

These actions must be so coordinated as to reinforce one another. Programs for the general strategy between now and the time when the USSR has greatly increased nuclear power should be developed as a matter of urgency."

2. a. This paper prescribes the principles to be applied, in conformity with paragraph 26–c quoted above, in exploiting discontents and other problems in the USSR and the European Satellites, such as tensions inherent in the police state, low standards of living, opposition to collectivization, cultural and intellectual regimentation, interference with religion, dissatisfaction of minorities, nationality problems, the governmental structure of the USSR, ideological weaknesses of the Soviet system, and disaffection in the Satellites.

b. Such discontents and other problems can be usefully exploited only if the U.S. (1) has or can develop a capability for such exploitation and (2) will thereby advance a specific objective within this capability.

3. In exploiting such discontents and other problems, the following principles should apply:

a. Measures for exploitation should be mutually consistent and should be directed toward specific U.S. objectives which are within existing or potential U.S. capabilities.

b. Seek to create and increase popular and bureaucratic pressures on the Soviet regime through the exploitation of discontents and other problems to promote evolutionary changes in Soviet policies and conduct which will be in U.S. interest and tend to lessen the chance of Soviet attack upon the U.S. As appropriate, seek (1) to cause the regime to occupy itself increasingly with internal problems and (2) to pose difficult decisions tending to create uncertainty or divisions within the regime.

c. Continue basic opposition to the Soviet system and continue to state its evils; but stress evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. At the same time make clear that while the U.S. is determined to protect its vital security interests by force if necessary, it does not seek to impose its ideas of government on the USSR by force.

d. Generally depict the causes of the discontents and other problems which are to be exploited not as inherent conditions reparable only by revolution but as conditions susceptible to correction by the regime if it should choose to take the necessary action.

e. Apply these principles to the European Satellites, taking advantage as appropriate of the special opportunities existing in these countries to exert greater pressures, and to weaken the ties which bind the Satellites to the USSR.

f. Because substantial change in basic conditions in the USSR or the Satellites (including the imminent threat or initiation of general war) might render these principles inappropriate, they should be continuously reviewed. In order to be prepared to meet any such substantial change, the U.S. should continue to develop and maintain capabilities which would be required in the event of such change, in

so far as this can be done prior to such change without impairing the carrying out of these principles.

. . . . . .

4. Exploitation of vulnerabilities in accordance with the above principles can be expected to modify the policies of the USSR and the European Satellites along lines more compatible with U.S. security interests only if further Communist expansion is prevented. The USSR and the European Satellites are not likely to experiment with alternatives more consistent with U.S. interest as long as the accustomed Communist techniques of military and political pressure on and in the free world show signs of achieving success. It is to be emphasized that no political warfare strategy can in any sense substitute for adequate military, political, and economic programs designed to strengthen the Free World. Therefore, success in carrying out the above principles will depend upon:

a. Maintenance by the U.S. and its allies, for an indefinite period, of military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to cope successfully with general war should it develop; and united determination to use military force against such aggression.

b. Building the strength and cohesion of the free world and taking adequate actions for the purpose of (1) creating cohesion within and among all the free nations, remedying their weaknesses, and steadily improving the relative position of the free world and (2) destroying the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in the free world.

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5. Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty) [1]

Washington, February 8, 1955.

[Here follows an unrelated paragraph.]

The big story from Russia broke early this morning. I received a call at 7:30 at my house from Bob Clark of INS reporting that Malenkov had been replaced as Russian Premier and issued a statement [2] in typical Russian fashion claiming that he lacked experi-

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers.

[2] Malenkov's statement, read by someone else before the Supreme Soviet with Malenkov in attendance, was discussed in telegram 1263 from Moscow, February 8.

ence to handle the agricultural program of his country. I called Foster Dulles as soon as I got to the office. He was at home, and the shocking thing was that no one in the State Department had called him despite the fact that the story had been out for several hours.

(Dulles later raised all sort of hell in his department, and I don't believe such a thing will happen again.)

Dulles told me that while he had not anticipated these exact changes (it was later announced that Bulganin would succeed Malenkov) we had got wind of the fact that some big changes were coming up in Russia about a week ago. He said that, of course, this was indicative of dissatisfaction within Russia and recommended that we have no official statement on it at this time. I passed this on to the President with Andy Goodpaster, and the President agreed.

The stories came thick and fast out of Russia after the Malenkov resignation. Bulganin was "elected" Premier. Then Molotov made a saber-rattling speech [3] accusing the United States of aggression and saying that the Soviets had developed the hydrogen bomb to a degree where the United States was far behind them. This reversed Malenkov's statement of several months ago [4] when he said that any nuclear war would result in the destruction of civilization. Molotov said it would not but only result in the destruction of the civilization of the decadent west.

Throughout the day the President was informed of these reports by Goodpaster but neither the White House or the State Department had any official comment. Actually, the President told me when he was in his office with Goodpaster that he believed the following:

1. That the Russian hierarchy has been having considerable trouble prior to Stalin's death. As Stalin was becoming weaker in health, the in-fighting and double dealing for power had started. Actually, when Malenkov was named as his successor, it was in effect a compromise and the fighting still continued. This was, of course, evident when Beria was done away with and is more evident now with Malenkov in this post. The President also told me that this was just another reason why he had been resisting the British plea for a four-power conference. "It took an awful long time to get the British to realize that with the trouble going on inside of Russia, it would not be to the advantage of the free world for Churchill and myself and whoever the French man would be to sit down publicly with any given leader of Russia. If we did that, it would serve notice, not only throughout the world but also within Russia that we were recognizing Malenkov or Bulganin or whoever else it might

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(Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/2–855) Bohlen's views on the significance of Malenkov's resignation are presented in greater detail in Bohlen, *Witness to History*, pp. 368–372.

[3] Molotov's speech of February 8 is analyzed in *Soviet Affairs*, March 1955, pp. 4–6. (Department of State, INR Files)

[4] Malenkov made this statement on March 12, 1954.

be as the leader. That would give him a great advantage within Russia and would tend to minimize the struggles for power that are going on within Russia. We certainly don't want to do that and that's why I have never wanted to meet with the Russian leader—at least for the time being."

2. I asked the President if he thought that Bulganin's appointment would mean that Russia was moving toward war. He said that he did not think so; that as a matter of fact, if the Army had more influence in Russia, it would probably be a conservative influence. "You know, if you're in the military and you know about these terrible destructive weapons, it tends to make you more pacifistic than you normally have been. In most countries the influence of the military is more conservative, and so while I do not know for sure, I would not be surprised if the Army influence would be just that within the Soviet Union. They're not ready for war and they know it. They also know if they go to war, they're going to end up losing everything they have. That also tends to make people conservative."

Later in the day Molotov made a speech in Moscow [5] when he really rattled the sword, saying that Russia was way ahead of the United States in the production of the H-bomb and also said if Russia were attacked, it would destroy western civilization. I called Lewis Strauss on the H-bomb charge and he told me that we have no evidence at all that the Russians are as far advanced as we are on the H-bomb although of course we know they have it and have exploded thermonuclear weapons on testing grounds within their country. Strauss said that he was sure this was merely a propaganda speech by the Russians. I told him to send me a memo to this effect [6] so I could show it to the President and he did the next morning.

[Here follows the remainder of the diary entry.]

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[5] Hagerty is apparently recapitulating what he said above about Molotov's speech and is not referring to another speech by Molotov that day.

[6] Not found at the Eisenhower Library or in Department of State files.

6. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles), Washington, February 8, 1955, 10:15 a.m. [1]

AWD said he thinks we should get together to see how we can capitalize on developments in Russia. He talked with Rockefeller—maybe he could get his teeth into it. AWD wondered what Radio Free Europe should say—what line we should take. The Sec. said he thinks the approach should be it is obvious the constant changes of personnel etc. indicate that things are not going well. AWD mentioned his admitting guilt and lack of experience. This should be played up through unofficial channels. They could lunch here said the Sec. and agreed to ask Rockefeller, Cutler, Streibert and AWD will join about 1:30. [2]

They decided not to invite Defense, but Rockefeller's office called and suggested under NSC 5505 [3] they should be invited. AWD in the Sec.'s absence said o.k.

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Prepared by Phyllis D. Bernau in the Office of the Secretary of State.
[2] No record of this meeting has been found.
[3] Presumably a reference to NSC 5505/1, Document 4.

7. Memorandum of Discussion at the 236th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 10, 1955 [1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and discussion of items 1 and 2.]

3. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence said that he would devote most of his time to an "appreciation" of the situation in Moscow. For over a year now there had been signs that Malenkov was losing power. However, the actual secret of his "resignation" had been very carefully kept. There had been good reason to believe that the summoning of the Supreme Soviet a month ahead of time would

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on February 11.

have dramatic repercussions, the more so since this coincided with the summoning back to Moscow of a significant number of Soviet Ambassadors abroad.

Mr. Dulles then said that he did not believe that Malenkov's fall from power was to be ascribed to any of the assertions of guilt made in his statement. For one thing, he had been less responsible for the failures in Soviet agriculture than Khrushchev himself, and he had had certainly as wide administrative experience as Bulganin. The real point seemed to be that Malenkov had lost the second round of a great power struggle. Accordingly, this may be the beginning of the end of the period of collective leadership in the USSR.

Mr. Dulles then gave a brief comparison of the decline and fall of Beria [2] and Malenkov, noting that a possible reason for the fact that thus far Malenkov had escaped Beria's fate was that Beria had actually been caught in a plot to seize power.

Khrushchev, continued Mr. Dulles, was now clearly in the dominant position in the Soviet hierarchy. Moreover, the influence of the military was now at an all-time high in the Soviet Union—this despite the fact that Marshal Bulganin was in truth an "old Bolshevik" rather than a genuine military man. He had had no battle experience, and was usually known as "General Rabbit" by the real soldiers in the Soviet Army. According to the statements of a high-level defector, the Soviet Army now gained for itself the power and prestige in the Soviet Government which had once been held by the MVD.

In the view of CIA, said Mr. Dulles, the committee form of government cannot endure in the USSR. He predicted that the struggle for supreme power would continue, with Khrushchev playing the cagy Stalin game of slowly consolidating his power against his rivals. He had deliberately refused the first job (of Prime Minister) in order to consolidate his rivals against himself.

The difficult question was how and why this crisis had come to a head at this particular time. Obviously the economic issues had played an important part, with Malenkov cast in the role of goat. Foreign policy had also played a considerable part. There was a widespread feeling that Malenkov's so-called "soft" line had not been notably successful, especially in Europe.

The President interrupted to comment that this judgment showed how different the picture looked to the Russians than to ourselves, who had been so greatly concerned about the apparent success of the Soviets with the soft line of foreign policy.

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[2] Beria's arrest was announced on July 10, 1953.

Mr. Dulles went on to point out that Molotov does not seem to have shared Malenkov's views on the line to be followed in foreign policy. Molotov preferred the tougher line, and we could certainly expect tougher words on that subject from now on out. It was too early to say whether the actual foreign policy would change along with the words, but very possibly it would not.

Neither economic nor foreign policy, continued Mr. Dulles, sufficiently explains what had happened in Moscow. It was "a truly Russian affair", with Malenkov obliged to sit and listen while his statement of shortcomings was read before all. It was quite likely that Malenkov would gradually disappear from view.

Mr. Dulles described the appointment of Zhukov [3] as "very interesting". The defectors to whom he had referred earlier had insisted that Zhukov was much too popular in the Soviet Union ever to be appointed to the Ministry of Defense.

The President interrupted to say that Zhukov was, despite everything, "a likable cuss", and had on more than one occasion manifested to the President a certain independence of his political associates. Mr. Dulles said this might prove to be a matter of the carrot-and-the-stick policy, Zhukov being the carrot and Khrushchev the stick. The President agreed, but pointed out that the increase in Army influence symbolized by the elevation of Zhukov did not necessarily portend a tougher and more dangerous Soviet policy. The Army, said the President, tended to be a conservative force.

[Here follow the remainder of the briefing and discussion of items 4–6.]

S. Everett Gleason

[3] Zhukov was named Minister of Defense on February 9.

8. Intelligence Report Prepared by the Office of Intelligence Research [1]

No. 6839 *Washington, February 17, 1955.*

KHRUSHCHEV REACHES TOP AFTER LONG, STEADY RISE

Abstract

The resignation of G.M. Malenkov from the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers on February 8 cleared the way for Nikita S. Khrushchev to assume the position of number one authority in the Soviet Union. The course of Khrushchev's career has now brought him to the stage where, operating from Stalin's old vantage point as Party First Secretary, he has outdistanced all his colleagues in the accumulation of power.

Khrushchev was born in 1894, the son of a miner. He received little or no education, worked for a period in the coal fields, and joined the Party only in 1918, after the Revolution. The Party educated him and advanced him through the ranks to the important post of Moscow secretary in the mid-1930's. Stalin accepted him in the Politburo in 1938, and sent him to the Ukraine as Moscow's viceroy. During the first part of the war he was at Stalingrad and Voronezh. Returning to Kiev in 1943, he ruled the Ukraine with an iron hand for the next four years. Then, following an apparent set back, he returned to Moscow in 1949 to become the spokesman for the government's kolkhoz amalgamation and resettlement program. After peasant resistance developed to some features of this, Khrushchev was publicly rebuked in early 1951 and transferred to other Party work.

Immediately after Stalin's death in March 1953, Khrushchev occupied a position publicly subordinate to the top three leaders—Malenkov, Beriya, and Molotov. He played his hand well, however, and quickly replaced Malenkov as first-ranking Party secretary. Khrushchev's discernible rise began after the fall of Beriya in June 1953. He assumed direction of the government's new farm program and began to tinker with foreign affairs. During 1954 his activities and publicity in domestic and foreign fields overshadowed those of his Kremlin colleagues. He paid visits to the three most important countries in the Soviet orbit—Communist China, Czechoslovakia,

[1] Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70, USSR. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the report was prepared in collaboration with the Division of Biographic Information and was based on information available through February 8, 1955. The 15-page body of the report and the 6-page chronology of Khrushchev's activities since Stalin's death are not printed.

and Poland. Although lacking an important bureaucratic position, he acted as though he occupied one and participated increasingly in governmental affairs.

In his political views, Khrushchev has been careful to reflect doctrinaire positions. This is particularly true of his statements of foreign affairs. Toward the West he is outspoken in his hostility, and repeats the dialectical stereotypes with seeming conviction. In internal affairs he follows closely the standard Party line with its traditional emphases.

Khrushchev's personality is forceful, dogmatic, and blunt. He is essentially a simple type with few inhibitions and little sophistication. He seems to owe his present position to a combination of dogged perseverance, ruthlessness, and native shrewdness. Unlike most Bolsheviks he is reputed to have a sense of humor. On occasions, especially when he has had too much to drink, he has been heard making indiscreet statements. Khrushchev is married, has a large family and, contrary to rumor, is not Malenkov's brother-in-law.

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9. Editorial Note

According to the memorandum of discussion at the 239th meeting of the National Security Council on March 3, the following discussion took place during the briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on significant world developments affecting United States national security:

"Mr. Dulles then turned to the internal situation in the Soviet Union. There had been so many changes in the government in recent days that it was proving very difficult to appraise the significance of the changes beyond stating that they indicated a picture of dissatisfaction with the status quo, especially in the realm of agriculture. When Mr. Dulles noted that Zhukov was not among those who had recently been promoted, Secretary Hoover commented that he thought this significant, and the President said with a smile that perhaps the failure to promote Zhukov was the result of our saying too many nice things about him here in the United States.

"Noting that the Soviet Military Attachés in the European satellite states had been called home to Moscow for consultation, Mr. Dulles suggested that this might be the precursor of a Soviet effort to create in Eastern Europe military defense arrangements similar to those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File)

A report by the Office of Intelligence Research on the leadership changes announced February 28, entitled "Some Soviet Leadership Questions Clarified" (Intelligence Brief No. 1750), concluded that the changes, including those raising to First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers Mikoyan, M.G. Pervukhin, and M.Z. Saburov, indicated a further reduction in Malenkov's position in both the party and the government. (Department of State, SOV Files: Lot 66 D 70, USSR) Bohlen's appraisal of the leadership changes and how they affected Malenkov's position were transmitted in telegram 1464 from Moscow, March 5. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 761.00/3–555)

Apropos of Dulles' remarks about the possible establishment of an Eastern European defense arrangement similar to NATO, the Soviet Union and seven Eastern European countries signed a treaty of "friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance" at Warsaw on May 14, 1955.

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10. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Acting Special Assistant for Intelligence (Howe) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, May 5, 1955.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: Position of The Military in The Soviet Ruling Group

Soviet military leaders undoubtedly have gained in prestige since Stalin's death. There is no indication, however, that the power position of the Military within the ruling group has been notably strengthened or that the Soviet armed forces are playing a more independent role than in the past.

In allowing the military increased public prominence, the present regime was probably motivated by a desire to take advantage of the popularity of the armed forces among the population. Thus, there occurred such developments as the assignment of a leading role to army generals in the Beriya trial; the appointment of Marshal Zhukov, the USSR's leading war hero, as Minister of Defense; Zhukov's interview with the Hearst delegation and his letter to

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/5–555. Confidential.

President Eisenhower; and the recent promotion of ten generals to the rank of marshal.

These actions have not impinged on the supremacy of the Party. Zhukov, for example, is a member of the Party Central Committee and is not the first military careerist to serve as Minister of Defense. His lack of top-level influence is clearly implied in the failure to include him among the new deputies to Prime Minister Bulganin. Certain of the actions, such as the recent promotions, may indicate the growing concern of the regime with problems of national defense. Nevertheless, there is no professional military leader in either the Presidium of the Party or the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. The Party safeguards itself against possible rivals through the maintenance of units in all institutions. Recently there have been indications that such units within lower military echelons have been strengthened, and Molotov stated in February that 77 percent of all Soviet soldiers are either Party or Komsomol members.

Under these circumstances there appears to be little likelihood that the army can supplant the Party as the center of power; nor is there reason to believe that the Party has been impelled to enter into a concordat with the military in order to continue the dictatorship. It is probable, however, that relations between the army and the Party are somewhat more amicable than under Stalin.

A similar memorandum has been addressed to the Secretary. [2]

Fisher Howe

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

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11. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and His Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong), Washington, May 19, 1955, 2:50 p.m. [1]

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. ARMSTRONG

The Sec. asked what is the present status of the Cominform. A. said it has never officially been liquidated but it has been pretty dormant for 3–4 years. It puts out a periodical from he believes

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Prepared by Phyllis D. Bernau.

Budapest and has carried on a propaganda function, but there have been no meetings for its members. The Sec. asked what is it that runs the Communist Parties all over the world. The mechanism, said A., by which direction gets out is varied—sometimes the line is given by *Pravda* or *Izvestia*—sometimes in the journal or by courier and word of mouth. A. said the question of whether the Soviets might now close it out is one they have been speculating on as a gesture they could make without any cost to themselves. The Sec. asked what can they do with cost in relation to International Communism. A. said not very much because they maintain connections clandestinely. The Sec. asked re our never getting proof from Guatemala of any contact. A. said nothing conclusive. The Cominform was not used as a channel of guidance though it may have been partially. A. said he could bring someone up to talk about it, but the Sec. said he hadn't the time now. The Sec. said we have to put our heads together with CIA and figure what it is we want to ask for. The Litvinof Agreement [2] applies to us and is full of holes. It is hard to think of something that is not full of holes. To merely ask for the dissolution of the Cominform would be worse than nothing because it would not cost anything. A. will try to get something up. [3]

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[2] Regarding the conditions in the notes exchanged on November 16, 1933, between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim M. Litvinov, by which the two countries agreed to enter into diplomatic relations, see *Foreign Relations*, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 28–37.

[3] No communication on this subject from Armstrong to Dulles has been found, but see Document 42.

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12. Editorial Note

At the invitation of Nelson A. Rockefeller a group of 11 experts in Soviet-American relations met in Quantico, Virginia, June 5–10 to explore methods for exploiting Communist bloc vulnerabilities. The group, known as the Quantico Panel, was composed of the following members: Dr. Frederick Dunn, Director of the Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; C.D. Jackson of *Time-Life*; Drs. Ellis A. Johnson, Paul Linebarger, and George Pettee of Johns Hopkins University; Dr. Max Millikan of the Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. Philip Mosely, Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia Universi-

ty; Dr. Stefan Possony of the Department of the Air Force; Dr. Speier of the Rand Corporation; Dr. Charles A.H. Thomson of the Brookings Institution; and W.W. Rostow of the Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who was designated the panel chairman.

The Quantico Panel Report was submitted to Rockefeller under cover of a memorandum of June 10, 1955, from Rostow. The report consisted of five chapters and four appendices, plus ten papers prepared by individual panel members. In his covering memorandum, Rostow wrote that the one impression that stood out in his mind was "the unanimous belief of the Panel members that the U.S. now enjoys a significant but transitory period of over-all strength vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc." He noted further that the "next two or three years afford the United States the opportunity to negotiate from a strong position for genuine concessions by the enemy without sacrifice of essential positions of strength" and that this kind of negotiation, "along with a vigorous and urgent development of potential Free World strength, could create the conditions for victory in the cold war." Rostow's covering memorandum and a summary of the recommendations by the panel are printed in volume V, page 216.

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13. Editorial Note

From July 18 to 23, President Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Eden, French Premier Faure, and Soviet Premier Bulganin met in Geneva to discuss disarmament, the German question, and the expansion of East-West contacts. Documentation on the meeting is in volume V, page 361.

A memorandum of a conversation between Vice President Nixon and Secretary Dulles on July 30, records Dulles as making the following remarks about a possible followup to the Geneva Summit Conference:

"I expressed the opinion that it would be of doubtful wisdom for the Vice President to seek to make a trip to the Soviet Union at this time. In any event, I felt that high level exchange should await the outcome of the second round at Geneva. I mentioned the activities of the Soviets in insisting upon the retention in Vienna of two of the major front organizations of international Communism and said this action was a striking contrast to what Bulganin and Khrushchev had told the President and me at Geneva. I thought we

ought to be a bit cautious about the Geneva outcome until there had been further testing and not seem to be going overboard as Eden was." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Vice President Nixon)

In a memorandum of August 8 to the Secretary of State Rockefeller discussed the factors bearing on a possible visit of Soviet leaders to the United States as follows:

"1. If the top Soviet leaders were to be invited to this country, it would seem that perhaps the best time for such a visit would be during November or December of this year for the following reasons:

"a. Because if the Soviet leaders were here while Congress was in session, the question of appearing before a joint session of Congress might arise, and this could lead to some rather delicate situations.

"b. If they were here during the 1956 elections, their visit might become involved in the domestic political situation.

"c. A visit prior to the Big Four Ministers meeting in October would obviously be inadvisable; however, the possibility of an invitation to come following the meeting might have definite advantages in its effect on their delegation at the conference.

"2. One objection to the visit has been that the President might be embarrassed by a reciprocal invitation. This could be satisfactorily taken care of should Vice President Nixon represent the President. This possibility has already been suggested by a number of Senators." (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/8–955)

In a memorandum to Rockefeller, August 18, Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy replied that an invitation by the President to Soviet leaders to visit the United States would be "premature." He explained that "we are in the midst of a probing operation designed to throw light on the actual intentions of the Soviet leadership vis-à-vis the United States" and that it would be better to wait until after the meeting of the Four Foreign Ministers in Geneva in October and November to consider the question of a possible visit. (*Ibid.*)

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14. Editorial Note

The Department of State was asked on June 28 to cooperate in the first major United States balloon intelligence operation directed at the Soviet bloc, eventually codenamed "Genetrix." The United

States Air Force had been developing the concept of plastic balloon reconnaissance since 1946. After studying the use of plastic balloons as carriers of photographic and electronic reconnaissance equipment since 1948, by 1953 the Air Force was experimenting and testing the balloons for such purposes. By the middle of 1954, the Air Force had launched over 500 reconnaissance balloons in test project "Moby Dick" and had, by the fall of that year, drawn up a basic operational concept for all future important reconnaissance programs. On March 23, 1955, Air Force headquarters assigned the Strategic Air Command to undertake a pioneer reconnaissance of Soviet territory. (Memorandum of a conversation by Robert F. Packard, July 22; Department of State, INR Files: Lot 61 D 67, Genetrix; John T. Bohn, "History of the First Air Division," unpublished paper done in SAC History Division, Office of Information, Headquarters, SAC, November 1956, volume 1, pages 2–3)

Project Genetrix was conceived and designed by the Rand Corporation for the United States Air Force as a means of overcoming the lack of photographic and meteorological intelligence on the Soviet bloc land mass. SAC was charged with operational responsibility for Genetrix. The plans initially called for free flight of balloons from west to east across the Soviet land mass from launching sites in Europe.

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15. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions [1]

Washington, November 14, 1955.

CA–3790. Subject: Balloon Reconnaissance Operation—Project Genetrix. For principal officer only. The United States Air Force has made plans for a balloon reconnaissance operation to be conducted during the period 1 December 1955 and 1 May 1956. The code name for this project is Genetrix and is classified Confidential. The plan provides for the launching of approximately 2700 plastic, gondola-carrying balloons . . . . Of the 2700 balloons launched, 2500 will be photographic systems and 200 will be electronic intercept systems. Subsequent to launching, it is expected that the ballons will drift for

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5411/11–1455. Top Secret. Drafted by Furnas and cleared with Bennett, Barbour, and Major Conradi of the Air Force. Sent to 41 missions in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, as well as to Ottawa.

several days at various altitudes between 40,000 ft. and 80,000 ft. eastward over Communist-controlled territory. The greatest concentration of balloons will probably emerge from the Communist-controlled eastern coast of Asia into a planned recovery area in the Western Pacific between 10 degrees and 70 degrees north latitude. Elements of the First Air Division, Strategic Air Command, will be responsible for recovery of balloons in the planned recovery area.

Based on the best available information at this time, some of the reconnaissance balloons may be expected to land outside of the planned recovery area in some cases, and possibly in the area of your responsibility. It is requested that you render all possible and appropriate assistance to Air Force representatives in your area in connection with this project.

The United States Air Force will forward to all major air commands and air attachés concerned all details regarding Project Genetrix. Air attachés will have primary action responsibility in the recovery of the reconnaissance gondolas. Attachés or Air Force representatives will be instructed to brief thoroughly Chiefs of Mission and Principal Officers on pertinent details of the project to include the project's cover story which may be used when authorized to inform local government officials or members of the press.

The Department is now considering, with the Air Force, whether and in what form press releases should be made in Washington either when the project is initiated or when information concerning it is picked up here or abroad. Press releases or answers to questions in the field should be carefully coordinated with action in Washington. Accordingly, no action to publicize or to inform local officials should be taken by addressees or Air Force representatives prior to further communication from Department.

Communications to the Department on this subject should be by personal letter to W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, or by telegram, or despatch marked "For Roger".

Hoover

16. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, November 30, 1955—1 p.m.

1235. For R. Air Attaché has received no recent or detailed information referred to in third paragraph CA–3790 Nov 14, [2] nor any indication of cover story. I assume that information which it is hoped warrant possible political repercussion, but hope very warrant possible political repercussion, but hope very much that Dept has anticipated use Soviets might make of this operation when, as would appear inevitable, it becomes known through balloons landing on Soviet territory and opportunity for damaging propaganda exploitation which this might afford. While Soviets might prefer to ignore operation in view of extreme sensitivity on balloon question, believe we should be prepared for every type Soviet political and propaganda reaction, possibly including raising matter UN. Anticipation of possible reaction is particularly important since in this instance there can be no question of disguising direct US Govt responsibility.

In view imminent inauguration project believe important that Air attaché here should be given soonest cover story.

Bohlen

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5411/11–3055. Top Secret.
[2] *Supra.*

17. Paper Prepared by the Division of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe, Office of Intelligence Research [1]

Washington, January 11, 1956.

THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SITUATION AND THE CIA PAPER OF 12/30/55 ENTITLED "SPECULATIONS ON SOVIET LEADERSHIP SITUATION" [2]

Most recent evidence supports the view that Khrushchev is the dominant figure in the Soviet hierarchy. He has become the most important spokesman of the Soviet regime on both domestic and foreign questions. It is likely that the hand of Khrushchev is behind a number of the shifts of local Party officials which have occurred since the July announcement of the forthcoming Party Congress, but not all officials affected can be directly linked to him. It is possible that these local changes are designed to achieve two related objectives: (1) they may serve to strengthen Khrushchev's influence throughout the system of territorial Party organs and effect a "packing" of delegations to the congress with his adherents, and (2) the shifts also raise a number of Party officials to positions where they would be logical nominees for membership in the Central Committee or other bodies to be elected at the congress. The rise of Khrushchevism influence does not mean, however, that "collective leadership" has lost all significance. "Collective leadership" never involved, and of course does not now involve, the equal sharing of power at the top level. Appreciation of Khrushchev's superior position should not lead, therefore, to the conclusion that he has secured, or is about to secure, a Stalin-type prominence.

1. The CIA paper *Speculations on the Soviet Leadership Situation* presents arguments for a series of three hypotheses. The first, the approaching impregnability of Khrushchev, is the most convincing of the three, but appears, nevertheless, to be overdrawn. The other two, positing a coalescence of anti-Khrushchev forces or arguing for a continued effectiveness of collective leadership, are weakly supported; in the case of the latter, over-weakly.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/1–156. Secret. Attached to the source text was a brief memorandum of transmittal from Klessen to Howe, January 11.

[2] A copy of the paper, sent to Klessen under cover of a memorandum of January 5 from Howe requesting his division's comments, is *ibid.* In the memorandum Howe noted that the CIA paper seemed "to present three different hypotheses and marshalls the arguments behind each without making a selection." Attached to the CIA paper was a note dated December 30 from Amory to Howe, in which Amory said he was "sticking with the third hypothesis for the time being."

2. The conclusion that Khrushchev's position "will become practically impregnable" after the 20th Party Congress (February 1956) is supported by some dubious arguments. Leadership changes are not as uniformly indicative of Khrushchev's sway as the paper implies. The authors seem to have overlooked the appointment to the Party's Presidium last July of Suslov, whose ties to Khrushchev are very tenuous. Likewise, Khrushchev's influence is not too evident in the appointment in 1955 of new deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. Two of the new deputy chairmen cannot be directly linked with Khrushchev, nor can Mikoyan, Pervukhin, and Saburov, who were elevated to First Deputy Chairmen. Even some of the recently-appointed Secretaries of the CPSU, Khrushchev's immediate lieutenants, cannot be classified in any definite way as Khrushchev protégés. The fact that Malenkov still holds a position in the government and that there was a long delay in the appointment of Matskevich as Minister of Agriculture could also be interpreted as indicating resistance to Khrushchev's influence.

Much of the argumentation on this topic is based on very capricious speculation. Thus, the authors describe Yegorov and Konstantinov as Malenkov men, although the evidence for the proposition is most inconclusive. Molotov is hastily dismissed as a deviationist. The formulation used by Molotov for which he was forced to admit his error was an incidental reference buried in a full dress foreign affairs speech.[3] If it was considered at all serious ideologically it seems that some attempt would have been made before October to correct it, yet the speech was still being published in pamphlet form in minority languages as late as September. The main reasons for the rebuff to Molotov seems to be suggested by the timing of the letter just prior to the Geneva Foreign Minister's Conference. It appears that Khrushchev and Bulganin wished to emphasize their final authority in the field of foreign policy. Soviet comment at the time suggested that the censure was also related to the rapprochement with Yugoslavia, which Molotov reportedly opposed.

3. Reasoning and evidence buttressing the second and third hypotheses are extremely weak. The proposition on anti-Khrushchev moves is introduced by three most doubtful points: the so-called Malenkov promotion to First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the so-called *Pravda–Izvestiya* conflict over the corn program, and the appointment of a "Malenkov man," i.e. Konstantinov,

[3] The party journal *Kommunist* on October 8, 1955, published a letter of September 16 from Molotov, in which he recanted comments he had made in his February 8, 1955, report to the Supreme Soviet about the foundations of a socialist society having already been built in the Soviet Union.

as agit-prop chief. The paper refers to five possibly dissatisfied groups in the population. There is very little evidence of this dissatisfaction, and in some cases even of the group's existence. The argument for dissatisfaction within the army element seems to oppose the argument given earlier suggesting that the army will be faithful to Khrushchev.

The arguments presented to support the collective leadership hypothesis, the third, do not stand up very well and in some cases might be used to prove the opposite point. What is called "the best ammunition" is Khrushchev's and Bulganin's willingness to travel abroad for five weeks. Their willingness to travel abroad so long could also be interpreted as reflecting Khrushchev's complete confidence in the security of his position. The contention that Mikoyan and Bulganin are friends or "cronies" of Khrushchev does not necessarily have anything to do with the existence of collective leadership.

4. The authors show a certain naivete and amateurishness in their handling of evidence on the leadership question. This is exemplified in the reference to Kaganovich speaking "as one fully in accord with current policies" at the October anniversary celebration, to Mikoyan acting "as if he fully approves the current state of affairs," to Bulganin as "content to play a supporting role," and to Zhukov as "prominently associated with policies of the regime." These postures and declarations are perfectly standard and prove nothing about leadership struggles or harmony.

The treatment of the military in the first part seems to be an especially bad example of misuse of fact. The contention is made that the officer corps is probably in a better position under Khrushchev and Bulganin than it was under Malenkov. Apparently this is based on the elevation of a number of general officers and marshals to higher ranks in 1955. The authors seem to forget that there were a number of promotions when Malenkov was Chairman of the Council of Ministers; that the call-up and discharge procedure was put on a more regular basis in 1953; and that other privileges were granted and efforts made to raise the prestige of the military before Malenkov was ousted. It should be recalled, also, that Marshal Zhukov was promoted to a top military position and subsequently elected to the Party Central Committee in the period of Malenkov ascendancy. The purported satisfaction of the military in 1955 over their budget is unconvincing. Although the publicly-announced amount increased in 1955 over 1954, there is great uncertainty as to the actual total.

18. Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty) [1]

Washington, January 24, 1956.

At 12:15 Shanley came into my office to tell me that he had just received a call from the Secretary of State [2] informing him that the State Department, through Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, had received a call from the Russian Embassy requesting an appointment for the Russian Ambassador, Georgi M. Zaroubin, to see the President to deliver a personal message from Premier Bulganin. [3]

Shanley said that Dulles, in talking to him, had asked him to check with me to see how I felt about such a request before we talked to the President. Dulles had explained to Shanley that usually under diplomatic protocol, whenever an Ambassador of any kind requested an appointment with the President to present a message from his Head of State, it was granted. Shanley and I both agreed that we would tell the President of the request and also about Foster's recommendation that the President see him. We discussed briefly the time of the appointment, and both of us agreed that we should not put it on the President's schedule before the press conference, which was scheduled for 10:30 A.M. tomorrow. We agreed on suggesting to him the hour of 11:30.

I asked Shanley if the State Department had told him what it was about, and he said that they had not and that the Embassy had not given Mr. Merchant any indication of the contents of the message.

When the President came back from lunch at 2 o'clock, we went in to see him and inform him of the request. He agreed with Dulles' recommendation and said that he would see the Russian Ambassador either at 3:30 that afternoon or at 11:30 the next morning—"or any other time that Foster recommends." He asked us if we knew what the Russian Ambassador wanted to see him about, and we told him the State Department said they didn't know. He asked us to recheck with Dulles on the time of the appointment. As we were leaving the room, he called me back and said, "Jim, see what information you can get."

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers.

[2] A memorandum of this telephone conversation, which took place at 12:14 p.m., prepared by Phyllis D. Bernau, is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.

[3] According to Beam's memorandum of January 24 through Merchant to Secretary Dulles, it was Beam, not Merchant, who had been called by the Soviet Embassy. (Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Memos 1956–7)

Shanley and I put in a joint call to Dulles from Shanley's office.[4] We told him that the President had agreed to see the Russian Ambassador and had offered either 3:30 that afternoon or 11:30 the next morning. Foster agreed with us that it should not be before the press conference because that would probably open up the press conference to a lot of questions. I asked Dulles if he had any idea what it was about, and he said he had but he could not discuss it with me on the telephone. He asked me to come over to his office immediately because there were some matters he wanted to discuss with me to be relayed to the President before the appointment was definitely set.

I immediately got a staff car and went over to the Secretary's office, going into the building through the basement entrance and up to his office by the private elevator. Dulles and Herbert Hoover, Jr. were waiting for me, and we had a meeting, which lasted about 20 minutes, on the subject.

Dulles started off the conversation by telling me that the call had come in earlier that morning from the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires to Livingston Merchant. Zaroubin was out of town in New York. The Chargé d'Affaires, requesting the appointment in the name of the Ambassador, said that the Ambassador had a personal message from Bulganin to be delivered to the President. Merchant asked the Chargé if he could tell him what the message was, and the Chargé repeated quite bluntly that it was a "personal" message from Bulganin. Livingston then asked if it dealt with disarmament and the Chargé said that it did not. That was as far as Merchant could go. He had to drop the conversation.

Dulles then said that the message could be any number of things but that he and Herbert Hoover, Jr. thought they had a good idea of what it was. They said that they were sure this sudden Soviet move, with the request that the Ambassador personally deliver the message (the first time that the Soviets have requested an appointment since we have been in office—or as a matter of fact, some time prior to that) was undoubtedly in line with some new Soviet propaganda program. Dulles stressed the point that the Chargé d'Affaires' answer that it did not deal with disarmament would in Dulles' opinion eliminate a possibility that it might deal with some aspects of the President's "Open Sky" proposal.

Dulles said that what he thought it was was a very strong Soviet protest on our secret "Weather Balloons". This program was

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[4] A memorandum of this conversation, which took place at 2 p.m., prepared by Bernau, is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. Secretary Dulles also called Radford at 12:09, and Allen Dulles at 1:05 about the Soviet Embassy's request and its possible significance. (Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Memos 1956–7)

started in full swing three weeks ago, and at the time it was started we expected that it would take the Soviets about three weeks to catch up with it. We know that some of these balloons were shot down by Soviet aircraft and anti-aircraft fire. Dulles said that he expected the protest, if that is what it was, to be coupled with another attack against the President's "Open Sky" recommendation. He said that he expected that the protest would cite the "weather balloons" as another instance of the United States attempting to get military information over Soviet territory and that the "Open Sky" recommendations were merely another step in that direction.

The Air Force publicly announced the "weather balloons" in connection with the National Geophysical Year but that the announcement had not received much attention. He (Dulles) said it was extremely lucky that there had been news stories of late about the weather balloons in Tokyo which had been floated over the Pacific Ocean and which were presently floating around the skies of Texas and Oklahoma.

If this protest followed along these lines, we would, of course, deny it and say that we were participating, as we had already long since announced, in research for the Geophysical Year and that such research would be made available to all countries.

I asked Dulles if the Ambassador himself would call on the President, and after checking with Livingston Merchant, he said that the appointment itself would be made with Zaroubin. Dulles and Hoover also thought that if they were right in their guess, the Russians would put out a copy of the letter from Moscow at about the time Zaroubin was seeing the President. That would launch a world-wide propaganda campaign against the United States, picking up the old charges of war mongering and all the rest.

I told Dulles that normally I announce the President's schedule at four o'clock for the next day and that if the appointment with Zaroubin were set for 11:30, I would, of course, have to announce it at four. He agreed that this was the way to do it to make it as routine as possible although we both realized that the Russian Ambassador visiting the President was in itself a news story. Dulles said he thought I should say in my announcement that protocol had been observed, that the call had come in to Livingston Merchant and had been relayed to the Appointment Secretary at the White House. He also said that he thought I should say that the Ambassador was going to deliver a personal message from Bulganin so that this would show the world that this was handling the call on a strictly diplomatic routine basis.

Dulles also wanted me to tell the President that the reason he was urging this so strongly was that if the President saw Zaroubin to deliver a message from Bulganin, he would think that the Kremlin

would have a difficult job in the future of declining to see Ambassador Bohlen with messages from the President that we wanted to get into the Kremlin. In the past the Russians have insisted that Bohlen present messages from the President to the Russian Foreign Minister, Molotov, instead of Bulganin. We have always felt that it would be much better if our Ambassador could deliver personal messages from the President directly to Bulganin without having to go through Molotov.

Dulles asked me to go back and get to the President with this information as soon as I could and then let him know of the President's final decision. He said the Russian Embassy had been calling Merchant's office every hour on the hour to see if the State Department had an answer and that he wanted to give the answer to them as soon as possible. I told Foster that I would do so and left his office, returning immediately to the White House.[5]

When I got back, Dillon Anderson was with the President briefing him on National Security Council matters, but I sent in a note through Shanley saying that Dulles had asked me to come to his office and that he had some confidential information which he wanted me to tell the President as soon as possible. Shanley brought the note in and came out to tell me that the President would see me in ten minutes just as soon as he finished with Dillon Anderson. When Anderson came out, I went in to see the President and told him of my talk with Dulles. He readily agreed that he should not see the Russian Ambassador before the press conference and then said, "Foster may be right on his guess. I haven't thought too much of this balloon thing and I don't blame the Russians at all. I've always thought it was sort of a dirty trick. But that was the gamble we took when we made the decision and they ought to have a good answer ready for me if I have to use it when I see the Ambassador. You call Foster and tell him that I want his suggestions for that answer over in my office in a sealed envelope no later than 9:30 tomorrow morning. Also tell Foster that I want him here with me when the Ambassador comes in.

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[5] After Hagerty left, Dulles called Merchant at 2:23 p.m. to verify that it was the Soviet Ambassador and not the Chargé who wished to see the President. The Secretary also called Howe at 2:29 to ask who made the original announcement, and Howe indicated that it was the Air Force in California. Howe subsequently called back and transmitted the message through Bernau that there had been a simultaneous release to the Associated Press ticker in Washington and at the launching site in Vernalis, California. Howe said that the announcement had not been picked up particularly by American newspapers, but it had been by the foreign press, including British and French newspapers. He noted also that subsequent releases conforming to the original release had been made in Tokyo, Hawaii, Alaska, and Germany, and the Air Force believed that a release was made in Norway as well. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

I also told the President that I would have to announce this at four o'clock, saying that Zaroubin was coming to see him and he asked me why I had to do that and why I could not postpone it until tomorrow. "If you announce it today, you'll have a whole flock of cameramen and reporters outside." I told the President that this would be so but that Foster and I agreed that it should be put on the schedule and handled as routinely as possible. I said that we both felt that the Russian Embassy would leak the appointment and that this would cause more confusion and more mystery than a straightforward announcement of it from the White House. He thought that over for a minute and then said, "Yes, I guess that's right. O.K. You announce it at four."

The President also said that he was quite sure that this was undoubtedly part of a Soviet propaganda move timed deliberately to break just before his meeting with Prime Minister Eden.[6] "That's the way they do things, and we will have to handle it as carefully and delicately as we can." The President, however, warned that we must not at anytime close the door on such messages as this coming through and would have to receive them and give them study no matter whether we might be convinced in advance that they were merely propaganda steps.[7]

[6] Eden visited Washington January 31–February 1.

[7] Hagerty and Shanley passed on the President's wishes to Dulles in a telephone call at 3:11 p.m. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Bernau; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

19. Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty)[1]

Washington, January 25, 1956.

In at 8:00. Went in to see the President after the press conference staff meeting. I told him that I had been thinking about what the message might contain and that while I thought Foster probably might be right, I had also thought overnight of several other things it could be. Among these were: (1) A request by Bulganin and Khrushchev to visit this country following their visit to England; (2) A seeming acceptance of some phases of the President's "Open Sky" program with a lot of strings attached; (3) A statement to the

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers.

President that the Russians would agree with the United States to call off all thermo-nuclear tests.

The President said that he thought that those could also be considered as possibilities and then he smiled calmly and said, "Well, we'll know the answer in a few hours." He told me to call Dulles and tell him to be on hand in his office before the Soviet Ambassador arrived at the White House.

When we returned from the press conference, the President had an appointment with Clare Booth Luce and Dulles arrived in Shanley's office about 11:20. Zaroubin arrived at the White House at 11:25 and pushed his way through a horde of photographers and reporters at the main entrance of the Executive offices without any comment. He was accompanied by John Simmons who escorted him to the conference room. I met him there and told him the President would be with him in a few minutes. He said he was glad to see me and that he had not seen me since Geneva. I replied that I was glad to see him. We were in the conference room with Alexander Logofet, the State Department interpreter. Clare Booth Luce came out in a few minutes, and Dulles went into the President's office.

Promptly at 11:30 Zaroubin was brought in with John Simmons to the President's office, the interpreter accompanying them. Simmons then left the office, and the President and Dulles conferred with Zaroubin.

(See memorandum of conversation supplied by the State Department.) [2]

[Here follows the remainder of the entry.]

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[2] *Infra.*

20. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 25, 1956, 11:30 a.m. [1]

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Soviet Ambassador Zaroubin
Secretary of State Dulles
Mr. Logofet (interpreter)

After the Soviet Ambassador had made a statement from an aide-mémoire (attached), [2] the President spoke as follows:

1. His remarks were necessarily of a very preliminary character.
2. He was absolutely and most completely sincere in his conviction of the need for better relations between our countries.
3. He had been concerned with the deterioration in those relations since the meeting of last July.
4. He shared the view that the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States wanted peace.
5. He would give serious study to the proposal now made by Chairman Bulganin and in due course make a written reply.

The President then asked whether it was the view of the Soviet Government that the proposal should be kept confidential, at least for the time being. The President expressed the view that the matter could be developed more productively if it were treated as confidential, but that we would of course acquiesce in whatever the views of the Soviet Government were in this respect.

The Soviet Ambassador stated that he had no instructions from his Government on this point, but would immediately communicate with his Government, and in the meantime would not disclose the nature of the communication. He expressed his personal agreement with the point of view on this matter expressed by President Eisenhower.

I then indicated that perhaps the Soviet Ambassador had better follow the usual practice, which is that after talking with the President, visitors make no statement of their own, but leave it to the White House to make such statement as it deemed appropriate. The Ambassador said he would follow this practice.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Confidential; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. A summary record of the meeting prepared by Alexander Logofet is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

[2] Not printed. Zaroubin also presented to the President a letter from Bulganin dated January 23, which proposed a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States, to which was attached a draft of such a treaty. Both Bulganin's letter and the Soviet draft treaty are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 6, 1956, pp. 193–195.

Thereupon the President and I sought to formulate the statement which the White House would issue and it was agreed that Mr. Hagerty would put out a statement which would say in substance that there had been a friendly communication from Chairman Bulganin to the President which was another one of the communications which they had exchanged since becoming acquainted at the Summit Conference.

The Soviet Ambassador expressed his accord with a statement of this general character. Thereupon the Soviet Ambassador and the interpreter retired.

The President and I then discussed the situation briefly. I said that I felt it probable that this was essentially a propaganda move, but that, of course, we should not jump to that conclusion. I said I saw significance in the fact that this proposal was made as a bilateral proposal to the United States, apparently without corresponding the proposal to the UK and France, although this might come later.

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21. Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty) [1]

Washington, January 25, 1956.

[Here follows the beginning of the entry.]

Zaroubin was in the President's office for fifteen minutes and left at 11:45. He declined any comment at all to the reporters in the lobby other than to say that he thought the President was looking fine. This was in accordance with the President's wishes and the agreement that Zaroubin had made in the President's office. When the Ambassador left, the President called for me and I went into his office through Ann Whitman's office. Dulles was alone with him. As I walked in, the President said, "Well, Jim, it wasn't what we thought. There is no mention of the balloons."

Dulles said that he was quite surprised that it had not been balloons but then laughed and said, "Maybe that's what you get for having somewhat of a guilty conscience." The President replied that he was sure that the Russians knew about the balloons and that they might bring it up at some later date. The President then told me that he had agreed that there would be no publication now of

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers.

the letter but that he had also told the Soviet Ambassador that I would make a short statement. He then said, "Why don't you say something like this: "Intermittently since the Geneva Conference the President and Premier Bulganin have been exchanging correspondence. The Soviet Ambassador brought in a letter containing certain ideas which the Premier has asked the President to study."

Dulles interrupted to say that he thought the letter should be described as "friendly" and the President said Yes, I should put that in. He then told me that he thought I should add that the Premier had asked the President to study the ideas further in the interest of promoting world peace. The President agreed to this and I revised my statement accordingly.

I then asked the President and the Secretary if they thought there was any danger of the message breaking from Moscow. The President said he did not think so, at least at this time, since he had raised that point with Zaroubin and said that it probably should be released at a later date. Zaroubin said that he would check with his government and let Dulles know.

I held my press conference on the statement and declined to answer other questions. Speculation throughout the day was on almost every subject conceivable, ranging from a story by the New York *Daily News* that Khrushchev and Bulganin had invited themselves to this country to others more near the mark on the renewal of the "Spirit of Geneva."

I talked to Dulles later in the day, and we both agreed that it was a very clever letter which the Soviets would undoubtedly use for propaganda purposes. The idea of a 20-year Treaty of Friendship with the United States, Dulles told me, was not a new one. Molotov had discussed it with him at Geneva. There is nothing proposed in the Treaty which cannot be done through the machinery of the United Nations to which both the United States and the USSR have pledged themselves.

Dulles said that his guess is that the Russians have realized since Geneva that they have given the impression to the free world, and to much of the neutral world, that they have broken agreements which they made at Geneva and are desperately trying to get back into the "big smile and friendly neighbor" attitude. At any rate, the proposal for a treaty will be sure to touch off a very lengthy debate in this country, and Dulles believes that we should turn it down politely, pointing out that we want deeds not words.

Later in the day I got a query from the British press as to whether we were going to wireless a copy of the letter to Eden on board the *Queen Elizabeth* and I called Dulles again and told him of my query and he said I had better duck that one, that we could not

officially send anything like that to the British without including the French and possibly the Italians and Germans.

I received a copy of the translation of the letter, the memorandum of conversation in the President's office and the proposed text of the Treaty at my home at 8:30. I wanted it in case the news broke from Moscow or leaked from Washington. Radio Moscow played it perfectly straight that evening and merely said that the message from Bulganin had been delivered to the President and that the American press showed great interest in it.

I had only one call during the evening, that from Bob Clark of INS, checking on the *Daily News* story of a Bulganin–Khrushchev visit to this country. I told Bob that I could not comment but if I were in his place, I would advise the INS not to pick it up.

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22. Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty) [1]

Washington, January 26, 1956.

I went in to see the President early in the morning to tell him that I had been thinking about the message overnight, that I thought it was very cleverly phrased and that I thought we should get it out publicly as soon as possible. He told me that he thought that was right but that we would have to wait until we heard back from Zaroubin since he had requested Zaroubin to check with his government. He laughingly told me that he was somewhat relieved at the proposals made in the message because—"I had another idea what it was that I didn't tell anyone. I thought that it was an invitation from Bulganin for me to visit Russia. That would have been something to give us a lot of thought." I asked the President if he would have accepted. He merely laughed in reply and said, "Well, we didn't get the invitation."

Turning back to our original subject of release of the letter, the President asked me to discuss it with Dulles. I saw Dulles before the NSC meeting and told him my feeling that we should get it out. He said he agreed with me and the longer we held it, the more the Russian propaganda machine would be able to build it up as a great new proposal which in effect was merely a repetition of all the previous Russian proposals rolled into one. He said that he was going to ask the President to discuss it with just the members of the

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers.

Security Council in his office after the meeting. This the President did. [2]

Later before Dulles left the White House we had another discussion and he asked me personally to discuss it with the President to see if we could get authority from the President to ask Chip Bohlen to get an agreement to release the correspondence. I said I thought there would probably have to be a White House statement in connection with the release, and he agreed. Dulles said that he thought it should be clearly pointed out that there were no new proposals and that it should not be considered too seriously. What they are trying to do by this maneuver is to try to sell us a Treaty of Friendship and then go around and put pressure on all the smaller countries to do the same. The UN Charter provides for everything they propose, particularly the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means and it would simply break up the United Nations and put a lot of pressure on all the other countries of the world. "I'm against it, and it should be rejected, although I suppose we must say that we are studying it." I told the Secretary I would talk to the President when he came back from lunch.

When the President returned from lunch, I told him of my conversation with Dulles and the President said that if Foster thought we were aiding the Communists by holding it up, we should release it, but he insisted that we should not do it on our own but we should get Russian agreement. I told Dulles of this conversation and when he went in to see the President on the Eden visit, the President discussed it with Dulles and also gave him authority to wireless a synopsis of the letter to Eden on board the *Queen Elizabeth.* (This was the first time such authority was given, and it was strange that earlier in the day, a short UP story from the *Queen Elizabeth* said that Aldrich and Eden were conferring together on the contents of the letter. Until the President gave authority, no such message had been sent to either Aldrich or Eden on board the ship and the story was probably either a complete dope story by a reporter or fed out by a British member of the party to give the impression that Eden had been cut in on it.) The wireless went off about three o'clock. [3]

Later in the evening I received press calls, particularly from Bill Lawrence of *The New York Times* who came awful close to the actual

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[2] No record of this discussion has been found.

[3] A copy of the message dated January 26 from the President to Eden was attached to a brief covering memorandum from Robert G. Barnes to Goodpaster, also dated January 26, in which Barnes said the message was handed to the British Embassy at 2 p.m. that day and that he understood the message had been cleared with the President by telephone. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)

facts. Lawrence personally called me to tell me that the *Times* tomorrow morning was going to print a story which said that the new part of the proposal was a non-aggression pact between the United States and the USSR. He said that the *Times* had received this information from an informer.

I again called Dulles and urged speedy action in getting agreement to release the letter, and he promised that he would do so, getting off a cable tonight to Chip Bohlen requesting such permission. He said that he hoped we could get it out by tomorrow.

At six o'clock Zaroubin called at the Department of State to see Livingston Merchant and informed Merchant that he had now received instructions from his government. They were to the effect that the Russians did not plan to release it "for some time".[4] This is what we expected and is completely in line with the Soviet propaganda campaign which they are now obviously waging on the message. When Zaroubin left, Merchant went to Dulles' office and they dispatched a cable to Bohlen telling him to tell Molotov that because of the widespread speculation on the message in this country we wanted him to know that we would release it soon, either Friday or Saturday.

[4] A memorandum of Merchant's conversation with Zarubin is in Department of State, Central File 611.61/1–2656.

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23. Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty)[1]

Washington, January 27, 1956.

I had a rough night last night on this whole matter. The *New York Times* was first in print with the story that Russia was offering us a bilateral Treaty of Friendship or non-aggression pact and I received quite a few calls starting at 10:30 P.M. and running through until about 3:00 A.M. To all of them I replied I had no further comment other than what I had said the first day on the message, and that was that.

When I called Dulles at nine this morning, I said to him, "Good morning, Mr. Secretary, this is your midnight correspondent." He laughed and asked if I had many queries last night and I told him I had. He was not attending the Cabinet meeting because he was

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers.

working with his people on a draft report turning down the Russian proposal. He thought it was particularly important to have a reply by the President included in any publication of the Bulganin message, and I agreed.

I saw the Secretary at 2:25 just before he went in to see the President on the Eden visit, and he said he had been working all day on the reply and that he expected to have a draft over for the President's study by 3:30. I told him that I had been queried by some of the newspaper people as to whether or not the United States or the Administration would fill in in a bi-partisan way the leadership of Congress before any action was taken on this publicly. He said we probably should do that and that the leaders on both sides should know in advance that we were going to turn it down.

Carl McCardle called me later at three o'clock to tell me that he had an idea where the *Times* got their story. I believe that the State Department has been playing this one close to its vest and I personally do not think that the leaks came from there. . . .

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24. Editorial Note

On Saturday, January 28, the United States Government released the text of Bulganin's letter of January 23 to the President, along with a reply dated January 28 by the President. In his reply, the President noted that a number of provisions in the proposed treaty of friendship and cooperation were already contained in the United Nations Charter, to which both countries were signatories, and he wondered "whether again going through a treaty-making procedure, and this time on a bilateral basis only, might indeed work against the cause of peace by creating the illusion that a stroke of a pen had achieved a result which in fact can be achieved only by a change of spirit." The President reiterated the United States Government's dedication to achieving progress on the three issues discussed at the Geneva Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers meetings the previous year—namely, European security and Germany, disarmament, and East-West contacts—and said he was looking forward to receiving a further expression of Bulganin's views. For the full text of Eisenhower's reply, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 6, 1956, pages 191–193.

In his response of February 1, which was delivered by Ambassador Zarubin the following day and released at that time by the

United States Government, Bulganin emphasized the Soviet Government's belief in the usefulness of a Soviet-American treaty, especially in that such a treaty would make it easier to resolve the issues discussed in Geneva. The text of Bulganin's letter of February 1 to Eisenhower is in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 26, 1955, pages 515–518.

According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation between Secretary Dulles and W. Park Armstrong, on February 3, the following exchange took place:

"A. is watching Genetrix, and has some people in his office on it now. The Sec. is anxious to keep close watch on the extent to which they are coming through and be alert to any evidence there is of diminishing returns. The Sec. wants to stop it if it gets to that basis. A. said they are talking of the Air Force desire to raise the daily launching rate to 40 per day—only 11 went up yesterday. A few are coming through now and some have begun to transmit but have not reached the area of cutdown. A. will come up after he finishes with the people there. The Sec. said he and the Pres. are nervous about it. If it is not producing substantial returns, he does not want to go on about it. We found out what can be done and probably discovered some bugs in the thing. They agreed the time for protest is near. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Phyllis D. Bernau; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

On February 4, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the American Embassy in Moscow protesting and demanding the immediate cessation of United States reconnaissance balloon flights over the Soviet Union, as well as an end to propaganda balloon flights to which it had protested before. The note indicated that some of the reconnaissance balloons, with "automatically operated photo cameras for aerial survey, radio transmitters, radio receivers and other things," had been captured. For text of the Soviet note, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, February 20, 1956, page 295.

According to the Secretary's memorandum of his conversation with the President at 10:15 a.m. on February 6, the following discussion took place:

"We discussed the matter of the Soviet protest about the meteorological balloons. The President recalled that both he and I had been rather allergic to this project and doubted whether the results would justify the inconvenience involved. The President said he thought the operation should now be suspended. I agreed, but said I thought we should handle it so it would not look as though we had been caught with jam on our fingers. I said we would prepare and promptly dispatch an appropriate note." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

In a memorandum of February 7 to Macomber, Beam wrote that the draft United States reply had been cleared with the Air Force

and in the Department of State, with three changes included at the suggestion of the Department's Legal Office. (Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Memos 1956–7)

On February 8, Ambassador Bohlen delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry a reply to the Soviet note of February 4. It reaffirmed that the United States Government "is not directly or indirectly participating in any project to dispatch propaganda balloons over the Soviet Union." The note also explained that the other balloons were meteorological balloons, the launching of which had been announced publicly on January 8, and gave the following description of the project:

"The balloons are equipped with instruments to measure and record meteorological phenomena such as air jet streams, and with photographic apparatus to provide pictures of cloud formations which bear on air movements at various velocities. Much valuable scientific information is being accumulated. It is hoped that this method of meteorological research will contribute substantially to the forthcoming International Geophysical Year programs.

"The declared purpose of the project is made clear by the fact that the equipment itself contains instructions in several languages, including Russian, for its recovery and delivery to the authorities charged with the evaluation of the data obtained. In the interest of scientific research, it would be much appreciated if the Soviet Government would return the instruments which have come into its possession.

"Similar surveys have been conducted for some time through the launching of some thousands of meteorological balloons over the United States. These have been equipped with safety devices and have constituted no hazard even to dense civilian air traffic. As explained in the announcement, the balloons observed by the Soviet Government are equipped with the same safety devices.

"The United States Government would be happy to explain further to the Soviet Government the safety measures incorporated in the project. Provisionally, however, in order to avoid misunderstandings, and in view of the Soviet Government's objection, the United States Government will seek to avoid the launching of additional balloons which, on the basis of known data might transit the USSR."

Appended to the note was a copy of the Department of Defense press release of January 8 announcing the project. For text of the United States note of February 8 and the Department of Defense press release of January 8, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 20, 1956, pages 293–295.

25. Policy Information Statement for the United States Information Agency [1]

EUR–243 *Washington, February 8, 1956.*

20TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is scheduled to meet in Moscow, February 14, 1956. Under the Soviet system the Party is the directing and controlling force in the Soviet state, and the Party Congress is theoretically the supreme Party forum. The Party itself has been alternately subjected to the control of a few persons, or of one person, i.e., Stalin, who became the unquestioned master of both Party and state.

Six Party Congresses were held before the October Revolution, in various countries. From 1918 to 1925, Congresses were held annually. The 15th Congress was held in 1927, and the 16th, 17th and 18th in 1930, 1934 and 1939, respectively. At the 17th Congress in 1934, it was decided that Party Congresses would be held every three years. This rule was not observed. It was not until October 1952 that the 19th Congress was held.

At the 19th Congress many changes were made in Party rules. The word "bolshevik" was dropped from the name of the Party, which became the "Communist Party of the Soviet Union." The Politburo was replaced by a larger Presidium, and the Central Committee was enlarged. After the death of Stalin, the Presidium was reduced in size, so that it was again numerically comparable to the old Politburo.

The convening of the 20th Party Congress was announced by the Soviet press on July 14, 1955. The decision was made a few days previously by the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which published the following agenda:

1. Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU by Secretary of the Central Committee, N.S. Khrushchev.
2. Report of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU by Chairman of the Auditing Commission, P.U. Moskatov.
3. Directives of the 20th Congress of the CPSU for the Sixth Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR in 1956–60, by Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, N.A. Bulganin.
4. Election of the central organs of the Party.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.00/2–856. Confidential. Drafted by Collins and cleared with EE, P, and EUR. This statement was sent to 115 diplomatic and consular posts as an enclosure to instruction CA–6001, February 8.

Delegates to the 20th Party Congress have been and are being selected by oblast, krai and republic Party Congresses. These meetings have been accompanied by announcement of certain changes in the positions of state and Party leaders. These changes give some reason to believe that the Congress itself may reveal certain other adjustments in the top Party leadership. There has been speculation that Party First Secretary Khrushchev is strengthening his position as top man of the Party hierarchy. For the present, however, it seems unlikely that he will yet assume the position once occupied by Stalin.

The draft directives of the Sixth Five-Year Plan will no doubt be adopted in approximately their present form.

It is also possible that the Congress may receive a report from the special committee created in 1952 to revise the Party Program. There have been no published revisions of the Program of the Party adopted in 1919. The special committee was headed by Stalin, and included Beria, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov and several others. Since Stalin and Beria are dead and Malenkov has been demoted, the special committee has presumably been reorganized in the meantime.

The 20th Party Congress will probably not bring any surprises on policy issues. The post-Stalin leadership has been rather voluble in the discussion of Party lines and purposes. Nevertheless, the proceedings of the 20th Congress will be followed with considerable interest, particularly from the standpoint of any possible personnel shifts within the Party hierarchy, and tightening up of Party ideology.

Public Position:

It is not in our interest to give the 20th Party Congress undue public attention. The proceedings should be reported factually and objectively without any great amount of commentary on the news emanating from the Congress itself. If the Congress should develop news of a sensational character, further guidance will be given.

The meeting of the 20th Party Congress offers a good opportunity to illustrate the great contrast between the Soviet one-party dictatorship and our democratic system of parties and government. The fact that this is an election year in the United States underlines the appropriateness of comment along these lines.

The subserviency of national Communist parties to the Soviet Party and to Soviet policy can be underlined by appropriate noting of attendance at the Moscow sessions by representatives of these parties.

The following themes could be used to emphasize the nature of the Communist Party dictatorship in the Soviet Union:

1. Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution establishes the Communist Party as the only legal party.

2. The Party makes all the important decisions in the Soviet system, not the legislative or executive bodies.

3. The Party itself is controlled and directed by an elite group at the top. The Congress is a rubber-stamp for decisions made by this small group.

4. Any changes in leadership or organizational forms do not alter the autocratic and dictatorial nature of the regime.

Caution:

Speculation on moves toward a Stalinist-type, one-man control should be avoided.

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26. Editorial Note

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union opened in the Great Kremlin Palace in Moscow on February 14, 1956. In attendance were the delegates to the Congress and representatives from 55 foreign Communist parties. A selection of speeches at the Congress, the Report of the Central Committee given by Khrushchev on February 15, Bulganin's Report on the Sixth Five-Year Plan published in *Pravda* on February 22, the resolutions and directives adopted by the Congress, and a list of the officials elected at the Congress are printed in Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies—II*, pages 8–202. The fact that Khrushchev gave a speech before a closed session on the concluding day of the Congress, February 25, was not known in the West until the middle of March (see Document 33). Telegrams from the Embassy in Moscow to the Department of State reporting and commenting on the proceedings of the Congress are in Department of State, Central File 761.00. Bohlen's recollections of the Congress are in *Witness to History*, pages 393–396.

27. Memorandum of Discussion at the 277th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 27, 1956 [1]

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence said that he would like to comment at some little length on developments at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party which was concluding today at Moscow. [2] The composition of the new Presidium (Politburo) had not yet been announced, but it seemed unlikely that there would be significant changes in the top personnel. 60% of the new Presidium consisted of members who had been re-elected; 40% were newly elected. Of the latter group, Khrushchev had obtained a large number of his own supporters. Mr. Dulles commented that it would be interesting to see whether Molotov would continue in the roster of the eleven full members of the Presidium. That he would was likely, although his position was weakening and he might disappear from power in a year's time.

At this point the President interrupted to ask who would be Molotov's successor if he did disappear, and would this successor be even more anti-Western than Molotov. Mr. Dulles replied to the President by stating that a successor to Molotov would be more in line with the Soviet "new-look". He added that Molotov's speech before the Party Congress [3] had been one of the briefest and most colorless of the many addresses. It was actually possible to deduce the rating of high Soviet officials by the length of the speeches they had made.

Mr. Dulles then held up to view copies of the full texts of all the speeches made at the Party Congress. He observed that Mikoyan's speech [4] was among the most interesting; in short, Mikoyan charged that the United States was setting up an Iron Curtain. Mr.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on February 28.

[2] The Congress concluded on February 25. Dulles may have been referring to the plenary session of the Communist Party Central Committee held on February 27.

[3] Molotov's speech, published in *Pravda* on February 20, was analyzed in telegram 1871 from Moscow, February 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/2–2056) An English translation is in Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies—II*, pp. 98–103.

[4] Mikoyan's speech of February 16, published in *Pravda* on February 18 was analyzed in telegram 1861 from Moscow, February 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/2–1856) An English translation is in Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies—II*, pp. 80–89.

Dulles then indicated that the CIA was preparing complete texts of all the speeches. These would prove, he believed, very significant guides to Soviet intentions. We had somewhat neglected these speeches in the past, just as we had unfortunately neglected Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. There was no intention now to repeat this error. The President asked Mr. Dulles to brief down these speeches and send copies of the briefs to all interested members of the National Security Council. [5]

Secretary Dulles agreed with Mr. Allen Dulles on the importance of trying to find out what the Soviets were actually circulating as guides for the conduct of members of the Communist Party. We must pay close attention to what they are teaching to their subordinate party members. It was this kind of information which would provide real indications of possible changes in the Soviet Union. Such indications were far more significant than what the Soviet leaders said to the outside world.

Mr. Allen Dulles then went on to sum up the significance of the Party Congress. In the first place, the present collective leadership of the Soviet Union is accomplishing a peaceful evolution to replace Stalinist control. They were dropping the idea of absolute dictatorship; they were minimizing the threat of military power to accomplish their ends; and they seemed to be abandoning the dogma of the inevitability of war with the imperialist powers. Three main anti-Stalinist ideas had been spelled out at the Party Congress. First, the idea of collective leadership; second, stress on peaceful coexistence rather than on the inevitability of war; and third, peaceful transition to socialism through parliamentary mechanism. This latter point seemed to indicate a strong Soviet drive in the direction of establishing popular front governments in other countries.

Mr. Dulles predicted that many old-line Communists outside the USSR would find it extremely difficult to accept the new doctrines set forth at the Party Congress. There will be widespread dangers of Titoism. Indeed, Tito believes that the Soviet Union has bought his doctrines lock, stock and barrel. [6]

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[5] Not found in Department of State files.

[6] According to a memorandum of the discussion at the 278th meeting of the National Security Council on March 1, the following comments were made:

"Turning to the final situation in the new Soviet Politburo, Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that there had been no change respecting the full regular members of this group. Marshal Zhukov, however, had been elected a candidate member of the Politburo and, so far as Mr. Dulles could recall, Zhukov was the first Army officer ever to attain this height in Soviet history. Secretary Dulles turned to the President and said that Marshal Zhukov had the President to thank for his honor (laughter)." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

28. Editorial Note

The process of drafting a response to Bulganin's letter of February 1 to President Eisenhower reiterating the Soviet proposal for a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the United States (see Document 24) extended through the month of February. Draft replies dated February 9, 12, and 23 are in Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Bulganin.

One view of the significance of the Soviet proposal was that the Soviet Government feared the imminent outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Communist China and it desired a Soviet-American treaty as a hedge against China's invoking the Sino-Soviet mutual assistance pact and involving the Soviet Union in war with the United States. This view was advanced by Galen L. Stone, Second Secretary of the Embassy in France, in a letter of February 8 to Robert Kranich in the Office of European Regional Affairs. According to a memorandum from Armstrong to Allan Evans in the Office of Intelligence Research, dated February 16, Stone's letter and the hypothesis it contained were discussed with "considerable interest" at the Secretary of State's Staff meeting the previous day and Armstrong had been requested to prepare an analysis of the hypothesis. Evans sent his comments on the hypothesis to Armstrong in a memorandum dated February 23, in which he concluded that "although the suggestion is a novel one, we consider it to be without validity insofar as available information can be a guide," evidence that pointed to "the closest collaboration between the USSR and Communist China, particularly since the Khrushchev–Bulganin–Mikoyan visit to Peiping in 1954." Armstrong passed on Evans' comments in somewhat abbreviated form in a memorandum of February 27 to Merchant. All these documents are *ibid.*, Central File 611.61/2–2756.

It was apparently the February 23 draft reply that was discussed by Secretary Dulles in a telephone conversation with Robert Bowie on February 24. Bowie said that the United States would be helping the Soviet leaders if it made a "full-dress" reply to Bulganin's letter. He suggested merely adding something about the Soviet proposal to

a letter on the subject of disarmament that was also being drafted for the President to send to Bulganin. In an apparent reference to the speeches at the 20th Party Congress, Bowie noted that the Soviet leaders "have said in effect we made a lot of blunders under Stalin, but we are not like him." The full-dress reply, according to Bowie, made it possible for the Soviet leaders "to say we are raking up old stuff etc." Dulles said he would like to give the President a choice of which way to respond. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Phyllis D. Bernau, February 24, 6:44 p.m.; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

On February 25, Dulles sent to the President a draft full-dress reply No. 5, dated February 25, and a covering memorandum explaining the two options and expressing his belief that any middle course would be unsatisfactory. On February 27, Eisenhower returned the draft full-dress reply to Dulles with the comment that he had no objection to either course, provided that the full-dress reply was modified so as to include "both our negative bill of particulars as well as a positive program that we believe adequate." This correspondence is *ibid.*, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. According to a February 28 memorandum from Barnes to Elbrick, Dulles and Eisenhower discussed the matter the previous day and the President accepted Dulles' suggestion that they merely add a brief paragraph to the disarmament letter. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

On March 1, the President sent a letter to Premier Bulganin responding to Bulganin's letter of September 19, 1955, regarding disarmament. The final paragraph of the President's letter reads:

"I also wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge receipt of your letter of February first which replied to mine of January twenty-eighth. My view remains generally as expressed in that letter. But I shall continue to study the problem with a view to seeing whether it seems that any useful new steps can be taken as between us. I may communicate again with you later on this matter."

This letter was delivered by Ambassador Bohlen on March 5 and the text released in Washington the following day. For the full text of the letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 14, 1956, pages 514–515.

29. Intelligence Report Prepared by the Division of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe, Office of Intelligence Research [1]

IR–7205 *Washington, March 6, 1956.*

THE TWENTIETH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

Abstract

The first public criticism of Stalin by his successors stands out as the highlight and main innovation of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (February 14 to 25). Otherwise, the conclave served largely as an authoritative occasion for the Soviet rulers to confirm and formalize their current policies.

Criticism of Stalin. In the nearly three years since his death, Stalin's stature has been progressively reduced. The new regime shrank the symbol of Stalin largely by withholding adulation from him and concentrating it entirely on Lenin. The Congress has now marked a further distinctive step as the rulers took to open attack. Their criticism centered chiefly on the ill-effects of one-man rule, with its glorification of an all-wise leader. Beyond this, however, while they neither completely buried Stalin nor brought into question his basic state policies, they ranged critically over many fields, including economic development, ideology, law and foreign affairs.

The Soviet rulers are rewriting history and rehabilitating some of Stalin's victims; how much further they will go remains to be seen. Clearly to find clay feet on the infallible demi-god whose rule for three decades encompassed all facets of Soviet life will have widespread effects—but effects whose manifestations will depend upon a whole complex of related factors.

Collective Rule. The attack on one-man rule served to underscore the virtue claimed for collective leadership which, formally enshrined as a guiding principle, has thus become an obstacle to concentration of overwhelming power in the hands of one individual. That the present ruling group is stable appears from the absence of changes among full members of the Party Presidium. New and younger blood has been brought to the top circle by the candidate members, expanded to six.

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[1] Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487, USSR. Confidential. Attached to the source text was a memorandum of transmittal from Armstrong to the Acting Secretary of State, March 14, in which Armstrong wrote that the 49-page report, "while fairly long, is interesting reading and covers many points of significance to US policy makers." A note on the source text indicates that the report was based on information available through March 5.

Inclusion in the latter group of Marshal Zhukov, the first professional military chief to reach Presidium level, appears to represent both recognition of him personally and appreciation of the military ingredient in policy-making rather than an indication that the armed forces are growing to be a distinct political force.

Khrushchev received no special build-up at the Congress, but his leadership within the ruling group was strengthened by the number of new Presidium candidate members and new members of the Central Committee who have had past links with him.

Foreign Affairs. In foreign affairs the Soviet rulers claimed major successes for their current policy and announced they would pursue it with greater vigor. They set forth as the underlying basis of their policy the thesis that peaceful coexistence is "the only alternative" to nuclear war, and they indicated that the USSR will energetically champion coexistence as an activist program aimed at undermining Western defense efforts. They called for the development of friendly relations throughout the world, and especially with the underdeveloped countries. Although this policy was to apply also to the major Western powers, it was not meant to imply concessions on major East-West issues. Their goal was evidently to remove apprehensions of a Soviet threat and instead to imbue the USSR with an air of respectability, normalcy, and tolerance.

To further this impression, the Soviet rulers readjusted their ideological stance: they stressed the preventability rather than the inevitability of war and, without renouncing violence, they sanctioned for foreign Communists a "non-violent" acquisition of power by parliamentary means. They sought both to assure non-Communists that the USSR is not wedded to violence and to reassure Communists that a period of coexistence would not undercut their struggle for the promised ultimate victory of Communism nor jeopardize the prospect of winning it.

Any improvement in state-to-state relations between Communists and non-Communists would involve no ideological reconciliation. The speakers confidently predicted the inevitable world triumph of Communism on the grounds that Soviet military power would protect the Soviet base; that continuing Soviet economic successes would inspire others to take the Communist path; and that a majority of mankind, although representing different views, was already joining together in "one mighty stream" that would wash out the underpinnings of historically-doomed capitalism.

Domestic Innovations. Traditional emphasis on enforced industrialization and on the maintenance of high level armaments continued at the Congress. It approved the Sixth Five-Year Plan, announced in January, adding a provision for shortening the work-week to 40–41 hours before 1960. A breakdown of investment figures for 1956–60

showed a marked similarity, with some deviation in favor of agriculture, to the pattern implemented in 1951–55.

The leaders showed some concern over living standards and promised to bring up the level of the lowest-paid workers and pensioners while retaining the present policy of a sharply differentiated income structure. Another innovation was the proposal to establish fee-charging boarding schools. Although justified in part as a way of meeting the problem of children who lack adequate parental supervision, these schools will probably be select elite-training institutions.

The importance of these developments on the internal scene was less than the implications of the attack on Stalin, which opens the way to a re-evaluation of all sectors of Soviet life. In this sense the Congress could turn out to be, in Mikoyan's words, "the most important Congress" in Soviet Communist Party history since Lenin's time.

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30. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, March 7, 1956—2 p.m.

1993. Yesterday evening at Bulganin's reception I had a series of extremely interesting conversations with virtually all top leaders. In all my experience in this country I have never seen them so relaxed or forthcoming on variety of subjects. They answered individually, with apparent frankness, almost any questions that I asked them.

I shall deal with these questions in separate telegrams [2] since they are in varying degrees of confidentiality. In general, however, since it is now apparent that Soviet leaders in private conversation are disposed to talk very much more frankly than in the past with foreign representatives here, I urge Dept to make every effort to avoid leaks which could only impair real possibilities of useful developments in this field.

All Soviet leaders with whom I talked, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov, Malenkov and Mikoyan, expressed great satisfaction at

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/3–756. Secret; Limited Distribution.

[2] See *infra* and Document 32.

President's decision to run again,[3] and repeatedly expressed their high regard for him and their belief in his genuine desire to work toward conditions of tranquility and peace throughout the world. I told them that while of course I had no direct information on subject, I was personally convinced that an important element in his decision was the feeling that the job of restoring some stability and tranquility to the world was still to be done and was a sign of his deep and genuine interest in working towards that end.

Bulganin and Khrushchev both said they had been favorably impressed by President's message on disarmament[4] and that while our views are still far apart they welcomed indication of movement in this field. I shall deal in separate message with views on this subject and other foreign policy matters which Khrushchev expressed to me last night.

Bohlen

[3] The President announced this decision on February 29.
[4] See Document 28.

31. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, March 7, 1956—9 p.m.

2006. Eyes only for Acting Secretary. Yesterday evening Bulganin told me with reference to previous conversation we had had in past[2] re lack informal contact with Soviet leaders, that any time that I wished to have an informal and, as he put it, "heart-to-heart" talk with him he could arrange it in such way as to avoid publicity. He said I could either see him alone or together with Khrushchev at his dacha or any other convenient place. He also said if I liked we could bring along Molotov. I thanked him for this suggestion and said that I did not wish to waste his time in idle talk, but that if occasion arose in future I would be glad avail myself his offer.

Later on in evening he returned to subject and said that he had been completely serious and hoped that I would take advantage of this possibility, repeating that he would see me alone or with any

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Top Secret. No copy of this telegram has been found in Department of State files.
[2] Not further identified.

other members of the Soviet leadership I would wish to have included. He said he thought it was most important at this juncture that there should be means informal discussion "without commitment". Throughout evening Bulganin made great effort to impress upon me the importance of US/Soviet relations and of the desire of Soviet Government to see some genuine improvement in this field. I told him of course the US had friends and allies and I could not go in for bilateral deals, to which he replied that he had not in mind any deals behind backs of or at expense of associates.

I am very anxious to safeguard the secrecy of this suggestion which at some time in future [might] come in very useful. Obviously, in part at least, it might be an attempt to sow suspicion with our allies, but I am inclined more to believe that Bulganin recognizes need for some method of communication rather than by official notes or highly publicized communications. I shall of course never on my own initiative take up his suggestion, and would only do so under explicit instructions from Department. In addition, if any use is to be made of this offer I would have to be much more fully aware than I am at present of our thinking on outstanding questions.

I think it might be useful, if you agree, to bring this message to the attention of the President as I believe almost for the first time since I have been here possibilities of diplomatic action are really opening up. [3]

Bohlen

[3] On March 12, Hoover informed Bohlen that his telegram had been shown to the President, who had read it with great interest. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–HO/3–1256)

32. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, March 7, 1956—9 p.m.

2007. Following are chief points interest which emerged from my conversations with Soviet leaders last night (Embtel 1993 [2]). I will in each case identify source of information.

Internal party matters. Originally Molotov, in reply to my question, and subsequently independently Khrushchev, gave me following information as to operation of high party organs.

1. Presidium decisions are in general taken without vote but in event disagreement vote is taken with recording in the protocol of minority or even individual views. Both were emphatic on this subject and Khrushchev said in event of disagreement which cannot be ironed out in discussion a vote is "obligatory."

2. The Secretariat is subordinate to Presidium during periods between meetings of Central Committee and has no independent status of its own. Khrushchev was again emphatic on this point and used the word "unconditionally".

3. The RSFSR Bureau is also completely subordinate to Presidium and, according to Khrushchev, was set up for administrative reasons in order to render more orderly the conduct of party business in the RSFSR where, as he said, there were "large party organs" in Moscow, Leningrad and other areas. He said past practice had shown that the previous mechanism was inadequate to insure continuity and administration over these "big" party organizations. In this sense the position of the RSFSR in the party structure tends to approximate, although some difference still remains, that of the Union Republic.

4. Candidates to the Presidium have right to attend regular sessions of Presidium but do not do so in all cases. They have right of participation in discussion but no vote.

Taking advantage of the nature of conversation and in order to see his reaction, I told Khrushchev that there had been some press comment that he was on the way to becoming another "great leader." His reaction was immediate and definite, although he did not appear bothered by the question. He said that this was "absolute nonsense" and "could not be" under present conditions. He said that the objective circumstances of the Soviet Union rendered this impos-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/3–756. Secret; Limited Distribution. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that this telegram was pouched to Tokyo on March 30 and to Budapest, Bucharest, and Belgrade on April 5.

[2] Document 30.

sible. I received subsequently from Mikoyan a statement along these same lines.

I was in a discussion with Khrushchev and Malenkov together when the subject of reasons for the latter's resignation came up. On this subject the party line was rather closely adhered to since Malenkov said that having been designated to head the group at time of Stalin's death it was found that he did not have enough "experience." In reply to my question on economic policy, Khrushchev admitted that certain adjustments had been necessary. In part, he said, that this was because they came to realize that disarmament was not an immediate prospect (although he did not say so I think he had German rearmament in mind), but both denied with vigor that there had been any "quarrel" between them on economic policy. Khrushchev said "Why, Georgi Malenkov is one of my closest friends". Of all the topics discussed I felt this one was the least frank.

Subsequent to these discussions Mikoyan gave me a brief description of how business was conducted under Stalin, particularly in later years. He described these as "difficult times" and said that Stalin made decisions on his own frequently without any consultation "with any of us." Mikoyan said this situation could not be repeated after his death and that therefore the collective principle was reinstated in the party. He said that by this procedure Stalin had abolished the principle of voting in party organs and in effect had destroyed their vitality and usefulness. On question of rewriting history, Mikoyan said "under present circumstances" it is essential that the history of Soviet Union should be rewritten in order to conform with reality, and intimated that the process might be quite far-reaching. He told me in all probability that Lenin's testament would be public and in reply to my question he admitted the existence of a letter from Lenin to Stalin breaking off all personal relations on the Georgian question referred to by Trotsky in his biography of Stalin.

As a sidelight on attitude towards Khrushchev, at one point in conversation with Bulganin and Molotov I mentioned that I had just seen at the Indian Embassy a documentary film of the Indian trip and said that there was one very interesting picture of Khrushchev getting on an elephant, to which Molotov said "Yes, an elephant getting on an elephant."

At another time to both my wife and myself Khrushchev said "You will understand why after the death of Stalin we had to get rid of Beria."

In general, whenever subject was mentioned all leaders I talked with emphasized that under present conditions in Soviet Union collective leadership was the only form of rule possible but did not

do so with the appearance of voicing a line concerted in advance, since in most cases they were in response to specific questions from me on one of the other aspects treated above.

I believe the foregoing will be of interest to Department, not because remarks in themselves are of such great importance, but as an illustration of the greater frankness with which these people are now talking to foreigners.

Foreign Affairs. Khrushchev spoke to me at some length on problem of disarmament, stating as already reported he felt President's message [3] had "certain positive elements" in it. I told him I thought disarmament question seemed to be in something of a chicken and an egg stage, since I am sure he realized that the US and other Western nations could not accept any agreement on disarmament until we were certain that workable and effective method of inspection and control had been developed; to do otherwise would be to take an unacceptable risk for national security. Khrushchev said that he favored control, but he thought their proposal of inspection airfields, ports, railheads, etc. would provide safeguard against surprise armed attack based on his experiences in the war. I told him that development of modern weapons had changed the picture since last war and, as President indicated, combination President's open skies proposal and Soviet plan for inspection airfields, ports, etc. could form basis for an adequate inspection and control system. He reminded me of his observations to the President at Geneva [4] and said in their view this could be culminating point of disarmament structure but that present state of mistrust in world affairs did not render it feasible. He admitted, in reply to my question, that what chiefly concerned him was possibility that aerial inspection in itself would not lead to disarmament and that when adequate photographs had been taken it might be abandoned, and repeating his Geneva observation said it was primarily an intelligence operation.

I told him I thought his fears were groundless, since that was not its intention and indeed as President stated the very institution of aerial photography would be probably the most effective means of dispelling distrust and fear of surprise attack. He repeated several times, as did subsequently Molotov and Bulganin, that the Soviet Union was deadly serious in regard to disarmament and that they felt that with genuine effort some common basis for agreement could be found. He did not repeat in this conversation the usual charges that "certain circles" in the US were blocking progress in

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[3] See Document 28.

[4] For documentation on the Geneva Heads of Government meeting, July 18–23, see vol. v, pp. 119 ff.

this field, but seemed to show a realization of the complexities and difficulties of the problem.

Germany. Khrushchev and Molotov asked me if I had read recent TASS declaration on Germany,[5] and I said that I had and that I did not find it [at] all surprising in view of the position they had taken at both Geneva conferences. Khrushchev then said he hoped that the West understood very clearly that they were "not in a position" to make any deal behind the backs and at the expense of the DDR, and that they could not and would not go along that path. Khrushchev said that the West German Government did not seem to realize this fact which had been the reason for the TASS announcement, and he expressed the view that Von Brentano was largely responsible since he had found Adenauer "more realistic" during their Moscow visit. Both repeated that the only road to unification was by direct dealings between the two Germanys.

I said I thought this provided no solution whatsoever and would merely legalize and perpetuate division of Germany, and until German unity was achieved in accordance with the freely expressed wish of the German people there could be no real tranquility or security in Europe. Neither disagreed with this statement but merely repeated that they would not sell out East German regime for any consideration and that this fact must be faced.

I gained the distinct impression that the Soviet leaders themselves had no clear policy for the future in regard to German unification and had gotten themselves into position where they had very little room for maneuver, and their problem of DDR set-up was chief obstacle. In fact, Khrushchev at one point said strategically Soviet Union had little interest in, what he rather contemptuously described as, 17 million Germans but that matter of DDR was a "political" question.

Bulganin made to me last evening what I regard as one of the best expressions of Russian Bolshevik mentality when in discussing Soviet American relations he said "You cannot escape Russian friendship."[6]

As indicated in my previous message on this subject,[7] while

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[5] Not further identified.

[6] A similar view was expressed to the first U.S. Minister to Russia, John Quincy Adams, in 1810 by Russian Chancellor Nikolai P. Rumiantsev, who said, "Our attachment to the United States, I assure you is *obstinate—more obstinate than you are aware of.*" (Quoted in Adams' despatch of October 12, 1810; *The United States and Russia: The Beginning of Relations, 1765–1815* (Washington, 1980), p. 704.)

[7] Document 30.

none of foregoing is new or of vital importance I hope it will be possible to keep it confidential.

Bohlen

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33. Editorial Note

On February 25, at the final session of the 20th Party Congress, which was closed to all except party delegates, Nikita S. Khrushchev delivered a long speech denouncing Stalin for having executed without cause during the purges of the 1930's thousands of military and political figures. For Khrushchev's recollections of the origin of this secret speech, see *Khrushchev Remembers*, pages 346–350.

Ambassador Bohlen first heard of the speech on March 10 at a reception at the French Embassy and reported this in telegram 2045 from Moscow, March 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/3–1256) Bohlen's recollections of his efforts to confirm the rumors about the speech are in Bohlen, *Witness to History*, pages 397–398. In telegram 2091 from Moscow, March 16, Bohlen reported that he was informed by a Western correspondent in Moscow that an unidentified Russian source indicated that the Soviet Government sent Tito a detailed summary of Khrushchev's secret speech, which was apparently hand carried by the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow to Tito. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/3–1656)

Regarding the release of this speech, see footnote 3, Document 50.

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34. Memorandum of Discussion at the 280th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 22, 1956 [1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and item 1, "Report by the Secretary of State".]

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on March 23.

2. Significant World Developments Affecting U. S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence explained that he would like first to discuss the dramatic news from Moscow. The plain attempt to blast Stalin to pieces had raised a number of interesting problems. Someone had suggested, indeed, that Joseph Stalin had now become "the Trojan corpse" which was to be introduced inside the defenses of the free world.

Mr. Dulles then went on to describe the alleged now famous final meeting at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Foreign Delegates had been excluded from this meeting at which Khrushchev so violently criticized Stalin. Mr. Dulles believed that Khrushchev's purpose at this meeting was to provide guidance to the Soviet delegates present on how to deal henceforth with the Stalin myth or saga. No one knew precisely what had transpired at this meeting, but Mr. Dulles said that the following was his own guess. It seemed quite likely that as Khrushchev was proceeding to read the directives downgrading Stalin, questions were put to him from the floor which he had undertaken to answer extemporaneously. While this might account for some of the drama, it was also apparent that Khrushchev had deliberately undertaken in his speech to destroy Stalin, because he had cited chapter and verse on all of Stalin's crimes. Mr. Dulles then proceeded to summarize the alleged contents of Khrushchev's speech. Thereafter he noted that while nothing had yet appeared in the Soviet press with respect to this now famous occasion, a great many newspaper people in the Soviet Union had managed to pick up bits and pieces of what had happened. The fact that there had been no official denial of these newspaper stories, and the fact that the USSR was permitting these stories to get by the censors, would seem to indicate the basic truth of the allegation that the attack on Stalin had taken place.

As in the case of what had occurred at this meeting, so likewise with the repercussions in Georgia.[2] It was hard to distinguish between fact and rumor. Mr. Dulles then gave a general account of the student riots in Tiflis. It seemed particularly significant to him that the uprising in Tiflis went so far that the Soviet Government

[2] The anniversary of Stalin's death, March 5, passed unnoticed in the Soviet Union. On March 7, student demonstrations, whose purpose was unknown, took place in Tiflis, the capital of the Georgian Republic. There were unconfirmed reports that Soviet troops or police fired on the demonstrators on March 8. A brief chronology of the developments in Georgia was attached to a memorandum of March 19 from Beam through Murphy to the Acting Secretary, in which Beam concluded that there was "no information to indicate that the reported demonstrations in Georgia are serious or that the situation is not fully under control." (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/3–1956)

had been obliged to relax some of its major anti-Stalinist measures in Georgia.

Mr. Dulles next directed attention to the question as to why the rulers of the Soviet Union had decided to attack Stalin's reputation in this particular way and at this particular time. This was a puzzling problem. One explanation, of course, was the Communist penchant for self-criticism. Another explanation perhaps lay in the hope of the Soviet leaders to gain respectability aboard by virtue of a complete break with the past. Mr. Dulles expressed skepticism as to whether this latter objective would be attained, although he admitted that it might have some effect on the Socialist parties throughout the world. Another possibility was that the Soviet leaders had permitted themselves to be pushed further than they had initially intended to go, thanks to Khrushchev's exuberant personality. There was always the possibility, of course, that Khrushchev had been drunk. Nevertheless, it was significant that there was as yet no visible tendency to reverse the trend in the direction of destroying Stalin's influence.

Mr. Dulles then commented that these events afforded the United States a great opportunity, both covertly and overtly, to exploit the situation to its advantage. Stalin had been the chief theoretician of the Soviet Union. He had been its great war hero in addition to his more familiar role as Dictator of the Soviet Union for twenty-five years. What would the Soviets now do with all the vast accumulation of Stalin's printed works? It would take years to rid libraries and individuals of these volumes. There was also the problem occasioned by the fact that Stalin's detractors had all worked closely with him over a long period of years. It would obviously be very difficult to create a new tradition. There was the problem of Stalin's policies which, if any of these, would now be repudiated. Finally, what would the leadership in the satellite states now do? These men were almost all the creatures of Stalin.

In conclusion, Mr. Dulles suggested that all of these problems had important policy implications for the United States. Accordingly, they should be most carefully considered. In Mr. Dulles' opinion, Khrushchev and the other leaders had been guilty of a most serious mistake.

The President expressed agreement with Mr. Dulles' judgment. He gave it as his personal belief that when the Soviet leaders decided to adopt the new tactics and approach with which we are now familiar, they had felt themselves obliged to repudiate Stalin. After all, said the President, the Soviets could not make people like Nehru believe, at one and the same time, in the sincerity of the new Soviet tactics and in the validity of the Stalinist line and tactics.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that Communism could not be held together without a doctrine. In this belief Stalin was correct. While

the present Soviet leaders could rid themselves of Stalin's books and Stalin's doctrine, they would have to find a substitute. Both the President and Mr. Allen Dulles suggested that the substitute was already at hand in the writings of Lenin. Secretary Dulles agreed, but pointed out that there was no handbook of Leninism. Lenin's writings encompassed ten large volumes. It was going to be very difficult to decide what to pick out of these volumes and summarize in a handbook.

Secretary Wilson said that he had one question to put. Was there any likelihood that what had happened in the Soviet Union would turn out favorably for the United States? The President and Secretary Dulles answered that they thought that these events would be definitely advantageous for the United States.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

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35. Intelligence Brief Prepared by the Office of Intelligence Research [1]

No. 1902 *Washington, March 30, 1956.*

THE DESECRATION OF STALIN

The public desecration of Stalin by his successors constitutes a major psychological jolt whose ultimate repercussions on the Soviet population and Communists abroad cannot yet be foreseen.

Initial reports from both inside and outside the Soviet Union reveal that the attack on Stalin has produced disbelief, uncertainty, confusion, embarrassment, and anger.

Hazards Ahead. The Soviet rulers certainly realized that by publicly attacking Stalin they would create for themselves certain risks. Because they would hardly attempt political suicide, they presumably calculated that they could successfully cope with these hazards, which they may have unduly discounted.

The main risk was an intangible one: the psychological effect on Party members at home and abroad. For years millions within the USSR and abroad have been encouraged to believe in the wisdom of

[1] Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487, USSR. Confidential. A printed note on the source text reads: "This is an Intelligence Report and not a statement of Departmental policy."

a demi-god and the consequent correctness of all Soviet methods and policies. About half of the present Soviet population has been born since 1929 when the cult of Stalin-worship began. Communist parties abroad attained their largest growth during the post-war period when Stalin-worship reached its all-time high.

The sudden effort to eradicate a quarter century of indoctrination that Communist loyalties should be directed toward the symbol of Stalin would require many Communists to make a deep personal readjustment. For years they had either uncritically accepted all things Stalin or disciplined themselves to suppress private doubts that Moscow has now publicly expressed. The Soviet rulers presumably count on intensive indoctrination, and the habit of compliance to lubricate the process of readjustment, but the speed with which the Communist rank-and-file can reorient itself after such a psychological jolt remains to be seen.

The Soviet rulers will need to set up guideposts to clarify the new path for the Party line. Pressures to resist the line and pressures to exceed it will have to be checked at all levels. The license to criticize Stalin cannot be allowed to become a permit to question basic Soviet policies, or the legitimacy of the current rulers, or their role in aiding Stalin's rise and his mistakes. The rewriting of 36 years of Soviet history and the actual rehabilitation of some of Stalin's victims will have to be controlled by countless decisions that may ultimately touch on all facets of Soviet life.

Evidently the Soviet rulers are willing to accept the consequences of a period of confusion and uncertainty. They presumably calculate that their machinery for persuasion and coercion will enable them to keep within limits the negative repercussions and in time will ensure support for the new line. The very act of initiating criticism of Stalin appears to indicate that the Soviet ruling group views its own position with confidence. The absence of various Soviet rulers from the USSR during the reported demonstrations in Georgia, apparently touched off by the attack on Stalin, further points toward assuredness among the ruling group.

Moving with Caution. Meanwhile, they appear to be unfolding their campaign against Stalin with some degree of caution.

The present leadership had begun to shrink Stalin's symbol almost immediately after his death by withholding adulation from him and concentrating it instead on Lenin. This treatment of Stalin during the three years leading up to the Party Congress suggests that at least a substantial portion within the ruling group, if not all, agreed that he should be cut down in size.

Whether this shrinking process was also part of a premeditated program leading up to an open attack on him at the Congress is open to question. The treatment of Stalin fluctuated during this

period. Although reduced in stature, he remained a positive symbol. His birthday anniversary in December received unusual attention and as late as January he was accorded favorable treatment. Had the Soviet rulers been pursuing a fully agreed program, it is possible that they would have sought to condition the Party and the population for the shock of public criticism of Stalin. The suddenness of the switch from passively withholding praise of Stalin to actively assailing him and the variations in the treatment of this issue by various speakers at the Congress suggest that the ruling group may have been divided on how far to go and may have reached a decision only shortly before the Congress.

Even at the Congress, they moved with care. In the published speeches they avoided criticizing Stalin by name, except once, although he was the unmistakable target for their attack. The detailed indictment was reserved for Khrushchev's speech at a closed session on the last day of the Congress.

It is understandable why the Soviet rulers preferred to reserve their main attack for a closed meeting. Yet the possibility cannot be completely excluded that they had not intended to go beyond the charges made publicly, but that in view of the mixed reactions to these charges they felt it necessary to justify their attack by revealing a more detailed indictment.

Since the Congress they have continued to move gradually. A month after Khrushchev's secret speech the Soviet press had yet even to mention the fact of its delivery. Soviet censors had allowed foreign correspondents to refer to it since March 17, but criticism of Stalin by foreign Communists has been deleted from reports of their speeches in the Soviet press.

For the first month after the Congress the indoctrination of the Party rank-and-file and apparently some non-Party persons has been confined to an oral basis. Party leaders and agitators have addressed meetings throughout the Soviet Union, presumably revealing the contents of Khrushchev's secret speech or a reported secret circular from the Central Committee based on the speech. A British Communist correspondent in Moscow estimates 30 million Soviet citizens will have attended these meetings. Given the rapidity of rumors within the Soviet Union, a large share of the population can now be assumed to have heard of Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin.

While the oral indoctrination continues, the Soviet press broke its silence on March 28 when *Pravda* published a commentary denouncing some of the evils of Stalin's rule. *Kommunist*, the Party's theoretical journal, and *Red Star*, Army organ, followed with critical articles. The *Pravda* piece centered on the point that it was absurd, even superstitious, to imagine that Soviet successes are the work of

only one man. Rather it is the people, led by the Party, who make history.

The commentary appeared to be only a partial paraphrase of Khrushchev's reported speech. It did not go as far as the charges already revealed in the published speeches of the Congress and it ignored various charges made by satellite leaders, who would be unlikely to exceed Soviet instructions on so delicate a topic. *Pravda* did confirm that a large-scale "explanatory campaign" was under way and would purposely avoid a rapid pace because of the vastness and difficulty of the task at hand.

Meanwhile, the regime has indicated the new attitude toward Stalin by removing some, not all, pictures and statues of him from various public places. The Soviet radio is said to have stopped broadcasting the lyrics of the national anthem, which includes a favorable reference to Stalin. The name of the large Stalin Automobile Works in Moscow is reported to have been changed to Moscow Automobile Works. New history books are said to be in preparation. At least one prominent victim of Stalin's purges has been seen in Moscow after nearly 20 years in prison, and others are reported to have been rehabilitated. There are rumors that petitions are being circulated demanding the removal of Stalin's body from the Red Square mausoleum. How far the regime intends to go in displacing public symbols of Stalin is yet to be revealed. It should be noted that Stalin peace prizes were awarded to foreigners in mid-March.

Charges Against Stalin. Since the text of Khrushchev's speech is not yet available, it is impossible to compile a complete set of the approved Soviet charges against Stalin. However, the allegations made in public at the Party Congress, the *Pravda* commentary of March 28, and the similarities in statements by foreign Communist leaders, suggesting that they were working from a common text, indicates the general nature of the charges. The most detailed set of charges appeared in the Yugoslav newspaper *Borba* on March 20, and these were described as still incomplete.

Apparently Stalin's activities generally before 1934 are to be favorably regarded. He was hailed by *Pravda* for his role in the Soviet civil war, for opposing Trotsky, his role in building socialism. Foreign Communists also praised him for undertaking the collectivization of agriculture and for launching the program of forced industrialization. One line common to foreign Communists is to hail the "great victories" achieved during Stalin's time, but to admit that "they may have cost more than was necessary."

After the early 'thirties he is said to have "gradually" placed himself above Party and state and instituted one-man rule during which he made a number of errors and committed various excesses. In particular, his methods are said to have resulted in:

(1) Stultification of the Party apparatus and administrative overcentralization

(2) Illegal use of the police and resultant excesses, including unjustified repression even of fellow Communists

(3) Self-adulation, fabrication and distortion of Soviet history and unjust maligning of veteran Communists

(4) Theoretical errors, especially in regard to the growth of capitalism and nationality policies

(5) Failure to prepare the USSR for the Nazi attack and errors in the conduct of hostilities

(6) Unjustly liquidating a large number of Soviet military officers

(7) Inflexibility in foreign policy, including mishandling the Yugoslav issue

(8) Incorrect emphasis in agriculture

(9) Stagnation in arts and literature.

The *Borba* article spelled out these charges in greater details. It alleged that Khrushchev accused a "morbidly suspicious" Stalin of conducting a reign of terror over his associates as well as the population at large, ordering the death of Voznesensky, instituting the "doctors' plot," and committing other crimes. Pending clarification from Soviet sources, there is no way to judge the accuracy of these press reports.

Although the Soviet rulers have indicated that they do not intend to repudiate Stalin completely, they may find it difficult to preserve Stalin's earlier merits once his reported excesses become widely known.

Motives for the Attack. The apparent effects of the attack on Stalin, apart from the psychological disturbances, probably throw light on the motives of the Soviet rulers. These effects included:

(1) *One-man rule besmirched.* Stalin's mistakes and excesses were invariably traced to the fact that he had managed to place himself above state and party. The criticism of the evils of one-man rule thus served as a contrasting backdrop for the praises of the virtue of collective leadership and as a condemnation in advance of any future attempt of a single individual to acquire a monopoly of power.

(2) *Identity of present ruling group established.* The public burial of the cult of Stalin-worship appears designed to give the impression of a break with the excesses of the Stalinist past and to portray the present rulers as a more reasonable regime.

(3) *Position of "Stalinists" undercut.* The dethronement of Stalin also serves to dilute the authority of those who have referred to Stalin as an authority to justify their positions.

(4) *Stalin's reputation smeared.* Assuming the correctness of Khrushchev's reported description of the terrors of life under Stalin, his former associates doubtless shared an emotional interest in publicly smearing him. In addition, they undoubtedly believed that their action would find approval among certain groups of the population.

While these effects doubtless reflect varying factors in the Soviet decision, they do not seem in themselves to provide a satisfactory explanation for the Soviet rulers' action. Much the same effect could have been achieved by simply letting Stalin be increasingly ignored. The conclusion seems inescapable, therefore, that the Soviet rulers deliberately wanted to make a spectacular impact such as the public denunciation of Stalin would produce. (Togliatti is reported to have said that the Soviet rulers told him that the Soviet party needed a severe and sudden shock.)

Did the Soviet rulers feel compelled to go to this extreme, or did they elect the action of their own free will? There is little evidence that they considered themselves under any immediate compulsion. Certainly the current international situation contained no pressure for them to dissociate themselves publicly from Stalin's methods. The domestic situation is obviously less well known, but present evidence does not indicate that any internal pressures compelled them to defame Stalin. Suggestions that the Soviet military had forced them to attack Stalin accords the armed forces an independent political role in no way supported by available evidence.

Clearly the Soviet rulers face various domestic problems, but they have given no indication of weakness in their will to cope with them. Indeed in the critical field of agriculture, they demonstrated increased confidence in the stability of their rule by initiating, after the Party Congress, renewed pressure against the peasants.

Increasingly during their three years of rule, the new rulers have demonstrated their own approach to some of these problems. They have brought about a general relaxation in the atmosphere of tension that clouded Stalin's last years. They have shown an awareness of the need of Soviet elite groups for a feeling of greater personal security: to be able to carry out their work without the threat of police terror. They have succeeded in ending one-man control of the police and thus reducing the threat of capricious coercion. They have sought to decentralize certain governmental and economic functions, distributing greater responsibility to the lower levels and to units outside of Moscow. At the same time, however, they have maintained an undiluted monopoly of political power, reserving to themselves the prerogative of final decision.

In essence, they have attempted to operate a totalitarian state without a single dictator and to reduce the paralyzing sanctions of Stalin's rule.

If less reliance is to be placed on coercion, threatened and real, then other means of inducing the population to perform satisfactorily rise in importance. In a system where coercion plays a strong role,

those below are expected simply to obey; they have little positive feeling of participation and are fearful of accepting responsibility.

During Stalin's era the regime sought to persuade as well as to coerce, and repeatedly called for measures to raise "inner-Party democracy," increase the activity and initiative of the Party rank-and-file, abolish a formalistic execution of decisions. Malenkov at the Nineteenth Party Congress especially emphasized the need for self-criticism and criticism from below, but revealed the ineffectiveness of such appeals when he admitted that some who had taken this course had suffered persecution and reprisals. Exhortations to greater effort apparently could not overcome the stagnation produced by fear and apathy.

The post-Stalin regime has similarly sought to revitalize the Party and to attract a more positive response from both elite groups and the population at large. The acceptance of responsibility and the exercise of initiative does not, however, come easy after years of experience in the penalties for failure, real and alleged. If the post-Stalin regime was to avoid a return to a greater reliance on coercion, it would have to convince the lower ranks of its seriousness in encouraging greater activity at their level and reassure them that such activity would not lead necessarily to personal jeopardy.

In such a context, the attack on Stalin can be viewed as a deliberate effort to stimulate the Party and the population by shock-treatment. Denunciation of terrorism would be expected to be received by the population, especially the elite, as a reassurance and to be answered by them with a more creative and enthusiastic approach to their work.

The regime might have been able to produce such a response by focusing the Soviet economic effort on raising the standard of living. Under the Sixth Five Year Plan, however, the Soviet worker is again being called upon to raise the productive capacity of the USSR. The goal of catching up with and surpassing the US economic output refers to heavy rather than light industry and thus offers little prospect for an early substantial rise in the Soviet general standard of living. Unwilling to divert resources for increased consumers' goods as a stimulant to the Soviet worker, the regime has apparently sought to spur him on with psychological inducements.

What response will be finally forthcoming from the Soviet population can only be surmised at this time. Although the Soviet regime appears to be urging the removal of certain inhibitions, its followers can be expected to move cautiously in testing any new ground.

The defamation of Stalin can also be regarded as a logical extension of current Soviet foreign policy efforts to appear respectable and to win support abroad. At the national level, local Commu-

nist parties will have to surmount their embarrassment, but in time may find themselves in a stronger position to claim that they are independent and to appeal to other leftist groups to establish popular fronts. It has been suggested that the attack on Stalin cannot but have an effect on the relationship between Moscow and parties within and outside the Communist bloc. The bloc parties face the same general problems on this subject as in the Soviet Union itself. In some cases, doubt may be thrown on the status of Communist leaders who have long been identified with Stalin or who occupy Stalin-like positions. Outside the bloc Communist Party members have raised publicly questions about the permissibility of criticizing the Soviet Union and of relying more heavily on their own evaluations particularly of local situations. How far Moscow will permit such questioning and to what extent it will insist on a common international Communist line remains to be seen.

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36. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, April 1, 1956—9 p.m.

2232. Vienna for Ambassador Bohlen. Embassy is making tentative comments re statement proposed in Deptel 1112 [2] but subject to Ambassador's views if he can be reached.

Presumably would be best if we are able to defer official comments until Soviet actions provide surer guide to meaning of 20th Party Congress and of de-Stalinization movement, but presume comment unavoidable if press raises issue. Objective then would presumably be to have best impact on those areas at moment most critical to our interests, as we do not believe it feasible to formulate comments which would have universally favorable impact.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/4–156. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Vienna. Bohlen left Moscow on March 19 to take leave in Vienna and to return to Washington for consultations. He returned to Moscow and resumed charge of the Embassy on April 24.

[2] Telegram 1112, March 31, contained a draft statement on the anti-Stalin campaign for use by the Secretary at his April 3 press conference and requested the Embassy's comments on the statement. (*Ibid.*, 761.00/3–3156) For text of the statement as released by Dulles at his news conference on April 3, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 16, 1956, pp. 637–638. A transcript of the news conference, during which several questions were asked regarding the Soviet Union and Khrushchev's speech, is *ibid.*, pp. 638–643.

It is also desirable comments provide minimum opportunity to Soviets for distortion as counter-propaganda.

In Asia and Middle East there appears willingness even anxiety to believe that the new Moscow lines indicate a basic reorientation of Soviet policy having as objective a lessening of tensions which will make it easier for newly sovereign populations to pursue development of their economies in peace. These peoples must also recognize that Soviet offers of assistance give them the opportunity to bargain. Probably the Yugoslav interpretation of events is similar although much deeper since it evidently stems from a conviction the principles that Tito has been enunciating are vindicated by Soviet emulation. Therefore, if it is Asians (and Yugoslavs) whom we particularly want to impress at this time, we would suggest that the statement give particular emphasis to what might be called "promising" elements in the current developments. We also believe that "denouncing Stalin" is of secondary importance; such denouncement seems to have been necessary (although the reasons may be obscure) in order to give emphasis and meaning to the line that has been developing for some time of so-called revolutionary legality.

In sum, we would hesitate to give the impression to the Asians that we rebuff without waiting to test the sincerity of the Soviet leadership in their offers of cooperation, negotiation and aid which have certainly impressed the Indians, Burmese and Arabs.

If it is considered desirable to retain the enumeration of deeds which the Soviets could perform as proof it would seem important to include disarmament in the third paragraph. We are somewhat dubious, however, about the desirability of including the Japanese since it is quite conceivable that the Soviets, having set up inflated bargaining positions, may be preparing in the relatively near future to make some "concessions" which the Japanese would find difficult to turn down at the price of normalization of relations. Also, although from our point of view Soviet activity in the Middle East is increasing tensions, we wonder whether our referring to the matter, at least until after Hammarskjold has completed proposed mission, would have a useful effect on the Arabs.

If we wish to concentrate on Europeans it should be useful to point out that although Soviet leadership may be responding in part to the aspirations of Soviet citizens long submerged by the repression characteristic of the Stalin style of government, nevertheless what that leadership now gives, it does so unilaterally and in no way surrenders the right to take away again although barring major domestic or foreign crisis, it would appear difficult for them to return overnight to Stalinist methods. The prerogatives Stalin monopolized have been somewhat dispersed, but not dissipated, among the new governors; and if there is at present a closer identification

between the interests of the regime and the aspirations of Soviet citizens, with consequent effect upon the method with which the regime operates, there has been no renouncement of objectives. What seems to have happened is that the regime's conviction that communism will ultimately prevail by operation of historical forces, barring nuclear warfare, has grown deeper and its greater self-assurance permits it a more relaxed method of rule and allows it to concede greater self-determination to satellites and Communist parties abroad.

Although the new posture may in the short run cause waverers in Western Europe to waver more and permit intellectuals etc. who found it difficult to stomach Stalin to satisfy their nostalgia for Lenin and therefore to regard the Soviet Union with additional sympathy, we concur fully with draft statement to effect that these and possibly other foreign repercussions have, in the light of circumstantial evidence so far available, played secondary part in the formulation by Soviet leaders of the present line. As statement implies, internal developments, e.g. the system although beset by serious, although not critical problems, has held together and operated successfully without the all powerful hand of Stalin; vested interests, professional and economic, have contributed to regime's stability.

Soviet people have long frustrated aspirations, seem to have been decisive in bringing the regime to its present conclusions and postures [*sic*]. Cutting across all of this is sobering effect of honest estimate of the nuclear equation (difficult for Stalin to reconcile with principles of infallibility and vulnerability).

In sum we would heartily agree that none more than the United States would welcome such changes provided they have cumulative favorable effect upon Soviet conduct of its relations with other countries.

Walmsley

37. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Beam) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) [1]

Washington, April 3, 1956.

SUBJECT

OCB Ad Hoc Committee on Anti-Stalin Campaign

The OCB Ad Hoc Committee has drawn up two papers—an intelligence round-up on the anti-Stalin campaign and general US policy paper [2]—which have been circulated to the OCB Board Assistants. The Committee is now meeting daily and will currently submit brief papers covering (1) latest developments (2) comments thereon (3) agreed courses of action and recommendations.

The first such paper is submitted herewith.

New Developments

Kommunist, Party theoretical journal, has an editorial (text unavailable) criticizing stagnating effects of Stalin's role on party organs. *Red Star*, Army organ, has accused Stalin of underestimating Lenin's military genius. Reports still conflict on whether violence took place in Georgia, but confirm that demonstrations did occur.

The attack on cult of personality apparently produced criticism of Ulbricht, but he appears to have weathered the storm. Party leadership elsewhere in the orbit does not seem to be affected.

In Yugoslavia, the text of the *Borba* article of March 20 has just been received and appears to be the most complete, and probably authoritative statement, of Soviet charges against Stalin. (Tab A). [3]

General Comments

While the *Pravda* March 28 editorial significantly did not mention Khrushchev's speech, it apparently sought to curb extreme interpretations of that speech. By dividing the Stalin era into good and bad periods it tried to create as smooth a possible transition to

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[1] Source: Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Stalin I. Secret. Copies were sent to Sohm, Comstock, and Stoessel for William Jackson. Attached to the source text was a brief note from Beam to Murphy, also dated April 3, in which Beam wrote that this memorandum was the result of two meetings of the committee and explained that the "budget is rather meager since we only include recommendations which have been agreed upon between all of us."

[2] One of these references is presumably to Document 35, since there is a previous draft of this paper dated March 27 and headed "Intelligence Paper prepared for OCB Working Group," Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Soviet and Related Problems. The general U.S. policy paper referred to has not been further identified.

[3] Not printed.

the new approach and to placate those communists both within and outside Russia who may have been shocked by Khrushchev's harsh denunciation.

The *Borba* editorial fails to credit Stalin with any "good period". It refers to Bulganin, Khrushchev and Mikoyan as the leaders of the Soviet communist party, perhaps indicating they are the ones the Yugoslavs primarily look to as against other leaders who may hold different views.

There has been a different tempo of acceptance of the new line by the communist parties outside of Russia. This has occurred faster in the parties in Poland and East Germany.

Agreed Courses of Action

For the time being US *overt* propaganda should continue to be pitched on a minor key. The anti-Stalin campaign is following its own course, very much to our advantage. If the communists could show that the US was gloating over their present embarrassment, they might be able to close ranks and also discredit the US with some Socialist elements who would dislike a sensational "capitalist" victory.

While continuing to promote the destruction of communist credibility, as provided in general guidance, US media should endeavor to delay as long as possible the closing of the gap between the new communist line and the old.

US media can point out the inconsistency between the *Pravda* and *Borba* editorials, emphasizing the former did not tell the whole story.

Doubt and criticism can also be stimulated by asking hypothetical questions of a kind probably in the minds of many communists.

Opportunities for creating confusion within foreign communist parties, and particularly in France and Italy, should be exploited by indirect means, as is now being done, rather than by direct US intervention, which would be counter-productive.

Guidance has been furnished to USIA on the Secretary's press statement of April 3 (Tab B).[4]

[4] See footnote 2, *supra*.

According to the preliminary notes prepared by Richards on the OCB meeting of April 4, the following occurred:

"The work of the working group on the Anti-Stalin campaign was discussed at some length. It was generally agreed that the working group was serving a useful purpose and it was agreed to accept the following recommendations as to the handling of the reports:

" '(1) That the OCB Working Group continue to meet to appraise new developments and to advise the policy officers of State;

" '(2) That the Chairman of the Working Group (Mr. Beam) be charged with the responsibility of seeing that working group papers are brought to the attention of top policy officers in the Department; and,

" '(3) That after the Working Group paper has been acted upon at the policy level in State, appropriate guidance immediately be sent through normal channels to USIA.' " (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, OCB Preliminary Notes)

38. Editorial Note

At the 281st meeting of the National Security Council on April 5, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles made the following comments during his briefing on significant world developments affecting United States security:

"The Director of Central Intelligence said he would comment first on the campaign to downgrade Stalin, which he said was continuing briskly. He referred to editorials published in *Pravda*, in the publications of the Soviet armed forces, and in *Kommunist*. Mr. Dulles speculated that, thanks to the play in the foreign press, the anti-Stalin campaign was receiving more impetus than its instigators had originally intended it to have.

"Mr. Dulles said that only yesterday had the Chinese Communists finally made known their views on the anti-Stalin campaign, in the shape of a long statement which had reached us last night. It was evident from this statement that the Chinese Communists were in some difficulty because they do not fully accept the new Soviet insistence on collective leadership. Incidentally, said Mr. Dulles, he personally believed that the Soviet leaders had their tongues in their cheeks when they professed to believe in the practice of collective leadership.

"At this point Mr. Dulles went on to comment on the various satellite reactions to the downgrading of Stalin, to the wholesale rehabilitation of individuals who had been purged, and finally to point out that in some of the satellites political difficulties were bound to emerge from this campaign.

"In concluding his remarks concerning the downgrading of Stalin, Mr. Dulles reported the comments of the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir William Hayter. The Ambassador believed that the anti-Stalin campaign was basically directed toward internal Soviet objectives rather than to foreign relations." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The views of the Chinese Communist Government on the anti-Stalin campaign, as expressed in an article in the official party newspaper *Peoples Daily* of April 5, were transmitted to the Department and analyzed in telegram 1969 from Hong Kong, April 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/4–656)

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39. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, April 9, 1956—7 p.m.

2300. This telegram and following message [2] (which will contain reference to present one) are companion pieces designed as of possible use during Ambassador's consultation. Present message seeks to present general picture of post-20th Congress period, while next one will deal more specifically with most important element of so-called campaign against personality cult and will also endeavor to identify some of new problems which present solutions of old problems may produce.

I. Where Stalin is himself criticized in current line, it is because of specific errors attributed to him, errors which it is implied party, had it been able, would not have permitted. These errors were serious primarily in sense they diverted or slowed progress of Soviet Union or increased risks to it. Stalin's "constructive" achievements, i.e. whenever he consulted leadership, are still separated and preserved. It is more plausible, therefore, to consider campaign anti-Stalinism rather than anti-Stalin.

II. Destruction of myth of Stalinist infallibility and invulnerability transfers to party legality, morality and omniscience. This, as reported before, provides ideological underpinning for party necessary as backdrop and to justify party decisions and actions of government responsive thereto.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/4–956. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, and Bonn and pouched to posts in Eastern Europe.

[2] Telegram 2316, *infra*.

It is as necessary to these people as to other societies that policy be based upon some standard of morality, ethics or faith; it is constitutional foundation which even most arbitrary of governments seem to need to justify itself.

III. Unified field theory of Soviet action seems to be borne out by developments. While needs of internal situation and of purposes of party seem to have immediately preponderant role in shaping new postures, external effects are not absent.

A. As to internal side, motives while in most instances still obscure seem to be divided into two categories.

1. Internal compulsions. These would include such problems as agricultural yields, productivity of industrial labor, and very importantly, the loosened relationships within Presidium inherent in collective leadership. Well-being of Soviet citizens which for a large percentage fall short of their aspirations and which during Stalinist forced draft were pretty much ignored, must also be present as consideration. It can be moreover imagined that professional military pride which had been deeply injured by purges and by Stalin's assumption of credit for winning war has been a factor taken into account at least by leaders in weighing effects of present movement. Also, fact that system has held together despite demise of the autocrat suggests that party, bureaucratic and professional classes (especially those advanced rapidly into vacancies created by purges) have developed vested interest in privileges and positions attained in regime, contributing to its stability, and have some means to make their voice heard. It might also be expected that intellectual curiosity unsatisfied by strictly controlled availability of scholastic and technical material has created restiveness in growing numbers of students and younger professional people.

2. Internal purposes. At same time, thanks to proven stability of regime and demonstrated workability of collective leadership (crisis of succession in any case has been weathered), leadership has found itself sufficiently strong to take certain measures of its own will to counter-act and overcome its inherited shortcomings. While ends may be unclear to outsiders, it is unlikely that they differ greatly from what they were under Stalin, but progress towards these ends under Stalinist system was often slowed, arrested or reversed. One of important effects of Stalinism was lethargy and mediocrity engendered in state and party bureaucracy and discouragement of initiative and spontaneity in arts, professions and technology. Undoubtedly present moves are designed to encourage initiative and provide incentives in order to increase material and intellectual output.

B. External factors. Realization that course Stalin had been pursuing would only increase risk of war, and honest appraisal of nuclear equation that was incompatible with principle of infallibility and invulnerability necessary to Stalin must have had important influence on present leadership. These people are sensitive to foreign reactions to estimates of their own intentions and are able, where

Stalin was not, to behave in manner designed for favorable foreign impact. It cannot very well have escaped them that Stalin's rigidity, suspicions and brutality were mainly responsible for fear abroad of Soviet Union, and for military and political counter measures taken abroad. If this fear can be dispelled more auspicious atmosphere might be built for historic developments which as Marxist leaders of Soviet Union feel must in time take place. Realistic strategic concepts that Soviet Government now gives signs of accepting indicate that modern war, i.e. destruction of Soviet resources and base of power, would advance neither their national interests nor Marxism.

IV. As to loosened relationship within Presidium (referred to above) its effects must be felt down lines of command: in Soviet relationships with Chinese Communists and satellites, and in those with countries of rest of world. This is less a calculated effect than psychological one, but even so it is extremely important one to recognize since it does not in any way represent lessened hostility toward United States and "reactionary" societies. Conviction of leadership here in "rightness", strength and stability of system and in Marxist theory of history is no weaker, and is probably stronger. Willingness to "compete" in so-called peaceful co-existence starts from borders outward, never inward, of expanded empire inherited from Stalin. There is no sign of intent to move back from these borders. Competition they envisage is either in uncommitted areas or among populations of our allies, under new and, it must be admitted, more sensible set of ground rules. Undoubtedly Soviets have also in mind, without factor being controlling one, appeal to so-called progressive elements in West who were unable to stomach Stalinist brutalities, of mystique of daring reform movement credited to Lenin.

V. Cumulative documentation of the new line indicates that leadership has taken account of problems to arise from shift away from measures of repression toward incentives and indoctrination. Present movement is cautious, each step seems to be tested by measuring its contribution to envisaged ends against new problems it generates. When they speak of democratic centralism involving two antagonistic concepts, they are speaking of relative emphasis rather than of clear cut principle.

(These inbuilt problems were manifest at Writers' Congress and more recent Architects' Congress, and crack few days ago at provincial press for lack of originality; exhortations to creativeness coupled with warnings against departures from lines laid down from the top or violations of discipline.)

In sum, the place is in motion, but there is no evidence as yet that problem of stimulating initiative has been reconciled with necessity of preserving discipline.

Walmsley

40. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, April 11, 1956—7 p.m.

2316. This is companion to Embtel 2300, [2] and is specific appraisal current treatment of Stalin based on latest authoritative Soviet statements (editorial current issue *Kommunist* and *Pravda* article April 5—Embtel 2278 [3]).

While yet impracticable here to try answer many questions on this development (e.g. precisely when and under what circumstances decision taken to launch frontal attack on Stalin), seems reasonably clear that party leaders pursuing three broad goals:

1. Leadership undoubtedly calculated campaign would facilitate restoration "Leninist norms party life," infusing new vigor into party structure which (particularly on intermediate and lower levels) had withered under Stalin. In words *Kommunist*, "ignoring by Stalin of norms party life, collective leadership led to violations internal party democracy, lowering of activity of Communists, their initiative, independence, retarded development criticism and self criticism". In sense, move is shock treatment, reaching new heights in post Stalin efforts to revitalize party. Purpose made clear by *Kommunist*: "Internal party democracy is not end in itself, but means for developing energy, activity of Communists, for mobilizing them for fulfillment economic and cultural plans".

2. By disassociating themselves from and condemning arbitrary acts of Stalin, party leaders probably hope to win wider active support from key groups in Soviet population (e.g. cultural, managerial, scientific, military). They seek to convince both these groups and ordinary citizen that "democratic" party rule has replaced one man dictatorship forever. Move has further advantage of helping establish present collective leadership as proper, legitimate successor Lenin.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/4–1156. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, and Bonn and pouched to posts in Eastern Europe.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/4–556)

3. Finally, by repudiating certain aspects of Stalinism and presenting themselves as Leninist "democrats", they may hope simultaneously to remove onus which brutalities Stalinism placed on party of world opinion and to narrow gap between Western social democracy (Titoism) and Soviet Communism.

Party leadership can reasonably be expected to achieve some success toward these goals. Its effect on certain segments of population non-Communist world, coupled with flexible foreign policy and deft manipulation propaganda symbols, should help USSR in its world diplomacy. Within Soviet Union, campaign should appeal among key groups mentioned above, not only because Stalin deflated but (perhaps more important) because it makes more convincing assertions Soviet leaders that police terror as it existed under Stalin is thing of past. Additionally, campaign will probably create atmosphere conducive to more realistic discussion of internal economic and social problems and may stimulate—as intended—greater local initiative. Finally, psychological-ideological barrier to reestablishment personal dictatorship raised by campaign must be regarded as one of its most significant substantive results.

On other hand, campaign poses certain real and potential problems for regime, though it is impracticable at this time to assess precisely their impact and this aspect must be approached with great caution. Nonetheless, following items deserve mention (subject to overall reservations in conclusion this message):

Party leadership runs risk of encouraging freedom thought, expression beyond intended limits, of creating or reinforcing doubts concerning party as infallible. *Pravda* editorial April 5 (tone of which somewhat defensive) makes clear that under "guise of condemning personality cult", at least few party members have already given vent to "anti-party statements", while others have taken "liberal attitude" towards these offenders. *Pravda* wailing may dampen further public expression "anti party statements" among party rank and file, but will it provide convincing answer to questions and doubts underlying such statements? This connection intelligent Russian contact of Western diplomat here recently asserted that campaign has shaken "faith" average Soviet in party and its leadership (has there been some miscalculation of impact?).

2. Senior members of Presidium in shaping course also place selves in exposed position. Abroad it is easy to point to hypocrisy these people and foreign Communists, but internal impact can be far more important. It is recalled in speeches at 20th Congress (which by nature is form for agreed policy presentation) Voroshilhov only member of party Presidium (except Kirichenko) who failed to criticize personality cult, while Molotov [garble] relatively weak in their condemnation. At least seven members party Presidium cannot escape fact they were Stalin's creatures and tools during many of actions now criticized. This thought must come to minds of many Soviet citizens. And if repudiation of Stalin carried far enough,

implication of these henchmen could be used in future by rising generation in party.

3. Process of repudiating certain methods or institutions of Stalin renders more difficult their future utilization by present leadership, in event this deemed necessary in time of stress.

Above is summary certain real gains and losses involved for party dictatorship. Without prejudging sum result this much can be said, there is no reason to believe that losses will have any significant immediate effect on Soviet political and social structure; they were apparent to leaders; anti-Stalin consistent with current Soviet internal, external policies and latest sign of confidence on party leadership (unconfirmed report is effect leadership considered initiating campaign as early as 1954 but concluded move premature) no evidence yet course completed, but that it logical in series of efforts since Stalin's death to rationalize party dictatorship but also introduces new, dynamic element with possible far reaching consequences.

Walmsley

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41. Memorandum From Richard H. Davis of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff (Bowie) [1]

Washington, April 11, 1956.

SUBJECT

Mr. Bohlen on Soviet Developments

At the EE staff meeting last Tuesday [2] Mr. Bohlen exposed himself to a wide variety of questions concerning developments in the Soviet Union and its policies. Mr. Savage has suggested that a list of the principal points made by Mr. Bohlen might be useful to you before the S/P meeting on Friday with Mr. Bohlen. [3]

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[1] Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487, USSR. Confidential.

[2] Apparently April 3.

[3] No record has been found of this meeting. An unsigned memorandum, dated April 12, of the meeting on April 10 between the Ad Hoc Working Group on Stalinism and Ambassador Bohlen, is in Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Stalin Committee. In a telephone call to Dulles on April 18, Sherman Adams asked whether the Cabinet would like to hear Bohlen. Dulles replied that the Cabinet members might enjoy it, but he would rather that Bohlen not speak. Dulles said that "it would build him up too much—he is not working with us." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

The EE staff meeting covered a wide variety of subjects and Mr. Bohlen's responses were as usual made in his own inimitable style and language. I, therefore, do not feel able to do more than list principal subjects and points made by Mr. Bohlen in the discussion.

1. Denigration of Stalin

Reasons:

a. Assurance against another Stalin or one-man dictatorship.

b. Fundamental need for establishing new basis for operation of collective leadership—necessity revise all history, philosophy, etc. All facets of Soviet life intertwined with cult of Stalin which had to be placed in perspective.

Timing:

Not a last-minute decision. Natural that new Soviet leaders should await Party Congress before defining position on Stalin.

Effects:

a. In Russia certain bewilderment and shock among uneducated masses who never had "inside track" on methods Stalin's rule. On the other hand, bureaucrats, intellectuals and Army welcome assurance that Stalin-type rule less likely to reoccur.

b. In satellites Mr. Bohlen pleaded ignorance of latest developments, but advanced opinion that while this attack on Stalin would provide temporary difficulties, it would contribute in long run to readjustments Moscow groping for in its control-relationships.

c. In free world countries foreign Communist parties would experience considerable difficulties. Socialist parties were less likely to be taken in by appeal to united front; whereas, bourgeois parties were more susceptible to Soviet blandishments.

2. Internal Developments

a. No struggle for power. Collective leadership most important fact and source of Soviet policy changes.

b. Collective leadership is in process "institutionalizing" its rule. Under Stalin all Soviet institutions were subject to his arbitrary and often brutal rule. New leadership seeks to revitalize institutions of Soviet state led by Communist party. This applies to army and there is *no* evidence army has assumed separate rule.

c. Ideological reformulations at 20th Congress striking evidence that ideology, except in its basic sense, such as the public ownership of all means of production, is servant of the Soviet regime in power.

d. If possible, we will soon witness "honorable" retirements from Presidium to make way for new, younger blood at pinnacle; for

example, Vorashilov out to pasture with Molotov assuming chief of state role.

e. Problem of discipline *vs.* initiative and responsibility. Soviet leaders may have opened up "Pandora's Box" but unlikely serious difficulties will arise.

3. Foreign Aspects

a. Western world, particularly US, attune to fighting past Soviet threats of (1) military nature, (2) subversion. Soviets have now moved to classic methods of diplomacy.

b. Immediate aim is assault on Western defense systems with concentration on weakest links such as Baghdad Pact. Nevertheless, NATO members object of Soviet attentions, particularly flanks: Scandinavian countries, Greece and Turkey.

c. Yugoslavia: Contrary to widely held Western opinion, journey to Belgrade [4] was not a pilgrimage or "Canossa". It was a carefully calculated move with eye toward Soviet relations with other countries, particularly Egypt, India, etc. Moreover, it is part of long-term readjustment in control-relationships with satellites where Stalin-type control no longer feasible in long run.

d. Ideological reformulations and move to diplomatic offensive suggest foreign Communist parties no longer as necessary as in past to Soviet Union.

[4] Reference is to the visit of a Soviet delegation, including Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan to Belgrade, May 26–June 2, 1955.

42. Editorial Note

On April 18, a statement was published in *Pravda* (Moscow) in the name of the members of the Cominform announcing the dissolution of the organization and the discontinuance of its journal, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*. An English translation of the statement is in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1956, pages 377–378.

At the 282d meeting of the National Security Council on April 26, Allen Dulles, as part of his briefing on significant world developments affecting United States security, briefly commented on the dissolution of the Cominform. According to the memorandum of discussion at this meeting, "Mr. Dulles expressed the judgment that this event had no practical significance, but could have important

propaganda value and would certainly be pleasing to Marshal Tito." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The Division of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, analyzed in detail the decision to dissolve the Cominform in the May issue of *Soviet Affairs* and concluded that it "marked one more gesture in Moscow's campaign to prove its respectability and lack of hostile intentions toward the outside world. The announcement of the move, which Italian Communist leader Togliatti said was decided at the Soviet Party Congress in February, appeared timed with the arrival in Britain of Khrushchev and Bulganin and was a logical culmination of the Soviet effort to woo Tito and evolve new means to attract support from Socialist and neutral groups." (Department of State, INR/Files, *Soviet Affairs*)

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43. Memorandum From the Deputy Director (Plans) of Central Intelligence (Wisner) to the Director (Dulles) [1]

Washington, May 8, 1956.

SUBJECT

Views of a Leading Expert [2] on Soviet Affairs Regarding Causes and Significance of the Downgrading of Stalin

1. It is believed that you and certain other Agency officials will be interested in the hypothesis, set forth below, of one of the most outstanding American experts on Soviet affairs, which I have just received. For the reasons which I have expressed orally to you, I do not deem it advisable to identify this expert in this memorandum. . . . It is my hope that a certain amount of additional research, keyed to the various points that are advanced in support of this hypothesis, will be productive of material tending to support or disprove at least some portions of the analysis, thereby affording to us a somewhat clearer view of the matter. I would recommend against the dissemination of this document outside the Agency until such time as it has been subjected to further research and analysis.

2. The expert takes exception to the view which has been expressed in certain quarters that the present Soviet leadership is a

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[1] Source: Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Memos 1956–7. Secret.
[2] George F. Kennan.

group of amiable and mutually cordial persons, welded together by their long apprenticeship under Stalin who have found a workable and enduring solution to the inherent difficulties of collective leadership. In particular this expert is skeptical of the view that the recent wave of anti-Stalin revelations in Russia represents only the implementation of a plan conceived long in advance, and quite harmoniously, by the entire group at the top. [The foregoing is perhaps an over-simplification of the line of thought to which exception is taken—but it is set up in this manner by the expert to provide a clear point of departure for his analysis. Actually I am not aware that any of the respectable experts consider that there is *complete* harmony within the top leadership, since most of those who are inclined to the view that barring unforeseen crises we can expect a substantial period of mutual accommodation as between the leaders have qualified their statements in various ways and in varying degrees.] [3]

3. The hypothesis which appears to this expert the most plausible and most worthy of attention with respect to these recent happenings in Russia is simply this:

"That the members of the present leading group either killed Stalin, in 1953, or brought about his death as a side-effect of an effort to remove him from power;

"That they did not wish to admit this at the time for fear of causing 'panic and disarray';

"That they have been aware from the start that some day and in some way the truth must come out;

"That this has been the basic reason for the entire action, since Stalin's death, to reduce his stature in the public eye; that these men have been concerned, in other words, to reveal—gradually and discreetly—the true frightfulness of Stalin's personality in order that when the truth does come out their action may appear as a justifiable step to save the movement from possible destruction at the hands of a semi-mad villain rather than as an act of treachery and jealousy;

"That the secret thus shared by these men is indeed in some respects a bond of unity among them, but at the same time a very touchy and delicate factor in their relations and one that can easily be or become, the source of violent suspicions and disagreements;

"That there has not by any means been full agreement to date as to:

"(a) The point at which the complete revelation should be made, or—accordingly—

"(b) The rate of speed at which Stalin's image should be deflated;

[3] Brackets in the source text.

"That the vacillating and erratic quality of their recent behavior with respect to the treatment of Stalin (the increased use of his name at the close of 1955, followed by the complete rejection of it toward the end of January) reflects these disagreements; and

"That there is considerable likelihood that these recent developments involve not just a theoretical argument about how fast the debunking of Stalin ought, in the interests of the movement, to be permitted to proceed but threats or insistence, from some quarter, that the revelation of what occurred in 1953 may—or should—take place in the near future."

The expert adds that if his hypothesis is generally accurate, then there would be every reason to suppose that the killing of Beria (who would not—in this expert's opinion—be accepted as a party to the action against Stalin) had something to do with knowledge on Beria's part of what had occurred and of the fact that he could not be depended on—not sharing the guilt—to observe the same rules and to have the same sense of responsibility in this respect, as the others.

This expert also doubts very much that Molotov was a party to any of this, which would explain his estrangement from the ruling group; but his cautious temperament plus perhaps the fact that he has no actual proof, might be considered sufficient guarantee, in contrast to Beria, that he will make no trouble. Malenkov, too, cannot have been a full-fledged participant in the action against Stalin, a circumstance that would explain much in the development of his position since Stalin's death, and may be very important for his political future as well.

4. This expert emphasizes that the foregoing is only a hypothesis, but states that he has been encouraged to give it to us by what seems to him to be some general confirmation, in subsequent events of the interpretation of Soviet internal happenings which he gave to us shortly after the death of Stalin.

Note: This analysis and hypothesis is quite similar in certain respects to that which appeared in the 16 April issue of the *New Leader*, in an article by Vishniak, entitled "Was Stalin Murdered?" The Vishniak article contains references to other authors said to hold similar views (e.g., Nicolaevsky, Borkenau, Crankshaw, Joseph Newman, Gouzenko). It may well develop that the processs of normal research will not produce any very clear-cut results, by way of affirming or disproving the thesis. . . . The fact that a serious and knowledgeable expert can arrive at such an hypothesis suggests that it may be a very credible one . . . .

Frank C. Wisner [4]

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

44. Report by the Operations Coordinating Board's Special Working Group on Stalinism [1]

Washington, May 17, 1956.

Part I

SUMMARY OF U.S. POLICY GUIDANCE AND ACTIONS TAKEN TO EXPLOIT THE CAMPAIGN

A. U.S. Objectives To Be Served by Exploitation of the Anti-Stalin Campaign.

In the Soviet Union.

1. Expansion of the official criticism of Stalin into pressure by the people of the USSR for the diversion of effort away from military production and expansion of communism abroad toward a higher standard of living and more representative government at home.

2. Extension of Soviet admission that one-man rule was undesirable into an eventual admission that one-party rule carries the seeds of dictatorship.

In the Satellites.

3. A loosening of the ties binding the satellites to Moscow and creation of conditions which will permit the satellites to evolve toward independence of Moscow.

In the Free World.

4. Exposure of communist claims to infallibility and utopian pretensions.

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[1] Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Soviet and Related Problems. Secret.

According to a memorandum from Stevens to Beam, dated May 23:

"At the OCB meeting on May 23 Mr. Hoover called attention to points C–12–d and e on pages 2 and 3 of the status report dated May 17. He said he felt these were important considerations which would permit the undermining and discrediting of current Soviet propaganda lines and suggested that they should receive major emphasis in media output. There were no other comments on the status report. Mr. Hoover suggested that the report should receive broader circulation than is normally given status reports and it was agreed that copies would be circulated for information to members of the NSC and to other selected recipients.

"In the briefing session this morning, the question of the future status of the Special Working Group was discussed. Mr. Hoover expressed the opinion that it was important that a high level group continue active in this field and suggested that the present Special Working Group be continued and that the members of the NSC–174 Working Group be designated as their deputies and continue their normal work. Mr. Hoover repeated this suggestion in the form of a proposal at the Board meeting today and the Board concurred in the proposal." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 761.00/5–2356)

5. Prevention of the use of the denigration of Stalin by communist parties to come to power through parliaments in free countries where they are now represented.

General.

6. Extension of Soviet admission of Stalin's mistakes at home into an admission of Stalin's mistakes abroad.

B. General Approach.

7. A distinction is being made between the U.S. official line and other U.S. means to exploit the campaign.

8. Publicly, U.S. media are adopting a note of cautious skepticism, calling upon the Soviet leaders to demonstrate their professed attachment to reform by correcting still outstanding major abuses in domestic and foreign politics. For the time being, an attitude of jubilation over communist embarrassment is being avoided in order to obviate a counter-productive reaction which might cause the communists to close their ranks. In order to stimulate and maintain the momentum of the effects of the campaign without directly involving the U.S., overt media are helping to keep in circulation the flow of material and comment, wherever generated, damaging to the communist cause.

9. In the non-attributable field the U.S. is employing its resources to sow confusion and doubt in the communist world, to undermine the objectives of the campaign through ridicule and questioning and to expose the attempt of the present leaders to dissociate themselves from unpopular communist tenets.

10. It is appreciated that an excellent opportunity is presented to exploit the contradictions of communism and this is being done wherever possible by direct statement, by implication or suggestion as appropriate to each particular form of media.

C. Guidance Issued.

11. Statements by U.S. officials. Agencies concerned are basing their official comment and line of questioning principally upon Secretary Dulles' press statements of April 3 and April 24, his speech of April 23, and on pertinent portions of the President's speech of April 21. [2]

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[2] Extracts from these statements by the President and the Secretary of State were attached to the source text, but are not printed. Regarding the Secretary's press conference on April 3, see footnote 2, Document 36. The transcript of his press conference of April 24 is in Department of State *Bulletin*, May 7, 1956, pp. 747–753. For text of Dulles' address before the annual luncheon of the Associated Press in New York City on April 23, see *ibid.*, April 30, 1956, pp. 706–710. President Eisenhower's speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, broadcast over radio and television, is *ibid.*, pp. 699–706.

12. *Use of non-official comment.* Agencies concerned have been advised to use foreign and U.S. non-official opinion and report local communist confusion to achieve our immediate goals rather than to give evidences of a major U.S. propaganda campaign. Such attributed non-official material is emphasizing the following main points.

a. Stalinism is the antithesis of democracy.

b. Stalin's men are still ruling the country and Stalin's policies, reiterated at the recent Party Congress, are still being pursued—collectivization, police state, domination of the satellites and Baltic States, control of foreign communist parties, etc.

c. Only a few of Stalin's victims have been rehabilitated to date.

d. The Soviet Government has confirmed Western accusations of many years standing.

e. Communist claims to infallible leaders and doctrine have been shattered.

f. Communist leaders have admitted that Soviet policies under Stalin involved "excessive costs."

g. On the basis of past experience and in view of continued Soviet emphasis on heavy industry and armaments, we are urging the Free World to remain on guard against a new turnabout by confronting the Soviet Union with the firm determination of a cohesive Free World to resist aggression.

13. *Maximum reliance on indigenous sources.* Wherever and whenever possible we are using local opinion and reaction, and confusion among communist parties, to achieve our objectives without publicly injecting widespread U.S. output.

14. *Regional emphasis.* Agencies are tailoring output to fit target areas, to wit:

a. *The Soviet Union.* The Soviet population is being encouraged to take advantage of the anti-Stalin campaign to obtain greater political relaxation and a higher standard of living.

b. *The satellites.* Hope for greater freedom is being strengthened, and pressure toward this goal is being encouraged. Intra-party dissension and differences with the Moscow line are being exploited.

c. *The Free World.* The continuity of basic Soviet policies from Lenin to the present is being emphasized. Agencies are seeking to counter trends toward the relaxation of vigilance, striving to prevent the assumption of respectability by the Soviet leaders, discrediting and promoting dissension among the local communist parties. Stress is given to the servile attitude of foreign communist parties and their leaders toward the USSR. Yugoslavia is being encouraged to remain independent, physically and ideologically.

d. *The Far East.* Questions are being raised whether "collective leadership" is to be the new fashion for Asia and it is being pointed out that the Far Eastern communist leaders are no more infallible than Stalin.

D. Implementation of Agreed Points of Guidance.

15. *Overt Media.*

a. *Radio.* The U.S. International Broadcasting Service has emphasized the actual news of the denigration of Stalin with commentary based on various Free World editorial viewpoints. The output has been designed to raise questions in the minds of listeners. In the Bloc the need for actions to demonstrate the sincerity of recent communist pronouncements has been publicized. In the Free World the statements of foreign socialists, particularly those made at the British Trade Union meeting at Margate,[3] have been used to warn against the Popular Front.

b. *Press.* The International Press Service has paralleled the line taken by the USIBS. It has also despatched cartoon roundups and comic strips using the guidance themes.

c. *Film.* USIA is providing some film for a film biography of Stalin being prepared by the American Broadcasting Company.

d. *Research.* All research agencies are examining old files for information on Stalin and also for information on Bulganin and Khrushchev for possible future use in the event the ban against attacking the present leaders is lifted.

16. *Unattributable Propaganda.* Appropriate agencies, in close coordination with the Department of State, are engaged in unattributable propaganda in direct support of U.S. objectives as outlined in Section I above.

E. Coordination With the British and French.

17. The British and French have been informed regarding our approaches to the anti-Stalin campaign and suggestions have been solicited from them. As a result of cooperative arrangements, the French organization "Peace and Liberty" will shortly issue a new satirical poster series dealing with the anti-Stalin campaign.

Part II

MOTIVATIONS OF THE CURRENT ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN

18. It was agreed that the Soviet leaders have probably not felt compelled by foreign developments to take the step of jettisoning the symbol of Stalin. Possible motivations include the following:

a. The desire of the present Soviet leaders to confirm their own position by a dramatic break with the past, thereby gaining popularity at home and respectability abroad.

b. The desire to gain greater freedom of action to pursue current emphasis on coexistence by eliminating a contradiction between the Stalinist symbols of the USSR and its present avowed intentions.

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[3] Not further identified.

c. The desire of the current rulers to forestall the rise of a future Stalin (both in the Soviet and other orbit parties) by denouncing the "cult of personality."

d. The desire to stimulate the lower administrative ranks to assume more initiative and responsibility instead of merely awaiting orders from above—by informing them that this is expected of them and by removing the source of fear of responsibility.

e. The aim of strengthening the role of the Soviet Party both at home and in its leadership of foreign communist parties, in order to make good the loss of Stalin's dominating influence.

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45. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, May 17, 1956—4 p.m.

2582. Have now had opportunity to study document referred to in Embtel 2558 [2] (which was being photostated for extra copies for French). Document is not actual speech but notes taken during one hour possession member French Embassy Warsaw. Assuming notes to be full summary of original text it is still not possible to ascertain with any degree of accuracy whether original was authentic text of Khrushchev's speech or not.

There is nothing in summary which contradicts reports and rumors current here in mid-March and subsequently concerning text of speech. On the other hand, there are certain important omissions; for example, no reference is made to Stalin's executions of Soviet marshals and officers which was most substantiated of initial reports. Furthermore, there are a few errors of fact which it is doubtful Khrushchev would have made.

According to document Khrushchev made copious reference to unpublished Lenin documents, including testament and other notes and letters directed against Stalin. These bear a suspicious resem-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/5–1756. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] In telegram 2558, May 14, Bohlen reported that the Counselor of the French Embassy in Moscow had loaned him a copy of a despatch from the French Embassy in Warsaw, which was purported to be a summary of the text of Khrushchev's secret speech on Stalin. Bohlen indicated that he had not yet studied the document, but that at first glance it appeared "highly plausible" and the French Embassy was "apparently convinced of its authenticity." (*Ibid.*, 761.00/5–1456) Bohlen transmitted to the Department of State a photostat copy of the summary as an enclosure to despatch 503, May 18. (*Ibid.*, 761.00/5–1856)

blance to Trotsky's writings on subject in his biography Stalin. This in itself of course is not disproof, and merely may indicate accuracy Trotsky's memory but, on the other hand, could equally well have been compiled by someone on basis Trotsky's works.

In general, document adds very little to previous information concerning nature Khrushchev's speech, except on few minor points.

Photostat copy is being forwarded to Department by next pouch.

Bohlen

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46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [1]

Washington, May 18, 1956—4:54 p.m.

1286. CAS Headquarters has procured purported copy Khrushchev speech of February 25. Since document may be same as one on which notes taken . . . appreciate your spelling out errors mentioned Embtel 2582 [2] to assist analysis here.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/5–1756. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Klosson and cleared with EE and Armstrong, who signed for Dulles.

[2] *Supra.*

. . . Owing sensitivity source, document being treated noforn until further notice. Copy being sent you for comment soonest. [3]

Dulles

[3] In telegram 1300 to Moscow, May 21, the Department indicated it was forwarding by air pouch the document procured by the CIA and compared its contents to the contents of the document obtained by Bohlen. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/5–1956)

In his memoirs, Ray Cline, who was then the CIA's expert on Sino-Soviet relations, recalled that the agency obtained a copy of the speech in April "through non-American intermediaries, at a very handsome price." Cline, who was asked to read the document to vouch for its authenticity, argued that it was authentic and that it should be made public as an aid to students and scholars interested in the Soviet Union. Cline said that he had also pointed out that it was a rare opportunity to have all the critical things that "we had said for years about the Soviet dictatorship confirmed by the principal leader of the Soviet Politburo." But, according to Cline, Wisner and James Angleton, Chief of Counterintelligence and Counterespionage, opposed publication of the speech and wanted to "exploit" it by "feeding selected bits of the text to specific audiences on which they wanted to have an impact." (Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars*, pp. 163–164) In a public statement on November 29, 1976, Angleton said the CIA did not pay for the copy of Khrushchev's speech, but instead obtained it from a European Communist whose motive was considered ideological. (*New York Times*, November 30, 1976)

47. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, May 28, 1956, 11 a.m. [1]

OTHERS PRESENT

Under Secretary Hoover
Mr. Allen Dulles
Admiral Radford
General Twining
Colonel Goodpaster

The President indicated he had wanted to have this meeting in order to see just what we are doing, and how we are handling the matter of special reconnaissance flights. He referred to a recent protest by the USSR. [2] He said he wanted to give the Soviets every chance to move in peaceful directions and to put our relations on a better basis—and to see how far they will go. For this reason, during this period, it is particularly desirable to be wise and careful in what

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

[2] The text of the Soviet note, May 14, was transmitted to the Embassy in Moscow in telegram 1273, May 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/5–1456)

we do. Mr. Hoover read the draft text of a reply to the Soviets.[3] The President thought a passage might be added to the effect that our Government had instructed its aviation services to be especially careful in this regard (possibility of navigational error in Arctic regions).

Turning then to a discussion of the Soviet invitation to General Twining,[4] the President said he had wondered why they picked out one Chief, rather than the JCS as a whole, since they function as a body—specifically he wondered whether they did so for personal reasons or with some other purpose in mind. General Twining said that the invitation was for Soviet Aviation Day, and that they were inviting air officers of many other countries. Admiral Radford recalled that at Geneva Khrushchev had said laughingly that the Soviets might send their chiefs over to look at U.S. war plans, and that he had said that might be all right if it were fifty-fifty. He added that the JCS had considered the matter and were disposed to accept an invitation if extended, indicating that they would want to look seriously at what the Soviets have.

The President said that if General Twining wanted to go, he saw no reason why he should not. He would not foresee that the visit would be of any particular intelligence value, however. General Twining said there was a good possibility that he might go in the Boeing 707, flying non-stop from the United States to Moscow. The President (and the others present) thought this was a splendid idea if it could be worked. The President said that General Twining could say while he was there that if the Soviets want to trade military visits, and go around and really see what the other country has in a military sense, they might invite our Chiefs, who would be prepared to visit the Soviet Union providing the Soviets were willing to have their chiefs visit us.

The President next discussed certain other reconnaissance efforts.

He then returned to the subject of the invitation to General Twining and indicated he thought it should not have come directly to the Air Force, but should have come through diplomatic channels, inasmuch as the Soviet Embassy is accredited to the President. He indicated that he thought an answer ought to go to the Soviets through the American Ambassador to the effect that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force is authorized to attend, and that he will

[3] The draft has not been found, but on May 29 the Department of State presented to the Soviet Embassy a note explaining that navigational difficulties in the Arctic region may have caused unintentional violations of Soviet air space, which, if they in fact had occurred, the Department regretted. The text of the note was transmitted in telegram 1332 to Moscow, May 29. (*Ibid.*)

[4] See Document 105.

provide his own transport. All things considered, he felt it was best for General Twining to go.

The President repeated that he is very anxious to see how far the Soviets are ready to go in making offers and working for better relationships. General Twining said the operation protested has been stopped. All actions were completed. It was set up last February and conducted in recent weeks.

G
Colonel, CE, US Army

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48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [1]

Washington, May 31, 1956—12:42 p.m.

1339. For Ambassador. On basis extensive additional analysis and checking here, by most knowledgeable governmental experts and consultants, we strongly incline view that document Deptels 1286 and 1300 [2] our possession is authentic copy of version Khrushchev secret speech prepared for use and guidance Communist leaders of satellite country where document procured. All experts call attention to obvious omissions and distortions in text which prepared for external use, and in addition mention likelihood omissions from original speech of certain most sensitive and potentially embarrassing portions full story Stalin era.

Question of whether, and if so, how to release document in relatively near future is now raised in view partial leakage contents of some similar versions, most notably *France Soir* 28 May issue, and probability of further leakages of incomplete or distorted versions. One important concern this connection is possibility that versions so leaked by others will present speech in light unduly favorable to present regime and will gain a measure of currency and acceptance which would tender difficult this being overtaken by more balanced version which we have.

Medium for release currently being most favorably considered here is that entire document would be released by Committee for

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/5–3156. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Armstrong and cleared with Murphy and Beam, who signed for Hoover.

[2] See Document 46 and footnote 3 thereto.

Free Europe, which method would at least partially obviate appearance of official governmental sponsorship and exploitation document.

Of special interest here would be your views on impact of indicated type of release and exploitation and general desirability handling matter in manner proposed, i.e., assuming that no official responsibility for action or document is taken.[3]

CAS has just received additional collection of documentary material running to some 30 pages which appears to have been issued as supplement to version of speech our possession. This material includes purported texts of letters and other documents similar to, but not contained in, text of speech. CAS advises that these documents likewise appear authentic and that some are believed entirely new material, i.e., hitherto unknown to us.

Hoover

[3] For Bohlen's response, see Document 51.

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49. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, June 2, 1956—4 p.m.

2712. Announcement this morning change in Foreign Minister carried in all papers. (Embtel 2707[2]).

As entire world is aware, Molotov's resignation from Foreign Minister position has been rumored for well over year when became apparent that Bulganin and Khrushchev had taken out his hands direction Soviet Foreign Affairs (in part at least because his known opposition to Yugoslav rapprochement). It not necessary here review clear evidence his loss authority in this field nor oblique criticisms his direction Soviet foreign relations at 20th Party Congress.

Shepilov as his replacement has also been rumored, although there have been counterrumors in favor of Gromyko. Shepilov's

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/6–256. Confidential. Received June 2, 11:32 a.m. Repeated to Belgrade.

[2] Telegram 2707, June 2, contained the announcement by the Soviet press that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on June 1 complied with Molotov's request that he be relieved of his duties as Foreign Minister and had appointed Dmitrii T. Shepilov to replace him. (*Ibid.*)

elevation to candidate member Presidium gives him requisite party standing.

While decision eventually remove Molotov appears have been germinating for over year, timing is obviously in connection with Tito visit,[3] and in order remove Molotov as one co-signatories of [*with*?] Stalin of excommunication messages of 1948 from direct participation Tito talks.

Announcement gives no indication of transfer to any other specific job but makes clear that Molotov retains position as First Deputy Prime Minister.[4]

Bohlen

[3] Tito visited the Soviet Union June 1–23.

[4] A more detailed analysis by OIR of Molotov's removal as Foreign Minister is in *Soviet Affairs*, July 1956, pp. 11–12. (Department of State, INR Files, *Soviet Affairs*)

50. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

Washington, June 2, 1956—3:50 p.m.

843. Department recently obtained from confidential source copy of document which purports to be version of Khrushchev's secret Feb 25 speech as prepared for confidential info and guidance of leadership of a Communist party outside USSR.[2] Study furnishes

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/6–256. Confidential. Drafted by Beam, cleared with Murphy, and signed by Beam for Hoover. Sent to Moscow, Prague, Vienna, Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Budapest.

[2] In a memorandum of June 1 to Acting Secretary Hoover, Armstrong wrote that he was attaching a revised translation of Khrushchev's secret speech, which should be substituted for the earlier translation sent to Hoover on May 18. Armstrong noted that Wisner made the following comments in transmitting the revised translation to the Department:

"All the evidence we have been able to collect to date tends to confirm our earlier belief that this document contains the substance of N.S. Khrushchev's secret speech of 25 February 1956 at the XXth Communist Party Congress, as prepared for the confidential use and guidance of the leaders of the Communist Party in one of the European Satellite countries. In the time that has passed since my first letter, we have had this document examined by a number of experts on Soviet Communism and checked as to factual accuracy in many ways.

"We continue to feel that the original speech probably contained additional revelations that were omitted or altered in the version released for Satellite consumption.

"The speech as here presented adds a great deal to our knowledge of the

grounds for confidence its authenticity but Department does not propose to vouch for it.

Local correspondents aware Department's possession of document and pressing for release. Accordingly Department will probably make document public some time Monday afternoon Washington time.

Document lengthy and will be air pouched to addressees soonest.

In releasing document Department will simply let it speak for itself and will offer no commentary. [3]

Hoover

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implications of the degradation of Stalin. It makes clear that the present Soviet leaders lived in mortal terror for their own lives in the last days of Stalin's rule." (*Ibid.*, 761.00/6–156)

[3] In telegram 1353 to Moscow, June 2, not sent to the other Eastern European posts, the Department of State said that since the Washington press was aware of the Department's possession of a copy of the speech, it was no longer feasible to use the method of release indicated in Document 48. In publishing the document the Department did not plan to provide background or comment, but would let the text speak for itself. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/6–256)

The origins of the decision by the U.S. Government to publish the speech are not clear. In his memoirs, Ray Cline recalled that he was alone with Allen Dulles on June 2 working on the drafting of a speech, and Dulles mentioned that he had heard that Cline was in favor of releasing the Khrushchev speech. After Cline explained his reasons for this position, Dulles said that he too favored release. According to Cline, the Director first called Wisner and then Foster Dulles and obtained their concurrences to releasing the speech. (Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars*, p. 164) However, in a statement in Washington on November 29, 1976, James Angleton, who was head of CIA's special operations and counterintelligence division in 1956, disputed Cline's version. According to Angleton, the decision to publish the speech "was made by Eisenhower, Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles. They decided its significance should take precedence over political action, and therefore, with the President's consent, the text and footnotes prepared by the CIA were given over to the *New York Times*."

Eisenhower was at his Gettysburg farm from the afternoon of Friday, June 1, to the morning of Monday, June 4. Foster Dulles was on vacation in Watertown, New York, from May 25 through June 5. No record has been found of telephone conversations they may have had during June 1–4 regarding the publication of Khrushchev's speech.

The speech was published in the *New York Times* on June 4 and reprinted in Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies—II*, pp. 172–188.

51. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, June 2, 1956—4 p.m.

2718. Deptel 1339.[2] Having had opportunity of careful study of document I agree with conclusion that this is in all probability authentic copy version Khrushchev's speech, at least as sent to satellites.

Certain errors of fact which had been noted in French document, e.g. date of deportations and Eikhe arrest, are corrected in this document. From comparison two documents it is apparent French version was based on same source, but since text from which notes were taken by French in Warsaw was in Russian two documents were apparently not identical. In view of complete secrecy surrounding event it is possible that Eikhe's execution in 1940 is authentic, although as observed (Embtel 2603)[3] end of 1938 was generally regarded as bringing to a halt excesses great purge and I still for this reason find puzzling reference to Stalin's enciphered telegram concerning use physical torture as late as January 1939.

In addition, I have had from entirely independent source confirmation of certain specific details in document which tend to confirm its credibility, as well as possibility that document may be actual speech itself and not merely version prepared for Communist leaders in satellite countries. These details come from French journalist, Michael Gordey, at present in Moscow and he obtained this information from an old Menshevik friend whom he had known well in Paris and who had returned to Soviet Union in 1950. Gordey is of Russian parents, speaks perfect Russian and is extremely knowledgeable about Soviet Union. He of course has no knowledge whatsoever of existence document in question but had seen French version in French Embassy. His informant had not actually seen text of Khrushchev's speech himself, but had received second-hand account from old Bolshevik friend who I believe had actually been present or in any event had seen stenographic account of speech. Version of speech given Gordey followed very closely that outlined in document and included certain specific details which were not in French version, namely reference to Khrushchev's telephone call to Vasilevsky on Kharkov battle and his conversation on same subject with

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/6–256. Secret. Limited Distribution. Received June 2 5:43 p.m.

[2] Document 48.

[3] Telegram 2603, May 19, contained Bohlen's listing of the errors he perceived in the version of the speech obtained by the French. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/5–1956)

Malenkov when Stalin refused to come to telephone. Informant also gave in much greater detail than in French version Eikhe, Kedrov, Rudzut and, particularly, Kirov cases.

In addition, Swedish Ambassador told me that Bulgarian Ambassador here, who claims to have seen text of speech, had given him outline without details and order of subjects and construction of speech from source followed very closely order of subjects and general organization of documents.

While nothing can be conclusive in a matter of this kind, I believe these independent confirmations here in Moscow from persons stated above who have no knowledge of our possession of document certainly tend to add to its credibility.

In regard to publicity I am of two minds. In general I believe that documents such as this concerning Soviet policies which are believed to be genuine are worthwhile publishing in that they help clarify public opinion and explain what is actually going on in this country, and this document would be invaluable to students of Soviet affairs who would normally not have access to it. However, I would seriously doubt if publication would be valuable to our side from propaganda point of view. Speech is extremely serious and convincing and goes far to providing real evidence that current Soviet leadership determined to persist in present mere "liberals" course and do away with certain abuses of Stalin period. Theme throughout speech, particularly on page 12, that there must be no repetition of Stalin's crimes will, I am sure, be regarded as strong evidence in many quarters that current leadership has indeed in certain respects "reformed". Very fact that text given in this document is more balanced than previous speculations and leaks will, I feel, not only tend to enhance its credibility but will give more credit than discredit to present leadership. Fact that document when published will undoubtedly be denounced as spurious by Communists will not, in my opinion, offset reaction more favorable than not to present regime.

Therefore, I would conclude if primary purpose of publication is to place current rulers in unfavorable light, I would be inclined not to publish. On the other hand, if main purpose is merely to get out an interesting and important document concerning political developments in Soviet Union, publication would be useful, particularly as leaks are almost certain. In this connection I note (Paris 5677 to Department repeated info Moscow 212)[4] that entire French version

[4] Telegram 5677, May 31, indicated that the U.S. Embassy in Paris obtained from the French Foreign Ministry a 19-page typewritten copy of Khrushchev's speech that was presumed to be the same as the one Bohlen obtained from the French. The French Foreign Ministry had shown copies of the document to certain journalists, including Americans, and had given them permission to use the document without

has been given to correspondent by Quai d'Orsay so that substance of speech has already been made public. If Department's decision is to publish believe Committee Free Europe is as good a channel as any in order to avoid appearance US Government involvement.

I have strictly observed noforn classification; however, I do feel certain obligation toward French Embassy which made available to us other version, but will do nothing pending further instructions from Department.[5]

Bohlen

attribution. It was also pointed out that *France Soir* on May 29 had printed under a Vienna dateline excerpts patently taken from the same version. (*Ibid.*, 761.00/5–3156)

[5] In his memoirs, Bohlen wrote that his advice "was rejected." (Bohlen, *Witness to History*, p. 399) It is clear, however, that the decision to publish the speech had already been made by the time Bohlen's advice was received in the Department. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: "Mr. Furnas (R) notified 7:15 p.m., 6/3". A handwritten notation reads: "No further action."

52. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, June 16, 1956—3 p.m.

2837. At last night's reception I had short talk with Khrushchev and following points emerged. He seemed to be considerably more subdued than usual and mentioned fact that he was very tired after his trip with Tito.[2] I took advantage this reference to tell him that American and other Western correspondents who had been along on trip with Tito were very much displeased at discriminatory treatment they had received during trip, and told him of complaints I had had in this regard from US correspondents. Khrushchev said that he had been unaware of this on trip although he said Tito had mentioned it to him, and brushed matter aside by stating that there were still some bureaucrats in Soviet system who could not easily adjust to new conditions.

Khrushchev then in mild but definite terms said that he simply did not understand attitude of US, and particularly that of Mr.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/6–1656. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] During Tito's visit to the Soviet Union, June 1–23, Khrushchev accompanied him to Stalingrad, Rostov, and Novorossisk, June 10–13.

Dulles, and felt that recent speeches and statements were difficult to reconcile with views that had been expressed at Geneva Conference.[3] I told Khrushchev that I felt that he simply did not understand operation of American system with its free expression of opinion and, in particular, the institution of press conferences where leading government officials were subjected to free and untrammeled questioning by correspondents on any subject.

He said he felt that while Soviet relations were improving with other countries, with the US it was going very slowly indeed. Given this opportunity I told him I thought words were insufficient in matters of this kind and he surely realized special responsibility of the US to which he agreed. I told him that as long as the major questions such as Germany, disarmament and others which were the chief causes tension remain unsolved that mere words on desirability of improved relations, etc. were not going to change situation. I gave him my personal opinion that Soviet leaders seemed believe they could have everything their own way and that the constant assault in their own statements and their propaganda against measures such as, for example, NATO, which US and its associates felt to be vital to security seemed to me to be incompatible with the constantly reiterated thesis of desire for co-existence and normal relations. I told him that constant attacks on so-called policy of "positions of strength" led me to believe the Soviet Union desired we should operate from position of weakness while they maintained their strength intact. Khrushchev countered by saying that at Geneva Soviet Union had indicated its willingness to accept as an international fact NATO and had proposed renunciation of force agreement between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. I told him I thought that additional pieces of paper of this nature were unnecessary in view of the Charter of the UN and besides any such question brought US squarely up against the problem of the division of Germany. Khrushchev did not argue point but returned to his original thesis and said he felt the US did not understand the depth and significance of changes which were taking place in Soviet Union.

I told him I did my best to keep my government informed but despite certain improvements the area of secrecy was so great in this country that it was very difficult for an Ambassador to obtain a clear picture of what was going on. I mentioned in this connection fact that middle of March the whole world knew that he had made very important speech to a closed session of Congress but no reliable information on this subject had been available in Moscow. (I did this in hope that Khrushchev would make some remark on subject of

[3] For documentation on the Geneva Heads of Government meeting, July 18–23, see vol. v, pp. 119 ff.

version published by Department.) Khrushchev at first attempted to deny that there had been any special speech, but finding this untenable he said versions had been circulated which did not correspond to truth but denied (incidentally this is party line since similar statements were made to me last night by Malenkov and Molotov with big smiles on their faces) that he had read the version recently published on grounds that it required "a big work of translation."

Khrushchev then referred to Twining visit [4] and said he hoped that this would be step which would lead to better understanding of Soviet Union, to which I replied that would depend in no small measure to degree of frankness which General Twining was dealt with during his visit here.

Khrushchev throughout the conversation spoke in unusually quiet and restrained terms and seemed to have very much on his mind the problem of relations with the US. He inquired after President's health and expressed satisfaction when I told him that his condition was excellent and from all accounts he had undergone the operation without any difficulty. [5]

Bohlen

[4] Twining visited the Soviet Union June 23–July 1; see Document 105.
[5] President Eisenhower had an operation for ileitis on June 9.

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53. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, June 18, 1956.

SUBJECT

Documentary Material Supplemental to Khrushchev's Speech

In connection with your San Francisco speech, [2] you should know that the Department and CIA have each separately obtained copies of the so-called "Unpublished Documents" that were supposed to have been distributed among the delegates to the XXth

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/6–1956. Secret.
[2] For text of Dulles' address before the 41st annual convention of Kiwanis International at San Francisco on June 21, a speech entitled "The Contest Between Despotism and Freedom," see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 2, 1956, pp. 3–7.

CPSU Congress. . . . A translation into English runs to 34 double-spaced, legal length pages. There are 17 documents involved, including Lenin's "testament," Lenin's note regarding the treatment of nationalities, and other notes by Lenin regarding domestic policy.

We and CIA have been examining the documents to ascertain their authenticity and value in the event of publication. The tentative consensus is that, while a small part of the material has not been previously published, most of it has appeared in one form or another in the West. On balance there seems to be little additional propaganda or political advantage to the United States in publication, but the documents would be of some interest to students of Soviet history and would tend to some degree to keep alive interest in the Khrushchev speech. We have reason to believe that both the British and French have also by now obtained these documents, although they have not indicated any plans for publication.

The view of EUR, P and ourselves is that the documents would probably better serve US interests if released by the British, but in any case, at a date to follow your speech in San Francisco. EUR is exploring the possibility of the British doing so. Alternatively, the documents could be released as a routine matter here, at such time and in such fashion as to encourage their tie-in with and focus upon the Khrushchev speech, following your speech in San Francisco. When the choice between these alternatives is clearer, a recommendation will be made to you through Mr. Murphy. [3]

If you care to see a copy of the documents prior to departing for San Francisco, I have them available.

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[3] In a memorandum of June 19 to Murphy, Armstrong summarized the origin of the documents, which he said numbered 18, not 17, and how they were obtained and repeated as recommendations to the two alternatives mentioned in this memorandum, apparently leaving it to Murphy as to how the documents were to be published. There is no indication on this memorandum of the decision Murphy reached. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/6–1956) But on June 30, the Department announced that it recently obtained through a confidential source copies of certain documents it believed were distributed to the delegates at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February. These 18 documents were published in the Department of State *Bulletin* of July 23, 1956, with an explanation that the Department decided to make the documents available in the interests of scholarship and historical perspective and in light of the fact that on June 30 the CPSU made public a segment of the documents in the group. (*Ibid.*, pp. 153–161)

54. Notes of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, Washington, June 25, 1956, 9:15 a.m. [1]

[Here follows discussion of items 1–9.]

10. *Khrushchev's Speech and Conflicts in Communist Parties*—Mr. Bowie said there had been a "suspicious similarity" between statements made by western communist parties regarding Khrushchev's speech. He thought there was something here to be exploited among the satellites.

Referring further to the speech, those present agreed that it had offered good material for use by the informational agencies. The Secretary said there should be policy guidance on what line to take. This should be carefully thought through. He added "that we have an opportunity the like of which might not occur again for many years. Now is the chance to fragmentize the wall of granite of the International Communist Party." Mr. Henderson made two points: One, that we should not ignore the Baltic States and, another, that while Khrushchev had been jabbing at Stalin's brutality to Communists, he had not mentioned the cruelty to the Koreans, Poles, Persians, Afghans, and many others. Mr. Murphy asked if the OCB would not do something about this problem. Mr. Phleger, insisting that we should exploit this break, asked if Khrushchev's speech had been "circulated physically" abroad. The Secretary reiterated that it should be translated and printed in foreign languages, e.g., one-half million copies to Indonesia.

Continuing on the same subject, the Secretary said he would speak about it at his press conference on Tuesday. [2] He would make the point (1) that despotism can only hold together under brutality and iron discipline and (2) this discipline was accepted only in an atmosphere of constant victories. There had been no such recent victories. Mr. Bowie asked if the President could make a speech on July 4. The Secretary said that a speech was not likely but a statement or television film might be possible.

Action: To sum up, Mr. Hoover proposed, with general concurrence, that (1) there should be a meeting before the next OCB session, with the Directors of CIA and USIA, to discuss further exploitation of this issue and (2) Mr. Beam's committee (in OCB),

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[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meeting: Lot 63 D 75. Secret. Drafted by Murat W. Williams. According to an attached attendance sheet, the participants at this meeting included Dulles, Hoover, Murphy, Bowie, MacArthur, Henderson, Armstrong, McCardle, and Elbrick.

[2] For text of the transcript of the Secretary's press conference of June 27 dealing with the Khrushchev speech, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1956, pp. 47–49.

which had been analyzing the speech, should attempt to set an official and unofficial line on exploitation.

[Here follows the remainder of these notes.]

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55. Memorandum of Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 28, 1956 [1]

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence said that he would like to comment first on the reaction outside the Soviet bloc to the publication of Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress and the subsequent developments relating thereto. There had been rather dramatic speeches by Togliatti and Nenni in Rome, followed by statements in behalf of the Communist Parties of France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and others. In addition, *Pravda* in Moscow has published the statement by Dennis, head of the Communist Party, USA, as reported in the *N.Y. Daily Worker* of June 18, 1956. Mr. Dulles thought it remarkable that the Kremlin leaders should have selected the U.S. Communist Party criticism as the springboard for their first public reaction to the publication of the Khrushchev speech. He predicted that the *Pravda* statement would presently be followed by other significant statements on this subject from official Kremlin sources. All the above-mentioned reports had contained criticism of the current leadership of the Soviet Union. The chief question posed in all these statements was this: How did such gross inequities creep into the Soviet system of government when all the present Soviet leaders surrounded Stalin at this very time? To illustrate his point Mr. Dulles cited several instances in which this question had been posed, particularly the manner in which it had been posed by the Dennis statement in the *Daily Worker*. Mr. Dulles emphasized that while these statements were all critical in some degree of the present Soviet leaders, an attempt was generally made in these statements to maintain the link between the

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on June 29.

local Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as distinct from the current Soviet leadership.

In further elaboration of his general point, Mr. Dulles stated that Nenni was having a "field day" at the expense of the Kremlin. His objective appeared to be to formulate an agreement for the creation of a popular front government in Italy or at least to bring about the so-called "opening to the left". This objective has alarmed Togliatti.

The basic question which emerges from all this current confusion is the question as to what the Kremlin is actually driving at. Are these developments simply the result of confusion in the Kremlin, or are they the result of a deliberate design? Mr. Dulles said this was a difficult question to answer, but he believed that the men in the Kremlin certainly never intended that Khrushchev's speech should produce such far-reaching results as it had in fact produced. On the other hand, we must take into account the possibility that the speech was deliberately designed to confer a semblance of respectability and independence on the Communist Parties in countries outside the Soviet bloc, with the ultimate objective of producing popular front governments in these countries. Even if this proves to be the case, Mr. Dulles pointed out the serious implications of any attack on a dictatorship and its leaders. Whatever the ultimate purpose of the Kremlin, what has actually happened may well impair the Soviet leadership in the end.

Mr. Allen Dulles then asked Secretary Dulles whether he perceived any objection to his reading a summary of a cable from Ambassador Bohlen[2] describing the conduct of Khrushchev at the reception in the Kremlin given to General Twining and the leaders of other Air Force delegations. Secretary Dulles replied that he was only concerned that the fact that this information had come from Ambassador Bohlen be kept within the walls of the room. Accordingly, Mr. Allen proceeded to describe the ineptness, discourtesy, and general misconduct of Khrushchev at this reception, emphasizing in particular the obvious disgust of the other Soviet leaders with Khrushchev's behavior. This, said Mr. Dulles, at least indicated that the present leaders of the Soviet Union were not very happy, and that they had a lot of serious problems on their hands. It might well be possible for the United States to exploit these problems to its own advantage.

When Mr. Allen Dulles had concluded his observations, Secretary Dulles stated his belief that Khrushchev was the most dangerous person to lead the Soviet Union since the October Revolution.

[2] Telegram 2915 from Moscow, June 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5861/6–2556)

He was not a coldly calculating person, but rather one who reacted emotionally. He was obviously intoxicated much of the time, and could be expected to commit irrational acts. The previous Soviet leaders had been for the most part the chess-playing type. Khrushchev was the first top authority in the USSR who was essentially emotional and perfectly capable of acting without a calculation of the consequences of his action. Stalin always calculated the results of a proposed action. Bad as he was, you at least knew what you were up against in dealing with him. In fact, Stalin's only serious blunder was the Korean war, and this could readily be forgiven him in view of the fact that the U.S. Administration at the time had given every possible indication that the United States was indifferent to what happened in Korea. All in all, said Secretary Dulles, he would be glad indeed to see Khrushchev go, and there was evidently considerable feeling in the governing circles in the USSR that he ought to be fired. Unhappily there was no easy means to get rid of him. Death or violence were about the only recourse.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that a special meeting of the Supreme Soviet had been called in Moscow for the middle of July. It was possible that something would happen at this meeting along the lines Secretary Dulles had been talking about.

Secretary Dulles said that in addition to the cable from Ambassador Bohlen just summarized by the Director of Central Intelligence, a later cable from the Ambassador had arrived in the State Department. [3] It described the reception at the Kremlin given for the Shah of Iran. Notable were reflections by Marshal Zhukov on the behavior of Khrushchev at the previously mentioned reception for the Air Force delegations. Of great interest also was Zhukov's statement that U.S. estimates of the production of Soviet aircraft and submarines were much too high.

The Vice President inquired as to what line the United States should take with respect to the apparently growing independence of the Communist Parties in countries outside the Soviet bloc. Are we to regard this phenomenon as a calculated effort to confer respectability on these national Communist Parties, or are we to take it as evidence of confusion and weakness in the Soviet leadership and in their control of national Communist Parties? Mr. Allen Dulles replied that it was impossible to give a clear answer to the Vice President's question as yet. The issue was still the subject of vigorous argument. Nevertheless, one line that we seemed safe in playing up was that there was obvious confusion in the USSR.

Governor Stassen commented that in his opinion there was a good possibility that all these statements critical of the current

[3] Telegram 2920 from Moscow, June 26. (*Ibid.*, 700.5861/6–2656)

Soviet leadership were part of a central plan devised by Moscow. If this was indeed the case, the Soviet objective would be to position themselves more effectively for the newly developing phase of economic, political and psychological warfare against the free world. It seemed quite possible to Governor Stassen that Khrushchev sometimes pretended to be drunk and that his indiscretions might well be deliberate. At the same time, Governor Stassen emphasized that the Soviet leaders are unleashing forces that no one, not even these leaders themselves, could be sure would not get out of control. In any event, both possibilities deserved careful study, for the United States must not permit itself to be caught flat-footed, whichever possibility proved to be the fact.

Mr. Allen Dulles replied that there was still about a 50–50 division of opinion among the CIA experts as to which of these two possibilities was correct. Mr. Dulles added that he himself personally inclined to believe that the Soviet leaders were in fact now engaged in making the best of a bad situation.

Secretary Dulles said that he agreed with Mr. Allen Dulles' opinion. He warned, however, that this did not mean that the Soviet leaders could not ultimately snatch a victory from their current difficulties. Secretary Dulles then paid a warm tribute to the success of the Director of Central Intelligence in obtaining a copy of Khrushchev's secret speech and having the contents of it published. Secretary Dulles described this as the greatest feat by American Intelligence in a number of years.

Secretary Dulles went on to say that the problem posed by these developments in the Soviet Union could be described as follows: The Kremlin leaders, being generally recognized as evil men, had in past years generally been ostracized by civilized people. Since we agree that these leaders are evil men, should our objective be to try to maintain them in a state of ostracism; or, alternatively, ought we try to induce them to shed their evil ways, even though we realize that in doing so they will gradually cease to be ostracized?

Citing his statements in his press conference yesterday,[4] Secretary Dulles said that he preferred the course of action of trying to induce the rulers of the Soviet Union to shed their wicked ways.

As for what had happened as a consequence of the Khrushchev speech, Secretary Dulles said he was quite sure that the Soviet leaders had never planned to have events happen as they did. On the other hand, since developments had followed the course that we have seen, the Soviet leaders are now trying to make the best of it. Certainly we do not want to assist them in this endeavor. On the

[4] A transcript of the Secretary's news conference on June 27 is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1956, pp. 47–53.

other hand, the United States certainly cannot take the position that developments since the Khrushchev speech are meaningless, that nothing whatsoever has happened in the Kremlin, and that no changes are taking place in the USSR. As a matter of fact, the allies of the United States go much further than we do in accepting the reality of the changes which are occurring in the USSR. The United States will be in real danger of isolation from its allies if it refuses to accept the possibility of some real changes in Soviet practices.

Basic to the whole situation in the USSR, Secretary Dulles insisted that it was impossible to run a dictatorship like the Soviet dictatorship without having recourse to terrorism and iron discipline such as Stalin had consistently employed. Stalin was no mere sadist; he employed terror methods simply because he realized that it was essential to instill terror in order to rule the people of the USSR. Nevertheless, continued Secretary Dulles, the people of a dictatorship will not go on accepting terrorism unless it is accompanied by a series of victories for the government which employs the terror. If you go for a period of five years without a significant victory, as was now the case in the USSR, the people will simply no longer endure to be governed by terrorism. This is a lesson that history teaches about all dictatorships, and history is the best guide as to what is now occurring in the Soviet Union. Hitler illustrated the same phenomenon in his own career.

Secretary Dulles warned that all this did not mean that the United States would not now have to face up to another very grave problem—namely, the problem of preventing the creation of popular fronts, including the Communist and Socialist Parties, in many countries of the world. Happily, even this danger was not at present as great as it had been, for instance, six months ago. The recent disillusioning visit of the French Socialists to Moscow,[5] and the reaction of the Labour Party leaders to the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to London,[6] had marked distinct setbacks to the Soviet objective of winning over the Socialists to cooperation with the Communist Parties. There was, after all, a basic cleavage between the Communist and the Socialist Parties, and that cleavage had become increasingly apparent since the contacts of the last six months between Socialist and Communist leaders. Accordingly, the likelihood of a rapprochement between these two parties was now less than it was six months ago, although, of course, the Soviets would keep on trying.

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[5] A 12-member French Socialist Party delegation visited the Soviet Union April 28–May 14.

[6] On April 23, a group of British Laborites submitted to Khrushchev and Bulganin an inquiry about Socialists imprisoned in Communist countries.

Secretary Dulles then pointed out that we were too inclined generally to believe that nothing ever happened with respect to Soviet policy and action except as the infallible result of carefully laid Soviet plans. To ascribe such infallibility to the Kremlin was an error. Indeed, part of what had happened in recent months in the Soviet Union had happened because we ourselves in the U.S. Government had planned it that way.

Governor Stassen then turned to Secretary Dulles and said that his earlier remarks should not be taken as an indication of a belief that no significant changes had occurred in the Soviet Union and that the policies of the Secretary of State and the President had not likewise had a great deal to do with the effecting of these changes. In his earlier remarks, said Governor Stassen, he had only wished to suggest the possibility that the events transpiring in the Soviet Union may be the result of a general policy directive agreed upon in advance by the Kremlin leaders.

Mr. Allen Dulles said he had one last thought to inject into the discussion—namely, that Marshal Tito may have played a role in what had been happening since the Khrushchev speech. He reminded the Council that Togliatti had paid a visit to Tito just before the latter had started on his trip to Moscow. It was quite possible that on this occasion Tito may have urged upon Togliatti a greater and more independent role for the national Communist Parties, both in the satellites and in the free world.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

56. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence [1]

Washington, July 3, 1956.

SOVIET RESOLUTION ON CULT OF PERSONALITY [2]

1. The Central Committee resolution appears as an effort to keep under control further critical discussions of Stalin and prevent such discussions from becoming an inquiry into the characteristics of the Soviet system and the past actions of current Soviet leaders. In response to the recent questioning of Togliatti and others, it advances an explanation of how Stalin managed to gain control and why he was not removed. Moscow presumably expects foreign Communists to accept this explanation and terminate their discussions, since the resolution stresses that Stalin is a thing of the past and in effect warns that critical discussions of the Stalin situation parallel efforts of the imperialists to distract the working class from future tasks.

2. Compared to the depth of analysis of Togliatti's questioning, the resolution is superficial, transparent, and hackneyed. Its defensive tone, lack of frankness, and incompleteness point up how difficult it is for Moscow to provide a serious explanation so long as the Soviet rulers refuse to permit discussion of the Soviet system and their own relations with Stalin.

3. The only foreign Communist reaction as of Wednesday [3] appeared in the New York *Daily Worker* which equivocally concluded that some would be satisfied and some would want to probe deeper.

4. The explanation of how the cult of personality developed provides no new thoughts, simply repeating what has been previously suggested by various foreign Communists. Moscow does go beyond its previous position, however, of ascribing everything to Stalin's vanity and argues that historical conditions, chiefly capitalist encirclement, also operated as a cause.

5. The explanation of why Stalin was not removed omits some points mentioned in Khrushchev's secret speech and provides some new points, but these raise more questions than they answer. The resolution denies that no counteraction was taken against Stalin and,

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7–356. The source text was attached to a brief covering memorandum dated July 3 from Armstrong to Howe, indicating that the memorandum was material for the Secretary's briefing book.

[2] On July 2, *Pravda* published a June 30 resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU entitled "On Overcoming the Cult of the Individual and Its Consequences." An English translation is printed in Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies—II*, pp. 221–227.

[3] Apparently June 27.

without elaboration, asserts that Party and military figures restricted his activity during the war. It also for the first time alleges that a "Leninist nucleus" existed in the Central Committee and, immediately after the death of Stalin, began the struggle against the cult of personality. These two new elements raise the possibility that within the Soviet ruling circle an effort is under way to build a case designed to absolve at least some of the current rulers from co-responsibility for Stalin's excesses and even to claim that these excesses had been opposed within the limitations of Stalin's rule.

6. As for guarantees against a repetition of Stalin, the resolution simply asserts that such excesses will not be allowed in the future, but does not state how they would be prevented.

7. The resolution completely ignores the remarks of Togliatti and others regarding new relations among Communist parties, including greater autonomy and mutual criticism.

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57. Memorandum From the Deputy Director (Plans) of Central Intelligence (Wisner) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) [1]

Washington, July 4, 1956.

SUBJECT

Views of a leading expert on the Soviet Union, concerning exploitation of the Soviet de-Stalinization program

1. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to your request for a somewhat fuller statement, in writing, of the current views of a leading American expert on Soviet affairs (hereinafter referred to as "the expert"). [2] [This information is submitted for your confidential use, since the expert has repeatedly expressed himself to me as being most anxious to avoid the creation of any impression that he is

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7–456. Secret; Eyes Only.

[2] According to a covering memorandum of July 5 from Murphy to the Secretary of State, the CIA was in continuous contact with George Kennan on matters relating to the Soviet Union. Murphy referred to the analysis of Khrushchev's secret speech made by Kennan, who had stated his opposition to publication of the speech (see Document 43). Murphy noted that the attached memorandum indicated that "Mr. Kennan was agreeably surprised over the heavy percentage of favorable and useful reaction, and that the first phase was more successful than he would have predicted."

seeking to intrude or in any way impose his views upon governmental officials having the responsibility for policy formulation, and I have undertaken to respect his requests in this regard.][3]

2. It will be recalled that the expert expressed the view, prior to the publication on June 4 by the State Department of a version of the Khrushchev secret speech, that it might be wiser and more effective in the long run if more "indirect means" could be found for releasing the document and exploiting its contents to our advantage. About two weeks after the publication of the document, the expert told me that he had been most agreeably surprised to find such a heavy percentage of favorable and useful reaction in the foreign press (extracts of which I have been furnishing to him on a continuing basis). He said that in his opinion this enterprise had come through the first phase more successfully than he would have predicted, and that on the whole things are rolling along very well. He felt certain that the impact upon the Free World Communist parties had been almost shattering and that they were filled with confusion and dismay. He commented particularly upon the "conspicuous malaise and bitterness of Togliatti", whom he regards as a most significant bellwether of Free World Communist leadership. He also commented in this same conversation upon the obvious difficulties of the satellite Communist leadership, and repeated his continuing view that the Kremlin leadership itself appears to be on the defensive and to have opened up a Pandora's Box for themselves. He was, however, quite strongly inclined to the view that now the campaign has been successfully launched, the more we can get others to say for us and the less our own top leaders have to say themselves, the better the results will be.

3. In a conversation which I had with the expert yesterday, for the purpose of requesting him to study and give us the benefit of his reactions and interpretations regarding the so-called "Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU" which was published on or about 1 July,[4] the expert offered the following additional observations and refinements:

a. The Resolution, especially the use which is made of the Poznan riots to blame all of their problems on "subversive imperialist intervention", is a typically Stalinist reaction; after all the Kremlin leadership were Stalin's own pupils, especially in so far as the non-Communist world is concerned. It appears more and more clearly that the differences between the present leadership and Stalin are mainly tactical as regards their handling of the outside world and in the conduct of foreign affairs generally. They seemed to feel that Stalin had missed a lot of good bets; viz., had made enemies

[3] All brackets in this document are in the source text.
[4] See footnote 2, *supra*.

unnecessarily and in so doing had united the Free World against him—and also Stalin had failed to cash in on many opportunities which should have been easily exploitable to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

b. The effort to justify the dictatorship in the 1920's and early 1930's in terms of capitalist encirclement is a Stalinist explanation and one which was entirely unwarranted by the factual situation. No one was planning to attack the Soviet Union during that period. They no doubt did have need of a tightening-up of the reins of authority when the threat of Nazi Germany became real, slow as Stalin was to open his eyes to the true nature of that menace.

c. The tone and content of the Resolution indicate that the Kremlin is very worried and their dragging in of the references to the Poznan revolt underscores this worry. It is of the greatest importance that they not be allowed to get away with this new lie. The expert said that whereas he welcomed the State Department's flat denial of our involvement or responsibility, he wanted to underscore in particular the importance of the avoidance on our part of any statements or actions which would be susceptible of the interpretation that we were involved—i.e., "let the lady not protest too loudly".

d. . . . [The expert continues to feel that there are many evidences of a continuing power struggle within the top leadership, and that they are still very far away from resolving all of the difficulties which are inherent in the attempt to convert from a one-man dictatorship to a truly collective leadership.]

Frank G. Wisner

P.S. You may want to show this to Jake Beam and Franny Stevens.

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58. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Gettysburg, July 13, 1956 [1]

[Here follow several paragraphs regarding the President's trip to Panama.]

(2) We discussed Khrushchev's speech and the controversy between the various Communist Parties which had resulted. I indicated that I felt that important forces were at work and that the Soviet Communists were in a dilemma of either allowing liberal

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private.

forces to grow and obtain recognition, or else revert to Stalinist type of repression, in which case they would lose the ground they had been trying to gain with the free nations as having become more civilized and liberal.

The President referred to a letter he had received [2] criticizing my having spoken publicly about this matter. He said he merely sent this to me for information and not because he accepted that viewpoint.

I said this problem like many others could be dealt with more readily if only part of the problem were considered. Our difficulty in the State Department was that we had to weigh all angles. In this case, it was very important from the standpoint of the Mutual Security legislation to portray our past policies as successful and to have some reason such as their success for continuing these policies. Furthermore, all that I said and did in this matter was very carefully weighed not only in the Department of State but also with Mr. Allen Dulles. The President indicated his complete understanding of the matter and approval of what I had done.

. . . . . .

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

[2] Not further identified.

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59. Paper Prepared by the Senior Research Staff on International Communism in the Central Intelligence Agency [1]

CIA/SRS–2 *Washington, July 15, 1956.*

THE PRESENT COMMUNIST CONTROVERSY: ITS RAMIFICATIONS AND POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS

1. The publication of Khrushchev's "secret" speech of 25 February created a strain, bearing certain appearances of a crisis, in the

[1] Source: Department of State, P/PG Files: Lot 60 D 661, Soviet and Related Problems (Beam File). Confidential.

A note on the title page reads: "This is a speculative study which has been discussed with US Government intelligence officers but has not been formally coordinated. It is based on information available to SRS as of 15 July 1956."

relationship of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) with the Communist parties of Europe and the United States. It accentuated prevailing tensions in at least some of the East European satellites. However, it does not seem to have affected Communist developments in Asia and Africa, judging from the few cautious reactions noted so far.

2. In the West, the controversy came into the open with questioning statements by the French CP, strong denunciations by Togliatti and Nenni, and somewhat milder criticism by the British and American CPs, all between 18 and 24 June. Some of the smaller European parties joined in the fray. Soviet failure to provide for publication of the speech by Communist organs, and the subsequent lack of an immediate explanatory follow-up unquestionably disconcerted Western CP leaders and caused confusion among the rank and file of Party members and fellow travelers. Nevertheless, the Western scoop only brought to a head the restlessness which had vexed the parties ever since the 20th Congress of the CPSU and created a need to vent pent-up feelings.

3. In the satellite orbit, East German Party chief Ulbricht's criticism was the first to be heard. Subsequent press comments, while chiming in with Ulbricht, made it clear, however, that criticism was to remain within bounds. The Polish press published most of Togliatti's interview, without comment. A direct connection of the Poznan uprisings with the present Communist crisis probably cannot be established. Rather, the uprisings may have been the result of more liberal policies promised after the 20th Congress, just as the East German uprisings of 17 June 1953 followed the introduction of Malenkov's "new course". The Hungarian press quoted a few lines of the Togliatti statement. During the post 20th Congress period, ferment increased, more among the intelligentsia of Hungary than among the workers, who stood on the side lines and seemed inclined to let the Party leaders fight the issues among themselves. However, the *Petöfi* circle of young intellectuals is promoting critical discussions and, at least by implication, demanding that Nagy replace Rakosi. As far as is known, no other satellite government permitted publication of the Western Party criticism, even though leaders occasionally referred to it.

4. The Chinese Communist Party which reacted slowly to the theses of the 20th CPSU Congress and finally came out with a statement of restrained endorsement, has apparently not participated in the subsequent controversy. It merely printed parts of the Togliatti interview alongside the 30 June Resolution, without comment. The Japanese CP, too, has been reluctant to take sides. That Party's leadership is probably preoccupied by factional fights which have been going on for some time and have not as yet been resolved. The

cautious and reluctant reaction of the Indonesian CP, which is trying to keep its peace with both Stalin and Khrushchev, is perhaps symptomatic of the state of mind of the Communist leadership in the uncommitted areas. Similarly, the Indian CP did not criticize Khrushchev severely, merely indicating that Stalin's merits should not be altogether forgotten and that further explanations should be provided. The Resolution will probably furnish sufficient clarification, from the point of view of the Indian CP leadership, which is concerned lest the masses become even more confused than they already are. In general, Communist parties in the uncommitted areas may be so impressed with Soviet activities, profitable to them, that they will submerge the controversy over the "secret" speech and at least pretend to be content with the Resolution. We believe that the course charted by the 20th Congress will prove more appealing to the Communists in these areas than was rigid Stalinism. As more Party "autonomy" is stressed, native nationalism may gradually lose its fear of the USSR as a new source of potential foreign domination.

5. The principal points of criticism by the Western parties were the following:

a. The CPSU leaders have mishandled the publication of Khrushchev's "secret" speech of 25 February by permitting the bourgeois press to scoop the Communists and have compounded this error by not issuing an immediate explanation;

b. The CPSU leaders cannot be absolved of all responsibility for Stalin's crimes; not having stopped him, they must share his guilt;

c. Past violations of "socialist legality" and the harm done to the International Communist Movement by the "cult of personality" cannot simply be accepted ex-post-facto; there must be guarantees that they will not occur again.

6. The principal inferences or conclusions drawn by Western Communist leaders in their criticism were:

a. The structure of World Communism may have changed;

b. The USSR has served as a model for building Socialist society, but the areas in which Communist rule is now established are so vast and varied that the Soviet model can no longer be mandatory.

c. In non-Communist parts of the world, there are countries where Socialism might be achieved by drawing together various socialist movements which have not yet reached a mutual understanding or agreement. This means that freedom of action is required by the national CPs to work out their problems in accordance with prevailing conditions.

Criticism and inferences were similar everywhere, and no real independence of thought was displayed.

7. The Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of 30 June,[2] published by *Pravda* on 2 July, was issued to provide an answer to the Communist critics. Although the document was signed by the Central Committee, there is no evidence that a plenary meeting of the Committee actually took place. The document appears to have been hastily drafted; it is repetitive and apologetic. In the endeavor to exculpate themselves, the Soviet leaders modified their previous statements regarding Stalin's behavior during World War II. They now claimed that they had succeeded in "sharply restricting" the dictator during this period but they admitted that afterwards they were unable to do so. Being psychologically cornered, the Soviet leaders aggressively revealed their revolutionary intentions more bluntly than in the 20th Congress statements, and their interpretation of the Party line is anything but mellow. The Resolution does not answer many pertinent questions raised by the criticism, nor does it deal sternly with the "rebels". It slightly slaps Togliatti's wrist but on the other hand quotes his positive statements, along with similar quotations from the CPs of China, France and the US, purporting to show that the fraternal parties throughout the world have approved of the new Soviet policies.

8. In order to dispel any impression among the Free World parties that the Soviet system had changed fundamentally, the CPSU emphasized again and again that the underlying principle of Communist strategy is and remains Marxism-Leninism. The paraphernalia of this ideology are unchanged: the Leninist principle of Party leadership (i.e. the dictatorship of the Party); the reinvigoration of "socialist democracy" (i.e. "democratic centralism", internally and externally); the use of cadres for the attainment of special targets (i.e. undercover activities); the continued interest in proletarian solidarity (i.e. central control of Communism in one form or another); and a more flexible method to achieve and maintain such solidarity (i.e. a tendency, for the time being, to retain control without rigid organization such as the Comintern). The Resolution (which falsely ascribes Stalin's thesis of building "socialism in one country" to Lenin) caters to former Stalinists as well as to those of Titoist leanings. It officially restates its undying enmity toward the imperialist West in general and the US in particular. It clearly disposes of any hope concerning changes which might decrease the Communist threat. Rather it confirms the 20th Congress proclamation of a Communist Renaissance following the Stalinist Dark Age.

9. Such a Renaissance, in the view of the Soviet leaders, can only be achieved by recognizing that previous tactics have become obsolete and that new conditions and circumstances require new

[2] See footnote 2, Document 56.

policies and methods. Among these circumstances the Soviet leaders include the following:

a. There is a nuclear stalemate, making resort to general war unprofitable;

b. There appears to be a chance that the polarization of power around the US and the USSR will give way to a variety of power combinations, and if this is the case, the Sino-Soviet bloc will in time acquire superiority over the Western camp without having to resort to violence;

c. A new "polycentric" concept, i.e. a modified application of Leninist "democratic centralism" to International Communist organization, will promote world-wide United Fronts and lead to Socialist-Communist combinations, such as Tito has suggested.

10. It is unlikely that the CPSU can and will change its position for some time to come. It will permit the development of Party "independence" outside the orbit, well aware of the risks involved but almost certainly confident of its ability to maintain its predominance in World Communism. It should be understood that "autonomy" will be limited to local interpretations of Soviet policies. Even prior to the 20th Congress, the visit to Belgrade [3] implicitly sanctioned greater freedom in the conduct of CP affairs. So far as the satellites are concerned, the Soviet leaders probably felt that Party autonomy could be confined to external manifestations without touching the substance of control, thereby preventing the emergence of genuine Titoism. They probably reasoned that, doctrinally, the People's Democracies have already chosen their road to socialism. Moreover, the political and economic dependence of the satellites upon the USSR, which is about to be further strengthened by impending economic integration into the Soviet Bloc, guarantees, by and large, the loyalties of the leadership. Having an overriding vested interest in the continuation of a Soviet-Satellite union, and controlling their armed forces and the police, the Satellite Communist leaders can be expected to prevent anti-regime resistance from creating more than occasional rioting. Serious tendencies toward Titoism could, if necessary, be curbed by Soviet armed forces. SRS believes that the Eastern Bloc is politically, economically, and militarily now so tightly knit that major deviations could and would not be tolerated by Soviet leaders. Occasional flareups of local independence, such as the Hungarian radio outburst of 3 July following Suslov's visit, will be treated as vents for national self-assertion but they will have little real meaning. In other words, there is no reason to believe that the satellites will not remain satellites.

[3] The Soviet leaders visited Yugoslavia May–June 1955.

11. The Soviet leaders probably foresaw difficulties with the Western powers when they launched the anti-Stalin campaign. But they may have looked upon Western Communist outbursts as tempests in the samovar which in time would calm themselves without harming the cause. They must have concluded that minor "revolts" of Western parties need not impede Soviet advance into the political vacuum of the uncommitted areas seething with powerful nationalist aspirations. There are indications that Asia and Africa are now the prime targets of Communism, taking precedence over stalemated Western Europe for the present.

12. The CPSU, with the help of the Central Committee's Resolution, will try to tighten the Party Line which had become somewhat diffused in the aftermath of the denunciation of Stalin. The CPSU leaders have embarked on a grand-scale tactical maneuver to overcome the obstacles in their way and to hasten the advent of a socialist society. In its bold conception, this tactic transcends that of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP). Basically, it uses the technique of decentralizing International Communism. The former Stalinist crime of "nationalist deviation" has now been declared a Leninist virtue.

13. In this connection there is evidence that Tito is still thinking of a world-wide Socialist-Communist combination, a "Fifth International", as it has been called. His interest in closer relations with Socialists has been developing ever since his break with the Cominform, and the theses of the 20th Congress probably have given new impetus to an old idea. Tito may have discussed this idea with Togliatti in Belgrade and with the Soviet leaders during his visit to the USSR.[4] It is conceivable that the Kremlin, far from objecting, in fact encouraged him to go ahead. It may have believed that such a combination would greatly stimulate United Front developments and would impress many "advanced" socialists in the uncommitted areas. However, this new "International" would differ from its predecessors, at least for the time being, in avoiding formal organization. Tito appears to envisage it as a loose association of leftists. Presumably he still is averse to becoming a member of a more formal organization, the control of which could pass into the hands of the USSR. Thus it may be assumed that, at the outset, the new "International" would center around Socialist and Communist groups of the Free World, notably from uncommitted areas, and that the USSR would not insist upon active participation or leadership. While the Soviet leaders may not be entirely happy about such a development, they probably believe that for the advancement of World Communism, Titoism is preferable to "reformist" socialism. Moreover, the Soviet

[4] Tito visited the Soviet Union June 1–23.

leaders probably expect that Socialists, by affiliating themselves with the new "International" would be more likely to break away from the influence of the Second International in general and the European Social Democrats in particular, which still is considerable.

14. The idea of the new "International" is not to be confounded with attempts on the part of Tito, which appear to be supported by the USSR, to create a neutralist "zone of peace". The implementation of this objective would greatly assist the USSR in its efforts to detach the Afro-Asian nations from Western influence and to substitute that of the USSR through political and economic manipulations. Evidently, both the creation of a neutralist combination of states and the establishment of a new Socialist-Communist "International" are viewed as supplementing each other. For the implementation of both plans, Tito may have been accorded a leading role as a mediator between the radical and moderate political groups, as a man who has demonstrated how to remain neutral even against heavy odds. But while the formal establishment of a neutralist bloc probably would meet with resistance on the part of leaders who seek to remain unattached to any type of political alignment, an informal "Fifth International" might win the sympathy of many leftists who desire a political position halfway between social democracy and Communism.

15. Although these developments may raise hopes that the deterioration of Communism is imminent, SRS does not believe that such hopes are justified. On the contrary, we feel that in the long run the danger of Communist encroachment is likely to increase rather than decrease. A determined, gradualist, and purposefully flexible Communist policy, not always recognizable as such, is difficult to combat with means at the disposal of a democratic country. In SRS–1 [5] we speculated that:

"The post-Stalinist concept of Communist victory is the achievement of 'socialism' in individual countries in a manner suited to national conditions, followed by the joining of such countries in a loose community of 'socialist' states. At first, these states would retain their national identities but as time goes by they would gradually merge into a World-Communist community which would rule itself according to ideologically motivated universal laws, having discarded national governments as we know them today." (Para. 12).

Doctrinally, Communism will now differentiate "between that which is universally valid in Marxism and that which is particularly applicable to one or another country". (Eugene Dennis in *Political Affairs*, June 1956, p. 3.) This approach would tend to avoid the narrow dogmatism of Stalin's era and might even go beyond Lenin's

[5] Not further identified.

democratic centralism toward Tito's "polycentralism". Such a decentralization of World Communism would provide for a flexibility of maneuvering that could not easily be matched by the more cumbersome parliamentary machineries of the West. Barring vigorous and novel Western countermeasures, the Titoist gamble of the Soviet leaders appears to have good chances of success. We may find Communism greatly expanding and possibly confronting the West with an unfriendly world combination of Socialists and Communists. Such a combination might flourish in an atmosphere which the USSR deliberately kept free of international tension.

16. Nevertheless, there are risks for the Communists. Their long-range tactic of decentralization might lead to a loosening of discipline and to fractionalization, especially in Europe. Without monolithic isolation, Communism could lose its spell, and might even be infected by evolutionary socialism. However, in our opinion, such a development is not likely to occur, unless the US and the West act vigorously to exploit prevailing Communist confusion, to counter the Soviet economic offensive effectively, and to undertake a more aggressive program for the conquest of man's mind. There is still considerable wishful thinking on the Western side. European and US newspapers have sensationalized Communist Party criticism; they have played down indications that the USSR still is the base of World Communism and that Communist Parties remain dependent upon Soviet ideological guidance, financial help, and organizational leadership.

17. We conclude that the present crisis, if in fact it is one, is not a grave danger for World Communism. We see no convincing reason to assume that the USSR has lost its ability to control the Communist movement. We believe that the CPSU leaders, when they launched the campaign against Stalin, probably expected manifestations of discontent. Nevertheless, they were willing to relax their absolute control of the Western parties, at least temporarily, in the belief that they could re-establish Soviet hegemony at will. We further believe that the Resolution will suffice as an "explanation", even though many questions remained unanswered, as the CPUSA and Togliatti have already pointed out. The Western Communist leaders will probably not press for further elaboration. As parish priests, they will interpret the Soviet encyclicals in accordance with their own needs, without resorting to the Moscow high priests. The line for such additional interpretation probably has been communicated to those European leaders (all members of the Cominform) who reportedly congregated in Moscow at the time the Resolution was published. We believe that the USSR's main concern will be the exploitation of Communism in Asia and Africa. In this area, it probably will proceed cautiously, dealing with national governments

rather than with Party officials, in pursuit of its economic offensive. Overtly, it will be circumspect, avoiding "interference in the internal affairs" of other countries. Covertly, it will press toward the formation of United Fronts and other Socialist-Communist combinations. Where their parties are outlawed, Communists will join socialist groups, thereby gaining and maintaining Communist influence in any new political combinations. If intra-Communist squabbles should continue or increase, it is possible that a tougher Party line may be adopted. The CPSU Resolution and current *Pravda* interpretations provide the theoretical tools for such a toughening within the framework of Khrushchev's "new course".

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60. Editorial Note

According to the memorandum of discussion at the 291st meeting of the National Security Council on July 19, Allen Dulles made the following remarks as part of his briefing on significant world developments affecting United States security:

"The Director of Central Intelligence said that the USSR was caught in a dilemma. The Soviets wish to continue their de-Stalinization program and at the same time cut off the debate that is now going on regarding de-Stalinization and the question of freedom They wish to foster the impression that there is no change in their policy of "liberalization", but also wish to close ranks and adopt a "harder" line, particularly toward the West. They wish to hold the loyalty of the Communist leaders generally in non-Communist countries, and also disavow certain of those leaders. They wish to modify conditions in the satellites, but at the same time "keep the lid on" and prevent additional riots such as those which recently occurred in Poland.

"Mr. Dulles then noted that a recent cable from Ambassador Bohlen had expressed the view that Pervukhin appeared to be gaining increasing influence in the Soviet governing hierarchy. This view was based on information regarding the seating arrangements at recent high-level Soviet meetings." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

61. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State[1]

London, September 24, 1956—1 p.m.

1622. The well-known writer and Soviet expert Louis Fischer who just arrived here following twenty-four day visit to Moscow gave following information to EmbOff today relating to Voice of America broadcasts to Soviet Union. Information based mainly on conversations he had with about twenty close friends he had known in pre-war days.

1. Voice broadcasts can be heard easily outside Moscow and with special devices even in Moscow.

2. Russians prefer BBC broadcasts and listen to it eagerly. Writers at House of Creation gather daily at 5 pm to listen to BBC.

3. Voice programs are strongly disliked because "they reflect dislike of Russian people and country" and "reek with propaganda". Russians are fed up with their own propaganda and like even less to listen to American.

4. American jazz of course is delight of Russian youth.

Russians who made these remarks to Fischer hoped Voice would improve and give them straight news, facts and viewpoints of US without irritating Russian patriot feelings. One friend remarked "no matter what we think of regime, we are patriots".

Other information follows which was told in strict confidence. He was struck by freedom with which ordinary people talked as compared with Stalinist era and relative absence of fear of police. He also noted persons asked questions that would never have been put forward in pre-war days and which indicated people are beginning to think of themselves. For instance, one student asked him what he thought of Marxism in such a way as to indicate it was not gospel. Writers felt freer and paid less attention to "directives" in publication.

Everybody with whom he talked had read secret Khrushchev speech to which they referred as a "letter". Depth of revelation had shocked them. In talking with Mikoyan latter made remark he (Fischer) had some bad things in his books about Soviet Union. Fischer replied they were not worse than "facts revealed by Khrushchev speech and asked why it could not be published in Soviet Union. Mikoyan said "still too early to do this". Mikoyan revealed towards end of Stalinist regime he was "facing destruction" and he otherwise let Fischer know he was violent anti-Stalinist.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/9–2456. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Moscow.

Fischer found great respect for Malenkov among his old friends who thought he was "not finished as a top leader". Malenkov was greatly respected for his competence, culture and breeding.

Russian friends greeted Fischer with open arms and saw him several times without in any way showing fear of police. One friend saw him five times. Thanks to Mikoyan visa was extended from eight to twenty days.

Fischer requested especially in using above information it not be attributed to him for fear it possibly endanger friends whom he saw.

Aldrich

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62. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, October 16, 1956—4 p.m.

837. Yesterday at Afghan reception in reply to my direct question Khrushchev confirmed that Central Committee meeting had been "postponed" until end of November or beginning December, probably latter. He gave explanation preoccupation leading party workers with harvest, state visits scheduled for October and November 6 holiday.

On domestic matters Khrushchev expressed himself as extremely "pleased" with record harvest and said that agricultural results this year had been outstanding in all fields, including corn. He denounced as nonsense reports in foreign press of any major domestic problems, and said "Our affairs here are going very well (po maslu)".

Khrushchev said it seems difficult for foreigners to understand that with restoration "democracy" in party individuals had right to express their own view and that frequently these views differ but did not represent real divisions in leadership.

Comment: While Khrushchev's remarks absence serious dissension could not in themselves be taken at face value, they were made naturally and not defensively. While these men are of course excellent actors, there was nothing in appearance either Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan or Zhukov, who were present, to indicate any

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/10–1656. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Belgrade.

element of strain. On the contrary, they all appeared relaxed and at ease.

In reply to my question if all members leadership had taken their vacation, Khrushchev replied to the negative saying Malenkov and Pervukhin were going on their holiday now and that Molotov and Voroshilov "whom we insist take two months", were still in the Crimea.

Bohlen

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63. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, November 23, 1956—11 p.m.

1299. Following announcement Molotov appointment Minister State Control (reported Embtel 1283), [2] *Central Press* today in routine chronicle item reported appointment V.G. Zhavoronkov, former Minister State Control, as Deputy Minister. Following are Embassy's initial comments on appointments.

Appointment Molotov raises several questions regarding motivations behind move and possible policy implications which impossible answer intelligently on basis present information; however, whatever may be specific reasons for appointment, it does not seem to indicate or presage measurable increase, if any, un [*of?*] Molotov's standing in Soviet leadership. Regarding rumor circulating here last week that Malenkov and Molotov to be appointed Chairman Council Ministers and Party First Secretary respectively, Molotov's new assignment would appear to lay to rest speculation that he might be elevated to top party spot. Should also be noted that Minister State Control as presently constituted is relatively minor post (previous incumbent Zhavoronkov merely candidate member party Central Committee), although as considered below possibility not excluded that job could become more important under Molotov.

On other hand, appointment announcement specifies Molotov retains post First Deputy Chairman Council Ministers and no reason

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/11–2356. Confidential. Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Telegram 1283, November 21, reported that Soviet radio announced Molotov's appointment as Minister of State Control and that the Embassy would comment the following day. (*Ibid.*, 761.13/11–2156)

assume his position as member party Presidium affected. Thus, appointment cannot be interpreted as signifying radical downgrading Molotov.

Within these limits, there are several possible interpretations of reasons for and significance move. (1) This could be basically trouble-shooting assignment. Molotov has had previous experience this field. Khrushchev in Central Committee Report to 20th Congress [3] criticized Operations Ministry and called for "radical reorganization its work (although press since then has given little attention to subject). (2) New appointment may be time-filling spot designed to charge Molotov with operational duties as far removed from foreign policy field as possible. Well known that Molotov's differences with present dominant party leadership over foreign policy (particularly rapprochement with Yugoslavia) led to his loss of major influence on foreign policy in 1955 and relinquishment 1956 post Foreign Minister. In this case, present difficulties satellite relations could explain timing of move. However, this would appear unnecessary in view Soviet-Polish declaration and *Pravda* article today stressing as official policy "different roads to socialism" concept which Molotov supposedly opposed.

Foregoing reasoning would also appear less cogent if Molotov were to retain responsibilities in cultural field which he has held sometime since he stepped down as Foreign Minister. As previously reported, Molotov in conversation with me few weeks ago confirmed earlier rumors that he was responsible for overseeing cultural activities. As late as November 20 *Soviet Culture* printed account meeting held by Ministry Culture on pictorial arts at which Molotov given top billing and delivered address. (3) Appointment could possibly foreshadow shift economic policy with possible attendant personnel changes. Switch to greater emphasis on consumer goods production could produce economic problems requiring strengthening watch-dog functions this Ministry.

One clue to significance Molotov's appointment is question future functions and responsibilities Ministry on State Control. If Ministry's responsibilities remain roughly at level of past few years this could indicate appointment Molotov in effect demotion. On other hand, if his appointment signifies radical increase in role this Ministry it could represent promotion. Evidence on this point may be forthcoming shortly.

As to wider implications, forthcoming plenum party Central Committee, which according to private statements in October by party leaders still scheduled for early December, may give answer.

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[3] See Document 26.

In conclusion might add that among diplomatic corps and foreign correspondents here there is no consensus opinion as to significance this appointment.

Bohlen

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64. Editorial Note

According to the memorandum of discussion at the 305th meeting of the National Security Council on November 30, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles made the following statement in his briefing on significant world developments affecting United States security:

"Mr. Dulles said that reports from both the American Embassy and other sources in Moscow were giving us fairly hard evidence of unrest in the Soviet Union itself. So far this unrest was mostly confined to youth and student groups. Such groups were expressing open sympathy for Hungary and calling for the creation of more than one political party in the Soviet Union. After citing certain specific instances of such student activity, Mr. Dulles pointed out that while these were small indications, they seemed to be signs of real discontent. There were even some signs of unrest in the field of labor. Other rumors concerning dissension in the high command in Moscow so far lacked confirmation, though it was certainly likely that there had been real attacks on Khrushchev's policies. In this connection Mr. Dulles pointed out that as long as the Soviet Union remained under such fire as it now was, it was very likely that the top Soviet leadership would try to hold together. The Central Committee was scheduled to meet before the end of the current year. If any changes are to occur in Soviet leadership, the meeting of this Committee might be the occasion of the announcement. While there was no doubt that Khrushchev's policy was under fire, it remained difficult to see who could successfully replace him. It was the general opinion of the intelligence community that Molotov's new position did not constitute a promotion." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

65. Memorandum for the Record, by the President's Staff Secretary (Goodpaster) [1]

Washington, December 18, 1956.

On the President's direction, I conveyed to Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford, and Mr. Allen Dulles individually and personally today between noon and 1 P.M. the President's instructions that, effective immediately, there are to be no flights by U. S. reconnaissance aircraft over "Iron Curtain" countries. Each of them confirmed that he understood what the President intended.

A.J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE US Army

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret.

66. Editorial Note

According to the memorandum of discussion at the 329th meeting of the National Security Council on July 3, the following remarks were made by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles during his briefing on significant world developments affecting United States security:

"The Director of Central Intelligence stated that a dramatic announcement could be expected some time today from Moscow. He pointed out that he had earlier informed the National Security Council of an unusual occurrence in the USSR—namely, the cancellation of the annual Air Show. This had been followed by an abrupt postponement of a visit by the Soviet leaders to Czechoslovakia. Today *Pravda* had published an editorial giving clear indication of the existence of disagreements in the highest ranks of the Soviet leadership. There were now unconfirmed press rumors that a purge was about to occur which would remove four top leaders accused of deviation. Included, according to these rumors, were Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich.

"The President commented that the more trouble the Soviet leaders got into, the better for us all." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Later that day, the Soviet Government announced that, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU from June 22 to 29, it was decided to remove 5 of the 11 members of the Party

Presidium. Three of these—Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich—were accused of collusion against party policy and expelled also from the Central Committee. The other two full members ousted from the Presidium were Pervukhin and Saburov. Former Foreign Minister Shepilov was said to have joined the three "anti-party" members and was dropped from his posts as Party Secretary and candidate member of the Presidium and expelled from the Central Committee. The new Presidium consisted of 15 members, including 5 promoted from the ranks of candidate members. Among these were Zhukov, Brezhnev, Furtseva, Shvernik, and Kozlov.

The initial appraisal of these developments by the Embassy in Moscow was transmitted in telegrams 14 and 22, July 3, and telegram 23, July 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7–357 and 761.00/7–457) The text of a statement regarding these events, released by the Department of State press officer on July 3, was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 14, July 3. (*Ibid.*, 761.00/7–357)

According to the notes of the Secretary's Staff meeting on July 5, there was considerable discussion of the announced changes in the CPSU Presidium. Acting Secretary of State Herter said that the President was considering sending a message to Zhukov "appropriate to the latter's appointment to the Presidium." (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75) In a memorandum of July 5 to Herter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John Wesley Jones submitted a formal recommendation that the President not communicate with Zhukov at this time, because Zhukov's new position was within the party, not the government. He concluded that "it would seem more appropriate, and perhaps more effective, to exploit this enhancement in Zhukov's position and prestige within the party hierarchy at a later date in connection with some substantive issue, perhaps related to disarmament." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 761.13/7–557)

For Khrushchev's brief reminiscence on the removal of the "anti-party" group, see Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, page 14. A more detailed account of these events is in the diary entries for July 3–6 of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, Veljko Mićunović, including his account of a lengthy conversation with Khrushchev on July 5, which Mićunović reported to Tito. (Mićunović, *Moscow Diary*, pages 258–275)

67. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions [1]

Washington, July 5, 1957—5:21 p.m.

12. Following are Department's preliminary views concerning some possible policy implications for USSR of dismissal top CP leaders.

1) Khrushchev has emerged more powerful than ever through elimination of leaders who have clearly spearheaded opposition to current "20th Congress" policy lines championed by him. Impact of development on continuance "collective leadership" principle not yet clear. There are no indications as yet Khrushchev turning to police in way Stalin did to eliminate potential opposition or that he has embarked on all-out effort obtain supreme power of Stalin.

Most other strong personalities of regime in political and prestige sense have of course now been removed and newly constituted Presidium can be expected share Khrushchev's policy objectives.

2) Current Soviet policies will probably remain unchanged but ability Soviet Government to pursue them may be enhanced by elimination of opposition. (Mikoyan made flat statement along these lines to Davis at July 4 reception. [2])

3) Elimination opposition, particularly Molotov, may facilitate closer cooperation between Poland and Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. Position of Stalinist elements in Eastern European satellites may be weakened with more emphasis on 20th Congress policy lines (satellite developments subject separate message). [3]

4) There are no clear signs of any effects on such important foreign policies as those with regard to disarmament and German reunification. Domestically USSR is likely to press forward with current Khrushchev programs in industry (reorganization of management) and agriculture (livestock campaign, etc.) with less effective opposition from bureaucratic and other elements who undoubtedly now aware that they no longer have spokesmen in top Party circles.

Addressees selected because of special interest in Soviet affairs. Your early comments requested.

Herter

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7–557. Confidential. Drafted by Stefan and Nathaniel Davis (EUR/EE) and cleared with Swank (OIR/DRS), Freers (EUR/EE), and Knox (EUR/RA). Sent to Paris, London, Bonn, Rome, Belgrade, Frankfurt for SRD, Munich for PRU, Manila, Saigon, Vienna, Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest, and Budapest and repeated to Paris for USRO and Moscow.

[2] Davis' discussion with Mikoyan was described in telegram 24 from Moscow, July 4. (*Ibid.*, 761.00/7–457)

[3] Not further identified.

68. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, July 6, 1957—3 p.m.

44. Department pass Defense. In unusual procedure Soldatov called me personally to Foreign Office July 6 to inform me clearance had been granted for Ambassador Thompson's plane fly Moscow July 10 and return July 12.

He then said purpose of calling me was to refer once again to his statement at time Ambassador Bohlen's plane last cleared, i.e., if Soviet Government desired to send a Soviet plane to US on similar occasion, request would meet with "positive" response from US Government. (Embtel 2343, April 15.) [2]

I asked Soldatov whether Soviets had in mind plane for use Soviet Ambassador exclusively and whether he had at this time specific request to make. He replied Soviet Government was only now "studying" question; it had no specific request to make at moment; Soviet plane might be for use Soviet Ambassador or for important delegations such as Soviet Delegation to UN. In reply my direct question he said he did not expect specific reply this matter now but merely desired "express hope" that if specific request made in future it would meet with US agreement.

Obvious from manner in which this question has been raised twice in succession that Soviets are seriously considering request to send Soviet plane to US for official purposes at least in next few months. Question of what type of plane they would or could use and alternative routes are technical questions which Department may wish to discuss with Air Force. When I referred in conversation with Soldatov to fact that during war Soviet planes had flown to US via Alaska and inquired whether they had any particular route in mind, he confined his reply to restating they were only studying matter.

We suggest that this matter be given thorough study and that Department be prepared to answer specific Soviet request at any time in near future. Soviet practice with regard use Ambassador's plane here is to require at least ten days prior notice.

Tying request for agreement in principle to flights to Moscow of Ambassador's special aircraft, Soviets have made it perfectly plain that refusal would result automatically in immediate cessation of privilege we have long enjoyed. Aside from Air Force considerations, result would be loss of this means to bring in classified material not

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/7–657. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 761.5411/4–1557)

physically suitable for transmission by pouch, inconvenience to Ambassador and loss of highly desirable logistic support for Embassy to say nothing of unfavorable publicity in view number of years we have exercised this privilege.

Davis

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69. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles), Washington, July 8, 1957, 12:16 p.m. [1]

TELEPHONE CALL TO ALLEN DULLES

AWD returned the call and they discussed things in Russia—they are afraid of Khrushchev as he is not the chess-playing type of Russian as Stalin and Molotov. AWD said K is not entirely free because the Army is coming up—may be working toward a military dictatorship. They agreed it is another step in the winning of long-range battle. The Sec said we have to calculate more closely. They agreed we should have had more dope on it. AWD said they are reviewing it and wants to talk with the Sec about it. AWD does not think we did well. They talked about seeing each other tonight (the Sec and Mrs D will dine at AWD's).

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations. Prepared by Phyllis D. Bernau.

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70. Memorandum of Discussion at the 330th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 11, 1957 [1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants and items 1 and 2.]

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on July 12.

3. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

Mr. Cutler indicated that the Director of Central Intelligence would confine his briefing to the recent changes in leadership of the Soviet Union, a subject which the Council would doubtless find of absorbing interest.

Mr. Allen Dulles displayed a chart entitled "USSR Party and Government Organization". With this chart as background information, he went on to describe the recent developments in the USSR as the most dramatic which had occurred in recent years, not even excepting the death of Stalin. He described the collective dictatorship in the Soviet Union as finished. Khrushchev had achieved clear-cut control of the Party apparatus. His only potential rival might be Marshal Zhukov. The Central Committee of the Communist Party had exercised real power against the Presidium, the old Politburo, for the first time in years. Mr. Dulles followed this with the listing of the major policy issues which had been the subject of debate.

Mr. Dulles then pointed out that the majority of the new Presidium were second-level figures, and that five very well-known members had been eliminated. This left Zhukov and Mikoyan as the only two personalities of real note who remained on as members of the new Presidium. Mikoyan appeared from the record not to be a genuine seeker after power.

Mr. Dulles followed these comments with a brief narrative and analysis of the events which had occurred in the Soviet Union, from the departure of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Finland,[2] up to the present time. This was followed by a recital of the official charges against "the rebels". Mr. Dulles stated his inclination to believe that in this extended contest Zhukov's intervention on the side of Khrushchev had been decisive. Bulganin's role, on the other hand, appeared uncertain. Perhaps in the early stages of the debate he had voted with the rebels against Khrushchev. In any event, Khrushchev would probably deem it advisable to keep Bulganin around for a while. This would tend to soften the blow that a disgrace of Bulganin would cause in countries like India, which Bulganin and Khrushchev had recently visited.[3] After a while, however, Bulganin might be allowed to retire quietly and be replaced by Zhukov. If this happened, Marshal Konev would be the logical candidate to succeed Zhukov in the Ministry of Defense.

Mr. Dulles indicated his doubts that show trials of the rebels were likely to be staged. Banishment or some kind of house arrest was more likely than show trials.

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[2] Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Finland June 6–13.

[3] Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India as part of a South Asian tour in November and December 1955.

Mr. Dulles followed with what he described as the tentative conclusions of the CIA as to the meaning of these events, pointing out that as yet these conclusions had not been coordinated within the intelligence community as a whole. Firstly, Khrushchev as a dictator would be dangerous and impulsive, though he may be restrained by Zhukov. Throughout his career, Khrushchev had shown himself to be a shrewd opportunist. He favors co-existence, different roads to socialism, reconciliation with Yugoslavia, and increased contacts with other countries. Khrushchev was likely to continue to follow these policies in the future if not prevented by events beyond his control.

Secondly, the future policy of Khrushchev and Zhukov with regard to the Soviet satellites was hard to analyze. Mr. Dulles stated the belief of CIA that these two individuals had primarily been responsible for the job that had been done in Hungary. On the other hand, Khrushchev's recent statements would raise hopes in the satellites for a softer Moscow line. This might raise such serious problems in the satellites that Khrushchev will not dare to relax Moscow's strict control.

Thirdly, Mr. Dulles thought it unlikely that these recent events would produce much of a change in the Soviet position on disarmament at London. It was conceivable, however, that Khrushchev might make some concessions in order to exhibit a victory for himself.

Finally, Mr. Dulles indicated that Khrushchev would be facing very severe internal problems, particularly with respect to industrial decentralization and agriculture. If these problems were not solved, the consequences for Khrushchev could be very serious. De-Stalinization is going on apace. The steam has gone out of the fanatic ideological Communism of the past.

In conclusion, Mr. Dulles said that he would like to emphasize three vitally important questions: First, can Party careerists really make the new industrial system work? Second, if the Party careerists fail, can Khrushchev save himself by adopting wholly new policies? Third, is the next great step military dictatorship?

(A copy of Mr. Dulles' briefing is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the recent changes in the top levels of the Communist Party and the government organization of the USSR.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

71. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence (Arneson) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 12, 1957.

SUBJECT

Possible Impact on Soviet Military Posture of the Kremlin Shake-up

While the Soviet leadership changes could portend the emergence of Khrushchev as a dictator in the image of Stalin, there is no present evidence that the secret police or the military are subordinate to him personally; or that Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Zhukov are ciphers within the Party. Counterbalancing forces to one-man rule will probably be operative into the foreseeable future despite the greater freedom which Khrushchev may enjoy in executing policy. The dangers inherent in such rule of a miscalculation leading to hostilities thus do not appear more pressing than heretofore.

The changes could also mean considerable enhancement of the power of the military. In the absence of evidence that the military in fact seek an independent power position, we interpret Zhukov's elevation to the Party Presidium as a recognition of influence he has exerted for some time over policy formation rather than as a harbinger of vastly increased powers. The military are nevertheless likely to serve as an important deterrent to a resurgence of Stalinist-type rule; professionally they are also likely to press for a continued preferential allocation of resources to military and related industrial investment.

The changes could likewise affect internal stability and bloc solidarity, both central to Soviet readiness and capability to initiate hostilities. They now appear unlikely, however, to produce a decisive impact in either respect. In the USSR the regime has not felt obliged to take unusual security precautions, and any discontent in Party circles has been muted by a massive propaganda campaign.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7–1257. Confidential. Drafted by E.C. Swank (OIR/DRS).

Much will depend on whether Khrushchev ultimately abstains from the temptation to widen the purge and whether he successfully implements the apparently popular agricultural and housing policies with which he is identified. As regards Soviet policy toward the bloc, the optimistic Polish interpretation of events [2] must yet be proved accurate. We believe that the USSR will continue to find it virtually impossible to achieve a stable satellite policy through a mixture of liberal and repressive measures. As a corollary, Eastern Europe seems likely to remain a dubious Soviet asset in the event of widespread hostilities.

In light of these considerations and Moscow's current stress on continuity of policy rather than dramatic change, Khrushchev's elevation is unlikely to entail any substantial modification of existing estimates as to the likelihood of a Soviet resort to force.

[2] The view of Polish officials that the changes in the CPSU would be the harbinger of improved East-West relations were described in telegram 32 from Warsaw, July 4. (*Ibid.*, 761.00/7–457)

72. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, July 15, 1957—7 p.m.

107. Department repeat as desired. Following are Embassy's further comments (Embtel 23) [2] on impact of June plenum on collective leadership as institution.

1. Collective leadership established after Stalin's death (more accurately after Beria expulsion in June 1953) was ad hoc working relationship among members of Presidium based on agreement that policy decisions would be reached by majority vote within Presidium, disagreements among Presidium members were permitted and expected, disagreements would be resolved within Presidium and above all not by means of arrest, and "chairman of board" of Presidium would have authority to lead but not to dictate and would not have power of life and death over his colleagues. Under this arrangement, Presidium has been center of political power and Party

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7–1557. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

[2] See Document 66.

Central Committee basically rubber stamp of authority for Presidium decisions, neither initiating policies nor vetoing Presidium decisions.

2. This working relationship (but not necessarily the institution of collective leadership) has now broken down with expulsion of five of original nine members of Presidium (excluding Beria). This creates fluid political situation in Soviet Union with three likely possibilities: (1) Establishment of absolute one-man rule by Khrushchev, (2) Continuance of previous collective rule by Presidium with Khrushchev pre-eminence as "first among equals" strengthened, (3) Solution along lines of (2) but with Central Committee achieving greater political power, particularly as court of last resort in case of major policy disputes in Presidium. If Khrushchev were to seek one-man rule, presence of following three factors would be important for his success: breakdown of practice in Presidium of reaching decisions by majority vote, establishment of personal control over secret police, and ambition and will to become personal dictator.

3. June plenum had some results which point in direction of establishment of one-man rule, and some signs have appeared since plenum of build-up Khrushchev for this position:

a) Plenum was triumph for Khrushchev over opposition attempting to unseat him from leading position in Presidium. It was public reaffirmation of and strengthened commitment to policies carried out under Khrushchev's leadership, in particular certain policies which were apparently introduced on his own initiative. These circumstances undoubtedly greatly increase Khrushchev's authority.

b) Khrushchev's most persistent opponents have been expelled from party leadership, including his most influential and dangerous rivals, Malenkov and Molotov. Presidium staffed with nine new members and presumably many of them have been thus rewarded for their personal loyalty to Khrushchev. Although entire question of personal loyalty among Soviet leaders is very obscure and frequently misleading (Shepilov good example), this factor cannot be dismissed as being without significance for immediate future at least. For example, six members of Presidium (four of them new members) are Central Committee Secretaries and directly subordinate to Khrushchev in his capacity as First Secretary. Thus, Khrushchev undoubtedly enjoys freer hand than ever before within Presidium.

c) Khrushchev has received extraordinary praise and honorifics on number of occasions since June plenum. Bulganin has twice singled him out for praise. In Leningrad he credited Khrushchev with "initiative" in proposing meat and dairy products program and in Prague [3] asserted that Khrushchev "deserves great credit in unmasking and crushing anti-party group." Soviet press coverage of Khrushchev–Bulganin visit has been almost exclusively devoted to Khrushchev's activities and Bulganin has been placed very much in background. (*New York Times* correspondent reports Moscow censor

[3] Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Czechoslovakia July 9–16.

passed story asserting Khrushchev receiving "top billing" on Prague visit. In past any such comment has always been deleted by censor.) Several provincial party organizations have singled Khrushchev out for particular praise. New height reached at July 3 meeting Uzbek party Aktiv which credited Khrushchev with rendering "great aid" in development Uzbek cotton and livestock industry, noted "great attention which Khrushchev has given to creative activities Soviet writers," and adopted resolution expressing confidence in new party Presidium "headed by First Secretary Khrushchev."

On other hand, certain build-up of Khrushchev is understandable in view of events and outcome of June plenum. Fact that Khrushchev singled out in Soviet press for particular attention and praise is only significant if it is part of concerted campaign inspired by him to build self up as one-man ruler. Neither quality nor volume of public praise so far indicates that a campaign with this objective has been launched.

4. Following is case against establishment of one-man rule.

a) If Embassy analysis of June plenum is correct (Embtel 61 [4]), Khrushchev did not take initiative in Stalinist tradition to eliminate his opponents but instead it was latter who were trying to depose him.

b) Present party leadership based its whole position at plenum on 20th Congress decisions, on "correction of mistakes and shortcomings caused by personality cult." It has strongly pledged itself to continue these policies and accuses opposition of trying to reverse them and "return party to incorrect methods of leadership condemned by 20th Party Congress." There is undoubtedly some truth to these accusations. According to Mukhitdinov (*Pravda Vostoka* July 5), opposition charged that industrial reorganization and decentralization measures in field of government meant "weakening of dictatorship of proletariat," that is, would mean in final analysis weakening of party's political controls. Their stand was apparently in favor of greater centralization political control, whereas Khrushchev group has rejected these "outdated forms of leadership" in favor of less centralization and rule based more on persuasion than whip. Establishment one-man rule with its consequences would run entirely counter to current general line.

June plenum decree contained no specific reaffirmation of principle of collective leadership but referred only to "restoration of Leninist norms of party life." However, several editorials and articles have appeared since plenum on subject "collectivity highest principle of party leadership" which condemn "violations of collective leadership" under Stalin and praise Central Committee's "undeviating realization of principle of collective leadership."

c) Khrushchev would have to gain direct control of secret police in order to become absolute dictator. There is little doubt that elements in party, intellectuals as a whole and army above all would be opposed to acquisition of this power by one man in particular to attempts by Khrushchev to use police measures against party members in order to eliminate opposition to him. All of these groups

[4] Dated July 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7–957)

suffered heavily from Stalin's form of rule based on control of police and could be expected to be against any return to this.

That is why fate of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov is of considerable importance. Any police measures against them would probably symbolize to many in top party and army circles return to Stalinism. There must be powerful opposition to such action on this ground alone. Present events (decrease in press treatment of subject since July 10 and Radio Moscow's July 10 foreign broadcast that the three will be given jobs and not brought to trial) indicate that Khrushchev will not seek this solution at least in immediate future.

d) Role of Zhukov in Presidium struggle and at CC plenum not clarified by subsequent information and hence remains subject of speculation. We agree with remark (Manila's 99[5]) that Zhukov would be unlikely support return to Stalinist one-man rule. But there is no evidence as yet pointing to active and early intervention of Zhukov in political struggle or ambition or determination to enhance his own or army's power outside military field.

e) Objective economic conditions, social forces in Soviet Union today and Khrushchev's present policies are not those which call for return to autocratic one-man dictatorship but gradual relaxation of Stalin heritage. Circumstances of Soviet Union in 1930's and Stalin's policies probably required Stalin's iron fist to keep Communists in power. Return to these methods today would not only arouse strong opposition among certain influential Soviet groups but also run contrary to entire trend of Soviet social and economic development. These social conditions do not have immediate political impact but in long-run would operate against Stalinist-type dictatorship.

f) Finally, all evidence indicates that it was Central Committee which decided issue and brought about expulsion of opposition group. Thus Central Committee by reversing Presidium decision exercised its formal authority as highest executive organ of party for first time since 1920's.

5. Above is summary of pros and cons regarding continuance collective leadership. To draw firm and final conclusion on this complex question is not possible at present: Information is fragmentary and not all pieces of political structure have fallen into place since disruption at plenum. Following should be regarded as tentative conclusions:

a) It is unlikely that Khrushchev has become or will emerge in near future at least as one-man dictator, especially on Stalin model.

b) It is likely that collective leadership by party Presidium will continue, but with Khrushchev having much freer hand within Presidium.

c) It is possible that Central Committee will in time tend to become more effective seat of power, with Presidium accountable to it at least on major policy issues. One act of will is not sufficient to bring this about, but expression of power is habit forming. This development is at best still great distance away and such develop-

[5] Dated July 9 and addressed from Bohlen to Under Secretary Herter, it contained Bohlen's preliminary analysis of the changes in the party. (*Ibid.*)

ment would be far cry from inner-party "democracy" to say nothing of state democracy. But it would nonetheless be important development, as it would permit freer expression of competitive social and political forces.

6. Given Khrushchev's personality it appears likely that he will be conspicuously in driver's seat, with Central Committee in immediate future closely watching outcome of his policies. Failure of any of his major policies (particularly if failure should come before major successes in other fields evident) or premature greed for sole power might result in action by Central Committee to remove him from party leadership.

Thompson

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73. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Cumming) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, August 27, 1957.

SUBJECT

Soviet Claim of Successful Testing of an ICBM [2]

The Soviet announcement is clearly made in a political context: The statement refers to the many years' discussion in the United Nations without result of the problem of disarmament, including a ban of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and on the other hand reiterates the Soviet claim that they have more than once submitted concrete proposals for reductions in armed forces and armaments and the prohibition of nuclear weapons as well as cessation of tests. The West is charged not only with not taking any practical steps in the field of disarmament, but also the creation of all kinds of obstacles.

The TASS statement categorically asserts that the United States and its partners not only reject the prohibition of nuclear weapons, "but in fact do not want agreement on the unconditional and immediate cessation of tests of nuclear weapons while staging large

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.5612/8–2757.

[2] In telegram 407 from Moscow, August 27, Thompson reported that all Soviet papers carried an announcement that the Soviet Union had successfully launched an ICBM and claimed that alleged Western resistance to disarmament had justified Soviet concentration on weapons development. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/8–2757)

series of tests with these weapons." The statement continues that because of this negative attitude on the part of the Western powers, "primarily the USA," the Soviet Government has been compelled to take all necessary measures with the object of safeguarding the security of the Soviet state. The statement concludes by asserting that the Soviet Government will nevertheless continue persistently to press for agreement on cessation of tests, prohibition of nuclear weapons, and the problem of disarmament as a whole.

We believe that the TASS statement was apparently aimed at heightening the effect of the Soviet demand for immediate cessation of or suspension of nuclear tests. It probably was timed to set the stage for a major Soviet propaganda offensive on the test issue in the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly, where Moscow hopes to score major propaganda gains. A Soviet move for an early recess in the London disarmament talks and a transfer of discussions of the disarmament problems to the General Assembly is therefore not to be excluded.

In your Press Conference we suggest that you may wish to emphasize the political context of the Soviet announcement, perhaps against the following background:

Speaking at Bangalore on November 27, 1955, Khrushchev said that because the West does not want to ban nuclear weapons the Soviets found themselves obliged to manufacture atomic weapons as well as ballistic missiles.

On December 9, 1955, Bulganin in addressing the Supreme Soviet said the Soviet Union desired an agreement outlawing nuclear weapons, including rocket missiles which had been developed over the previous few years and which "we can say are becoming intercontinental weapons" (the clear implication is that the Soviet Union was then developing intercontinental missiles).

In the November 5, 1956, message to Prime Minister Eden Bulganin posed the question: Suppose England were attacked by a more powerful state possessing all types of modern weapons of destruction?—"Such countries instead of sending naval or air forces to the shores of Britain could use other means as for instance rocket equipment" (quotation not precise).

January 23, 1957, *Pravda* in an article suggested that probably the United States was lacking in missile development. There was an implication in the article that by contrast the Soviet Union was ahead in such development.

In an article in the Soviet Army newspaper *Red Star* dated 16 August 1957, Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Marshal Vasilevski attacked an article which had recently been published by Admiral Burke on the subject of naval power. Marshal Vasilevski stressed developments in the field of ultra long-range missiles and said that Navies were not now as important as Admiral Burke thought.

Confidential: I agree with General Cabell that you may very well get a question at the Press Conference regarding the US intelligence

estimate of the Soviet Statement and also some question asking what American intelligence has been up to. We suggest that you make no specific reply on the point of a US estimate of the accuracy of the Soviet claim but say something along the lines that regular intelligence reports and estimates of Soviet military preparations and developments are constantly being made. We have known for a long time about the Soviet activity in missile development.[3]

[3] For the Secretary's comments about the Soviet ICBM launching at his press conference on August 27, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 16, 1957, pp. 457–462.

74. Editorial Note

On Friday, October 4, TASS announced that the Soviet Union had successfully launched an earth satellite. On October 7, in circular telegram 319 to 20 United States missions around the world, the Department of State requested for receipt not later than 3 p.m., October 9, any information that could be obtained concerning the local government's reaction to the Soviet satellite launching, along with the mission's appraisal of the probable political effects in the short run and in the longer term. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.56301/10–757) In circular telegram 324 to 46 other United States missions, October 8, the Department requested similar information to be received in Washington no later than October 20. Responses to these circular telegrams are also *ibid.*, 761.56301.

75. Letter From the Ambassador in the Philippines (Bohlen) to the Deputy Director (Plans) of Central Intelligence (Wisner) [1]

Manila, October 7, 1957.

DEAR FRANK: I was more than pleased to get your letter of August 30 giving Isaiah's thoughts on recent Moscow developments. [2] As always I find them most stimulating and he has the facility of bringing out new facets in any subject.

I give you below such comments as I can make from here. There is a vast difference, as I have again learned, from being in daily touch with the Soviet situation and attempting to work out some consecutive thoughts when the information is intermittent and fragmentary.

While I certainly did not anticipate any such spectacular developments, or at least not so soon, I have not found anything in the June events in Moscow to change any of my basic thinking on Soviet developments. On the contrary, I believe the manner in which this occurred demonstrated possibly more than anything else that collective leadership was indeed a reality and not a fiction. Had, as many people thought, Khrushchev been building his power position to a point of absolute mastery there would have been no need for a two-week fight including an eight-day Central Committee meeting for him to put down the opposition. From all indications I got here, the argument in the Presidium was real and not pro forma and I have yet to receive any information which would indicate that police or other armed force was used or threatened to bring about the final result. It seems to have been a question of who had the majority where and when. It would of course be folly to predict anything for the future, but I am by no means certain that the expulsion of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and, in a lesser level, Shepilov marks the end of a collective leadership and a return to one-man rule. It might even mark a trend in the opposite direction since apparently K had to bring the CC into the act which, so far as I am aware, is the first time that it has been made the final arbitrator of a dispute of this nature in the Presidium. It could therefore mean that in the future the circle of power will be broadened from the Presidium to include 133-odd voting members of the CC. Conse-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 79 D 379, Research Notes 1957. Secret; Eyes Only. Small sections of this letter are printed in Bohlen, *Witness to History*, pp. 453–456.

[2] Not printed. (Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 79 D 379, Research Notes 1957) Reference is to Isaiah Berlin and to Wisner's quoting of Berlin's private comments made in London on August 9.

quently whoever is top dog will have to in the last analysis obtain and retain the support of more people than in the post-Stalin period.

With reference to the specific passages you cite, I am not sure that Isaiah is right in presenting Malenkov vs K as a personal power struggle pure and simple. This is of course possible, but I don't think in the post-Stalin Soviet set-up that this factor plays as great a part as it did in the past. It would seem to be based on the assumption that there is one position, i.e. First Secretary of the CC, which has so much power that it is worth in itself struggling for and, as indicated above, the very fact that this group could hope to succeed against K would seem to indicate the position does not have any such power in itself. I would therefore be inclined to put Malenkov (although in a different context) in the policy fight. At a certain point policy disputes, as in all governments and particularly dictatorships, eventually end in a power struggle among the disputants. I agree that you cannot organically list Malenkov among the "Old Guard" and therefore his disagreements with K's policies were probably of a somewhat different nature than Molotov's and Kaganovich's. I am inclined to believe that all three for different reasons saw in K's *domestic* policies a real danger of loss of the collective political power of the top leadership and being Marxists feared that economic decentralization if pushed forward with the vigor which K usually throws into these matters would inevitably lead to some form of loss of control at the top. By that I do not mean revolution or violent overthrow but real problems of maintaining a political monopoly in a few hands with a certain degree of loss of control in economic matters. I'll admit I'm influenced by Mikoyan's ready and apparently favorable agreement the last day I was in Moscow with my observation that economic decentralization in Marxist terms must lead to political decentralization.[3] This may be one of the reasons why Mikoyan is still there and the others are out.

Following along the same line I would be inclined to believe that neither side planned this thing very carefully before the actual conflict. I cannot believe that Khrushchev and Bulganin accompanied by Serov would have spent a week in Finland just prior to the event if he had planned a coup of this dimension. Conversely, given the experience in conspiracy and general dirty work that all three of the opposition leaders had it seems to me unlikely that they would have done such a clumsy job if this had been a carefully planned coup timed to coincide with Khrushchev and Bulganin's absence. I am of course operating on very little evidence, but it seems to me that there was a confluence of those who disagreed with K's policies for

[3] Bohlen's conversation with Mikoyan is described in telegram 2374 from Moscow, April 17. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 661.00/4–1757)

different reasons along about this time over some question due to come up in the Presidium. Some of the opposition to K's policy, particularly on the part of Molotov and to a somewhat less publicized degree Kaganovich, have been known for some time. Malenkov's exact role remains unclear but given the age factor it is probable (and here Isaiah is right) that he was destined to take the top slot if the opposition movement had been a success. There were obviously many other factors besides economic decentralization involved and I would be inclined to give some weight to a rather frivolous one, namely that these three men who are rather serious and on the whole sober individuals were really concerned at K's freewheeling tendency to make off the cuff remarks and probably even commit the group by snap decisions, especially in the field of foreign policy.

With reference to the sentence you quote in sub-paragraph (g) on Hungary [4] I am in full agreement. I feel that those who feel differently are talking about a different matter. It is true that for the short run Russian ability to crush ruthlessly revolt in the face of Western inaction may have given them some prestige among Communist regimes in EE, but I am sure even the Russians do not consider that such a naked use of force in the long run is a "victory". Shooting people down has never been in history a final solution and certainly the Hungarian events did not solve any of the problems which the Russians face and will continue to face in my opinion in maintaining these regimes in Eastern Europe.

With reference to the military, again pleading lack of knowledge, I have seen nothing which would indicate that K's victory was due to the military as an independent cohesive force. It stands to reason if Zhukov had been against him he would have had great difficulty in eliminating the others. It does not follow that he is in any sense a prisoner of the military. On the contrary, I agree with Isaiah that Zhukov on the whole being somewhat of a pragmatist probably agrees with most of K's policies. I also agree that a military dictatorship would be probable only in the event of an emergency so

[4] Subparagraph (g) of the August 9 memorandum of conversation with Berlin was quoted by Wisner as follows:

" 'He does not believe the Soviets will provoke the Poles if it can possibly be avoided and is convinced that Khrushchev cannot afford another Hungary which, in Berlin's view, was a *disaster* for the Russians.' [This continues to be my own view and most of the current Washington thinking is likewise generally in accord. However, there is an important difference of opinion as to the nature and extent of the 'disaster' for the Russians, some feeling that on balance Hungary has turned out to be a 'victory' for the Russians simply because in crushing the revolt they demonstrated their willingness and ability to do so and the ineffectuality of the West—both as applied to Hungary and to similar situations elsewhere.]" The bracketed note is Wisner's.

great, either domestic or foreign, i.e. war, which would threaten the regime. I cannot see any reason why the Army as such, even assuming that distinct Army point of view is possible, would wish to take over the direction of all Soviet affairs except in the case of extreme necessity to preserve the system.

With reference to your (d),[5] while there obviously was quite a struggle, I do not believe that K has committed himself to any one faction but rather, as indicated above, to the CC as a whole and then only in the sense that he will be forced to keep his majority intact in that body. K's position, therefore, in my mind should not be compared to Stalin's but in very different circumstances more to Lenin's and I believe that his future depends in large measure on the success of his policies, primarily internal, and to a lesser degree in the foreign field.

On your (e)[6] I still believe that the Party by the nature of things will gradually lose out if the decentralization program is carried forward seriously and I do not see in the June developments a victory for the Party over the bureaucracy. As I may have mentioned during the briefing at your place, the provincial levels of the Party are considerably less impressive than the top leaders and are presumably so regarded by the factory managers and economic powers there than in Moscow. In other words, the bureaucrats, if such is the right word, will have the real operational power in the economic regional set-up and will probably be less disposed to listen to Party hacks at that level than the Ministers were to the Presidium. It must be recalled in this connection that the division between the Party *apparachi* and the real technocrats is greater at the provincial level than at the center where more often the top Ministers are also members of the Presidium.

On your (f)[7] the role of ideology is such a slippery one in Soviet affairs that it would take quite a dissertation to run down all of its ramifications. I believe, however, that ideology played a part in

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[5] In point (d) Wisner wrote that, according to George Kennan, "it must have been quite a struggle and that Khrushchev won out at great cost, probably committing himself on several issues to the military and perhaps to others, possibly to the Central Committee as a body."

[6] In point (e), Wisner asked the following question: "Recalling your statement that the Party would probably lose importance with the implementation of the decentralization program, would you feel that Khrushchev's stress on the role of the party is more leading from weakness than an assertion of strength. The bureaucrats may be dispersed by the new program, but does this really break their power?"

[7] In point (f), Wisner made the following comments:

"Certainly the ideology is not a matter of deep concern, but apparently they have to go through the motion of elections, parades, *agitprop* sessions, etc., to keep the society functioning. 'Carrots' may be necessary, but is not at least the semblance of faith also needed? What would happen if the current apathy toward all this turned into disgust and revulsion?"

the recent developments, particularly the "different roads to socialism" concept, not on grounds of ideological purity but on practical grounds of the consequence of pursuing one or the other courses of action which in Bolshevik history frequently are depicted in ideological terms. Ideology has shown itself to be so flexible that without serious loss of power at the top I would not believe for the foreseeable future that Soviet leaders will have too much difficulty in finding the proper ideological formula to deal with whatever policy they are pursuing and for that reason will never run out of carrots. However, if disarray sets in at the top and the process of spreading the power which, though it has not gone very far has been a continuing factor since the death of Stalin, gets to the point where the monolithic character of the regime is impaired, the lack of convincing ideology could become extremely important.

I realize the foregoing is very brief and I don't know that there is much point of my trying to look into a crystal ball from this distance. However, going deeper into the matter I am inclined to regard what has happened in the Soviet Union in June as a further manifestation of its basic contradiction of which I have spoken before and that is the contradiction between the social and economic changes in the Soviet Union brought on by the process of industrialization and the antiquated forms of political rule which were devised and perfected in quite different circumstances. The story is not over and I think we will see further developments, not necessarily in the near future, as a result of this basic contradiction.

[Here follow brief personal comments and a passing reference to the national elections scheduled in the Philippines.]

Yours, [8]

[8] The source text is not signed.

76. Memorandum of Discussion at the 339th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 10, 1957 [1]

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on October 11. The discussion of item 1 is also printed in vol. XI, pp. 757–764. The text printed here includes material not previously released for publication in volume XI.

1. Implications of the Soviet Earth Satellite for U.S. Security (NSC 5520; NSC Actions Nos. 1656 and 1713) [2]

Mr. Cutler explained the order in which the various aspects of this item of the agenda would be presented to the members of the Council. He then called on the Director of Central Intelligence for a briefing on the Soviet earth satellite.

Mr. Allen Dulles stated that at 1930 hours on October 4 the Soviets had fired their earth satellite from the Tyura Tam range. Its initial path followed the range, crossing approximately over the range's other end at Klyuchi. Two hours after the successful orbiting of the earth satellite and after the second circuit of the earth by the satellite, the Soviets announced their achievement. This delay in the announcement was in line with the previous statements of the Soviet Union that they would not announce an attempt to orbit their satellite until they had been assured that the orbiting had been successful. Moreover, all the indications available to the intelligence community prior to the actual launching of the satellite pointed to the fact that the Soviets were preparing to launch either an earth satellite or an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Mr. Dulles then stated that the actual launching of the earth satellite had not come as a surprise. Indeed as early as last November the intelligence community had estimated that the Soviets would be capable of launching an earth satellite any time after November 1957.

Information on the earth satellite itself remains rather sparse, but it is believed to weigh between 165 and 185 pounds.

The President interrupted to state that the Vice President of the Soviet Scientific Academy had informed Dr. Bronk that someone here had got a decimal point out of place. (There seemed to be no inclination in the Council to question the estimated weight as given by Mr. Dulles.)

Mr. Dulles continued by pointing out that the Soviets had joined together their ICBM and earth satellite programs, which fact helps to explain the speed of the Soviet launching of its earth satellite. We do not as yet know if the satellite is sending out encoded messages. Furthermore, we must expect additional launchings of Soviet earth satellites during the International Geophysical Year. The Soviets have said that they would launch between six and 13 such satellites.

Mr. Dulles then turned to the world reaction to the Soviet achievement. He first pointed out that Khrushchev had moved all

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[2] NSC 5520 is printed *ibid.*, p. 723. For texts of NSC Action Nos. 1656 and 1713, see *ibid.*, footnote 8, p. 747, and footnote 6, p. 753, respectively.

his propaganda guns into place. The launching of an earth satellite was one of a trilogy of propaganda moves, the other two being the announcement of the successful testing of an ICBM and the recent test of a large-scale hydrogen bomb at Novaya Zemlya.[3] Incidentally, added Mr. Dulles, ... Moreover, there had been another Soviet test late last night, also at Novaya Zemlya, ...

Larded in with Khrushchev's propaganda statements had been a number of interesting remarks, such as the one in which Khrushchev consigned military aircraft to museums in the future. With respect to this remark, Mr. Dulles pointed out that U.S. intelligence had not observed as many Soviet heavy bombers on airfields as had been expected. This raised the question as to whether the Soviets are in the process of de-emphasizing the role of the heavy bomber. There had been no clear verdict yet by the intelligence community on this question.

Mr. Dulles thought that there was no doubt that in gearing up all this propaganda of recent days and weeks, the Soviets had had an eye to the situation in the Middle East, and wished to exert the maximum influence they could summon on that situation. Much of the Soviet propaganda comment is following closely the original Soviet boast relating their scientific accomplishments to the effectiveness of the Communist social system. The target for this particular thrust, thought Mr. Dulles, was evidently the underdeveloped nations in the world. He informed members of the Council that he had copies of an FBIS summary of Soviet comment,[4] which were available to any who wished to have them.

The Chinese Communist reaction was to declare quickly that the launching of the earth satellite was proof of Soviet military and scientific supremacy over the United States. Maximum play on this theme was being provided in all the Soviet satellites.

Thereafter, Mr. Dulles touched on the reactions in Western Europe, in Asia, and in Africa. He concluded his remarks by emphasizing that the Soviet Union was making a major propaganda effort which was exerting a very wide and deep impact.

[Here follow comments by Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles and others on the United States earth satellite program; for text, see volume XI, page 758.]

Mr. Cutler then called on Secretary Herter for an appraisal of the foreign policy implications for U.S. security of the successful launching of the Soviet satellite. Secretary Herter initially stated that

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[3] See Document 73. On September 24, the Soviet Government announced that nuclear tests were being conducted in connection with army and navy combat training.

[4] Not further identified.

it was extremely difficult to make such an assessment because there was such a mass of information pouring into the Department of State. While there had been insufficient time to analyze this intake, there were already some indications of the serious effects of the Soviet success which we hope to be able to counteract.

Thereafter, Secretary Herter read selected quotations to illustrate his point, with particular reference to Turkey, Morocco, and the Philippines. He also pointed out the probable repercussions of the Soviet success in the United Nations. The United States may now encounter much greater difficulty in defending its disarmament position.

By and large, continued Secretary Herter, the reaction of our allies had been pretty firm and good, though even the best of them require assurance that we have not been surpassed scientifically and militarily by the USSR. The neutralist countries are chiefly engaged in patting themselves on the back and insisting that the Soviet feat proves the value and the wisdom of the neutralism which these countries have adopted.

Summing up, Secretary Herter described the first foreign policy reactions as "pretty somber". The United States will have to do a great deal to counteract them and, particularly, to confirm the existence of our own real military and scientific strength.

Governor Stassen enlarged somewhat on the repercussions in the United Nations. He believed it was yet too soon to measure these repercussions with any assurance, but already the first surprise was settling down and the diplomats in the UN have begun to realize that the fundamentals of the world situation have not been changed—namely, that the capability for mutual annihilation still exists. Governor Stassen doubted whether there would be any quick shifts among UN members.

Mr. Cutler then called on Mr. Larson, who said that he was hesitant to say what he was going to say because he was not sure that he really believed it. He then went on to say that while we could not permit ourselves to be panicked by the Soviet achievement, he did wonder whether our U.S. plans were now adequate with regard to the next great break-through. If we lose repeatedly to the Russians as we have lost with the earth satellite, the accumulated damage would be tremendous. We should accordingly plan, ourselves, to accomplish some of the next great break-throughs first—for example, the achievement of a manned satellite, or getting to the moon. Do we have any such plans, asked Mr. Larson. If not, our people should begin to think about them.

The President replied to Mr. Larson by stating that while he could hardly quarrel with Mr. Larson's conclusions if the Soviets were to win every time, the fact remained that the United States

couldn't possibly set up a whole vast scientific program of basic research in areas about which we don't know anything, and then attempt to outdo the Russians in each aspect of such a program. We must, above all, still seek a military posture that the Russians will respect.

The Vice President inquired of Mr. Allen Dulles whether it was possible to provide estimates of the amounts of money allocated to basic research by the United States in comparison with the USSR. [Name deleted] answering for Mr. Dulles, could not give a clear response, though he could not say that the Russians had put in more resources than we have. Mr. Dulles said that at least the Soviets have concentrated more heavily on the guided missiles field than we have, ever since 1945. The President, agreeing with Mr. Dulles, pointed out that the United States had not made any all-out effort in the field of ballistic missiles until after the Killian Committee had submitted its report to the National Security Council.[5] He added that of course the Soviets were bound to be ahead of the United States in certain fields and in certain discoveries.

The Vice President warned the Council that we must be prepared for the fact that Congress would insist on examining in great detail what we have been doing in the missiles field. In the course of such an examination they are certain to ask the question which he had just put—as to the relative amounts which the United States and the USSR had allocated to their respective missiles programs. Accordingly, we must be prepared to answer such a question.

After Mr. Larson had reiterated his plea for planning for a U.S. win in the next great break-through, Dr. Bronk commented that, in line with Mr. Larson's views, the United States could, if it chose, give much greater emphasis to the spectacular achievements that we have made in the scientific field—for example, we could stress our vast achievements in the field of cancer research. Regrettably, it was hard to get the press to take an interest in these achievements. Mr. Cutler suggested that we might perhaps have announced the successful launching of a U.S. missile with a range of 3500 miles. Secretary Quarles pointed out that the Operations Coordinating Board was presently engaged in examining our public relations policies with respect to our missiles programs. General Twining cautioned that we should not permit ourselves to become hysterical about the Soviet achievement.

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[5] Reference is to the Killian report of February 14, 1955.

The National Security Council: [6]

a. Discussed the subject in the light of:

(1) An intelligence briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the Soviet earth satellite, its relation to the Soviet ballistic missiles program, and world reaction to the Soviet earth satellite.

(2) A briefing by the Department of Defense on the information regarding the Soviet earth satellite obtained by scientific tracking, and on the status of the U.S. scientific satellite program under NSC 5520.

(3) Comments by the Director, National Science Foundation, and the President, National Academy of Sciences, on the scientific implications of the Soviet earth satellite.

(4) An appraisal by the Department of Defense of the military implications for U.S. security of the Soviet earth satellite.

(5) An appraisal by the Department of State of the foreign policy implications for U.S. security of the Soviet earth satellite.

b. Noted the statement by the President on the subject issued at his press conference on October 9, 1957; [7] and the President's statement at this meeting of the importance of adhering to the U.S. scientific satellite program under NSC 5520 as being well-reasoned and deliberately planned.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated for information and guidance to all holders of NSC 5520.

[Here follows discussion of "Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Programs", "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security", and "Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1957".]

S. Everett Gleason

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[6] Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 1799. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 148)

[7] For text of the President's comments at his press conference on October 9, as well as text of the statement issued by the President at the time on the U.S. space exploration program, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pp. 719–735.

77. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Missions [1]

Washington, October 10, 1957—8:11 p.m.

339. In view propaganda being made by Communists in relation to launching of satellite and their effort to stir up somewhat panicky reactions, we think it useful give you for background our estimate of situation.

Soviet satellite is of military importance only in sense that advancement of science in long run contributes to military technology. While Soviet satellite does not meet all of the scientific objectives, its values are scientific rather than military. Efforts to capitalize on Soviet satellite for cold war purposes should be discounted. Our own satellite program has, from start, been directed toward scientific purposes. You will have noted the President's statement October 9 that he "considers our country's satellite program well designed and properly scheduled to achieve the scientific purposes for which it was initiated". [2]

Soviets exploited the German assets, human and material, which they removed after World War II from Pennemunde, Germany and appear to have given this line of development both in its ballistic missile and satellite applications the highest priority of their military work over past twelve years. In vital air/atomic area we believe that Soviet Union now is, and for some time will continue to be, in a position of relative inferiority. From Mr. Khrushchev's recent speeches as quoted in press, and particularly his statement that "fighter and bomber planes can be put in museums", it would appear that he is trying to cover up on a relatively weak long-range bomber position. By attempting to jump long-range bomber stage he would avoid bearing at same time expense of a large bomber and missile development. It is unlikely however that he will have for some time an atomic delivery capability in the very long-range missiles which would be an adequate counterpart for the large number of bombers capable of reaching Soviet Union now in possession of United States.

We believe Soviet propaganda is in large measure designed to cover up this period of relative weakness which may exist for several years. Even if Soviet claims about long-range missiles are

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.56301/10–1057. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Dulles and Quarles, cleared with Allen Dulles and various bureaus and offices in the Department of State, and signed by Murphy on behalf of Acting Secretary Herter. Secretary Dulles left Washington at 1:40 p.m. for a vacation at Watertown, New York; he returned to Washington on October 14.

[2] See footnote 7, *supra*.

fully substantiated we believe that time difference between their operational capability in this area and our own will be minor and that at least in meantime we will have a distinct superiority with our long-range bomber force.

You should not feel or allow anyone to feel that United States is in a position of relative weakness. It is quite the contrary. Our foreign policy should reflect the basic sense of confidence which we feel in the military posture of our country.

It should be noted that proposals of the four Western Powers regarding control of sending objects through outer space as part of a disarmament agreement were introduced in London in August. These proposals thus antedate announcement of Soviet earth satellite and are not a response to it.

Your attention is also invited to statement by the President October 9 providing a summary of important facts in development by United States of an earth satellite. This is being communicated to all posts through USIA channels.

(Following paragraph should be added to this message for European and Middle East posts only.)

"It should be quite clear that in respect of European and Middle East apprehensions regarding Soviet attack by intermediate range ballistic missiles this would not occur without immediate overall reaction by United States. Such an attack would be completely unproductive unless US striking power was destroyed simultaneously."

Each Chief of Mission is authorized to use substance foregoing locally in his discretion in a manner designed to best serve the US interest.

Herter

78. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

Washington, October 11, 1957.

SUBJECT

Information on Soviet Earth Satellite

. . . . . .

Calculations based on a weight of 184 pounds for the satellite proper suggest that the final stage (satellite and housing, both orbiting) might have an empty weight of a little more than 400 pounds. It would be possible to orbit a mass of this size with the rockets currently estimated for the Soviet 700-mile missile. It would not be necessary to have higher thrust rockets, such as those used in an ICBM, but the USSR could have used such rockets. A feasible design for Sputnik could be directly adapted to a surface-to-surface missile capable of sending a sizeable warhead 3,000–3,500 miles.

Subsequent Soviet earth satellites are expected to be heavier and more instrumental. In March 1957, the IAC estimated that a satellite vehicle possessing substantial reconnaissance capabilities of military value probably could be orbited by the USSR in the period 1963–1965. There has not yet been any change in this estimate in the intelligence community, but I venture to say that if a second Sputnik is orbited in the near future, this date might well be 1960.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/10–1157. Secret.

79. Editorial Note

On October 26, TASS announced that Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov had been replaced as Minister of Defense by Marshal Rodion Ya. Malinovsky. The announcement provided no other details.

The initial appraisal by the Central Intelligence Agency of Zhukov's removal was in a memorandum from the Assistant Director of the Office of Current Intelligence to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, dated October 26, in which he concluded that Zhukov's removal was likely intended to allow him to concentrate more on political matters, that his political stature had not been reduced, and

that he probably would continue as a leading member of the Soviet hierarchy. The memorandum concluded, however, that "the possibility cannot be excluded at this time that Zhukov was removed because of policy differences with Khrushchev or that Khrushchev moved against the marshal to eliminate his most obvious contender for supreme power." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File—USSR 1956–1957)

For Khrushchev's recollection of the decision to remove Zhukov, see Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, pages 11–18.

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80. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, October 28, 1957—6 p.m.

850. Pass Defense. Although as stated in Embtel 844 [2] evidence still inconclusive on reasons for replacement of Zhukov as Defense Minister or significance of change for his personal standing in top party and governmental echelons, recent emphasis in military press on role of party as leader and organizer of Soviet Armed Forces may reflect one of issues over which there was disagreement in top Soviet circles. Beginning with *Red Star* editorial on October 16 which contended that "in leadership of Communist Party is main source of strength of our armed forces" and claimed that Soviet Army and Navy were "indebted" for World War II victories to Communist Party, military press has repeatedly referred to guidance and supervision of party over military (Weeka 42 and 43). On October 25 and 26 subject was treated especially heavily; *Soviet Fleet* editorial 25th entitled "In Leadership of Party is Source of Power of Soviet Army and Fleet," *Red Star* editorial 26 dealt with same subject as did *Soviet Aviation* article on same day. *Pravda* editorial today (only newspaper published on Monday) which entitled "Indivisible Unity of Party and People" repeats theme that "because of leadership of Communist Party and its Central Committee Soviet people and their Armed Forces won . . . [3] victory in fatherland war."

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/10–2857. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

[2] Telegram 844, October 27, contained Thompson's speculation on the significance of Zhukov's ouster, with the caveat that there was little information yet available on which to base an interpretation. (*Ibid.*, 761.13/10–2757)

[3] All ellipses are in the source text.

Theme of party supervision of military, of course, is not new. However, quantity of [garble] subject since mid-October has been stepped up impressively and apparently is not due solely to propaganda preparations for forthcoming celebration. This evident from recent treatment in military press of subject of improving "party-political work" in armed forces, particularly in *Soviet Fleet* editorial of 26th. Attributing to party leadership "chief source" of might of Soviet Armed Forces, editorial stated that in solving problems facing Soviet Armed Forces "important role belongs to military councils, political organs and party organizations along with one-man commanders." Editorial then stated that "instructions" to party organizations in armed forces (which Party Central Committee issued last April although they first mentioned in press in May) "obliged political organs and party organizations . . . to delve actively into all sides of military preparation, military discipline and indoctrination of personnel, to uncover on basis of criticism and self-criticism all shortcomings in instruction and indoctrination of troops, to assist commanders to adopt in time measures for eliminating defects hindering improvement of military preparedness of units, ships and subunits." Nevertheless, this editorial and one in *Soviet Aviation* on 25th stipulated that "orders and instructions of commanders" were not to be criticized, which had been made clear last May when military press first discussed Central Committee's "instructions." That there were differences in views, however, over scope of responsibility of political workers in Armed Forces was apparent in remarks of *Soviet Fleet* editorial that some party organizations were "weakly" studying problems affecting military training and discipline of troops because of "harmful" opinion that political workers should "not deal with questions of military preparation." This was also apparent in editorial's remarks that "there still are individual Communists who evaluate criticism of defects in instruction and indoctrination of troops as undermining their authority, interference in service functions of commander. This is mistaken, Philistine understanding of criticism."

From above it would appear that there has been considerable difference of opinion over extent of supervision political organs and party organizations would exercise over activities of military commanders and their troops. Obviously line cannot be sharply drawn between criticism of orders of commanders and criticism of training and indoctrination of troops.

Presumably military commanders would be inclined to interpret latter criticism as criticism of their "orders" while party officials would tend to interpret criticism of commanders' orders as criticism of troop training. Thus while principle of one-man command presumably basis for organizing structure of Soviet military system, it

in great danger of being vitiated by party interference. This could have been one of principal issues over which there were differences.

One paragraph in *Soviet Fleet* editorial of 26th may have been pointedly directed at Zhukov. It emphasized how a Communist must be "modest", must not "exalt personal self," and must not only teach masses but must be able to learn from them. Paragraph then asserted "Each member and candidate member of party, no matter what post he occupies, must have these valuable qualities". This is remindful of *Pravda* July 3 assertion immediately prior to announcement of action against "anti-party group" that there is no one in party, regardless of how high his post, who is above party criticism.

In respect to Zhukov, of interest American correspondents report original TASS announcement night of 26th said he was met by "high Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry officials." However, this fact was omitted from simple, inconspicuous statement of his return published on last or next-to-last page of all principal Moscow newspapers, including military ones. This obvious effort to play down return of Zhukov in marked contrast to *Pravda* first page announcement today that Aristov and Supreme Soviet Delegation had returned from visit to China and northern Vietnam. (Embassy officer who observed arrival of Aristov delegation yesterday at Vnukovo noted unusual amount of security personnel guarding reception party headed by Mikoyan.)

Also of interest that American correspondents on 27th were permitted to send out stories speculating that Zhukov has been downgraded, although day before censors cut out all references to possibility his replacement as Defense Minister indicated decline in his personal standing.

Thompson

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81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines [1]

Washington, October 29, 1957—5:23 p.m.

1376. For Bohlen from Cumming. Fully realize your absorption Philippine elections and physical remoteness Soviet scene. Many

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/10–2957. Secret; Priority. Roger Channel. Drafted by Cumming and cleared in substance with Herter.

here would be grateful however receive your interpretation current internal Soviet crisis. May well be even prior your receipt this message Soviets will have made authoritative release which would provide most useful material for interpretation which at present difficult even with all the sources available Washington. Following summary available facts may be of interest to you even if you have not time to give us your reactions no matter how tentative:

1. Zhukov returned 26 October from three-week trip Yugoslavia and Albania. That morning TASS gave him full title Minister of Defense; in afternoon TASS dropped Minister of Defense title in reporting his departure from Albania. Announcement release from Defense post made by TASS evening hours Moscow that day.

2. At midday arrival Moscow Zhukov received by military, press and Foreign Office personnel as well as Albanian and Yugoslav diplomatic representative. No top Party members present.

3. Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan arrived one hour late at Iranian reception early evening same day.

4. Indications are Central Committee in session since about 28 Oct.

5. Foreign communist correspondents Moscow indicated in despatches that idea Zhukov promotion (namely release from Defense duties for broader political duties) should be discarded and that feeling perplexity prevailed Moscow. Boffa, *Unita* correspondent Moscow advised no reliable briefing available.

6. Evening 28 October CBS correspondent Schorr suggested through Soviet censorship that issue broader than merely struggle between Khrushchev and Zhukov; conflict concerned internal rather than foreign issues; that most Western speculation was wide of mark; that outcome would have extremely farreaching implications; and that tipoff would come in appearance of portraits of Soviet Presidium members in preparation for Fortieth Anniversary "whoever they may be at that time." (These have not yet appeared.)

7. One factor current situation may be old issue Army–Party relationship military and party press recent months indicate see-saw battle this issue.

8. *Pravda* editorial 28th and other Soviet press items emphasize Party supremacy in all matters; Party leadership to victory World War II. *Red Star* stresses Party control and cites fable of officer Velikii Luki whose head turned by overpraise, considered himself above reproach and led by conceit to severe Party punishment.

9. Reliable . . . source reports news seriously shocked and disturbed members Soviet Officer corps. Other reliable . . . info reports replacement of Shtemenko who had been Chief GRU since some time in summer 1956 by Shalin who was previous GRU chief.

Thus, seems possible decision remove Zhukov, reassign Rokossovsky and remove Shtemenko all made 22 Oct.

10. Announcement Rokossovsky's assignment command Trans-Caucasus military district first appeared Tblisi local press 23 October replayed Moscow press 25 October.

11. AP and UP despatches datelined Moscow have just arrived reporting Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan with other unnamed Presidium members unexpectedly showed up at Turkish Embassy reception tonight. Khrushchev told reporters Zhukov would be given a new position "according to his experience and qualifications" but no decision yet made. Khrushchev said reports that Central Committee in Session were made up by correspondents. Also said his presence at Turkish party could be interpreted as peace gesture.

12. If you care to make any comments they should be sent through Roger channel.

Dulles

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82. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, October 30, 1957—7 p.m.

1631. For Cumming from Bohlen. Reference: Deptel 1376. [2] As you know, I have refrained since I have been here from commenting in most cases on Soviet developments, in part because I profoundly believe that our people in Moscow on the spot are in the best position to do so without views being submitted from all quarters of the globe. In addition, while I have not lost my interest I have lost touch with Soviet developments on a day-to-day basis. However, in this particular case I am very glad to give you my comments, primarily because, particularly after Geneva, I had considerable opportunities for informal talks with Zhukov and formed, insofar as it is possible with any Soviet official, some rather definite conclusions as to his character and cast of mind.

I shall, therefore, start with this aspect of the matter which will help to explain my subsequent remarks. Zhukov in my opinion

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/10–3057. Secret; Priority. Roger Channel.

[2] *Supra.*

above all is a Soviet patriot. He is a Bolshevik and as Hungary showed he is capable of ruthless and even brutal action if he feels the interests of the Soviet Union are involved. Ideologically, while not questioning the general premises of Marxism and Leninism, I would say his interest in this field, and hence in communism in other countries, is distinctly subordinate to his preoccupation with the security of the Soviet Union and by analogy of the whole Communist bloc.

On military matters from several conversations I am convinced that he is extremely sober and realistic in his evaluation of modern warfare and I would imagine has an extremely accurate comprehension of the correlation of forces between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Although primarily and principally a military man, he is at the same time a party member and has been since 1918. I am reasonably certain that he has no personal political ambitions and seriously doubt if he ever had any intention of making Soviet Armed Forces supreme as against the party. For these reasons I cannot see him engaged in the intrigues of power struggle for his own advancement. However, given his preoccupation of the effectiveness of the Soviet armed forces he would in my opinion fearlessly and bluntly resist any attempt to re-establish political commissar system in the form that existed under Stalin. He would probably be prepared to work closely with the political sections of the Red Army in the indoctrination of troops in ideology and in support of current Soviet policies, but would oppose the reinstitution of a system of Party spies and informers in the officer corps of the armed forces. His chief reason I would imagine would certainly not be any basic hostility to the party as such but rather his conviction based on past experience that any such system would be demoralizing to the officer corps and would reduce the military efficiency of the forces. It is entirely possible, therefore, that his dismissal arose from his opposition to attempts by Khrushchev and party people to reintroduce a full blown political commissar system in the Soviet Armed Forces. However, given the timing of this crisis I am inclined to believe that other elements, possibly more important to us, may have entered the picture. If it had been a purely internal matter in the traditional party/military jockeying on the subject of political commissars, it would hardly seem wise for either side to press it to a crisis at a time when international tension in the Middle East and U.S./USSR confrontation is probably more acute than at any time since Korea. If this crisis should explode into war dismissal of the most respected and competent military leader who in addition enjoys great personal popularity would be an act of unparalleled folly by Khrushchev and company. Even if Soviet intention is to score a diplomatic triumph in the Middle East it would certainly have been

wiser for the same reason to have awaited the end of this particular crisis.

Accordingly, I am inclined to the view that a difference of opinion as to Soviet foreign military policy is likewise involved. Given Zhukov's temperament and realism I believe it a safe bet that he views with concern, if not with real alarm, Khrushchev's reckless threats and saber rattling. With a more professional understanding of the present correlation of military forces in the world he may have been constantly opposed Khrushchev in the development of his Middle East policy and the risks that it most certainly involves. In my opinion, therefore, the latter consideration, possibly in conjunction with a latent dispute between party control and military efficiency, is a most likely explanation of the present crisis.

I entirely agree that the idea of Zhukov's promotion is untenable and have thought so from the moment his release from Defense duty was announced. If promotion had been in the cards standard Soviet practice would have been to announce his promotion and his departure from Defense as a consequence.

If information concerning a CC meeting is accurate (although according to the evening press here Khrushchev denied it at Turkish reception), this would appear to indicate Khrushchev and his supporters have encountered real opposition to the demotion and possible elimination of Marshal Zhukov. Khrushchev's remark that Zhukov would receive a new position according to his experience and qualifications is of course meaningless as to the nature of any new job he may have. It, however, may be an indication that because of opposition in the Army and even within the party Zhukov cannot just be dismissed out of hand and he may have to be given some face-saving job.

There is yet no indication that I have seen as to whether Zhukov is to be likewise removed from the Presidium which is of course a key point. If present crisis, however, results in total elimination of Marshal Zhukov from high Soviet councils I think it is a most disturbing development as I can see no one in the immediate entourage of Khrushchev who would be either in a position or have sufficient courage to act as a sober restraining factor on Khrushchev's tendency to gamble.

If you see no objection I would appreciate this being repeated to Moscow for Tommy. [3]

Bohlen

[3] Sent to the Embassy in the Soviet Union as telegram 500, October 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/10–3077)

83. Memorandum of Discussion at the 342d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 31, 1957 [1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and item 1, "CIA Annual Report".]

2. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence sketched the background and developments preceding the replacement of Marshal Zhukov as Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union. Just before his journey to Yugoslavia, Zhukov had seen Khrushchev in the Crimea, and apparently all had gone smoothly at this meeting. Zhukov was nine days in Yugoslavia and eight days in Albania. These facts raised certain questions. If there is as much danger of war as Khrushchev has lately been implying, why was Zhukov permitted to be away from Moscow for a period of three weeks? Were plots against Zhukov being hatched during this time? Was Marshal Rokossovsky sent to a provincial military command in order to get him out of Moscow when Zhukov was removed from his job?

Apparently when Zhukov returned to Moscow on October 26, he had no expectation that anything would happen to him. He immediately went into a series of meetings the outcome of which is even yet not known. Then came Khrushchev's announcement of Zhukov's relief from the Defense Ministry.

A meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party has evidently been going on for several days. We do not know what has occurred in this meeting. Perhaps Khrushchev may originally have offered Zhukov some other high-level job, but one remote from the Army, where Khrushchev feared the power of Zhukov. Apparently Zhukov did not react calmly to this proposal. What has actually happened to him physically since that time, we again do not know.

Undoubtedly Khrushchev would have preferred to settle this matter quietly and without fuss. It appears that Zhukov's dismissal has been instrumental in causing Marshal Tito to decline to go to Moscow for the November 7 celebrations. Meanwhile, the press of the Soviet Union is emphasizing the superiority of the Communist Party over the Army. Zhukov may not have sufficiently realized this point, so that Khrushchev felt the time had come to put the military in its place of subordination. In any event, Zhukov has been an outspoken advocate of the right of military commanders to control

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on November 1.

their troops, and to this end has reduced the power of the political commissars in the Soviet armed forces.

We have been hearing that Zhukov is to get another job, but the censorship has been stricter than ever in recent hours, and we do not know anything further about this job. It would seem, however, that the last die has not been cast. Will the Soviet Army take Zhukov's dismissal lying down? It is too early to predict an answer to this question. We may get the decision today as to what Khrushchev will finally do. In the meantime, it is unwise to make further prophecies.

The National Security Council:

Noted an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Marshal Zhukov.

[Here follow items 3. "A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense", 4. "U.S. Security Effort Overseas, FY 1957", and 5. "U.S. Policy Toward Spain."]

S. Everett Gleason

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84. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, November 3, 1957—2 p.m.

895. Having secured the domination of the police by the liquidation of Beria, of the government bureaucracy by the elimination of the "anti-party group," and now of the armed forces by the disgrace of Zhukov, [2] the Communist Party under the strong hand of Khrushchev has clearly established its supremacy over all the other elements of power in the Soviet system. This victory has not been achieved without cost. The morale of the armed forces will certainly suffer although how much will depend upon whether other military

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/11–357. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome.

[2] On November 2, the Central Committee of the CPSU announced a resolution ousting Zhukov from the Party Presidium and the Central Committee. Publication of the resolution in *Pravda* on November 3 was accompanied by a long editorial by Deputy Defense Minister Konev disparaging Zhukov's abilities as a military theorist and strategist. Within a few days, virtually all top marshals, with the notable exception of Vasilevsky, were identified as supporting the Central Committee action.

leaders are involved and the extent to which party intervention in military affairs will offend and discourage the professional officer corps. The roster of top military officers who lined up to kick the fallen hero appears to be virtually complete but many of them cannot escape responsibility if only by virtue of their silence in the face of Zhukov's alleged misdeeds and we would expect further changes in the military leadership to be quietly made in due course. The respect and esteem in which Zhukov was held by the public at large will add to the doubts and uneasiness of the public in general and while this may not be able effectively to express itself, it will make more difficult Khrushchev's efforts to increase the efficiency of the Soviet system by evoking enthusiasm and belief of the people in the system. The extent to which the leadership and propaganda apparatus has been employed in stating the regime's case indicates the seriousness with which the question of public opinion is regarded. This was also apparent in the charge the CC resolution made that Zhukov's role in World War II was being exaggerated and in Konev's *Pravda* article which minimized Zhukov's wartime exploits and pointed up his shortcomings. At the same time Konev supplied support for the claim that a personality cult was being developed around Zhukov, citing as one of the facts the painting of him on a white charger overlooking the burning Reichstag which was hung at his order in the Museum of the Soviet Army. This and the quotation in the *Pravda* editorial from Zhukov's recantation accepting the Party's charges as just are intended to undermine the basis of Zhukov's appeal to the masses and to reduce the area of latent opposition the anti-Zhukov move may engender.

Perhaps the most striking point in the decree of the Central Committee is the statement that Zhukov "showed himself an unsound political figure, inclined to adventurism, both in his understanding of the most important tasks of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as well as in the direction of the Ministry of Defense." This lends credence to the view that Zhukov opposed Khrushchev in the field of Foreign Affairs. The Syrian problem would certainly seem to be the most likely issue despite the strong statements made on this subject by Zhukov in Albania. There are of course other possibilities. For example, his prolonged stay in Albania may have been accounted for by his taking a hand in the Yugoslav–Albania problem. We have also been disturbed by the possibility that recent developments in Berlin and the recognition of East Germany by Yugoslavia [3] might presage a more aggressive Soviet policy in that area. The Syrian policy seems a more likely issue, however, since from his many statements on this question we know that Khru-

[3] Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations with East Germany on October 15.

shchev was personally involved in building up the crisis and it is in this area that the Soviet armed forces would be most handicapped in conducting limited military operations should the issue be forced. Whatever the immediate incident that may have precipitated a showdown, however, the basic factor was clearly the Party's concern that its control over the military was not secure. This rivalry between the party and the armed forces as institutions rather than a personal fear on the part of Khrushchev that his leadership of the Party was threatened by Zhukov was, in my opinion, the issue.

The removal of Zhukov leaves no strong figure in the Presidium, with the possible exception of the ubiquitous Mikoyan, who could be expected to exert a strong restraining influence on Khrushchev's impetuousness. This development can only be deplored from our point of view. For the time being however, Khrushchev's sensitivity to public opinion and the knowledge that by moving so quickly on so many fronts he has created a formidable latent opposition, may have a sobering influence. The charge against Zhukov of developing a cult of personality may for the time being act as a check on a similar build-up of Khrushchev, the logic of the Soviet system and his own personality, however, appear to be pushing Khrushchev toward one-man dictatorship but whether he can successfully carry out this role remains to be seen.

Thompson

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85. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, November 4, 1957.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: *Significance of Zhukov Ouster*

The ouster of Marshal Zhukov is in all probability the Party's rebuff of efforts on the part of Zhukov and perhaps other professional military leaders to reduce the influence of the Party apparatus in the armed forces. In April 1956, Zhukov publicly criticized the quality of political indoctrination in the armed forces and asserted the pre-eminent role of the military commander. Opposition to political interference has been long-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/11–457. Official Use Only.

standing among both career officers and men of the Soviet armed forces.

Evidence is lacking that Zhukov posed any present threat to Khrushchev's position of dominance in the Party Presidium. Zhukov is not known to have harbored ambitions beyond the military sphere. Even the announcement of his ouster carried no suggestion that he aspired to greater political power. Unlike Beriya and the leaders expelled last June, Zhukov was not charged with an attempt to seize power. He was charged, however, with fostering, largely within the military, a Zhukov "cult of personality." There is already the apparent beginning of a campaign, kicked off by First Deputy Minister of Defense Konev, to disparage Zhukov's abilities as a military strategist and theorist.

The insinuation that Zhukov favored an "adventurist" foreign policy is unsupported by any known facts. This vague charge has so far not been further developed in Soviet propaganda. If Zhukov represented an "adventurist" force in Middle Eastern policy, he might have been expected to remain in Moscow during the height of the crisis instead of visiting the Balkans. The slackening of Soviet alarmist talk on the Middle East, though coincidental with the Zhukov ouster, has been gradual and can be better explained by factors other than the Zhukov ouster.

Although related primarily to internal affairs, the ouster is not likely to produce any significant domestic innovations. The Party apparatus has now followed its demonstrations of supremacy over the secret police and the economic bureaucracy with an act designed to underline a similar primacy over the military. The ouster from the top leadership of so popular a figure as Zhukov may produce some resentment in both military and civilian ranks, but this should cause the regime no serious problem. The elimination of Zhukov, whose prestige exceeded his real power, is not likely to enhance materially Khrushchev's already well established position of dominance.

While it is questionable that Zhukov ever played a determining role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, Moscow may nevertheless now consider it expedient to counter foreign inferences that Zhukov's removal portends a further stiffening in Soviet attitudes and a greater willingness to court war. Recent Soviet achievements in the rocket and guided missile fields and evidence of an increasingly aroused Western response to recent Soviet challenges could in any case evoke a reinvigorated "coexistence" drive by Moscow. The desire to undercut Western expectations of a more bellicose Soviet posture could now be an important additional motive for accentuating Soviet appeals for a détente.

The timing of the move against Zhukov remains puzzling, in the absence of evidence that the army–Party issue had grown so acute as to

require immediate resolution. His absence in the Balkans apparently served as a convenient occasion to organize the case against him.

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86. Editorial Note

On November 6, the Supreme Soviet held a "Jubilee" session in honor of the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. Khrushchev delivered the major address—a long review of Soviet economic and political history, a recapitulation of Soviet accomplishments and goals, and a restatement of Soviet positions on various international issues. In the course of the speech, Khrushchev urged that there be further high-level negotiations between Communist and Western officials. A two-page analysis of the speech was sent to the Secretary of State as an enclosure to a memorandum from Cumming, November 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.11/11–857)

On November 7, Secretary Dulles, in a statement at National Airport in Washington, said that he did not interpret Khrushchev's remarks "as necessarily meaning a summit meeting." Dulles' comments at the airport, as well as the statement regarding Khrushchev's speech made by the Department of State press officer at the press briefing on November 7, were quoted in telegram 536 to Moscow, November 8. (*Ibid.*, 611.61/11–857) In telegram 917 from Moscow, November 8, Ambassador Thompson reported that he was inclined to believe that Khrushchev had proposed a summit meeting and that "this proposal is being seriously put forward and is not merely a propaganda gambit although I doubt that Khrushchev expects an early acceptance." Thompson also discussed what he thought the Soviet Government hoped to achieve by such a meeting and his belief that the United States Government's reply should be "along the line that we are prepared to participate in high level discussions at any time when there is prospect of success." (*Ibid.*) One view of what was anticipated at the Jubilee session is in a paper prepared by the CIA's Senior Research Staff on International Communism entitled "Speculation on the Program of the 40th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution," October 29, which was sent to Under Secretary Herter as an attachment to a memorandum of November 4 from F.M. Dearborn, Special Assistant to the President. (*Ibid.*, 761.00/11–457)

In recognition of the anniversary, it was decided that President Eisenhower would send Voroshilov a message of greeting, and Murphy, Elbrick, and Buchanan would attend a reception at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. (Notes on the Secretary's Staff meeting, November 5, 1957; *ibid.*, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

87. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Arneson) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, November 14, 1957.

SUBJECT

Impact and Implications of Soviet Earth Satellites

In view of your interest in the impact and implications of the Soviet earth satellites, you may wish to note the following summary of our recent estimate on this subject brought up to date to include Sputnik II.

1. Following its announcement of Sputnik I on October 14 [4], Soviet propaganda emphasized the satellite's scientific aspects but relied for the most part on free world sources to bring home its military implications. The rest of the Bloc elaborated both themes in volume. The second launching produced a smaller volume of propaganda along similar lines.

2. Outside the Bloc, Sputnik I tended to remove misconceptions about Soviet technological capabilities and to confirm its temporary ICBM lead. The resulting widespread concern was deepened by Sputnik II, which caused many to believe that the gap between the US and the USSR was wider than first realized. Although these views were tempered by the general belief that the US will match the USSR achievement in reasonable time, Sputnik II raised at least some doubts as to US ability to catch up quickly.

3. The USSR's prestige has risen substantially and the US has suffered a serious, although not decisive, setback. World opinion tends to hold that the sputniks per se have not altered the strategic balance of forces in the short run, since Soviet ICBMs are not yet thought to be in mass production. Nevertheless, some new weight

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/11–1457. Secret.

has been lent to Soviet foreign policy pronouncements and increased credibility may attach to Soviet claims in other fields.

4. Observers throughout the world agree that beyond the immediate future US ability to match the Soviet advance is crucial and that a significant lag would have far-reaching effects. In Western Europe, particularly, this has led to the conviction that NATO efforts must be strengthened, collaboration increased, and US leadership revitalized. In addition, in Europe and leading countries elsewhere, the sputniks gave new urgency to problems of strategy and military planning arising from the advent of ballistic missiles.

5. The USSR will make further intensive propaganda efforts to exploit the situation but probably does not believe that it is justified in radically altering its foreign policy for the present. Nevertheless, the Kremlin will experience some gain in confidence, may expect to seize political opportunities at less risk, and will exploit any sign of US failure to meet the challenge.

6. Free world opinion will be influenced by the Soviet achievement for some time to come. In Europe, pressure for increased US, US–UK and NATO effort and collaboration will continue. At the same time, further stimulus will have been given to development of European advanced weapon capability, partly because of continuing anxiety that the US may gradually withdraw once it has an operational ICBM. Fear that the US will enter bilateral negotiations with the USSR will also continue to be felt. Elsewhere in the world no major realignments seem probable in the short run, although attitudes will be influenced by progress in the weapons race. The status of US bases is for the present not likely to be affected.

7. Delayed or insufficient demonstration of United States success in the ballistic field would produce political and psychological effects of substantially more serious nature—for example, on attitudes toward neutralism and on the cohesion of alliances.

A similar memorandum has been addressed to the Under Secretary.

88. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, November 16, 1957—3 p.m.

953. Depcirtel 428, Nov. 5. [2] Embassy suggests addition sections on impact Sputnik within USSR and bloc.

Embassy believes Sputnik undoubtedly source pride to all elements Soviet society particularly intelligentsia. Regime attempt to equate communism and progress enhanced and its prestige probably raised, while disquiet certain professional and intellectual groups perhaps somewhat mollified. Although military angles not focus of principal stress, national sense of security also probably increased. However, Embassy contacts, though limited, indicate ordinary citizens remain more interested in bread and butter measures. Moreover, Zhukov ouster and way it was handled probably vitiated in short run some psychological advantages of Sputnik and pointed up gap between arbitrary and antiquated political system and ultra-modern technological achievements.

Finally Sputnik not unalloyed gain for intelligentsia, since though already high status of science boosted further, there are indications regime may seek use Sputnik success to demand greater exertions for comparable triumphs in other fields. In bloc, Soviets are obviously using Sputnik as symbol of growth Soviet power which should be proof to peoples of bloc that communism is irreversible. Hopes for liberation which already dimmed by passage of time in general and by Hungary in particular presumably will be further reduced. Repeated demands by Khrushchev (who will now seem to be leading from own "position of strength") that West recognize status quo in Europe will have some effect even if West maintains silence or gives verbal refusal.

On basis apparent Soviet analysis of new international opportunities now open to USSR, Embassy believes Dept estimate fails give sufficiently high rating to impact, especially in uncommitted areas, of present situation. This is one in which the USSR, after giving general impression of parity with US in nuclear field, has gone on dramatically to take stance of world leader in vitally important and imagination-catching field of future like rocketry, leaving US in position of catching up in science and technology which hitherto assumed US strong point. Embassy agrees that US launching satellite and ICBM might lessen impact, but there is no reason expect USSR rest on present laurels and meanwhile USSR has gone long way to

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.56301/11–1657. Secret.
[2] Not printed.

establish picture of itself (which it is assiduously promoting) as world power on par with and conceivably superior to US. In this connection, Sputniks have given much greater retroactive impact to ICBM announcement, a fact acknowledged but also underplayed in estimate.

Immediate consequences appear to be Soviet effort to inflate pressure for big power talks, and possibly increased Soviet belief that US and West ready or can be forced discuss disarmament on Soviet terms, admit Soviet role in Near East, and accept postwar Communist conquests in Eastern Europe and Far East. Moreover, since USSR is combining its greatly increased prestige and enhanced political stature with continued foreign assistance program in key uncommitted areas, it can be expected that tendency to accept Soviet help and expanded trade (with all possibilities of penetration thus implied) will grow as target nations feel need accommodation with Soviets, as well as real domestic pressures for industrialization—especially if US programs should become inadequate. With regard to section roman numeral IV B 7 and 8, it is true that Sputnik–ICBM does not increase danger of devastation threatening US friends which already huge, but its importance still great since for first time it brings into question US superiority or even certain parity vis-à-vis Soviet power on which these nations had been relying as shield.

Thompson

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89. Editorial Note

From November 14 to 16, a meeting was held in Moscow of representatives from Albania, Hungary, North Vietnam, East Germany, Communist China, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. On November 21, a declaration signed by representatives from all the countries except Yugoslavia was published. It reaffirmed the revolutionary nature of the international Communist movement and Moscow's direction of the movement. For text of the declaration, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1957, pages 527–539. For an analysis of the significance of the meeting and the declaration, see *Soviet Affairs*, December 1957, pages 6–8. (Department of State, INR Files, *Soviet Affairs*)

According to the memorandum of discussion at the 346th meeting of the National Security Council on November 22, Director of Central Intelligence Dulles made the following remarks during his briefing on significant world developments affecting United States security:

"Mr. Allen Dulles first referred to the recent meeting in Moscow on November 14 to November 16. The fact that the communiqué had only been issued yesterday (November 21) indicated that there had been difficulties encountered at the meeting. After summarizing the contents of the communiqué, Mr. Dulles pointed out that it was neither very ringing nor very important. It was significant that the Yugoslavs had not joined in the communiqué and that there was to be apparently no new Cominform." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

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90. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 10, 1957 [1]

SUBJECT

The Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Dulles
Senator Fulbright
Mr. Macomber

The Secretary alluded to the discussion he had with Senator Fulbright the previous Tuesday at the bipartisan meeting [2] and said that he would like to explain his views regarding the Soviet Union in somewhat greater detail. The Secretary said he did not believe he would convert the Senator to his thinking but he hoped that as a result the Senator would have a better understanding of his viewpoint.

The Secretary said he thought we had a three-fold task in connection with meeting the threat of the Soviet Union. The Secretary did not for a minute underestimate the military strength of the Soviet Union. The first requirement was to have a military capability which would deter the Soviet Union from initiating a hot war. The

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, December 1957. Drafted by Macomber. A note on the source text indicates that copies were sent to Herter and Smith (S/P).

[2] No record of this meeting, December 3, has been found.

second task was to be able to counter probing or "nibbling" operations by the Soviet Union in the form of small-scale aggressions around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The third task was to insure the economic progress of the underdeveloped areas in order to prevent the Soviets from taking over these areas by subversion.

The Secretary pointed out that the second and third tasks were heavily dependent on the Mutual Security Program.

The Secretary said that if we could succeed in these three objectives he believed that there eventually would be a change in the Soviet Union which would transform it into the kind of nation with whom we could have good relations in normal international society. He said he was not speaking of a revolution but of evolution. The Secretary said that it had been the experience of history that totalitarian regimes which existed on repressive measures in regard to its own people could only survive as long as they continued to achieve victories abroad. If they were denied such victories they were inevitably forced to release these repressive measures, become less authoritarian, and yield to the internal wishes of their people. The Secretary pointed out that when Khrushchev was asked why it took so long for the Soviets to do anything about the evils of Stalinism, the reply had been that it was impossible to do anything as long as Stalin was achieving great successes abroad. The Secretary thought that Khrushchev today needed these victories as much as Stalin had in the past. The Secretary pointed out that Khrushchev had many troubles at home. He alluded to the unrest in the satellites, the abandonment of the five-year plan, and the turnover in leadership. He thought the evolutionary process was even now beginning, pointing out that Russia was no longer ruled by one man or even by the Presidium but rather the locus of power appeared to be now in the larger Central Committee. (At this point Senator Fulbright interjected to say that it looked to him as though the power had descended for a time to the Central Committee but was rapidly ascending again to one man.)

The Secretary stressed that he could not determine whether the change he predicted in the Soviet Union would be in five, twenty-five or fifty years but he was convinced that if the Soviets could be denied external victories that the change would inevitably come.

Senator Fulbright said that he was less optimistic than the Secretary in his appraisal of the future course of the Soviet Union. He said that this evolutionary process might take place some day but he did not think it was enough of a certainty for us to base our policy upon it. He was, in fact, very discouraged about the possibilities of dislodging the Communist leadership from power in any foreseeable period of time. They had control of all the political,

military, economic, and the police resources and he did not see how they could be pried loose from these.

Senator Fulbright said that he had been enormously impressed by the implication of recent Soviet accomplishments and attached much greater significance to them than did the Secretary. He said he thought he was more "scared" of the present hot war potential of the Soviet Union than the Secretary was.

Senator Fulbright asked the Secretary what the effect of the Sputnik was abroad. The Secretary said the Sputnik had less effect abroad than it had in the United States. The Senator asked about its effect in the neutral areas. The Secretary replied that he had not seen recent reports but it was his impression that in some ways it helped the neutral areas in that the Soviets were considered the chief war makers in the world rather than the United States. The Secretary asked Mr. Macomber whether he had seen any reports regarding the Sputnik abroad. The latter said it was his impression that the preliminary reports indicated a growing hesitancy on the part of the neutral areas who had tended to lean toward the West to commit themselves in our direction. They seemed more anxious than before to wait a little longer to see whether the West or the Soviet Union would come out on top. On the other hand, Sputnik had tended to draw the Western European nations closer together and to the United States.

Reverting to his earlier theme, the Secretary stressed the importance of having a policy which envisioned a successful conclusion to our efforts. He said that the only logical and sound policy, if we accepted the Senator's reasoning, would be preventive war. The Senator's comment on this point was that regardless of logic a country like the United States with democratic institutions was incapable of initiating a preventive war.

[Here follows discussion of the Mutual Security Program.]

91. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, December 21, 1957.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: Foreign Policy Speeches by Khrushchev and Gromyko

In today's (December 21) concluding session of the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev and Gromyko delivered speeches on foreign policy, discussing, in particular, the disarmament question. In addition, the Supreme Soviet adopted a decree on foreign policy.

The main points in these three pronouncements, full texts of which are not yet available, were as follows:

1. Gromyko in effect rejected the idea of a Foreign Ministers Conference as an attempt to make Soviet representatives sit down . . . with the same men with whom the USSR negotiated . . . fruitlessly . . . over many years." He said the proposal for talks "could neither satisfy the Soviet Union nor be accepted." [2]

2. Gromyko proposed a special UN session or a disarmament conference of unspecified composition. Both these proposals, or variants thereof, have been advanced periodically by the USSR during the past four years.

3. Khrushchev repeated recent Soviet calls for a top-level East-West conference to solve international problems. He apparently continued to be vague as to participants, but Gromyko indicated that Moscow would press for Chinese communist participation in such a meeting as well as in talks on disarmament alone.

4. Both Khrushchev and the Supreme Soviet Decree took note of the NATO statement that the West would not use force unless attacked and, ostensibly in consideration of this statement, the Supreme Soviet instructed the Soviet Government to consider further unilateral reductions in Soviet military forces. Since 1955, the USSR has announced two major unilateral troop reductions totaling 1,840,000 men. These reductions appear to have been carried out to a substantial degree, although full confirmation is lacking. No reductions are thought to have occurred in 1957. Announcement of a new cut in response to the NATO conference had been considered likely by the Intelligence Community. Khrushchev also stated that pending agreement on disarmament the USSR would continue to develop modern weapons although within "reasonable limits" so as not to overburden the Soviet economy, an almost unique statement for a Soviet leader.

5. Both speakers took favorable note of Norwegian and Danish statements at NATO while being especially critical of Turkey, Italy, and the UK. Gromyko questioned Bonn's sincerity on the issue of

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/12–2157. Confidential.

[2] All ellipses are in the source text.

missile bases and indicated that in the case of Germany, Moscow would continue pressing for exclusion of *all* nuclear weapons.

6. Khrushchev, like the CPSU Central Committee Decree of December 17, stressed the importance of the recent international Communist party conferences in consolidating the Communist movement in the face of "reactionary" efforts to split it. He regretted Yugoslavia's failure to sign the 12-Party declaration as showing that ideological and political differences continued to exist. On the other hand, he stressed the "joint front" existing on many important issues and promised efforts to remove remaining differences.

7. There were no new substantive proposals in the three pronouncements; they recapitulated the suggestions contained in the recent Bulganin letters, stressing in particular the need to recognize the status quo, to set up an "atom-free" zone, and to sign a non-aggression agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In general, the statements struck a note similar to that in Bulganin's letters. They indicated no particular haste to enter negotiations, but rather reflected a belief that at the present juncture, the USSR can afford to hold out for talks more nearly on its own terms, (especially with respect to participants), than on previous occasions. Moscow seems intent on fostering inclinations in the West toward negotiation and toward going slow on new military decisions by striking a favorable attitude toward Norway and Denmark as well as Canada, by such unilateral concessions as the announcement of another troop reduction, and by Khrushchev's unusual inference that Soviet military development will be limited so as not to curtail the needs of other sectors of the economy. The statements make clear again that if negotiations should eventuate, a priority Soviet goal will be to obtain explicit Western recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe.

A similar memorandum has been sent to the Under Secretary.

East-West Exchanges

UNITED STATES POLICY IN ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM OF EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND PERSONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC

92. Memorandum From the Attorney General (Brownell) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) [1]

Washington, March 22, 1955.

This has reference to your memorandum of March 9, 1955,[2] relative to the admission to the United States of certain European non-official temporary visitors excludable under existing law.

Pursuant to your request, I am enclosing a one-page memorandum which I believe adequately summarizes the considerations and actions which have taken place in this matter. You will note that a suggestion is included therein for substituting certain language in NSC Document 5508, February 8, 1955.[3]

I am also attaching a copy of a more detailed report on this subject,[4] which was prepared for my use, in the event that you might have need for further background information.

I will be glad to keep your office informed of any further developments. I see no reason why this matter should not be the subject of consideration by the National Security Council on March 24.

Herbert Brownell, Jr.[5]

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Admission to the U.S. of European Soviet Bloc Nationals. Secret. Transmitted to the NSC under cover of a memorandum from Lay, dated March 22, indicating that it reported an agreement between the Departments of State and Justice pursuant to NSC Action No. 1336–b, and was to be considered by the Council at its meeting on March 24.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5508 Series)

[3] Not printed, but see NSC 5508/1, Document 94.

[4] Not printed.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[Enclosure] [6]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Justice

Washington, March 22, 1955.

The Secretary of State recommended to the Attorney General, in the national interest, the admission of eleven Soviet student and youth newspaper editors for a three week visit "to acquaint themselves with the life of students and youth in the United States". [7] The Attorney General, under a discretionary authority contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act, did authorize admission of this group under the sponsorship of the Institute of International Education.

The Institute of International Education, in accepting this responsibility, agreed to certain controls and requirements of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice, the Agency of Government primarily responsible for all alien visitors in the United States. It should be made clear, however, that these conditions are not such that will detract from the purpose of the visit. . . .

The general question of admitting to the United States various groups of visitors from Russia, such as Russian farmers, athletes, etc., is the subject of a paper recently considered by the National Security Council. The President directed that the paper be referred to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General for consultation and decision. As a result of such consultation, it has been agreed that as to all future applications for admission of visitors from Russia, this plan will be followed:—

The Secretary of State will informally advise the Attorney General or the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the group that desires to come to the United States. The Immigration and Naturalization Service will then develop, in consultation with the State Department, the necessary plans and controls which should be put into effect, including the selection of a non-Governmental organization to make arrangements for and to monitor the visitors while in the United States in cases where such action is

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[6] Secret.

[7] For text of the Department of State press release of March 10, announcing this decision, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1955, p. 487. On April 16, however, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the 11 editors decided not to visit the United States because they were unwilling to comply with the legal requirements for the issuance of nonofficial visitors' visas, including fingerprinting. For a Department of State press release of April 16 responding to this announcement, see *ibid.*, April 25, 1955, p. 695.

appropriate. When such plans are complete, the Secretary of State will be advised, at which time the necessary formal actions will be taken to authorize admission.

(It is suggested that the language in the paragraph immediately preceding be substituted for paragraphs 12, 13, and 14 in NSC Document 5508, February 8, 1955.[8])

Agreement has also been reached in principle as to authorizing the admission of the Soviet farmers[9] through this same mechanism and under the same controls.

Following the visit of the eleven Soviet student and youth newspaper editors, and following the receipt of information as to the results of that experiment, a detailed report will be made.

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[8] Not printed. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Admission to the U.S. of European Soviet Bloc Nationals)

[9] On March 10, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a note to the American Embassy expressing the view that an exchange of agricultural delegations, as suggested by the *Des Moines Register*, could be advantageous and asked for the U.S. Government's view on such an exchange. The text of the note has not been found in Department of State files.

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93. Memorandum of Discussion at the 242d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 24, 1955[1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and item 1.]

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Item 2 was prepared by Coyne; the remaining items were prepared by Gleason, on March 25.

2. *Admission to the U.S. of Certain European Non-Official Temporary Visitors Excludable Under Existing Law* (NSC 5427; NSC 5508; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 16, 1955; NSC Action No. 1366; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 22, 1955) [2]

Mr. Cutler summarized earlier developments with respect to the subject, noting that at the Council meeting of February 17, 1955, the NSC considered recommendations by the Planning Board to admit a limited increase in the number of non-official temporary visitors otherwise excludable under the McCarran Act for the purpose of countering foreign talk that it is the United States, rather than the USSR, that is maintaining an "iron curtain". He noted that at its February 17 meeting the Council was favorably disposed toward paragraphs 10 and 11 of NSC 5508, but that it found the provisions of paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of that report unacceptable. Accordingly, the Council referred NSC 5508 to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General for further consideration in the light of the Council discussion on February 17, and for subsequent report to the Council.

Mr. Cutler stated that on March 22 the Attorney General submitted memoranda [3] summarizing the considerations and action taken pursuant to the Council's discussion at its meeting of February 17. He mentioned that the memoranda reflected that harmony had prevailed between the Departments of State and Justice since this subject was last considered, and commented that the Planning Board, by its consideration of NSC 5508, served in the capacity of midwife to the Departments of State and Justice in helping to resolve the problem.

Mr. Cutler indicated that the March 22 memoranda before the Council for consideration today included a paragraph, agreed to by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to be substituted in NSC 5508 for paragraphs 12, 13 and 14.

To refresh the Council's recollection, Mr. Cutler summarized paragraphs 10 and 11 of the "Policy Guidance" statement contained in NSC 5508. He then read the paragraph which the Departments of

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[2] Regarding NSC 5427, "Restricting Diplomatic and Official Representatives of Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in Connection With Strategic Intelligence," July 19, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, footnote 9, p. 1246. NSC 5508 is not printed, but see NSC 5508/1, *infra*. Gleason's memorandum of February 16 to the Council was a covering memorandum transmitting a memorandum from Radford to the Secretary of Defense, dated February 15, giving the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 5508. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Admission to the U.S. of European Soviet Bloc Nationals) Regarding NSC Action No. 1366 and Lay's memorandum to the Council of March 22, see footnote 1, *supra*.

[3] See *supra*.

State and Justice recommended for insertion in the "Policy Guidance" statement in lieu of paragraphs 12, 13 and 14.

Mr. Cutler indicated that the Departments of State and Justice had been proceeding along the lines indicated in the proposed paragraph; that they had followed these recommended procedures in the case of the proposed admission of the Soviet student and youth newspaper editors, and in the case of the Soviet "agriculturists" who had been recommended for admission to the United States. He mentioned, with respect to the former group, that some of the "youths" designated for admission were forty years of age or more.

Mr. Cutler next directed attention to the third paragraph of the Attorney General's summary report dated March 22, which indicated that as a result of consultation between the Departments of State and Justice, it had been agreed that the plan outlined in the substitute paragraph mentioned above would be followed "as to all future applications for admission of visitors from Russia." He said that it was his understanding that the Policy Guidance contained in NSC 5508 was not intended to be limited in its application to Russian nationals, but that it was also to be applied to certain nationals of other European countries, both Soviet bloc and non-Soviet bloc, who were excludable under applicable sections of the McCarran Act. The Attorney General confirmed Mr. Cutler's understanding that the substitute paragraph was not intended to be limited to Russian nationals. Mr. Cutler suggested, accordingly, that a phrase be included in the proposed substitute paragraph to indicate that it applied to those categories of persons falling within paragraphs 10 or 11 of NSC 5508. The Attorney General concurred in Mr. Cutler's proposal.

Mr. Cutler then raised a question as to whether the word "religious" should be included in paragraphs 10–d and 11–c of NSC 5508, in view of Secretary Dulles' comments with respect to this aspect of the subject at the February 17 meeting of the Council. The Secretary of State indicated that he would like to see the word "religious" added in both instances.

Secretary Wilson raised a question as to the application of the term "scientific" in paragraphs 10 and 11 of NSC 5508, wherein those paragraphs refer to the admission of otherwise excludable aliens for participation in scientific, cultural, educational, or other types of meetings. He thought that we should be sure how far we intended to go with respect to the admission of such individuals for scientific purposes. He referred to a recent instance in Japan where Soviet technologists were granted entry and it later turned out that their real purpose in entering Japan was to examine Japanese plants engaged in manufacturing munitions for the United States. Secretary Wilson thought it would be a good idea to insert the word "reli-

gious" in paragraphs 10 and 11, and to drop the word "scientific" from those paragraphs.

Secretary Humphrey inquired whether the granting of admission permitted these aliens to go anywhere they liked in the United States. The Attorney General responded in the negative, stating that their travels were to be very carefully supervised and controlled.

The Attorney General stated that the Department of Justice was receiving very "bitter" mail critical of the United States for permitting these people to enter the country. In response to the President's inquiry as to the source of these criticisms, the Attorney General said the mail emanated from patriotic organizations and individuals.

The Attorney General then asked Mr. Allen Dulles if he was going to make a report on what those people who had been permitted entry previous to this time actually said and did when they returned to their home lands. Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative, and Mr. Cutler thereupon read the highlights of a report [4] which he had received from the Director of Central Intelligence, outlining highly critical and false propaganda charges which some of these visitors had made. Mr. Cutler noted that among other things some of the representatives from iron curtain countries who attended the recent Evanston Assembly of the World Council of Churches made the following accusations or complaints when they went back behind the iron curtain: (a) They were put under surveillance by U.S. secret police; (b) they—and even the Archbishop of Canterbury—were fingerprinted in the same manner as Chicago gangsters; (c) there was a crime wave in Chicago; (d) Bishop Peter [5] referred to an Evanston memorial to World War II dead which bears the inscription "December 7, 1941—blank", and charged that the failure of local officials to insert the second date was proof that the war had not ended so far as the United States was concerned. Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out in this connection that in some instances the governments of these people probably compelled them to make such charges when they returned home.

In reference to the foregoing, Mr. Cutler made a comment about the happiness expressed by the Secretary of State at the February 17 meeting over the fact that these religious people were permitted entry to this country. The Secretary said that he wanted to correct any misunderstanding on that score. He said he was happy that such a great organization as the World Council of Churches wasn't driven away, for he thought it would have been scandalous if the World Council had been forced by our policies to hold its meeting outside the United States.

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[4] Not further identified.

[5] Bishop Janos Peter of the Reformed Church of Hungary.

The Attorney General indicated that the only reason these people were being let in was to help the national interests of the United States. He thought, accordingly, that the Director of Central Intelligence should continue to keep a close check on what such people did and said when they returned to their respective homelands, for the purpose of determining whether we were achieving the desired results in granting them entry to the United States.

Mr. Rockefeller thought that the Director of Central Intelligence should report on the general psychological attitude being evinced around the world regarding the restrictive policies of our immigration laws, and Mr. Cutler replied that this subject was already covered in the basic paper.

Secretary Dulles, speaking of other psychological aspects of the cold war, mentioned that he had seen an item on TV from New York last night describing the interview which was held with one of the two Americans who had been thoroughly brain-washed by the Chinese Communists and who had returned to the United States by air yesterday. He thought the manner in which this individual "carried on" before the press and cameras was shocking; that he was vitriolic in his criticism of the United States to the point that it would make one's blood run cold to witness such a demonstration on the part of any American.

Secretary Wilson said that in the case of the American prisoners of war who were captured by the Chinese Communists and brainwashed, the military tried to take care of that situation by keeping them in camps for a while after they were brought back to the United States.

Secretary Humphrey said that while he had not seen the TV broadcast referred to by Secretary Dulles, he had heard about it, and that the general impression of those who reported it to him was along the lines that a terrible thing had been done to the returnee by the Chinese Communists in that he had obviously become deranged mentally.

Mr. Allen Dulles thought that it might be a good idea to put such individuals on slow boats rather than fly them back to the United States immediately after their release by the Chinese Communists.

The President commented that some of the newspaper people, by their ballyhooing of a situation of this sort, were only trying to stir up controversy, and he cited, as an example, the effort on the part of the people at his press conference yesterday to try and point

up differences between the Secretary of State and Senator George on certain foreign policy questions.[6]

. . . . . .

Secretary Wilson, referring to the fact that Soviet "agriculturists" would be coming in in the near future, said that it was in one respect a good thing, in that it indicated to him, from a military point of view, that the food situation in the Soviet Union was bad. On the other hand, he said he didn't want to help that particular situation by enabling their agricultural experts, through visits to the United States, to learn ways and means of bettering the agricultural situation in the Soviet Union. To this the President said that he did not believe that permitting a few Soviet farmers to visit this country would improve the situation one-half of one per cent. The President pointed out that the Russians got all of our literature and pamphlets on subjects. Furthermore, the President said, when U.S. farmers visited the Soviet Union they would be in a position to talk about how superior their agricultural attainments were to those of the USSR. In addition, the President said that this program was designed to help individuals as well as governments to get together. Considering these and related psychological factors, the President said, he did not feel too concerned about the point raised by Secretary Wilson.

Mr. Cutler indicated that NSC 5508 would be revised in line with the proposal contained in the Attorney General's memorandum of March 22 and in the light of the discussion at today's Council meeting.

The National Security Council:[7]

a. Noted and discussed the memorandum on the subject by the Attorney General, transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 22, and concurred in by the Secretary of State.

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in the reference report (NSC 5508) subject to the following changes:

(1) *Paragraph 10–d*: Insert "religious," after "educational," in line 2.

(2) *Paragraph 11–c*: Insert "religious," after "educational," in line 2.

(3) *Paragraphs 12, 13 and 14*: Delete, and substitute in the following therefor, renumbering the final paragraph accordingly:

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[6] For the transcript of the President's press conference on March 23, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 350–365.

[7] Paragraphs a–b and subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1357. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

"12. The Secretary of State will informally advise the Attorney General or the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of any individual or group falling within paragraphs 10 or 11 above, that desires to come to the United States. The Immigration and Naturalization Service will then develop, in consultation with the Department of State, the necessary plans and controls which should be put into effect, including the selection of a non-Governmental organization to make arrangements for and to monitor the visitor or visitors while in the United States in cases where such action is appropriate. When such plans are complete, the Secretary of State will be advised, at which time the necessary formal actions will be taken to authorize admission.

Note: NSC 5508, as amended and adopted, approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5508/1; [8] and referred to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General for the policy guidance contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 thereof and for appropriate action pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 13 thereof.

S. Everett Gleason

[8] *Infra.*

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94. National Security Council Report [1]

NSC 5508/1 *Washington, March 26, 1955.*

STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ADMISSION TO THE U.S. OF CERTAIN EUROPEAN NON-OFFICIAL TEMPORARY VISITORS EXCLUDABLE UNDER EXISTING LAW

General Considerations

1. *Introduction.* As a part of its "coexistence" campaign since the death of Stalin, the USSR has eased restrictions on travel to and from the Soviet orbit. Under the new Soviet policy, 101 U.S. private

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5508 Series. Confidential. NSC 5508/1 was circulated to the members of the Council under cover of a memorandum of March 26 from Lay, in which he noted the discussion and action taken at the Council's 242d meeting on March 24 and stated that the President had approved on March 26 the statement of policy as set forth in NSC 5508/1. In addition to the statement of policy, NSC 5508/1 included a table of contents, annexes, and maps, none printed, that were identical to those included in NSC 5508.

citizens were admitted to the USSR during 1953 and 1954.[2] The United States, on the other hand, for practical, security and political reasons arising from an enhanced awareness of the Communist threat, has been reluctant to admit European Soviet Bloc private citizens. As a result, the U.S. is placed in a paradoxical position, which is being exploited by Communist propaganda. Despite its traditional policy favoring freedom of travel and its record of having favored a liberal exchange of persons with the USSR in the post-war period, the U.S. is being accused of maintaining an "Iron Curtain"; and these accusations are being made not only by representatives of international Communism but also by otherwise friendly persons in the free world. This situation is causing damage, and may cause further damage, to U.S. prestige and the U.S. reputation for liberal world leadership.

2. *Present Law and Policy*. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, non-official alien visitors who are communists and subversives are excludable from admission to the U.S. Such of these aliens who there is reason to believe would enter to engage, even incidentally, in activities prejudicial to the national security, or who would probably engage in subversion or participate in the activities of a subversive organization, are admissible under no circumstances. The Act does permit the Attorney General, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, to exercise discretion to admit temporarily communists and other potential subversives not included in the above categories. Under the present statute, the Attorney General has exercised his discretion in favor of admitting 33 Soviet Union private citizens during 1953 and 1954.[3]

3. *Restrictions on Travel in the U.S. and USSR (see maps at end of paper)*.

a. *Restrictions on Travel by Foreigners in USSR*. The present Soviet regulations which restrict the travel in the Soviet Union by foreigners went into effect June 22, 1953. Whereas the previous regulations, effective January 15, 1952, closed nearly 50% of Soviet territory, the present Soviet regulations permit travel to all but about 30% of the Soviet land area. Americans and other foreigners may visit over 70% of large Soviet cities (of over 100,000 population) and may travel in such densely populated and heavily industrialized areas as European Russia. Inasmuch as the majority of places that hold interest for visiting foreigners are open, Intourist, the government agency which

[2] An additional limited number of U.S. commercial travelers may also have been admitted to the USSR without their presence being made known to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Figures on the number of U.S. private citizens admitted to the European Satellites are not available. [Footnote in the source text.]

[3] In addition, the Attorney General admitted 25 private citizens from the European Satellites during 1953 and 1954. This paper does not cover European Soviet Bloc nationals entering the U.S. in official capacities (including residence or attendance at the United Nations or specialized agencies) or as more or less permanent residents. [Footnote in the source text.]

arranges, coordinates and supervises the travel of temporary foreign visitors, can usually keep such visitors from entering off-limits areas or cities without their becoming aware of the existence of restrictions. Occasionally, American or other foreign visitors are permitted access to a closed area or city for some specific purpose. The present regulations also permit rail or air transit through closed areas en route to open areas. Because of this transit privilege, foreigners may traverse the entire breadth of the Soviet Union via the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

b. *Restrictions on Travel by Soviet Citizens in the U.S.* All Soviet citizens in possession of valid Soviet passports other than Soviet employees of the United Nations Secretariat are subject to travel restrictions during their stay in this country similar to the restrictions imposed by the Soviet Government on the travel of U.S. citizens and other foreigners in the USSR. A previous requirement that certain Soviet officials in this country, not including the Soviet delegation to the UN, give advance notification of travel outside the Washington, D.C. area, was extended on January 3, 1955 [4] to include the broader category of Soviet citizens as defined above. The new regulations also closed 27% of the U.S. to travel by those persons. They may still visit approximately 70% of large American cities and may transit closed areas by air, rail and, in certain specified cases, by automobile along designated routes. In order to permit greater flexibility in handling temporary Soviet visitors as opposed to Soviet officials stationed in the U.S., the new regulations contain a provision whereby, at the discretion of the Department of State, they may be permitted access to closed cities or areas if their presence in such cities or areas is germane to the purpose of the visit for which they were admitted.

4. *Advantages of a Modest Broadening of U.S. Admissions Policy.* U.S. admission of a larger but still modest number of European Soviet Bloc nationals (in categories falling within the discretionary power of the Attorney General on recommendation of the Secretary of State) would tend to maintain the reputation of the U.S. as a mature leader and as a believer in freedom. Such admission would thus counter Communist propaganda and tend to strengthen free world cooperation with the U.S. It would have the following additional advantages:

a. Admission of European Soviet Bloc travelers may lead to admission of more U.S. travelers into the Bloc, ...

. . . . . .

b. Some European Soviet Bloc travelers to the U.S. could not but be privately impressed by the American scene and American technological accomplishments. Some of these would report to at least limited local audiences a reasonably accurate picture of the U.S.

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[4] See Document 1.

c. There is a possibility that some travelers from the European Soviet Bloc countries might defect.

d. . . . The present restrictions have discouraged in advance the holding of some scientific and cultural conventions in the U.S. Under a broadened policy, such gatherings would probably bring to the U.S. important (and unquestionably admissible) non-Bloc visitors as well.

5. *Disadvantages of Broadening U.S. Admissions Policy.* It must be assumed that any European Soviet Bloc visitors would be selected on an official basis, and carefully screened and supervised for security; and that their visits would be designed to obtain maximum advantage for the Bloc. In particular:

a. Any group of European Soviet Bloc travelers admitted would probably include some intelligence agents.

b. Any group of European Soviet Bloc travelers would probably be able to gather, if only by observation, some strategic information on the U.S.

c. There is a risk that returning visitors might be exploited for propaganda purposes since the fact that they had been in the U.S. might lend personal authenticity to any distortions concerning the U.S. (However, in the past this risk has not proved serious.)

d. The selection by the European Soviet Bloc countries of disciplined groups who would distinguish themselves by superior performance might enhance the general prestige of the Bloc countries.

e. A relaxation of U.S. vigilance toward the Soviet peril might be fostered.

In addition, there is a risk that local public feeling in the U.S. might react against travel in the U.S. of Soviet Bloc nationals, leading to "incidents".

6. *Net Evaluation.* On balance, provided (a) appropriate internal security safeguards are established, and (b) prompt decisions are made on requests for visas, the advantages to the U.S. of a broadened admission policy outweigh the disadvantages. Such disadvantages will be more than counterbalanced by upholding the U.S. reputation for adherence to the principles of cultural exchange and freedom of movement, and by the other advantages cited above.

7. *Administrative Questions.*

a. Appropriate internal security safeguards must be established when European Soviet Bloc nationals are admitted to the U.S. The Attorney General has responsibility for approving the security provisions made in each instance. In most cases contemplated under this paper, total surveillance will not be necessary, but responsible private or governmental agencies may be entrusted with the burden of keeping account of the Bloc nationals' activities and of informing the Department of Justice (FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service) where its responsibility may be involved. It is recognized that any increase in the number of admissions, while entailing an

increased burden on some agencies for administrative arrangements and, in some cases, on the Department of Justice from an internal security point of view, is not likely to require additional personnel.

b. The travel restrictions on European Soviet Bloc nationals admitted under a broadened admissions policy should conform to NSC 5427,[5] except where specific cases make a specific departure therefrom desirable.

8. *Possibility of a Radically Broadened U.S. Admissions Policy*. Consideration has been given to broadening the exchange of visitors between the Soviet Bloc and the United States to proportions greater than the limited program contemplated in this paper. While it appears that a considerable intelligence advantage would be gained by large-scale visits of U.S. citizens to the Soviet Bloc nations, and while a broader program would give this nation more freedom in seizing the initiative in the propaganda warfare over the "Iron Curtain" allegedly erected by the United States, it does not appear that such a program is feasible within the framework of present law or national security policies. It must be recognized that waiver of inadmissibility is an exception and that the policy written into the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act itself is a policy of exclusion. Exercise of the Attorney General's discretion to waive inadmissibility in any great number of cases would convert the exception into a rule, and a legal basis for any such program would probably require an amendment of the existing provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It must further be recognized that the admission of any great number of Soviet Bloc nationals would increase the internal security problems attendant upon any such program, with a consequent increase in the administrative burden imposed on the responsible agencies.

9. *Related Problem of Excludable Non-Soviet Bloc Nationals*. Note must be taken of the fact that the exclusion provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act applicable to Soviet Bloc nationals apply equally to Communists, Communist sympathizers and other potential subversives from non-Soviet Bloc countries. A policy which admits excludable Soviet Bloc nationals and at the same time denies admission to excludable non-Bloc visa applicants is open to a challenge of inconsistency. Such persons, of course, are more apt to be Communists by conviction than many visitors from the Bloc countries. They are more likely to be effective propagandists. Their admission leads to no reciprocal travel advantages. They are not subject to travel restrictions applicable to USSR citizens. On the other hand, exclusion of such persons may be detrimental to the U.S. reputation among foreign free world nations. Their admission might permit the

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[5] See footnote 2, *supra*.

holding of many world-wide scientific and cultural meetings in the U.S. Adequate security safeguards might be provided, and as a condition of entry, some travel restrictions could be imposed. It seems desirable, therefore, that where such persons have important cultural or professional contributions to make to the U.S. by temporary visits to the U.S. for specific engagements or for participating in meetings held in this country, they should be considered for admission in the light of the same factors applicable to European Soviet Bloc visitors, under adequate security safeguards.

Policy Guidance

10. It would be in the national interest for the U.S. to admit European Soviet Bloc nationals to the U.S., provided:

a. They are admissible under U.S. law.
b. Their visits are of short duration.
c. Admission is based on general reciprocity as to the numbers and categories of U.S. nationals admitted to the European Soviet Bloc.
d. Admission is for the purpose of participation in specific and bona fide cultural, educational, religious, scientific, professional or athletic activities.
e. Appropriate internal security safeguards are established.

11. A limited number of non-Soviet Bloc nationals excludable only under Section 212(a) (28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (1952) should be admitted to the U.S. provided:

a. They have an important cultural or professional contribution to make to the U.S.
b. Their visits are of short duration.
c. Admission is for the purpose of participation in specific and bona fide cultural, educational, religious, scientific or professional meetings or engagements.
d. Adequate internal security safeguards are provided.

12. The Secretary of State will informally advise the Attorney General or the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of any individual or group, falling within paragraphs 10 or 11 above, that desires to come to the United States. The Immigration and Naturalization Service will then develop, in consultation with the Department of State, the necessary plans and controls which should be put into effect, including the selection of a non-Governmental organization to make arrangements for and to monitor the visitor or visitors while in the United States in cases where such action is appropriate. When such plans are complete, the Secretary of State will be advised, at which time the necessary formal actions will be taken to authorize admission.

13. The Executive Branch should endeavor to enlist support for the above policy from influential leaders in the Congress, and to promote understanding of it among the American people.

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95. Report Prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board [1]

Washington, March 29, 1955.

DISTRIBUTION THROUGH THE U.S. MAILS OF CERTAIN IMPORTED COMMUNIST PERIODICALS

1. *Purpose.* To review existing arrangements relating to the distribution through the U.S. mails of imported Communist periodicals which are published primarily for consumption in Soviet bloc countries rather than for the purpose of being disseminated as "political propaganda" in the United States.

2. *Basis For This Review.* Recent press criticisms alleging that postal regulations have made it difficult for some individuals and organizations to receive *Izvestia* and *Pravda* through the U.S. mails.

3. *Facts Bearing on This Problem:*

a. With certain exceptions, including first class mail, it is the general practice of the Treasury Department (Customs) to screen with special intensity mail imports from Soviet bloc countries. These imports are examined to ascertain (1) their dutiable status, and (2) their admissibility under various U.S. laws and regulations, including those dealing with "political propaganda" within the meaning of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which defines "political propaganda" as:

> "any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or other communication or expression by any person which is reasonably adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United States with reference to the

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Planning Board Member Files. Confidential. Circulated to the members of the NSC and other officials under cover of a memorandum of March 29 from Lay, in which he stated that the report was prepared by the Planning Board with the assistance of representatives of the Departments of Justice, the Post Office, and Commerce, the U.S. Information Agency, and the White House Press Secretary. Hagerty's diary account of the discussion of this issue at an OCB meeting on March 24 is in Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers.

political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party or with reference to the foreign policies of the United States or promote in the United States racial, religious, or social dissensions. . . .[2] The term 'disseminating' includes transmitting or causing to be transmitted in the United States mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce or offering or causing to be offered in the United States mails."

b. Even though the material so screened contains "political propaganda" it is promptly released for delivery through the U.S. mails, provided it is destined for (1) any individual or organization complying with the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act; (2) Governmental agencies; (3) certain bona fide individuals and groups of a non-Governmental character, in the absence of evidence indicating that the material, if delivered, would be disseminated further for propaganda purposes (included in this non-Governmental category are libraries, news establishments, educational institutions, scientific and other private research groups).

c. If the material so screened contains "political propaganda" but is not destined for individuals or organizations in the categories outlined above, it may be, and if detected is, barred from the mails by the Post Office Department pursuant to its understanding of (1) interpretations by the Department of Justice of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and other statutes relating to the non-mailability of printed matter, and (2) NSC Action No. 1114–b, dated May 13, 1954.

(1) In essence the interpretations of the Department of Justice authorize the Post Office Department to exclude from the mails "political propaganda" introduced from abroad by agents not registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act for the purpose of effecting dissemination within the United States.

(2) NSC Action No. 1114–b follows:

"Agreed that, in lieu of legislation on the subject [Importation of Communist Propaganda],[3] the responsible departments and agencies should remain alert to this problem and should do everything possible within the means now available to defeat the Communist objectives in importing propaganda into the United States."

(It is to be noted that the subject of this review is limited to but one aspect of the broad study on which NSC Action No. 1114–b was based.)

d. Inquiry indicates that: (1) approximately 1000 copies of *Izvestia* and 1000 copies of *Pravda* are sent to the United States daily; (2) they arrive by air freight, air mail and ordinary mail; (3) about 550 copies of each publication are promptly released for delivery to recipients listed in paragraph 3–b, above; (4) the balance are exclud-

[2] Ellipsis in the source text.
[3] Brackets in the source text.

ed from the mails because the processing agencies (a) construe them to be non-mailable "political propaganda" within the meaning of the Foreign Agents Registration Act as that Act has been interpreted by the Department of Justice; (b) are unaware of their intended use; (c) do not know whether they have been requested by the addressees.

4. *Conclusions.*

a. In the implementation of NSC Action No. 1114–b, it appears that the national security would not be adversely affected by permitting, in addition to the deliveries permitted under 3–b, above, delivery through the U.S. mails of imported Communist periodicals which are published primarily for consumption in Soviet bloc countries, provided they are not introduced into the United States for the purpose of being disseminated as "political propaganda".

b. The Departments of the Treasury, Justice and the Post Office, in appropriate consultation with the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency, should be governed by the preceding paragraph in resolving problems arising in the implementation of NSC Action No. 1114–b and the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

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96. Memorandum of Discussion at the 243d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 31, 1955 [1]

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Importation of Communist Periodicals (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Importation of Communist Propaganda", dated April 19, May 4 and 12, 1954; [2] NSC Action No. 1114; [3] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 29, 1955 [4])

Mr. Cutler advised the Council that during the last several weeks there had been a "rash" of press stories and letters to editors, alleging that the Post Office Department was obstructing the receipt of copies of *Pravda* and *Izvestia* sent through the mails to recipients in the United States. Based on these allegations the Planning Board, supplemented by representatives of the Departments of Justice, the

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Item 1 was prepared by Coyne on April 1.

[2] None printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Planning Board Member Files)

[3] NSC Action No. 1114–b is quoted in paragraph 3– C–(2), *supra*.

[4] See footnote 1, *supra*.

Post Office, and Commerce, and by the White House Press Secretary, prepared the reference report of March 29 which was scheduled on today's Council agenda. He said that the report focused upon only one particular aspect of the much broader subject of "Importation of Communist Propaganda". He noted that at its May 13, 1954, meeting [5] the Council considered that broader subject and agreed that in lieu of seeking legislation with respect thereto, the responsible agencies should remain alert to the problem and do everything possible within the means now available to defeat Communist objectives in importing propaganda.

Mr. Cutler then summarized the March 29 report of the Planning Board, which dealt with the more limited subject of "Importation of Communist Periodicals". He then read to the Council paragraph 4 of the report, which paragraph was submitted for action by the Planning Board.

The Postmaster General [6] said his Department would have no objection to paragraph 4; that it could see no great danger in releasing the 450 copies of *Pravda* and the 450 copies of *Izvestia* which were currently being withheld from the mails. He said, however, that in the case of certain other foreign Communist publications, the Post Office Department had some question as to whether they should be permitted to pass through our postal system, inasmuch as they contained political propaganda. He added that he did not think this question was a major one, and expressed the view that if problems did arise with respect to other publications, the Post Office Department would get together with the agencies concerned, as outlined in paragraph 4–b of the reference memorandum on the subject. He said that his Department would prefer to see the language in paragraph 4 qualified by including a provision that only a limited number of such periodicals would be permitted to pass through our postal system to their ultimate addressees. Mr. Cutler pointed out that if the numbers of such periodicals increased greatly, and if they were construed to contain propaganda, they would be kept out under paragraph 4 as presently written. The Postmaster General responded that there would be no necessity for amending the paragraph along the lines suggested by him so long as the interpretation expressed by Mr. Cutler was understood by all parties concerned.

The President concluded the Council discussion on this subject with the statement that he was astonished that the Post Office Department couldn't lose these things and not say anything about it.

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[5] A memorandum of the discussion at this meeting is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

[6] Arthur E. Summerfield.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the reference memorandum of March 29, 1955.

b. Agreed that:

(1) In the implementation of NSC Action No. 1114–b, the national security would not be adversely affected by permitting, in addition to the deliveries permitted under paragraph 3–b of the enclosure to the reference memorandum of March 29, delivery through the U.S. mails of imported Communist periodicals which are published primarily for consumption in Soviet bloc countries, provided they are not introduced into the United States for the purpose of being disseminated as "political propaganda" as defined in the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

(2) The Departments of the Treasury, Justice and the Post Office, in appropriate consultation with the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency, should be governed by the action in (1) above in resolving problems arising in the implementation of NSC Action No. 1114–b and the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General and the Postmaster General for implementation, and to the Secretary of State and the Director, USIA, for information.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

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97. Editorial Note

From July 18 to 23, President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Eden, Premier Faure, and Premier Bulganin met in Geneva. Their discussions centered on disarmament and the German question, but there was some discussion of the desirability of expanding the exchange of people and information between East and West. Texts of four statements by President Eisenhower at the meeting, including one on July 22 on East-West contacts, are in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1, 1955, pages 171–176. Further documentation on the formal sessions of the meeting, as well as delegation meetings and informal conversations between the Heads of Government, is in volume V, pages 361 ff.

On July 23, the Heads of Government issued a directive to their respective Foreign Ministers requesting that they continue discussion

of the issues raised at a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers scheduled at Geneva in the fall. (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1, 1955, page 176)

On July 25, in a radio and television report to the American people on the results of the Geneva meeting, President Eisenhower made the following remarks about the issue of East-West contacts:

"In the matter of increasing contacts, many items were discussed. We talked about a freer flow of news across the Curtains of all kinds. We talked about the circulation of books, and particularly we talked about peaceful trade. But the subject that took most of our attention in this regard was the possibility of increased visits by the citizens of one country into the territory of another, doing this in such a way as to give each the fullest possible opportunity to learn about the people of the other nation. In this particular subject there was the greatest possible degree of agreement. As a matter of fact, it was agreement often repeated and enthusiastically supported by the words of the members of each side.

"As a matter of fact, each side assured the other earnestly and often that it intended to pursue a new spirit of conciliation and cooperation in its contacts with the other. Now, of course, we are profoundly hopeful that these assurances will be faithfully carried out." (*Ibid.*, August 8, 1955, page 217)

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98. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, September 20, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Views of Secretary Dulles on East-West Contacts

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. Jackson
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Stoessel

After expressing his deep appreciation to Mr. Jackson for agreeing to accept the difficult job of coordinating the United States position on East-West contacts for the Geneva Conference, [2] the

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Stoessel.

[2] For text of the Department of State press release of September 19 announcing William H. Jackson's appointment, effective that date, as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State "to coordinate within the U.S. Government the development of U.S. positions for phases of the Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva pertaining to East-

Secretary said that he felt this whole subject was an extremely complicated one. He had the feeling that everyone wants to penetrate the Soviet Union, but no one wants the Soviet Union to penetrate us.

The Secretary said that we should keep very much in mind problems of reciprocity in connection with East-West contacts. For example, he noted that one of the proposals which had been advanced was to establish a USIA center in Moscow. This might be a fine idea in itself, but it would obviously cause the Soviets to request the establishment of a Soviet information center in the United States. The Secretary anticipated that we would have a very hard time with Congressional representatives and a large segment of the American people if we consented to the establishment of a Soviet propaganda mill in the U.S.

Furthermore, the Secretary observed that we are currently doing certain things with regard to the Soviets which might be difficult to alter. The Post Office stops Soviet publications from coming in and has warehouses full of such material. To reverse this practice might be difficult.

Mr. Stoessel mentioned, with regard to controls over Communist literature, that there are two bookstores in New York which act as agents for Soviet publications. These bookstores receive Soviet publications without hindrance and have available for distribution in this country some 500 Soviet newspapers and periodicals. The Secretary said he was interested to hear this and that it should be taken into account in our work on East-West contacts.

The Secretary said that some people talk about "eliminating the Soviet iron curtain" in a physical sense, i.e., to remove the actual barriers of barbed wire, watch towers, and so on. Again, this idea sounds appealing but might cause us some trouble. The Secretary recalled that he had talked recently with General Swing, of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, who had described in some detail our system of barbed wire barriers along the United States-Mexican border.[3] In addition to these barriers, it appears that U.S. patrols send out bloodhounds to track down persons attempting to cross this border. The Secretary understood the Communists have made a movie about these American border controls and that we might have this situation thrown back at us if we raise a question about removal of Soviet border patrols.

The Secretary believed that we should concentrate on items in East-West contacts on which we are in a position to reciprocate. He

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West contacts and exchanges," see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 3, 1955, p. 529.

[3] No record of this conversation has been found.

thought that radio communications and circulation of newspapers fitted into this category. We do not jam Soviet radio broadcasts to this country and we give full publicity in our newspapers to all speeches made by Soviet leaders. It might be possible to accomplish something in this field, so that the peoples of both countries will know what the leaders of both countries are saying. In the present situation, there is a blackout in the Soviet Union of true news about the United States. The Soviet communications media distort the American position on major issues and the Soviet people have little choice but to believe these distortions. This is a dangerous situation which we should try to improve.

The Secretary recognized that there would be difficulties in discussing this subject with the Soviets. For one thing, the Soviets have a controlled press and we have an uncontrolled press. No doubt, our press prints many things about the Soviet Union which are distortions of the truth and which are unpalatable to the Soviet leaders. The Soviets could point to this fact and ask us to take steps to correct this situation in the U.S. This would have to be rejected of course, since the press in the U.S. is free to print what it wishes.

The Secretary said that one of the chief difficulties we are faced with is that information the Soviets wish to disseminate in this country is known to all in the United States. On the other hand, what we try to get across to the Soviet Union is known to very few people there. Even though we may *think* that we are reaching a considerable number of people in the Soviet Union through radio or other means, there is no way of proving this. The Secretary recalled that when he was in Moscow in 1947 [4] he had been told that copies of the Russian language magazine *Amerika* were very rare and were sold at bootleg prices. This was because, the Secretary understood, the Soviet Government was buying up all copies of *Amerika* and very few copies were actually getting out to the people. This simply pointed up to him the task we have in insuring dissemination of our ideas in the Soviet Union.

On the subject of fingerprinting, the Secretary remarked that this was a question for action by Congress and that obviously we could not make any commitments one way or the other on it at Geneva. He thought we should look into the matter carefully and weigh the pros and cons of asking Congress to rescind the fingerprinting provision. For himself, he was not very sympathetic to changing the law. Many people here had objected to fingerprinting when it was first introduced but now they had grown used to it.

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[4] Dulles was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Fourth Session of the Council of Ministers held at Moscow, March 10–April 24, 1947.

In answer to Mr. Jackson's question as to how the East-West contacts item had come up in discussions between the four powers, the Secretary said that at the opening session of the Heads of Government Conference in Geneva, each speaker had referred to the desirability of increased contacts and this subject was subsequently placed on the agenda for discussion. As it turned out, only President Eisenhower and Mr. Faure had made statements on East-West contacts. Mr. Eden and Mr. Bulganin had submitted statements which had not been read at the meeting. The Secretary's impression was that the Soviets had emphasized trade and tourism in their opening remarks on the subject,[5] but that there had been no discussion which went very deep into the whole question of East-West contacts.

With regard to handling of the East-West contacts item at the October meeting in Geneva, the Secretary thought that it would be best to have a sub-committee of experts designated to go to work on this item at the start of the meeting. They could prepare positions on this subject which could then be considered by the Foreign Ministers. The Secretary thought he might suggest this to Mr. Molotov when he saw him in New York.[6] He believed that the directive of the Heads of State meeting provided for such a method of handling the question at Geneva.

In preparing our position, the Secretary felt it was important to coordinate with the British and French and not let them feel that they were being left out of any arrangements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He recognized, however, that many of the specific projects which the U.S. wished to propose would be of a bilateral nature with the Soviet Union. The Secretary indicated agreement with Mr. MacArthur's suggestion that the East-West contacts item be handled in a very general way with the Tripartite working group now meeting in Washington and that detailed discussion of it should be postponed until the working group meets in Paris immediately before the October conference.

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[5] See *supra*.

[6] Dulles met with Molotov, Foreign Secretary Macmillan, and Foreign Minister Pinay in New York on September 27.

99. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, December 21, 1955.

SUBJECT

U.S. Views on East-West Contacts post-Geneva

Discussion:

Embassy London's telegram 2205 of November 29 (Tab A [2]) reported United Kingdom thinking (as expressed by Paul Grey, Assistant Undersecretary in the Foreign Office and the British expert at Geneva on East-West contacts) with regard to follow-up action on East-West contacts during the post-Geneva period. The U.K. presently feels it would be well to let any follow-up "lie fallow" for a time in order to see what the Soviets may do during this pause. Mr. Grey thought, however, that the U.S. might wish to take bilateral action on specific items of interest to it. He asked for our thinking concerning East-West contacts.

The attached telegram (Tab B [3]) (to be sent by pouch) for your approval replies to London's cable and states that we feel it would be advisable for the U.S. to initiate action with the Soviets on a bilateral basis regarding certain points included in the 17-point Western memorandum on East-West contacts submitted at Geneva on October 31 (Tab C [4]). This would demonstrate that we were sincere in espousing these proposals and were not merely seeking propaganda effect. Our telegram would also go to Paris so that the views expressed therein could be discussed with the French.

Most of the points on which we recommend action would seem to be non-controversial and of advantage to the U.S. (book and publications exchanges, films, exhibits, reciprocal reduction in travel restrictions). A decision to move ahead on these is required, however. Certain policy questions arise in connection with exchanges of expert groups which should be decided before we proceed with the course of action outlined in the attached cable. These questions

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.60/12–2155. Secret. Drafted by Stoessel and concurred in by Stelle, MacKnight, Howe, MacArthur, and Hoover. A note on the source text reads: "I oppose this policy in the absence of a document from Intelligence agencies which clearly asserts U.S. advantage in proposed policy—SMcLeod". Another notation indicates that an undated letter from Cabell (Tab E), pertained to McLeod's dissent. Cabell's letter was not found attached to the source text.

[2] Not found attached to the source text. (*Ibid.*, 511.60/11–2955)

[3] Not found.

[4] Not found attached. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1955, pp. 778–779.

involve propaganda, intelligence and public relations issues. These issues must be dealt with whether we like it or not. They are being dealt with now on a piece-meal, ad hoc basis with all of the attendant risks of such an approach. This is not a satisfactory way to develop national policy.

As stated therein, we have already approached the Soviet Foreign Office with a suggestion that talks be instituted in Washington between representatives of the Department and of the Soviet Embassy to make plans for exchanges for a one-year period in various fields—for example, in agriculture and medicine. (Tab D reports Embassy Moscow's approach on this subject.) [5] No answer has been received from the Soviets to this approach, and it may be that, as it appeared at Geneva, they will attempt to evade commitments for the careful planning of exchanges in advance on a basis of mutual advantage, but will try to conduct exchanges in the future on the present ad hoc basis.

It may be noted that the Soviets have already accepted our proposal on *Amerika* magazine and have taken the initiative recently in proposing student and professor exchanges, despite the lack of a positive Soviet stand on these points at Geneva. They have also made several new proposals for technical exchanges.

We believe exchanges will continue between the U.S. and the USSR. The latter wants to obtain technical know-how and propaganda benefits from exchanges. Many individuals in the United States are anxious to promote or take part in exchanges with the USSR. The latter group includes those who look hopefully at any sign of "peace", those who believe in a sort of non-political "people's diplomacy", those who feel we will undermine the regime by exposing the people to Free World influences, and those, such as many scientists, who feel it essential that we have "contacts" in order to get to other specialists and show them the Free World is both unafraid and positively interested in mutual sharing of information. There are also those Americans interested in business dealings—both legitimate commercial enterprises and the promoter type. It would not appear advisable for us to attempt to bar further exchanges, since this would be incompatible with our stand favoring increased East-West contacts and would cut us off from obtaining intelligence benefits ourselves from exchanges. Also, we think more contact with the West will give Soviet officials a better understanding of Western realities and may help promote evolutionary trends in the USSR in the long run.

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[5] Telegram 1115 from Moscow, November 12, was not found attached. (Department of State, Central Files, 032/11–1255)

If exchanges are to continue, and they will whether we like it or not since passport controls are off and the Soviets are interested in sponsoring visits, it is important that we take the initiative in suggesting exchanges we want to see carried out, and in preparing careful plans for such projects. Therefore, we would propose to press the Soviets to accept our ideas on exchanges in the fields of agriculture and medicine, even if they do not seem inclined to respond to our initial approach. Moreover, we would wish to propose during the coming year a few additional exchanges in areas of high intelligence priority (for example, petroleum, transport, plastics). Groups would be small in size and publicity would be held to a minimum. The fingerprinting problem would not be a difficulty in such exchange, since incoming Soviet groups would be professional and capable of classification as official.

Action of this kind presupposes policy agreement on the following points:

1. *The U.S. is interested in actively promoting a limited number of officially organized reciprocal exchanges of professional and technical groups with the USSR.*
2. *Sufficient funds will be allocated to cover expenses of such exchanges.* (We estimate roughly that at least $50,000 would be required during FY 1957 to cover expenses of translators, tour guides and incidentals if professional exchanges of the type we wish to propose to the Soviets are carried through. For expenses between now and July 1, 1956, we would continue to draw on the Department's confidential funds and on other agencies. The Soviets would pay basic travel and subsistence expenses of their groups, and U.S. groups would pay their own way.)
3. *A special office will be established in the P area of the Department to handle East-West contacts.* (EUR/EE has been dealing with exchanges to date, but is unable to cope with the growing workload involved while continuing to perform its regular functions. The question of a new office to handle contacts and the problem of providing funds for its operation is now before Mr. Henderson for consideration.)
4. *The Department will support in the NSC a revised policy statement favoring a positive program of East-West exchanges.*

Recommendation:

That you approve in principle the policy outlined above on East-West contacts, including the numbered points in the preceding paragraph, and that you sign the telegram (Tab B) giving our views on the program to be followed on East-West contacts in the future. [6]

[6] There is no indication on the source text that the Secretary of State approved or disapproved the recommendation.

100. Memorandum From Robert Cutler to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, February 10, 1956.

I am writing this memorandum to you in my capacity as a private citizen (though with perhaps a residue tinge of N.S.C.). [2]

The Dean of Harvard University, McGeorge Bundy, spoke to me toward the end of January of a proposal which had been made to Professor Malia, while on a purchasing mission in the USSR, by a representative of the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education, for an exchange of a small number of scholars and students

This proposal is well set forth in Dean Bundy's

This proposal is well set forth in Dean Bundy's attached memorandum and in the attached copy of a more full letter by Professor Malia. [3]

The attitude of Harvard University is as follows. In the first place, it wishes to be guided by the policy of the United States in making any reply to the above mentioned proposal. Second, if the policy would permit acceptance, an acceptance which Harvard would be glad to explore, Harvard would agree to the exchange only if bona fide scholars were involved, but would limit its exchange to Harvard personnel of professorial or post-graduate grade (not undergraduate students).

In discussing this matter with . . . Dillon Anderson, it seems to me that the issue raised is covered by an existing NSC policy [4] (I do not mention its number so as to avoid classifying this memorandum). Bob Bowie could easily bring the policy paper to your attention. The question at issue is whether the Department of State is willing to move under that policy, getting the necessary clearance from the Attorney General.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.613/2–1056.

[2] Cutler resigned on April 1, 1955, as the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

[3] Neither Bundy's memorandum, which was enclosed with his brief letter of January 25 to Cutler, nor Professor Martin Malia's letter of January 30, is printed.

[4] Presumably a reference to NSC 5508/1, Document 94.

I have ventured to write you this personal memorandum because I find that my opinion, which is favorable to accept this proposal, is shared by Allen and Dillon. If the President had been available when I was here last Friday, [5] I would have mentioned it to him, but I do not think in view of what I have written above that it is necessary to bother him. I feel sure that he would agree with the point of view which is just expressed.

In my opinion the U.S. has much more to gain from such an exchange than the USSR. Of course proper safeguards would necessarily be taken in accordance with usual practice. Therefore, I hope that you will find a moment to consider and give some determinative action on this matter. [6]

The reason for taking such determinative action is that Harvard should make a reply one way or the other without more time intervening. The attached story from the January 25 issue of the *New York Herald Tribune* [7] shows the unfavorable publicity attending too long delay in answering such USSR proposals.

Bobby

[5] February 3.

[6] Attached to the source text was a memorandum of February 24 from Bowie to Hanes, to which Bowie had attached his memorandum of the previous day to Hoover expressing his view that student and professor exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union would be to the overall advantage of the United States. Also attached to the source text was the following memorandum for the files prepared by Robert G. Barnes and dated March 1:

"The Secretary expressed the view that in his opinion there are many factors both for and against proposals such as the one covered in the attached file. At the present time he indicated that he was against this proposal but this did not mean he would necessarily be against it in one, three or six months.

"Mr. Hanes has conveyed this information to both Mr. Beam and Mr. Stoessel with the request that Mr. Stoessel appropriately inform . . . S/P . . . . Mr. Hanes has also telephoned General Cutler to give him a summary of the Secretary's views.

"In view of the equivocal nature of the decision it is suggested that this not be further disseminated."

[7] Not printed.

101. Paper Prepared in the Department of State [1]

Washington, June 6, 1956.

EAST-WEST EXCHANGES

General Considerations

1. The basic strategy of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc is:

(1) To promote within Soviet Russia evolution toward a regime which will abandon predatory policies, which will seek to promote the aspirations of the Russian people rather than the global ambitions of International Communism and which will increasingly rest upon the consent of the governed rather than upon despotic police power.

(2) As regards the European satellites we seek their evolution toward independence of Moscow.

2. For the first time since the end of World War II there are visible signs of progress along the lines we desire.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, East-West Exchanges. Confidential. This paper was transmitted to NSC Executive Secretary Lay under cover of a memorandum of June 6 from Secretary of State Dulles, in which Dulles noted that since East-West exchanges were essentially a foreign policy program, "it is my belief that primary responsibility for it should be within the Department of State although it is obviously desirable that the views of other departments should be obtained." Dulles' memorandum and the attached Department of State paper were then distributed to the members of the National Security Council by Lay under cover of his memorandum of June 6. Lay indicated that the Department of State paper was being referred to the NSC Planning Board for study and recommendation prior to the Council's consideration of it.

This paper superseded a previous Department of State paper on the subject, which Murphy had submitted to Dulles on April 10. The June 6 paper was an outgrowth of, and closely resembled, a draft paper prepared by Secretary of State Dulles on May 12, which he prefaced with the remark that he had read the previous papers on the subject and had gained the impression that "we are thinking too much in terms of detail and not enough in terms of broad policy and scope for the execution of that policy." When the June 6 paper was presented to the NSC Planning Board for its consideration on June 7, Dillon Anderson stated that there was a "complicated history" of Operations Coordinating Board consideration of the subject of East-West exchanges, that "they had been working on a paper, but the members of the OCB who had been present at a recent meeting all agreed that it was desirable not to continue the OCB assignment when it became known that the Secretary of State himself had been thinking intensively on this subject for the past few weeks and that there had been prepared a document reflecting his thinking to be circulated to the Council." (Notes on the Planning Board Discussion, June 7; *ibid.*)

The Secretary of State's draft paper was also sent to President Eisenhower, for in a memorandum of May 30 to Under Secretary of State Hoover, Eisenhower said, "I have read the Secretary's memorandum labelled 'East-West Exchanges.' I agree with him. I should like to see some start made by the interested agencies toward the implementation of the ideas suggested." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)

3. Within the Soviet Union there is increasing education and consequent demand for greater freedom of thought and expression; there is increasing demand for greater personal security than existed under Stalin's police state and there is increasing demand for more consumer's goods and better living conditions for the masses of people. The demands referred to must be considerable because the Soviet rulers judge it necessary to take drastic and hazardous measures to seem to meet them.

4. Within the satellite countries there has occurred a considerable demotion of those who were dedicated to the Stalin doctrine of iron discipline of Communists everywhere, with the Soviet Communist Party acting as the general staff of the world proletariat. The fact that "Titoism" is now regarded as respectable by the Soviet rulers, and that it is profitable to Tito, encourages those within the satellite countries, such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary to seek a greater degree of nationalism and independence of Moscow.

5. There has thus come about a condition which should lead the United States intensively to seek projects which would have impact within the Soviet bloc and encourage the liberal tendencies referred to.

6. At the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers, the three Western Powers submitted a well-rounded 17-point proposal which reflected the above thinking. This was rejected by the Soviet Union which, however, indicated that it might be prepared to develop East-West exchanges along the indicated lines on the basis of bilateral talks.

7. The problem of East-West exchanges should be considered in the foregoing context.

Policy Conclusions

8. Our foreign policies are necessarily *defensive*, so far as the use of force is concerned. But they can be *offensive* in terms of promoting a desire for greater freedom, well-being and security within the Soviet Union, and greater independence within the satellites. In other words, East-West exchanges should be an implementation of positive United States foreign policy.

9. The exchanges should in large part be initiated by the United States itself, and we should not be content with the negative or neutral position incident to passing upon Soviet initiatives, or the initiatives of private groups within the United States. Of course, Soviet initiatives should be accepted, and the private United States initiatives should be welcomed, whenever they advance United States policy or seem to be an acceptable and necessary price for

what will advance United States policy. But the Government should be thinking and planning imaginatively in this field.

10. One aspect of this matter which requires particular consideration is the impact of what we do upon third countries. In many cases, the United States can tolerate a type of exchange which to other countries would be poisonous. It is suggested that consideration should be given to explaining to third countries, on a confidential basis, the scope and purpose of our program and the precautions we would take, so that they will not misconstrue what we do as evidence that we believe that Soviet purposes have now become benign. This could be done, for example, as regards the American Republics at a meeting of the Ambassadors, such as we have had with increasing frequency in recent months. There could be similar expositions made on a selective basis with friendly countries of Africa and Asia. In this way, it could be made clear that what we do is a part of *our* policy designed to weaken International Communism, and that it is not either an acquiescence in Soviet policy or a recognition that Soviet motives have so changed that they are no longer to be feared.

Objectives

11. To increase the knowledge of the Soviet people as to the outer world so that their judgments will be based upon fact and not upon Communist fiction.

12. To encourage freedom of thought by bringing to the Soviet peoples challenging ideas and demonstrating to Soviet intellectuals the scope of intellectual freedom which is encouraged within the United States.

13. To stimulate the demand of Soviet citizens for greater personal security by bringing home to them the degree of personal security which is afforded by our constitutional and legal systems.

14. To stimulate their desire for more consumer's goods by bringing them to realize how rich are the fruits of free labor and how much they themselves could gain from a government which primarily sought their well-being and not conquest.

15. To stimulate nationalism within the satellite countries by reviving the historic traditions of these peoples and by suggesting the great benefits which can be derived from a courageous policy of defiance of Moscow such as Tito exhibited.

Courses of Action

16. The U.S. should employ as a program guide the 17-point proposal submitted at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting. (At-

tached [2]) Each proposal should be judged on its merits as contributing to the agreed objectives.

17. The U.S. should make clear as appropriate to third countries the scope and purpose of our programs.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 99.

102. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the Members of the Council [1]

Washington, June 19, 1956.

SUBJECT

East-West Exchanges

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5427
B. NSC 5508/1
C. NSC 5602/1
D. NSC Action No. 1522–g
E. Statement of policy transmitted by Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 6, 1956 [2]

1. The NSC Planning Board (with the assistance of representatives of the Department of Justice, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security), after study of the statement of policy submitted by the Secretary of State as the Department of State position on the subject

[1] Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, East West Exchanges. Confidential. Copies were also sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

[2] Regarding NSC 5427, "Restricting Diplomatic and Official Representatives of Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in Connection With Strategic Intelligence," July 19, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, footnote 9, p. 1246. NSC 5508/1 is printed as Document 94. NSC 5602/1, "Basic National Security Policy", dated March 15, 1956, is not printed. NSC Action 1522–g requested the OCB and the Department of Justice to prepare a study of the factors involved in implementing paragraph 36 of NSC 5602/1. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95) Executive Secretary Lay's memorandum to the Council of June 6 is not printed, but see footnote 1, *supra*.

(Reference E), concurs in the policy set forth therein and recommends:

a. That for clarification the statement of policy be amended as follows:

Para. 8. In the second sentence, insert "individual" between "greater" and "freedom".

Para. 10. Delete the words "It is suggested that" at the beginning of the third sentence.

Paras. 11, 12 and 13. Insert the words "and satellite" after the word "Soviet" wherever the latter appears in these paragraphs.

Para. 16. Revise to read as follows:

"16. The U.S. should take the initiative in East-West exchanges as a positive instrument of U.S. foreign policy, employing as a general guide the 17-point proposal (attached [3]) as submitted at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting. Each proposal should be judged on its merits as contributing to the agreed objectives."

b. That the Council adopt the above-mentioned statement of policy, as amended, and submit it to the President with the recommendation that he approve it and (1) refer it to the Secretary of State for implementation in consultation with the Department of Justice and other departments, agencies and boards [as] appropriate; (2) direct that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General continue to cooperate in developing and applying appropriate internal security safeguards with respect to the admission of Soviet and satellite nationals to the United States.

2. The President has recommended to the Congress that the Immigration and Nationality Act be amended to permit the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to waive the requirement of fingerprinting of non-immigrants applying for visas to enter the United States temporarily. The Planning Board notes, as indicated in the attached letter from the Attorney General to the Secretary of State, [4] that the failure of the Congress to approve such legislation at this session would materially impede the implementation in the months ahead of the above-mentioned statement of policy as it applies to exchanges of persons.

3. In addition to the above recommendations unanimously agreed upon by the Planning Board, the following proposed amendments of the above-mentioned statement of policy are submitted by individual Planning Board representatives:

a. The ODM Member with the concurrence of the Justice Observer recommends insertion of the following before the final

[3] See footnote 4, Document 99.

[4] Dated June 13, not printed.

sentence of para. 9: "Administration of each proposed exchange program must therefore take into account the advantages sought against the acknowledged political dangers (abroad and at home) so as to secure a total net advantage to the United States from such contacts."

b. The ODM Member recommends insertion of the following as a new para. 11: "It is at least as important as the proper explanation of the meaning of this policy to third countries, to give a clear understanding of the way the American public could and should help to carry it out. There must be appropriate guidance as to the difference between the projected program of an American initiative in selected exchanges and in broader cultural contacts, on the one hand, and over-zealous friendliness to visitors who may in many cases be hostile agents."

c. The Defense Member with the concurrence of the ODM Member and the JCS Adviser recommends the following as a substitute for para. 10:

"10. One aspect of this matter which requires particular consideration is the impact of what we do upon third countries as well as upon military, political and economic cooperation among the countries of the free world. In many cases, the United States can tolerate a type of exchange which to other countries would be poisonous. Also, it is recognized that our embarking upon this policy may have a serious impact upon our capacity to maintain present military alliances and trade controls and involves taking a calculated risk of enhancing the spread of neutralism. To mitigate these effects as much as possible, we must exert constant and strenuous effort to convince third countries that our program is not to be construed as evidence that we believe that Soviet purposes have now become benign by:

(1) Explaining, on a confidential basis, the scope and purpose of our program and the precautions we would take. This should be done, for example, as regards the American Republics at a meeting of the Ambassadors, such as we have had with increasing frequency in recent months. It also should be particularly emphasized with the countries aligned with us in military alliances. There should be similar expositions made to friendly countries of Africa and Asia, and

(2) Constant public reiteration by top-level government spokesmen of the extent and nature of the substantive divisions that remain between the respective aims and objectives of ourselves and the Soviet Union and of the need for retaining maximum collective safeguards.

It must be made clear that what we do is a part of our policy designed to weaken International Communism, and that it is not either an acquiescence in Soviet policy or a recognition that Soviet motives have so changed that they are no longer to be feared."

4. The above-mentioned statement of policy, in the form in which it is finally adopted and approved, is intended to supersede NSC 5508/1. At a later date the Planning Board, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1522–g, will review NSC 5427, "Restricting Diplomatic and Official Representatives of Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in Connection with Strategic Intelligence".

James S. Lay, Jr. [5]

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

103. Memorandum of Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 28, 1956 [1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and item 1, "Significant World Developments Affecting United States Security."]

2. East-West Exchanges (NSC 5427; NSC 5508/1; NSC 5602/1; NSC Action No. 1522–g; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 6 and 19, 1956; Memo for All Holders of June 19 Memorandum, dated June 22, 1956) [2]

Mr. Anderson briefed the National Security Council on the contents of the draft statement of policy on the subject, and pointed out that, in addition to the usual membership, the Secretary of Commerce and Messrs. J. Edgar Hoover and J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman of the Council's internal security committees, had been invited to attend this Council meeting. (Copy of Mr. Anderson's brief filed in the minutes of the meeting.) At the conclusion of his briefing, Mr. Anderson suggested that the Secretary of State explain the philosophy behind the policy report.

Secretary Dulles said that this paper, as Mr. Anderson had pointed out, had come to the National Security Council by a somewhat unusual route. He himself had personally drafted the statement of policy, for the reason that the situation with regard to East-West exchanges had seemed to be hopelessly bogged down.

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on June 29.

[2] Lay's memorandum of June 22 has not been found. Regarding the other documents under reference, see *supra* and footnote 2 thereto.

The President had grown impatient, and had asked the Secretary of State to draft a new policy position on this subject.

The basic theory behind the new policy statement was that as this Government had hitherto been proceeding in the area of East-West exchanges its attitude had proved too passive and inert. All initiative in developing East-West contacts had been left either in the hands of the Soviets or in the hands of private American groups. This situation Secretary Dulles believed to be wrong, and he took the position that the U.S. Government should be thinking about what it wanted to do as a government, and not simply continue to act as a screen for private U.S. or Soviet proposals for increased East-West contacts. The President had evinced a very great interest in this matter at the Summit Conference at Geneva, and had maintained his interest ever since that time. Indeed, Mr. William Jackson had made a most thorough study of the problem of East-West contacts prior to the Summit meeting, and Mr. Jackson was of course present at the meeting today. As a result of Mr. Jackson's studies, a program for U.S. initiatives in the area of East-West contacts had been presented to the Soviets at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting. The Soviets, however, had turned down the U.S. program because, they said, it promoted the kind of exchanges which would be valuable to the United States but not the kind of exchanges desired by the Soviet Union. While this had been the Soviet attitude at Geneva, there were now indications that their views were changing.

Secretary Dulles then pointed out that the 17-point program elaborated by Mr. Jackson was a very good illustration of the kind of exchanges which the United States felt would be advantageous. As for the Soviet view of East-West exchanges, they had two main objectives in mind—first, through these exchanges to gain technical information which would prove of value, and secondly, to set precedents with respect to exchanges which they could make valid for third countries and thus gain political advantages which they could not hope to gain from exchanges with the United States. There were many types of exchanges which might prove advantageous or tolerable to the United States which would be bad for third countries not sufficiently strong or sufficiently shrewd to resist Soviet machinations. In concluding his statement on the general philosophy of the new policy statement, Secretary Dulles said that it reflected his belief that the United States could and should assume the offensive in the area of East-West exchanges. If we did this we could present the Soviet Union with hard choices and sharp dilemmas that the Soviets will not like, rather than, as in the past, permitting the Soviets to confront the United States with such choices and dilemmas. While the United States would never take the

military offensive against the USSR, it should certainly be prepared to take the offensive in the area of East-West contacts.

As to the dangers to third countries of the U.S. example of encouraging exchanges with the Soviet Union, alluded to by Mr. Anderson and noted in the present policy paper, Secretary Dulles agreed that the United States would have to proceed here with very great care. As a basic precaution against a misunderstanding of U.S. motives and objectives in encouraging East-West contacts, Secretary Dulles said that he had suggested confidential explanations by the U.S. Government to other governments which might be pressured by the Soviets for exchanges which would not be to their advantage. For example, in explaining our policy to the other American Republics, we could quite easily make use of the vehicle of the Organization of American States (OAS). Conversations in this body would certainly minimize the risks of the weaker American Republics inviting exchanges with the Soviet Union and citing the example of the United States as a guide. With the countries of Asia and Africa, which might well prove to be the target of Soviet initiatives, we could explain our policy on exchanges with the Russians by means of bilateral conversations. Secretary Dulles admitted, however, that private conversations, whether bilateral or otherwise, would probably not wholly eliminate the risks that third countries might misunderstand our policy and as a result themselves become involved in unfortunate exchanges with the USSR. This was a risk which we should have to run. The theoretical test of the proposed exchanges between the U.S. and the USSR was whether or not, on balance, they proved advantageous to the United States. They might well do so by at long last providing the people of the Soviet Union with accurate knowledge of the kind of opportunities that existed in the United States for the ordinary run of citizens. Such knowledge might well stimulate pressures on the Soviet Government to confer on its people rights and advantages similar to those enjoyed by U.S. citizens. Such pressures generated in the Soviet Union would certainly begin to absorb the thoughts, plans and resources of the Soviet Government and, accordingly, minimize the amount of energy and resources which the Soviet Government could devote to its attack against the free world on other fronts.

Secretary Dulles emphasized that no policy directive in and by itself would provide a certain answer as to the advantages and disadvantages of each exchange proposal. Each such proposal should be weighed on its own merits, though, of course, we might be obliged to accept a specific disadvantage and pay a specific price in certain instances in order to secure an over-all net advantage for the United States in the exchange program. Success or failure of the program would depend on operations carried out under this new

policy paper. After all, no policy can do more than indicate broad general principles, and Secretary Dulles believed that the present report goes about as far as one could usefully go in setting forth the criteria to govern East-West exchanges. Accordingly, it was now time to "get going" on the new program. The United States was already far behind the rest of the procession. Adoption of the new policy paper would get us into the way of dealing with this problem more intelligently and more expeditiously. If the policy did not work, it could be changed in due course. Case law may in time modify statute law, as it were.

At the conclusion of Secretary Dulles' statement, Mr. Anderson pointed out that the Council had not received the formal written views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the proposed new policy, and asked Admiral Radford if he would give orally the views of the Joint Chiefs.

Admiral Radford then handed Mr. Anderson a copy of the written views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[3] He pointed out that these written views were in agreement with the position on this paper taken by the JCS Adviser on the NSC Planning Board when the policy had been considered by the latter group.[4] Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs recommended that the Department of Defense be represented along with the Departments of State and Justice in responsibility for coordinating the implementation of the policy. Apart from these matters, Admiral Radford indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were very worried indeed about the impact of this new policy on our alliances unless we made crystal-clear to our allies the objectives that we sought in taking this new initiative toward expanding East-West contacts. Explanation by the U.S. Government to other friendly governments was not in itself enough, because these other governments would have to explain to their people why it was perfectly safe for the United States to indulge in contacts with the Soviet Union, whereas it might be dangerous for the country in question to follow the U.S. example. Accordingly, Admiral Radford believed that the Council should give careful consideration as to how far we could go in coming out with a public explanation of the basis for this new U.S. policy. If the 17-point program drawn up by Mr. Jackson and set forth in the present paper as a guide was to be

[3] The views of the Joint Chiefs were contained in a memorandum of June 26 from Radford to the Secretary of Defense, in which the revisions made by the NSC Planning Board as noted in Lay's memorandum of June 19 to the Council were accepted, with the further revision proposed that the phrase, "Department of Defense" be inserted after the word "Justice" on page 2, subparagraph 1–b, fifth line of Lay's memorandum. A copy of Radford's memorandum was distributed to the members of the Council as an enclosure to Lay's covering memorandum of June 28. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, East-West Exchanges)

[4] See footnote 1, Document 101.

applied as a package, that was one thing. If the 17-point program was to be applied separately, it was quite another thing. The Council should remember that the groups sent to the United States by the Soviet Union would all be hand-picked. The cards would be stacked against the United States because individual U.S. citizens would be free to visit the Soviet Union, although when they got there they would see only what the Soviet Union wanted them to see. Lastly, the U.S. Communist Party could be expected to encourage all kinds of American leftists to visit the Soviet Union. These people would come back, as had the scientific group lately, with reports all highly favorable to the Soviet Union. In conclusion, said Admiral Radford, the Joint Chiefs are prepared to admit the validity of the new policy proposed by the Secretary of State, but they were very worried as to the safeguards with which it would be carried out.

Mr. Anderson then called on Secretary of Commerce Weeks for his views on the policy. Secretary Weeks said he would address himself solely to those exchanges of personnel in which the Department of Commerce had a special interest. Thus, said Secretary Weeks, in exchanges of businessmen and industrialists the Department of Commerce was of the opinion that it should be given a formal role to play in the carrying out of the new policy. For example, the Department of Commerce should be consulted in advance as to the makeup of the teams of U.S. industrialists who were going to be sent on exchanges to the Soviet Union. The Department of Commerce was in a position to give good advice as to the membership of such teams, as well as advice as to what they should look for in the Soviet Union and what, in exchange, the Russians should see in the United States. Up to now, at any rate, the Department of Commerce had had no say in any of these matters.

Secretary Weeks then went on to comment on the impact of the export control legislation. The export control legislation circumscribed closely what it was legal for us to allow visiting Russians to see. For example, since our export control legislation forbade us to export radio tubes to the Soviet Union, it was obvious that it was contrary to the spirit of the legislation to permit visiting Russians to see radio tubes in the United States.

In conclusion, Secretary Weeks said he had a couple of specific recommendations to make in behalf of the Department of Commerce. First, if Russian teams were going to come to the United States, the United States should get a quid pro quo out of the visit. Admittedly the over-all policy on East-West exchanges was a responsibility of the Department of State, which developed our foreign policy. On the other hand, the substantive content of the exchanges was not in itself a foreign policy matter, and therefore Secretary Weeks hoped that whatever department was best able to give good

advice should have an opportunity to provide such advice. Certainly the Department of Commerce should be tied in more closely in all matters relating to what the Soviets were doing in the industrial field.

Mr. Anderson pointed out that the coordination of the implementation of U.S. policy with respect to East-West exchanges had in the past been confined to the Departments of State and Justice. Currently, however, and with respect to the new policy, the Planning Board was recommending to the Council not only that the Departments of State and Justice continue to be responsible for implementation, but had also added other departments, agencies and boards, as appropriate. Secretary Dulles said that he entirely concurred in the views just expressed by the Secretary of Commerce, and he believed that the Department of Commerce should be brought right in on the ground floor with respect to any exchanges of industrialists or other exchanges in which the views of the Commerce Department would be useful. Mr. Anderson went on to say that if the Council so desired, the Planning Board language could be amended to add specifically the Departments of Defense and Commerce to the implementing machinery if the more general language suggested by the Planning Board—namely, "other departments, agencies and boards, as appropriate"—was not deemed sufficient to cover the matter.

Secretary Dulles said he was inclined to doubt the wisdom of specifying any other department than the Department of Justice (and State) as constituting the coordinating group. After all, the Department of Justice, for obvious reasons, would be involved in each and every exchange between the U.S. and the USSR. Other departments and agencies of the Government would be brought in only when a given exchange proposal involved the specific responsibilities of that department or agency. The implementation of the proposed new policy would continue to be bogged down if the Council insisted on putting in as coordinating authorities every department of the Government which might conceivably have any interest in the exchange. Accordingly, the Secretary of State thought that the general language on implementation proposed by the Planning Board was quite acceptable. Proposals for adding other departments by name would probably have the result of stalling any offensive on the part of the United States to increase East-West exchanges. Secretary Dulles insisted that he did not look on the proposed new policy as forming the basis for a stalling operation but, rather, to permit us to assume the initiative.

The Acting Secretary of Defense asked permission to state his general philosophy with respect to the proposed new policy. Secretary Robertson then said that the recommendations of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, as earlier reported by Admiral Radford, had the hearty endorsement not only of the Service Secretaries, but of the Department of Defense as a whole, particularly with respect to the need to stress the effect on weaker third countries of initiative by the United States in the direction of increased East-West contacts. While he stated himself to be strongly in favor of taking the offensive in the field of East-West contacts, Secretary Robertson said he was very worried about the possible effects of the proposed new policy on such alliances as NATO and SEATO. Accordingly, he strongly recommended that the Council agree to accept the substitute paragraph 10 proposed by the Department of Defense.[5] This Defense version of paragraph 10 simply made explicit and firm the possible danger to our military alliances and to the political and economic cooperation in the free world of the adoption of an increased program of East-West contacts by the United States. Moreover, while the Department of Defense did not wish to have a hand in setting up all the different exchanges which might be contemplated between the U.S. and the USSR, it did wish to have its voice heard in any exchange which involved the responsibilities of the Department of Defense.

Speaking sharply, the Secretary of State informed Secretary Robertson that the Department of State was, after all, charged with the responsibility for conducting the relations of the United States with its allies—NATO, SEATO, and all the others. Quite possibly the State Department conducted these relations badly, but it was nevertheless the fixed duty and responsibility of the State Department. Secretary Dulles assumed that the Department of Defense did not aspire to take over these duties of the Department of State. Secretary Robertson replied that the Defense Department certainly did not wish to take over any of the responsibilities of the State Department. Nevertheless the Defense Department had a very real interest, for example, in the relations between the United States and those foreign countries in which the United States had military bases.

The Vice President said that he thought the language which directed implementation of the policy was suitable and OK, and that Secretary Dulles, having heard the discussion at the present meeting, would certainly bear the different points of view in mind and would be certain to bring in the Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce when such a course of action was clearly indicated with reference to a specific exchange proposal. On the other hand, if, instead of the Departments of State and Justice, a

[5] See subparagraph 3–c, Document 102.

whole large board of officials was assigned the task of implementing the new policy, very little would ever get done under it.

Admiral Radford suggested certain new language which would indicate that the Department of Defense should be kept informed of all impending exchange proposals in order that the Department of Defense could be in a position to state its interest and concern over any given proposal. If it were not kept informed of all current and impending exchange proposals, the Department of Defense might never know when its interests were involved in any specific exchange proposal.

Secretary Dulles replied that this was certainly fair enough, and a very good suggestion. Indeed, all interested departments and agencies should be kept informed of impending exchange proposals so that they could *assert* their right to a voice in the matter. On the other hand, he could not approve of a large board made up of representatives of all the conceivably interested departments, where every one of these individuals would have to be heard on every single proposal, whether his department had any specific interest or responsibility for the proposal or not. Such a large implementing board would serve to diffuse responsibility to a point which would assure that nothing would happen under the new policy.

Secretary Weeks said he had one additional suggestion to make. These other departments should not merely be kept informed, but kept informed in such a way that they would be given an opportunity to provide advice to the Departments of State and Justice before a decision on any given exchange proposal had been made.

Secretary Dulles said he had no objection to this suggestion either, but he assumed that Secretary Weeks would not be particularly interested in a proposal for an exchange of musicians between the U.S. and the USSR. Secretary Weeks replied that he would have none whatsoever.

The Vice President commented that the discussion had certainly brought out what the Council wished to have done by way of a coordinating group. Mr. Anderson said that he would circulate appropriate language to indicate the Council's wishes in this matter.

Mr. Anderson then invited the Council's attention to the problems raised for the implementation of the proposed new policy on East-West exchanges by existing statutes, and most notably by the requirement that foreign nationals visiting the United States unofficially must be fingerprinted. He invited the comments of the Attorney General on these impediments.

The Attorney General first inquired whether the implementation mechanism just agreed to by the Council was designed to cover exchanges under all the seventeen points listed in the annex to the proposed new policy. He said he wished to be sure that this was the

case, and Secretary Dulles replied in the affirmative. The Attorney General then went on to emphasize the two special concerns of the Department of Justice with respect to the proposed new policy—first, the problem of internal security posed by the admission of more Soviet and satellite citizens; and secondly, the requirement in the Immigration and Nationality Act for the fingerprinting of non-immigrants applying for visas to enter the United States temporarily. These two conditions, said the Attorney General, would pose problems in carrying out an expanded program of East-West contacts. The fingerprinting problem would be particularly difficult, and the Congress was unlikely to change the law requiring fingerprinting, even though this move had been recommended by the President.[6] Accordingly, the Attorney General said that we would presently find ourselves back in the familiar position of requiring the fingerprinting of all non-official visitors to the United States.

Secretary Dulles explained that he had long been sympathetic with the suggestion that the fingerprinting requirement be dropped from existing law. His position, he said, did not derive from Soviet criticism of the fingerprinting requirement, but from the complaints of nations friendly to the United States. He also agreed that it was extremely difficult to draw any real line between official and non-official Soviet visitors. For the time being, our only recourse was to try to persuade the Soviets to accept the fingerprinting requirement.

As for the internal security problem, which would be increased under the proposed new policy, the Attorney General said the most difficult aspect was the provision of effective monitoring of the Soviet visitors under an exchange program. Obviously the Soviet Government did use these delegations for its own particular purposes—espionage and the like. Therefore it was essential that we keep track of these people. The previous practice of selecting monitors from outside the Government had not been successful. Many of the monitors provided by private U.S. agencies failed on the job. In the future, therefore, monitors of a given exchange must be chosen from within the ranks of the Government. This was one reason why the Department of Justice would have to have a hand in carrying out the proposed new policy.

The Vice President then inquired whether the expansion of East-West exchanges, as proposed in this policy statement, would require additional funds for the Department of Justice to carry out its responsibilities. The Attorney General said that additional funds

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[6] This was one of several proposals Eisenhower made in his annual message to Congress, January 5; see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956*, pp. 1–27.

would be required if there were any notable increase in Soviet and satellite visitors to the United States.

Mr. Anderson inquired whether Mr. J. Edgar Hoover wished to add anything to the statement just made by the Attorney General. Mr. Hoover said that he agreed with and, indeed, would like to emphasize what the Attorney General had said, and particularly his expression of concern about the internal security aspects of adopting this proposed new policy. He proceeded to cite a number of instances in which Soviet visitors to the United States had engaged in espionage activities in the course of the last six months. Mr. Hoover also stressed his belief that each proposed exchange should be scrutinized and judged on its merits. On the other hand, he agreed with the foreign policy objectives set forth by the Secretary of State as underlying the proposed new policy.

Referring to the Vice President's question about the need for additional funds for the Department of Justice, Director Brundage inquired of the Secretary of State how large a number of Soviet and satellite visitors could be expected when the proposed new policy began to be implemented. Would the increase in numbers be so large as to involve budgetary implications? Secretary Dulles replied that he doubted whether the number would be so large as to have severe budgetary implications. He certainly neither expected the United States to be flooded with Russian visitors nor the USSR with American visitors.

Mr. Anderson then asked Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, whether he wished to add anything. Mr. Yeagley expressed agreement with the views set forth previously by the Attorney General and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference. He informed the Council that the internal security committees were now engaged in working out criteria for the successful implementation of the proposed new policy from the point of view of internal security. He did not believe that these new criteria would impair the effectiveness of the new policy.

Mr. Anderson then explained the editorial changes in the draft statement of policy unanimously recommended by the NSC Planning Board in the memorandum of June 19, 1956, to the National Security Council. The Council promptly agreed to accept these clarifications.

Mr. Anderson went on to deal with recommendations proposed by individual members of the Planning Board dealing with more substantive matters. He first described a proposal by the ODM member of the Planning Board, concurred in by the Justice observer, for the insertion of a new sentence at the end of paragraph 9, reading as follows:

"Administration of each proposed exchange program must therefore take into account the advantages sought against the acknowledged political dangers (abroad and at home) so as to secure a total net advantage to the United States from such contacts."

Mr. Anderson suggested that this language represented a somewhat more restricted approach to East-West exchanges, and that the ODM member strongly believed that each proposed exchange should be judged on its individual merit. Secretary Dulles wondered if this language was really necessary, in view of similar language in paragraph 16 of the present paper. The Attorney General also thought the proposed new language too restricted, even though his representative on the Planning Board had concurred in it. Mr. Cooley, representing the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, stated his willingness to drop the proposed amendment and to go along with the views of the Secretary of State.

Mr. Anderson then pointed out the next proposed amendment, proposed by the ODM member of the Planning Board as a new paragraph 11. The objective of this amendment was to call attention to the importance of a clear understanding of the new policy by the American public as well as by the peoples of third countries. There was included a warning against overzealous friendliness by U.S. citizens to visitors who might in many cases be hostile agents. Mr. Cooley explained that the ODM member of the Planning Board had in mind the need for guidance to U.S. hosts to Soviet visitors, especially visitors to important U.S. industrial plants.

The Vice President said he perfectly well understood the need to indoctrinate the American people as to the elements of danger in these exchanges, but he did not believe that it was necessary to include this matter in the statement of policy. Secretary Dulles said he also agreed strongly with the thought behind this proposed new paragraph, but concurred in the view of the Vice President that it was unnecessary to put such a warning in a policy paper. In general, it had not been the practice of the National Security Council to include implementation tactics in a policy statement. Accordingly, the proposal for a new paragraph 11 was rejected.

Mr. Anderson then invited the Council's attention to the important proposal by the Defense member of the Planning Board—concurred in by the ODM member and the JCS adviser—for a new version of the existing paragraph, designed to emphasize the dangers inherent in the new policy with respect to third countries and with respect to the military, political and economic cooperation of the countries of the free world. The proposed Defense paragraph 10 read as follows:

"10. One aspect of this matter which requires particular consideration is the impact of what we do upon third countries as well as

upon military, political and economic cooperation among the countries of the free world. In many cases, the United States can tolerate a type of exchange which to other countries would be poisonous. Also, it is recognized that our embarking upon this policy may have a serious impact upon our capacity to maintain present military alliances and trade controls and involves taking a calculated risk of enhancing the spread of neutralism. To mitigate these effects as much as possible, we must exert constant and strenuous effort to convince third countries that our program is not to be construed as evidence that we believe that Soviet purposes have now become benign by:

> "(1) Explaining, on a confidential basis, the scope and purpose of our program and the precautions we would take. This should be done, for example, as regards the American Republics at a meeting of the Ambassadors, such as we have had with increasing frequency in recent months. It also should be particularly emphasized with the countries aligned with us in military alliances. There should be similar expositions made to friendly countries of Africa and Asia, and
>
> "(2) Constant public reiteration by top-level government spokesmen of the extent and nature of the substantive divisions that remain between the respective aims and objectives of ourselves and the Soviet Union and of the need for retaining maximum collective safeguards.

"It must be made clear that what we do is a part of our policy designed to weaken International Communism, and that it is not either an acquiescence in Soviet policy or a recognition that Soviet motives have so changed that they are no longer to be feared."

After Mr. Anderson had read in its entirety the proposed substitute paragraph 10, Secretary Humphrey said that it sounded to him as though we were sending out a salesman and telling him every single word that he was to say to his prospective customers. If we cannot trust our salesman, we had better not send him out at all.

Secretary Dulles insisted that all that was really essential in the proposed new paragraph had been included in the original paragraph 10. He could see no need to include in this statement all the anxieties which we might have in adopting this new policy; nor was there any need to set forth in a policy paper an analysis of all the motives which underlay the new policy. If one was going to repeat, as the Department of Defense proposed, all the reasons against adopting a new policy, then it made equally good sense to set forth all the reasons in favor of adopting a new policy, the more so since it seemed to the Secretary of State that the National Security Council had virtually decided to adopt the proposed new policy.

Secretary Robertson pointed out that while the proposed new paragraph 10 seemed quite long when it had been read, actually there were only one or two sentences in addition to what had been stated in the original paragraph 10. Nevertheless, Secretary Robertson

thought these additional sentences were of very great significance. It might be true that the Secretary of State and other members of the Council would heed the warnings of the dangers in this new policy, but at the working levels at which the policy would actually be carried out, it was necessary to avoid a tendency to "soften up". The inclusion of the stronger warning language proposed by the Department of Defense would serve to check any softening-up process. Accordingly, Secretary Robertson stated his belief that the substitute paragraph 10 proposed by the Defense Department was a distinct improvement over the original paragraph 10.

Admiral Radford supported the views of Secretary Robertson, and again emphasized his conviction of the need for a clear public explanation of our objectives in adopting this new policy, as opposed to mere private conversations designed to explain our objectives to third countries.

Secretary Humphrey said that it seemed to him that in this matter the Council was trying to ride two horses. We all know that there is a risk in the adoption of this proposed program for increasing exchanges and contacts between the U.S. and the USSR. We had known this at least since the time of the Geneva Summit Conference. Accordingly, we have simply got to weigh the advantages of the new proposal as against its disadvantages, and make a clear choice. He personally favored taking the risks which were inherent in the new proposal. Admiral Radford invited Secretary Humphrey to remember that the groups of people which the USSR would be sending to the United States under the new policy, would be in every sense controlled by the Soviet Government. Secretary Humphrey said he was quite aware of that, but that nevertheless we were still obliged to run the risk. There was certainly a chance that these increased exchanges would have a real effect on the people of the Soviet Union, and might play a real part in convincing the Soviets of the errors of their system.

Admiral Radford said that all the same, adoption of this new policy constituted a very great gamble for the United States. He then went on to point out that if the U.S. Government restricted itself to explaining to governments of third countries, on a strictly confidential basis, the true objectives of the United States in adopting a policy of increased exchanges with the Soviet Union, the governments of these third countries would be unable to explain to their citizens the true motives of the United States. As a result, there

would be a clamor in these third countries to admit Soviet visitors, with citations of the example set by the United States itself.

. . . . . .

Secretary Dulles pointed out to Admiral Radford that confidential conversations with other governments was not the only possible avenue by which we could explain the objectives of this increased exchange program to the governments of third countries. . . . the State Department would make public statements explaining the new policy wherever it appropriately could.

Secretary Robertson stated that the objective of the Department of Defense in its substitute paragraph 10 was simply to state publicly that despite the increased contacts between the U.S. and the USSR, there remained major unresolved issues between the United States and the USSR. This was a useful warning to the free world and to our own people.

The Vice President commented that Defense and ODM, in supporting the new paragraph 10, were in effect simply seeking some public indoctrination as to the objectives of the new policy. As of the present time, we might all agree with the type of indoctrination proposed in paragraph 10. On the other hand, what we may wish to say publicly about these objectives would certainly be susceptible to change from time to time in the future. Moreover, continued the Vice President, those who are likely to make public statements about the objectives of this policy are, of course, the people who are gathered around the Council table this morning. If a clear understanding exists among these top spokesmen as to the risks and dangers of increased U.S.-USSR contacts, this was about all that we needed or could ask for. Secretary Dulles had certainly stressed these dangers in his speech at the Kiwanis convention.[7] It would be extremely difficult to set forth in this policy paper the precise line of indoctrination for the people of the United States and the free world.

Mr. William Jackson commented that if, in proposing its new paragraph 10, the Department of Defense was not really trying to change the proposed new policy but merely calling for a heightened public understanding of the policy, he could see no reason for not putting in a reference to educating the people of the United States into the present paragraph 17.

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[7] For text of Dulles' address before the 41st annual convention of Kiwanis International in San Francisco on June 21, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 2, 1956, pp. 3–7.

Admiral Radford professed himself still greatly worried about the probable inability of the governments of third countries effectively to explain to their people why the United States was showing a marked increase in its willingness to receive Soviet visitors and to send U.S. citizens to the Soviet Union. With some asperity, the Secretary of State informed Admiral Radford that the problem to which he had just referred was part and parcel of the daily routine of the Department of State. The problem of explanation of policy to the other governments was the responsibility each day of State Department officials. The State Department did not make a practice of telling the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Defense Department what kind of bombers, missiles or submarines to make. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles said he would appreciate it if the Department of Defense would trust the Department of State to exercise appropriately its functions and duties.

Secretary Humphrey expressed his agreement with the view just stated by Secretary Dulles, and again pointed out that we cannot avoid a certain risk if we adopt this policy. If the Council was not willing to take the risk, it should simply not adopt the new statement of policy.

Admiral Radford went on to express further concern as to the effect of adopting the proposed new policy, this time because of its possibly serious effect on our military alliances. Speaking with firmness, Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that the recent adoption by the National Security Council of a more liberal point of view with respect to the problem of East-West trade [8] had been a mistake. Sir Anthony Eden had gone back to England and was playing fast and loose with the understanding he had reached with us in the matter of British trade with the Soviet bloc.

Secretary Dulles replied heatedly that if the National Security Council had made a mistake in its recent decisions in the matter of East-West trade, it was a mistake made not only by the Council but by the President of the United States. Secretary Dulles did not believe that it was appropriate to criticize the President.

At this point Mr. William Jackson again undertook briefly to summarize the basic philosophy upon which the proposed new policy rested. Secretary Humphrey pointed out that in effect the proposed new program of increased East-West exchanges marked a point of departure for a quite new U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The real question was whether we were going to go to war with the Soviet Union or whether we were going to live with them. Up to now we have been trying to do a little of both at one and the

[8] Reference is to a decision taken at the 282d meeting of the National Security Council on April 26.

same time. We can no longer do so, and are now called upon to make our choice. We cannot have our cake and eat it too.

Secretary Robertson pointed out that the Defense Department was in agreement that we must take the risks inherent in the adoption of this new policy. Nevertheless he stressed again that we should not leave out the necessity for a clear public statement or statements as to our objectives. He then asked whether the Council would be willing at least to accept the first three sentences of the Department of Defense version of paragraph 10 as designed to stress the nature of the risk we were taking.

The Vice President inquired whether there was objection to Secretary Robertson's request. Secretary Dulles commented that if embarking upon this new policy involved the risks which Defense wished to emphasize, it was equally true that refusal by the U.S. to embark on this policy might have very serious repercussions in the realm of foreign policy. The Vice President remarked that Secretary Robertson, so it seemed to him, merely wanted to add a *caveat* against going overboard with the new policy. He could at any rate see no objection to the inclusion of the first sentence of the Defense Department version of paragraph 10. Secretary Dulles said that he had no objection to the inclusion of this first sentence.

The Vice President observed that he shared personally much of the concern shown by the Department of Defense over the impact of this policy on our alliances and on political and economic cooperation among the countries of the free world. In fact, however, the Council was really beyond the point of arguing. The President had already indicated strongly his views in favor of taking the risk. Discussion by the Council this morning had been of value in informing those whose task it would be in the future to implement the new policy. It furthermore seemed to the Vice President that the inclusion of the first sentence of the Defense Department version of paragraph 10, combined with the Council discussion, provided adequate guidance to the Secretary of State in carrying out this policy.

The Secretary of State again said he had no objection to the inclusion of this sentence, and the Vice President asked Secretary Robertson if this satisfied the Defense Department. The Vice President went on to say that he sensed a basic disagreement between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. This disagreement had been thoroughly aired and discussed, and the Vice President believed that the Council could go no further. If it did, the paper would have to go to the President with a split view, and the President would almost certainly accept the language for paragraph 10 as set forth in the original version.

Secretary Robertson made one more effort to explain the Defense position. Secretary Humphrey likewise again pointed out that

the fact of the matter was that this Government was directly and significantly changing its policies toward the Soviet bloc, and that we should frankly recognize this important fact.

Secretary Dulles agreed with Secretary Humphrey, and said that the actual change in our policy had been made at Geneva in accordance with the President's own decision. Under the Constitution of the United States we therefore had no other choice than to follow the President's decision. If in point of fact the new policy on exchanges works badly, there will be ample opportunity to change it. We have by no means frozen our course. If the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought at some future time that the new policy operated to our disadvantage, they should come and tell us so frankly, and we can work it out. There was always a forum for an appeal, and nothing catastrophic was going to happen as a result of the adoption of this new policy.

The National Security Council: [9]

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject, submitted as the Department of State position and transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 6; the recommendations thereon by the NSC Planning Board, transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 19; and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported by the Chairman, JCS, at the meeting.

b. Adopted the draft statement of policy contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of June 6, subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Paragraph 8, 2nd sentence:* Insert the word "individual" between the words "greater" and "freedom".

(2) *Paragraph 10, 1st sentence:* Revise to read as follows: "One aspect of this matter which requires particular consideration is the impact of what we do upon third countries as well as upon military, political and economic cooperation among the countries of the free world."

(3) *Paragraph 10, beginning of 3rd sentence:* Delete the words "It is suggested that".

(4) *Paragraphs 11, 12 and 13:* Insert the words "and satellite" after the word "Soviet" wherever the latter appears in these paragraphs.

(5) *Paragraph 16:* Revise to read as follows:

"16. The United States should take the initiative in East-West exchanges as a positive instrument of U.S. foreign policy, employing as a general guide the 17-point proposal (attached) as submitted at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting. Each proposal should be judged on its merits as contributing to the agreed objectives."

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[9] Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 1577, as approved by the President on June 29. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

c. Recommended that the President approve the draft statement of policy as amended by b above, and:

(1) Refer it to the Secretary of State for implementation in consultation with the Department of Justice and other departments, agencies and boards as appropriate; keeping the Departments of Defense and Commerce and, as appropriate, other interested departments, agencies and boards informed in advance of proposed East-West exchanges.

(2) Direct the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to continue to cooperate in developing and applying appropriate internal security safeguards with respect to the admission of Soviet and satellite nationals to the United States.

Note: The above-mentioned statement of policy, as amended and adopted and subsequently approved by the President, circulated as NSC 5607 for implementation in accordance with c above.

[Here follow items 3, "United States Civil Aviation Policy Toward the USSR and Its Satellites" and 4, "United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East."]

S. Everett Gleason

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104. National Security Council Report [1]

NSC 5607

Washington, June 29, 1956.

STATEMENT OF POLICY ON EAST-WEST EXCHANGES

General Considerations

1. The basic strategy of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc is:

a. To promote within Soviet Russia evolution toward a regime which will abandon predatory policies, which will seek to promote the aspirations of the Russian people rather than the global ambitions of International Communism, and which will increasingly rest upon the consent of the governed rather than upon despotic police power.

b. As regards the European satellites, we seek their evolution toward independence of Moscow.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, East-West Exchanges. Confidential. Circulated to the members of the Council as an enclosure to Lay's memorandum of June 29, in which he noted the discussion and action taken at the 289th meeting of the Council on June 28; see *supra*.

2. For the first time since the end of World War II there are visible signs of progress along the lines we desire.

3. Within the Soviet Union there is increasing education and consequent demand for greater freedom of thought and expression; there is increasing demand for greater personal security than existed under Stalin's police state, and there is increasing demand for more consumer's goods and better living conditions for the masses of people. The demands referred to must be considerable because the Soviet rulers judge it necessary to take drastic and hazardous measures to seem to meet them.

4. Within the satellite countries there has occurred a considerable demotion of those who were dedicated to the Stalin doctrine of iron discipline of Communists everywhere, with the Soviet Communist Party acting as the general staff of the world proletariat. The fact that "Titoism" is now regarded as respectable by the Soviet rulers, and that it is profitable to Tito, encourages those within the satellite countries, such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, to seek a greater degree of nationalism and independence of Moscow.

5. There has thus come about a condition which should lead the United States intensively to seek projects which would have impact within the Soviet bloc and encourage the liberal tendencies referred to.

6. At the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers, the three Western Powers submitted a well-rounded 17-point proposal which reflected the above thinking. This was rejected by the Soviet Union which, however, indicated that it might be prepared to develop East-West exchanges along the indicated lines on the basis of bilateral talks.

7. The problem of East-West exchanges should be considered in the foregoing context.

Policy Conclusions

8. Our foreign policies are necessarily *defensive*, so far as the use of force is concerned. But they can be *offensive* in terms of promoting a desire for greater individual freedom, well-being and security within the Soviet Union, and greater independence within the satellites. In other words, East-West exchanges should be an implementation of positive United States foreign policy.

9. The exchanges should in large part be initiated by the United States itself, and we should not be content with the negative or neutral position incident to passing upon Soviet initiatives, or the initiatives of private groups within the United States. Of course, Soviet initiatives should be accepted, and the private U.S. initiatives should be welcomed, whenever they advance U.S. policy or seem to

be an acceptable and necessary price for what will advance U.S. policy. But the Government should be thinking and planning imaginatively in this field.

10. One aspect of this matter which requires particular consideration is the impact of what we do upon third countries as well as upon military, political and economic cooperation among the countries of the free world. In many cases, the United States can tolerate a type of exchange which to other countries would be poisonous. Consideration should be given to explaining to third countries, on a confidential basis, the scope and purpose of our program and the precautions we would take, so that they will not misconstrue what we do as evidence that we believe that Soviet purposes have now become benign. This could be done, for example, as regards the American Republics at a meeting of the Ambassadors, such as we have had with increasing frequency in recent months. There could be similar expositions made on a selective basis with friendly countries of Africa and Asia. In this way, it could be made clear that what we do is a part of *our* policy designed to weaken International Communism, and that it is not either an acquiescence in Soviet policy or a recognition that Soviet motives have so changed that they are no longer to be feared.

Objectives

11. To increase the knowledge of the Soviet and satellite people as to the outer world so that their judgments will be based upon fact and not upon Communist fiction.

12. To encourage freedom of thought by bringing to the Soviet and satellite peoples challenging ideas and demonstrating to Soviet and satellite intellectuals the scope of intellectual freedom which is encouraged within the United States.

13. To stimulate the demand of Soviet and satellite citizens for greater personal security by bringing home to them the degree of personal security which is afforded by our constitutional and legal systems.

14. To stimulate their desire for more consumer's goods by bringing them to realize how rich are the fruits of free labor and how much they themselves could gain from a government which primarily sought their well-being and not conquest.

15. To stimulate nationalism within the satellite countries by reviving the historic traditions of these peoples and by suggesting the great benefits which can be derived from a courageous policy of defiance of Moscow such as Tito exhibited.

Courses of Action

16. The United States should take the initiative in East-West exchanges as a positive instrument of U.S. foreign policy, employing as a general guide the 17-point proposal (attached) [2] as submitted at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting. Each proposal should be judged on its merits as contributing to the agreed objectives.

17. The United States should make clear as appropriate to third countries the scope and purpose of our programs.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 99.

105. Report From the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force (Twining) to the President [1]

Washington, July 5, 1956. [2]

SUBJECT

Visit of the U.S. Air delegation to the U.S.S.R., 23 June–1 July 1956

Purposes of the Visit

Our general purpose in going to the Soviet Union was to find out how far the Soviets were willing to go in exposing the equipment and activities of their Air Force and of their supporting establishments.

We also had in mind these four specific purposes:

1. To attempt to measure their current and potential air strength and degree of readiness for global war, to the extent that the

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Secret. Twining was 1 of 28 foreign military representatives invited to the Soviet annual air show. The invitation was apparently first made through the Soviet Military Attaché in Washington on or about May 25. At the Secretary of State's Staff meeting that day, Dulles said that he was "on the whole" in favor of Twining's accepting the invitation, since it could be part of the U.S. offensive to reach "our hidden allies" in the Soviet Union, those forces in the Soviet Union which, he said, "are going in the same direction as ourselves." (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75) President Eisenhower gave his approval to Twining's acceptance of the invitation in a conversation with Twining and others on May 28; see Document 47. Documentation on the planning for Twining's visit to the Soviet Union and the composition of the U.S. Delegation is *ibid.*, Central File 711.5861.

[2] A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "submitted to the President in meeting 5 July 56."

conditions imposed by our hosts would allow and against the background of our existing assessments.

2. To report on Soviet intentions concerning further visits of military personnel between the United States and the U.S.S.R., as well as the motives behind this particular invitation.

3. To appraise the reactions of other air delegations invited at the same time.

4. To make recommendations as to the advisability of future exchange visits of military representatives of the two countries, and also to consider the possible frame of reference within which such exchanges might be made.

Summary of Results and Conclusions

It was apparent that in showing us what they chose to show, the Soviet leaders felt that they were being fairly open-handed. Certainly by contrast with their previous habits of secrecy, they did let down the bars somewhat. In point of fact, however, they gave us much less information than is openly available to them about our own air force and defense preparations. Though cordial, their air force leaders were invariably unresponsive whenever we attempted to converse with them on serious professional lines. Neither I nor other members of my party succeeded in promoting a forthright exchange of views with anyone.

Such exposure of operational aircraft and prototypes as they elected to make was done under conditions that permitted us only cursory observation. (The aircraft and equipment that we saw are discussed in the attached tab.[3]) The Soviets permitted close-up inspection only of those equipment items about which they had reason to suppose we already possessed rather complete information, or which had no important relationship to modern air combat capability; for example, their version of the Nene jet engine and one of their air transport plants, which is producing the IL–14.

With regard, therefore, to our first specific purpose—to measure at first hand their current and potential air strength and their degree of readiness for global war—we obtained no new information of significance. In fact, in the critical areas of long-range bomber production, defensive and offensive guided missile systems, and military applications of nuclear energy as well as the size, composition and location of operational forces and modern industrial installations, we encountered a blank wall. Nevertheless, the inspection of their aircraft and equipment, limited as it was, will enable us to refine some of our estimates of the quality and performance of Soviet air weapons. In this respect our trip was profitable. Further, the contacts with key Soviet military personalities permitted the

[3] The attachment, a 17-page "Preliminary Report" on the visit of the U.S. Delegation, is not printed.

members of the group to form some opinion as to their professional competence.

As to the Soviet air potential in the years ahead, our visit substantially strengthened previous assessments that the U.S.S.R. can reduce and is, in fact, progressively reducing the technological lead of the West generally and the United States in particular.

The factors supporting this judgment include (a) their emphasis on a thorough technical training of a large number of carefully selected personnel; (b) the variety of aircraft under development; (c) their ability to squeeze the maximum potential from a jet engine of Western origin and at the same time to develop powerful new engines on their own; and (d) the rapid rate of progress they have shown during the last few years in the research and development field.

Furthermore, given the heavy emphasis which they are placing upon the creation of a new technical generation, beginning with primary education and carrying through basic research and engineering development, we must reckon on the possibility of their achieving a scientific breakthrough and consequent technological surprise in new weapons.

Concerning our second specific purpose—to gauge Soviet intentions in the matter of future military visits, as well as their motives in our particular instance—these three points can be made:

1. Soviet officials at all levels repeatedly voiced the hope that our visit would be the first of a series of encounters leading to wider exchange of information. They plainly desire an early invitation to visit the United States.

2. The nature of the Soviet overtures definitely indicates a desire to establish a pattern for the exchange of military information on their terms as a counter to the U.S. proposal for aerial inspection, which they continue to reject.

3. Judging from the political and propaganda treatment given our visit, from the studied emphasis on defensive weapons displayed, and from statements made to us, the motives behind this first invitation were to further the general Soviet foreign policy line of reduction of armaments, and the lessening of international tensions, with the ultimate purpose of weakening the Free World's alliance system.

Concerning our third specific purpose—to appraise the reaction of other delegations—the representatives of countries in the Soviet orbit, so far as we were in a position to judge, associated themselves with the general Soviet line. With regard to our allies, the representatives of the NATO nations appeared to look to the United States for leadership. Their outward attitude was, in effect, "You show us the way. We'll follow." The British delegation acted somewhat more

independently. We believe, however, that in general the members of the RAF delegation are in accord with our views.

Recommendation

I am not prepared, of course, to render advice concerning the numerous political factors that must be taken into account in measuring the desirability of future reciprocal military visits. From a military viewpoint, however, my judgment is that the Soviets would undoubtedly gain from visits to the United States useful knowledge of air techniques and equipment, while we on our side would gain only to the extent that they can be persuaded to raise the curtain around their military establishment on subsequent visits by us.

If, therefore, it should be the decision of the United States Government to adopt a policy of reciprocal military visits, I recommend that such visits be under the following conditions:

1. That they be started with a clear understanding that they will be on a trial basis, subject to a more convincing show of forthrightness on the part of the Soviet Union.
2. That their visits to the United States be under appropriate military supervision.
3. That such visits be carefully controlled with a view toward bringing our knowledge of the Soviet air position up to a level corresponding to their knowledge of ours.
4. That consideration be given to the advisability of widening any invitations that the U.S. might extend to include nations of our alliance system as well as Soviet satellites, rather than confining this to a bilateral arrangement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

(A more detailed narrative of the visit is attached.)

N.F. Twining

106. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Director of the East-West Contacts Staff (Merrill) and Adlai E. Stevenson, Washington, September 18, 1956, 9:30 a.m. [1]

SUBJECT

Invitation to Soviet Bloc to U.S. Election Campaign

I called by appointment on Governor Adlai E. Stevenson this morning at 9:30 in his suite at the Sheraton Park Hotel to give him a secret letter from Ambassador Lacy. [2] This letter was for the purpose of informing him of the Department's proposal to invite two or three representatives of the Soviet bloc countries to come to the United States for a fifteen-day period in order to familiarize themselves with the two-party electoral process whereby the Chief Executive and members of Congress are chosen. No one else was present. Governor Stevenson read the letter with great care. I explained the advantages we consider can be derived from these invitations, whether accepted or not. He then became interested in the whole exchange program and asked me to describe the workings of the Immigration law and the part the fingerprinting requirement plays. This I did, and pointed out, inter alia, that the Soviet Government's refusal to permit their nationals to be fingerprinted was being used by them as a means to control the travel of their citizens to the United States. However, our Government had granted a number of special visas to those documented as officials, in instances wherein the visit was in our interest, and thus some sixty or so Soviet

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.603/9–1856. Secret. Drafted by Merrill. Copies were sent to various offices and bureaus in the Department of State, to Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Paris, London, Bucharest, Budapest, and to the White House in care of Francis Williamson.

[2] According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation between Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower on August 29:

"The Sec. referred to East-West exchanges—there is an idea to invite the Soviet Satellite Governments to send representatives to witness our elections and see how a free election is conducted. If they do it we would have the right to send some there and contrast their elections. Everyone concerned is for it—but the reason the Sec. is clearing the matter with the Pres. is we may think it important to clear it with the Democrats. It will be done through the Heritage Foundation. The Pres. does not see how they can make a political football of it. He would not mind taking it up with Sam [Rayburn] and [Walter] George and he mentioned one other. We would have to approve, they agreed, their having visas. The Sec. mentioned he could mention it to George when he sees him this p.m." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations)

Eisenhower and Dulles also discussed this subject in a telephone conversation the morning of August 30. According to the memorandum of their conversation:

"The Sec. asked if he mentioned the project to George—the Pres. said yes, and G. thought it a good idea. The Sec. said he is intrigued with it—it will be good propaganda for us if they turn it down, as he expects them to. The Sec. thinks he will go ahead." (*Ibid.*)

citizens had actually come here this year to international congresses and as a result of exchange visits.

Governor Stevenson then asked me what were the negative aspects of the proposal. I said there seemed to be only two. One involved the possibility of demonstrations, particularly by citizens of Eastern European extraction, and the other the presumption that upon return home the visitors would report unfavorably on our electoral processes. I explained that the first objection could be avoided by careful planning of the itinerary. In the case of the second, our media outlets would be able to counter such reports, perhaps by playing back actual quotes made while here. In any case, it was hardly likely that the captive peoples, particularly in the satellites, would believe critical reports, which incidentally they would be getting from their own media anyway. He warned that in the closing stages of the campaign there might be a spate of extreme anti-communist statements by various candidates, which might be considered insulting by the guests. To my expression of belief that this campaign would not find communism a major issue, he replied Vice President Nixon was forcing it on him and that he was not too sanguine it would not become one. He added he himself had no intention of exacerbating the issue of communists in government. (These remarks were obviously prompted by the press conference he had held yesterday.) [3]

I told Governor Stevenson that naturally Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower had knowledge of and approved the idea of inviting the Soviet bloc representatives, and that as a matter of course it was thought desirable he also be apprised of it. In order that there might be no misunderstanding as to why, I said that the possibility had been considered that the arrival of Soviet bloc representatives in this country could become a partisan issue in the campaign. He said he did not think it would, and it was quite clear from the way he expressed himself that he for one would not criticize the administration in this respect. He did add, however, that certain local candidates with minority constituents might indulge themselves. Governor Stevenson then offered the opinion that the invitation was a "good idea", particularly as it gave both the opportunity to the communists to view free elections and also to us to ask for reciprocity. He said he would be very glad to receive the visiting delegations, but hoped it could be limited to one occasion in view of the great pressures he would be under at the closing stages of the campaign.

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[3] Not found.

I said I would be in touch with Mr. Blair[4] as regards the itinerary and arrangements for receiving the bloc visitors. I explained that an experienced tour director, possibly a retired Foreign Service Officer, would be in charge of the group and that travel and other arrangements would probably be made by the Government Affairs Institute which handles such matters for leadership grantees from other countries here for elections. Governor Stevenson appeared well satisfied and put the letter aside for safekeeping. The conversation ended at ten o'clock.

I am certain that he has approved the objectives under which we are tending the invitations and will not seek partisan advantage therefrom.

[4] William McCormick Blair, Jr., a member of Stevenson's staff.

107. Editorial Note

On September 28, the Department of State announced that it had recently issued invitations through its missions abroad to the Governments of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania to send representatives to the United States in October "to view at first hand the free electoral processes in this country." The Department indicated that it assumed, on the basis of reciprocity, that Americans would be invited to view elections in their countries on the next appropriate occasion. For text of the announcement, as well as that of the formal invitation issued to these governments, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 8, 1956, page 550.

In a note delivered to the United States Embassy in Moscow on September 29, the Soviet Government accepted the invitation and invited American representatives to visit the Soviet Union during the election of the Supreme Soviet. (*Ibid.*, October 15, 1956, page 582) On October 20, the Department of State announced that, in addition to the Soviet Union, Romania had also accepted the invitation, but that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary had declined. The Department also announced the composition of the Soviet Delegation, which was to arrive in New York on October 22, and the arrangements for its itinerary through October 27. (*Ibid.*, October 29, 1956, pages 665–666) On October 24, the Department announced the composition of the Romanian delegation and its itinerary, beginning

with its arrival in New York that day and extending through October 27. (*Ibid.*, November 5, 1956, page 728)

On November 6 President Eisenhower won reelection to a second term, defeating Adlai E. Stevenson in the electoral vote 457–74 and in the popular vote by more than 9 million votes.

According to a report prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, the Soviet observers, in reporting their experiences after their return home following the election, "confined themselves strictly to Soviet propaganda stereotypes, although on departing they had praised the exchange as of value." The Romanian observers reported upon their return home that the things they had found in America had "strengthened our conviction in the superiority of our socialist democracy over bourgeois democracy." (Department of State, INR Files, *Soviet Affairs*, December 1956)

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108. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [1]

Washington, November 13, 1956—7:55 p.m.

588. After consultation with the President, [2] Dept has decided continuation of officially approved exchanges with USSR inappropriate in light of Sov behavior in Hungary and has therefore ordered immediate suspension. In accordance with President's wishes, decision is not to be publicized since publicity may jeopardize President's channel to Bulganin and may also scare off satellites, particularly Poland, with whom Dept hopes be able step up exchanges.

Dept plans following lines of action in implementing decision. On exchanges while continuing internal preparation for technical exchanges scheduled next year, Dept will make no approaches to Sovs while suspension in effect and will rebuff any Sovs initiatives.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.60/11–1356. Confidential. Drafted by Toon; cleared with Freers, Blake, and Murphy; and approved for transmission by Lacy, who initialed it for Hoover. Repeated to London, Paris, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, and Bucharest.

[2] In the wake of the Soviet Union's armed intervention in Hungary on November 5, President Eisenhower, in a meeting with Vice President Nixon and Under Secretary of State Hoover later that day declared that the United States should suspend the East-West exchange program and U.S. attendance at trade fairs and that U.S. officials should not attend the November 7 celebration in Moscow of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

On conference attendance, with exceptions conferences scheduled immediate future, Dept will advise sponsors of suspension of official exchanges and leave decision as to Sov participation to sponsors. Impresarios will be left decision on invitations to Sov cultural figures. On queries re private travel to USSR, Dept will refrain from counsel and simply advise no ban on such travel.

Dept has taken following specific action:

1. Suspended visit US mass feeding delegation to USSR scheduled Nov 15–30 and plan so inform SovEmb.

2. Informed SovEmb Dept unable arrange for attendance Sov specialists Automation Exhibition NYC Nov 26 (Embtel 1126 Nov 8 [3]). Emb should return passports to FonOff with this explanation.

Only other conference scheduled for near future to which Sovs invited is ASME Conference NYC Nov 25–30. To be consistent with action on Automation Conf, Dept will advise sponsors of current attitude toward reciprocal exchanges with Sovs and urge they withdraw invitations. Other sponsors who may seek Dept's advice on Sov attendance at future conferences will be simply informed of Dept's policy on exchanges but will be told decision to invite is theirs.

FYI, Dept felt obliged authorize visas for Sov observers Seattle Fisheries Conference (Deptel 560 Nov 8 [4]) because of international nature conference and previous commitment to SovEmb to permit attendance.

Hoover

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[3] Telegram 1126 transmitted the Foreign Ministry's urgent request for visas to be issued to the Soviet specialists. (Department of State, Central Files, 511.60/11–856)

[4] Telegram 560 briefly discussed the kinds of visas to be issued to the Soviet observers to the Fisheries Conference. (*Ibid.*)

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109. Editorial Note

At the Secretary of State's Staff meeting on December 3, Secretary Dulles questioned whether the press should be informed of the suspension of the exchange program with the Soviet Union "because it carries the implication that our past decisions to have exchanges were taken in [the] Soviet interest." He had no doubt that the exchanges should be suspended, since he felt that recent events had shown the United States probably had less to gain from them. Under

Secretary Hoover replied that the decision to suspend the exchanges had been made in discussion with the President following the Hungarian crisis and that it was to be a "temporary suspension pending clarification and a new evaluation of the situation." It was decided that in any discussion with the press on this subject, it should be emphasized that the suspension was temporary and "the inference should be avoided that our past policy of exchanges has been dictated by any desire to help the USSR at the expense of the U.S." (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

Later that day, the following responses were given by a Department of State spokesman to questions raised about the possible suspension of East-West exchanges at the Department's press briefing:

"Q. Have we suspended our exchange program with the Russians?

"A. Well, in view of recent developments, proposed Governmental exchanges with the Soviet Union have been suspended during a reappraisal of the program. This reappraisal is continuing.

"Q. When was the decision made?

"A. I don't have any specific date. It has been some weeks.

"Q. How about the satellite countries?

"A. This does not apply to any other country in Eastern Europe.

"Q. Is the State Department doing anything to discourage private exchanges?

"A. Not to my knowledge.

"Q. You say it is due to recent developments. Do you mean particularly the Soviet intervention in Hungary?

"A. I think you could draw that conclusion.

"Q. The decision (to reappraise the policy) came after the Hungarian attack, didn't it?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You are talking about proposed exchanges having been suspended.

"A. This applies to what is commonly known as 'East-West Exchanges' and this refers—as I have made clear—specifically to US-USSR exchanges.

"Q. Have we told the Soviet Governmental authorities to whom we have been proposing these exchanges, about our decision to suspend this program?

"A. That I do not know.

"Q. We have now decided not to participate in the (Moscow Trade) Fair, is that correct?

"A. That is right."

This exchange was quoted in telegram 675 to Moscow, December 4, in which the Department of State also noted that it planned to continue the East-West Contacts division. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 511.613/12–456)

110. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 28, 1957 [1]

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen [2]
Ambassador William S.B. Lacy
EE—Messrs. Freers and Blake
P:EWC—Messrs. Merrill and Toon

Ambassador Bohlen was informed that the British Foreign Office favored a gradual and unobtrusive resumption of exchanges with the Soviet Union but wished its action be coordinated with that of the Department. [3] While the Department had been considering for some time a lifting of the suspension, the matter had been brought to a head by the Soviet Embassy's undated Aide-Mémoire handed to Mr. Beam January 24, 1957, [4] in which the Department had been queried on its intentions with regard to several technical exchanges under discussion last fall. EE and EWC share the British view that exchanges with the U.S.S.R. should be resumed on a gradual basis; there remains the question of the method and timing of resumption.

Ambassador Bohlen was informed that American public opinion, (as reflected by recent polls), most editorial comment, and the views of American intellectual and scientific circles were in favor of resumption. It was the Ambassador's view that if the American public would support exchanges with the Soviet Union, as appeared to be the case, then he would favor resumption as in the national interest. If there is general agreement to resume, the Ambassador felt no useful purpose would be served by linking resumption to Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe or to current Soviet attacks on the United States in the General Assembly. While it is desirable on appropriate occasions to combat the Soviet standard line on East-West exchanges by stressing our belief that exchanges can fruitfully take place only in a favorable political environment and cannot as the Soviets contend create such an atmosphere, the issue now is whether we should resume exchanges or not. If it is agreed that it is

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.613/1–2457. Confidential. Drafted by Toon on March 7. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: "Approved in substance by Ambassador Bohlen."

[2] Bohlen left Moscow on February 21 to return to the United States for consultation.

[3] The British Foreign Office's views on this matter were communicated to Merrill and Toon by the Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington, William Barker, on February 20. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Central File 541.613/2–2057.

[4] Not found.

in the national interest to do so, we should not attempt to make resumption conditional on certain changes in Soviet behavior, notwithstanding the propaganda opportunities inherent in such an approach. He would recommend that no formal reply be made to the Soviet Aide-Mémoire; that, instead, the Soviet Embassy be permitted to deduce from the Department's actions that the suspension was lifted. He would agree that a suitable first step would be for the Department to inform the Soviet Embassy that the American mass feeding delegation was now ready to return the visit of the Soviet group last fall.

The Ambassador was careful to point out that the policy should not be one of full scale resumption without qualification. He felt we should proceed cautiously in order not to find ourselves confronted with the necessity of a further suspension in the event, as is very possible, that Soviet behavior in Poland or increased anti-United States campaign would require such action. In short, he believed we should start very slowly and be guided in the development of a program for exchanges by future Soviet behavior and the state of our relations with the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Bohlen felt that although American cultural performances in the U.S.S.R. are useful in combating the Soviet charge that the U.S. is a cultural desert and personal contacts between scholars and scientists have merit, exchanges of technical delegations are the most beneficial to the United States. . . . Tourism he felt had little impact on Soviet society, and while he had no objection to controlled student exchanges he did not share the British estimate of potential gain in this field. Although there had been signs of recent student unrest in the Soviet Union, he was convinced that disaffection had not and would not reach such proportions as to represent a real threat to the Soviet social order. He did not feel that the Soviet regime would have to resort to coercive measures to cope with this problem. Because of the hunger of Soviet youth for education and its awareness that only through education could their status in Soviet society be improved, the threat of expulsion for non-conformism would be adequate.

As to cultural exchanges, the Ambassador felt the American position should rest not only on Soviet unwillingness to comply with the fingerprinting requirement but also on the hostility of American public opinion to the Soviet Union at the present time. By mentioning the latter, we would prepare the ground for official discouragement (for security or other reasons) of a large-scale Soviet cultural invasion in the event the fingerprinting requirement should be lifted at the current session of Congress.

111. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President [1]

Washington, March 27, 1957.

SUBJECT

Resumption of US–USSR Exchanges

You will recall that officially sponsored exchanges of delegations between the United States and the USSR were discontinued last November. No initiative has been taken in that respect since that time, although the objectives of NSC 5607 [2] regarding exchanges with the USSR are now as pertinent as ever before. . . .

We have accordingly been giving consideration to a resumption of exchanges with the USSR some time this spring. We believe it would be natural and unobtrusive to resume exchanges with the Russians by claiming from them their reciprocal obligations to receive American mass feeding experts in the USSR this spring. Russian mass feeding experts (concerned with Army feeding techniques, disaster relief feeding, large institutional provisioning) visited the United States last fall; the reciprocal visit of the US experts to Russia was cancelled by our suspension of exchanges with the USSR. [3]

During the coming seven or eight months, we propose to effect exchanges with the USSR in the fields of iron and steel technology, coal mining, peat mining, and public health. The British are also very much interested in resuming their exchange program with the USSR, for reasons similar to ours. You will recollect that this was discussed with Selwyn Lloyd at Bermuda. [4]

On January 24 the Soviet Embassy handed us an Aide-Mémoire [5] inquiring as to our plans regarding the exchanges under discussion with the Embassy last October. Subject to your approval, we would reply orally to the Soviet Aide-Mémoire to the effect that the United States is now prepared to send a mass feeding delegation to visit the Soviet Union.

I recommend that you authorize the Department of State, in the national interest, to resume gradually and carefully the series of

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret.

[2] Document 104.

[3] Not further identified.

[4] Reference is to a meeting between U.S. and U.K. officials at Bermuda on March 22 at 10:30 a.m.

[5] See footnote 4, *supra*.

officially sponsored exchanges with the USSR in pursuance of the objectives of NSC 5607 and our intelligence needs.[6]

JFD

[6] The following notation in President Eisenhower's hand is in the margin of the source text; "O.K. provided we have bi-partisan info. DE"

In telegram 1079 to Moscow, April 4, and repeated to certain posts in Eastern Europe as well as London, Paris, Rome, Bonn, and Tokyo, the Department indicated it planned an "unobtrusive resumption" of exchanges of technical delegations with the Soviet Union and that it would orally notify the Soviet Embassy that it was ready to send the delegation of mass feeding experts to the Soviet Union. The Department indicated further that it was prepared to discuss details of other proposed exchanges, particularly those in the fields of public health administration and steel. It noted that permission had already been given for Soviet participation in several international conferences to be held in the United States during the spring, including the visit of six nuclear physicists to a conference in Rochester, New York, in April. (Department of State, Central Files, 511.60/4–457)

112. Report by the Operations Coordinating Board's Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems [1]

Washington, October 14, 1957.

REPORT ON PROPOSED GOVERNMENT PROGRAM FOR STUDENT EXCHANGE WITH SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE

Background:

1. Possible student exchange with the Soviet Union and other East European countries has been under active consideration ever since the Geneva Conference. One of the 17 proposals put forward by the three Western Foreign Ministers at Geneva on October 31, 1955, specifically called for exchange of students. [2] And on June 29, 1956, the President approved the recommendation of the National Security Council that the U.S. should seek exchanges with the countries of Eastern Europe, including the USSR, [3] along the lines of the 17-point proposal at Geneva.

[1] Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, East-West Exchanges. Secret. Circulated to the members of the Board under cover of a memorandum of the same date from Staats, in which he noted that the report was to be considered by the Board at its October 16 meeting.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 99.

[3] Document 104.

2. Khrushchev "challenged" the U.S. to student exchange, mentioning a figure of 200, in talking to a group of U.S. tourists this summer.[4] Also, the Soviet Foreign Office has taken the initiative in suggesting exchange of students as a topic for negotiations in the overall discussions on exchanges scheduled for late October.

3. U.S. fingerprinting requirements, which had previously frustrated any student exchanges with the Soviet bloc, have now been amended by Congress to permit waiver of these requirements for visits of less than 12 months, and the necessary implementing action has already been taken by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.[5] Favorable action is also expected on a policy paper now circulating in the State Department[6] which would recommend to the Attorney General that he waive inadmissibility for Soviet bloc exchangees who are members of the Communist Party or affiliated organizations, since it is anticipated that the majority of the bloc exchangees will be members of such organizations.

4. Thus, at the present time there are at last indications that a modest student exchange program might be successfully arranged with the Soviet Union and other East European governments.

5. Two concrete projects to comprise a government-financed student exchange program with the Soviet Union and other East European countries have been submitted to the Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems in order to achieve full interagency understanding of, and support for, the program. The two projects, both of which would be sponsored by the Department of State, are complementary, though somewhat different in scope.

6. The first project has been drawn up by the International Educational Exchange Service of the Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, in conjunction with the East-West Contacts Staff. This project calls for an extension to Eastern Europe of the rather extensive program of educational exchange with friendly and neutral countries which has been underway for some years under the terms of Public Law 402.[7] At present, the IES program for exchanges with friendly and neutral countries involves about 6,300

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[4] Not further identified.

[5] On October 10 the Department of State announced that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, acting under authority conferred upon them by Section 8 of P.L. 316 of September 11, 1957, were authorizing the publication of regulations waiving the fingerprinting requirement in the case of most nonimmigrant aliens. For texts of the announcement and the new regulations, also dated October 10, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 28, 1957, p. 682.

[6] Not further identified.

[7] Apparently an error in the source text, since no P.L. 402 enacted between 1945 and 1957 dealt with educational exchange. Presumably reference was to P.L. 584 amending the Surplus Property Act of 1944, otherwise known as the Fulbright Act, signed into law on August 1, 1946. (60 Stat. 754)

exchanges annually at a cost to the U.S. of around $26,000,000. Except for a small program recently launched with Yugoslavia, all IES exchanges have been with non-Communist countries.

7. Here is a brief summary of the IES project as submitted to the Special Committee. It is apparent that the plan calls for a pilot operation only. Moreover, details of the plan are quite tentative, and its administration must be quite flexible.

a. The total number of exchanges would be 114, including 44 students, 44 leaders and specialists in the field of education, 17 research scholars, and nine teachers. An effort will be made in administering the program to see that there is adequate representation of various fields of interest among the exchangees.

b. Twenty exchangees will come to the U.S. from the Soviet Union, 34 from Poland, 9 from Czechoslovakia, and 5 from Rumania. An equal number of Americans will go to each country, except that only 12 Americans are slated to go to Poland. The 20 Soviet exchangees would include 10 students, two research scholars, and eight leaders.

c. For Soviets coming to this country the U.S. would pay all expenses in the U.S. but not international travel expenses. For other foreigners, it is contemplated to pay international travel costs as well as expenses in the U.S.

d. It is contemplated that the U.S. will pay only international travel costs for Americans going to the Soviet Union, but all costs for Americans going to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.

e. Students, teachers, and research scholars would be exchanged for a full academic year; leaders and specialists would visit for several months only.

f. Total cost of the 114 exchanges is estimated at $554,000. IES plans to ask Congress for a supplemental appropriation of this amount to be expended in FY 1958 and FY 1959, and hopes that a decision can be reached by April 1958, so that student, teacher, and research scholar exchanges can begin with the opening of the academic year in September 1958, and leader exchanges even earlier.

8. The United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, in a recent report to the Secretary of State,[8] has approved the IES project in principle. The Commission recognizes the program as a "modest one" but a "beginning." The Commission stresses the need for caution and flexibility, and "accepts the assurance of the Department that exchanges will be carried out only as it is determined that this can be done on the basis of reciprocity, as Congress intended, and with adequate provisions for sufficient freedom of movement and protection of the educational content of such exchanges as to warrant a reasonable expectation that the goals prescribed by Congress for these programs can be achieved."

[8] Not further identified.

9. Here is a brief summary of the second project, submitted by the East-West Contacts Staff, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The various aspects of this project, too, are quite tentative at the present time.

a. This project differs from the IES project in that it involves only students and only two countries, U.S. and USSR. Also, the number of students to be exchanged is considerably greater and the length of the visits much shorter.

b. During the summer of 1958, for a period of about six weeks, 100 American students would visit the Soviet Union and 100 Soviet students would visit the United States.

c. It is contemplated that the travel costs of American students to and from the Soviet Union would be paid for by the U.S. Government, and that the expenses of the American students in the Soviet Union would be borne by the Soviet Government.

c. [*d.*] To keep down the costs to the U.S. Government (and at the same time to simplify the task of selecting Americans to visit the Soviet Union) it is proposed that each American exchangee contribute a sum in dollars which would defray the expenses of a Soviet student during his stay in this country. (The contributions required of the American students might be raised for some of them by foundations, scholarship funds, church groups, labor unions, etc.) The travel expenses of the Soviet students to and from the U.S. would be paid for by the Soviet Government.

e. Travel costs to and from the Soviet Union for 100 Americans are estimated at $100,000. A supplemental appropriation of this amount would be requested from Congress in conjunction with the IES request.

f. The Soviet visitors would probably go in groups of 20 to five different universities which have, or would organize, appropriate summer seminars.

g. In view of the nature of the project and the number of persons involved, present security requirements for Soviet bloc visitors, which put too much of a burden on the American hosts, would have to be revised. Obviously, it would not be possible or desirable to require individual surveillance over each Soviet student. It is anticipated that most of the visitors would be handled in groups and would be under constant observation of faculty advisers and the student organizers of the project. The security dangers would appear to be minimum. However, responsibility for security should rest solely with the FBI.

Pros and Cons of the Proposed Projects

10. *Disadvantages* of launching any program of student exchanges with Communist countries might include:

a. Soviet bloc students in this country might engage in espionage or subversive activities. (However, it is more likely that the bloc governments involved would prefer to put their best foot forward and avoid the possibility of a display of bad faith. Furthermore, it is questionable that bloc governments would find use of

exchangees for these purposes worthwhile. It is expected that any such activities could be controlled by our security organs.)

b. The bloc governments might seek to subvert American students abroad. Also, American students, because they are often less mature politically and in other ways than many foreign students, might, through their immaturity, reflect adversely upon the U.S. (It is contemplated that the selection process would ensure that the U.S. participants be representative of the best of American youth and thus would reduce these risks to a minimum.)

c. In addition, there will be some public opposition to the exchanges in this country as unwarranted burdens on the taxpayers or as an unnecessary display of willingness to cooperate with, and lend prestige to, Communist regimes. (On the other hand, broad public support for the principle of student exchange with Communist countries has already been manifest. The current intellectual ferment and interest in new ideas among Soviet bloc students is fairly well known to the American public, and it is clear that student exchange is one of the few steps which the U.S. can take to further directly its program of promoting peaceful change in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.)

d. There may be opposition to the proposed projects from some quarters on the grounds that they are too modest, too small-scale, to meet the needs of the times. (Both projects are in the nature of pilot operations for the first year, and could be expanded considerably if this should prove desirable on the basis of actual experience.)

e. Another disadvantage might be that other countries more susceptible to Communist penetration than the U.S. would be influenced by the U.S. example and initiate or increase their own exchange programs with bloc countries, to the overall detriment of the Free World cause. (It is true, however, that extensive exchanges are already underway in many countries, and it is hoped that the example set by the U.S. of careful organization of exchange programs and careful selection of exchangees will have a beneficial effect.)

11. *The advantages* of the proposed projects would include:

a. Exposure for even six weeks to American life could be expected to widen the intellectual horizon of Soviet bloc students, at least to some extent, and to suggest new ways of thinking, which Communist education has sedulously withheld from them.

b. The returning Soviet bloc students could be expected to share, to a degree consistent with personal security, their experience in the U.S. with many fellow students who have had no contact with the U.S. and thereby help to correct misconceptions about this country which their governments encourage.

c. The returning Soviet bloc students could be expected to act as a leaven in their society, working in the direction of a decrease in tension between the Soviet bloc and the West. Thus, as a more immediate result, they could be expected to increase pressure within their society for wider contacts outside the Sino-Soviet bloc, and in the long run to encourage evolutionary change in the Soviet system.

d. The American students in the Soviet bloc could be expected to help spread among the people a first-hand knowledge of the

outside world, particularly of the U.S. A good example of this process at work was seen in the impact of foreign visitors on Soviet young people at the recent Moscow youth festival. [9]

e. Their experience would encourage many to pursue studies of the Russian language, of Communism and of the USSR and perhaps to increase ultimately the pool of U.S. specialists in those areas of knowledge.

f. The returning American students could be expected in themselves and through their influence among other Americans to increase popular American recognition of problems of American foreign relations, particularly with the Soviet bloc.

g. Soviet acceptance of the proposal would make it possible to achieve the advantages described above. Soviet rejection would bring with it a loss of prestige among the peoples of the world, including those within the Soviet bloc and in the "uncommitted areas" of the world.

Recommendation:

12. The Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems finds that the program for student and educational exchanges with the USSR and other countries of Eastern Europe set forth in the two projects proposed by the International Exchange Service and the East-West Contacts Staff of the Department of State, and outlined in paragraphs 7 and 9 above, is a logical, timely, and highly desirable first step in the right direction and recommends that the OCB concur in this finding.

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[9] The Sixth World Festival of Youth and Students held in Moscow, July 28–August 11, the results of which are analyzed in *Soviet Affairs*, September 1957, pp. 11–13. (Department of State, INR Files, *Soviet Affairs*)

113. Notes on the Meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board, October 16, 1957 [1]

Washington, October 16, 1957.

Report on Proposed Government Program for Student Exchange with Soviet Union and Other Countries of Eastern Europe [2]

Mr. Lacy (S/EWC), Mr. Kendrick (EE), Mr. Merrill (P/EWC) and Mr. Wyman (P/IES) were present for the discussion.

In his briefing for the Board Mr. Lacy stated that talks with the USSR were now scheduled to begin in Washington on October 28. He summarized U.S.-USSR exchanges for the past few years and noted several of the disadvantages arising from legislative and Department of Justice requirements. It was pointed out that NSC 5607 [3] charges the Department with its implementation in conjunction with the Department of Justice, and that both Departments were directed to develop and apply internal security safeguards. Mr. Lacy stated the present system, which requires that the Department secure sponsors for Soviet bloc visitors, has been burdensome and disliked by American schools and individuals who have undertaken to act in this capacity.

The exchange proposals were presented to the Board. In one, the U.S. and USSR would exchange 100 students for a period of six weeks in the summer of 1958 or later at a cost of about $100,000. The second proposal was for a U.S.-Soviet European bloc exchange of 114 persons, students and teachers for one year, leaders and specialists for six months. The latter program would cost about $550,000. It was generally agreed that the objectives of both programs accord with NSC policy. Mr. Larson stated his conviction that a six-week program is much too short to be effective and suggested that anything less than a year is inadequate.

Under Secretary Herter pointed out that NSC policy requires the U.S. to take the initiative in such exchanges as a positive instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Since the U.S. negotiators in the coming talks must know the boundaries of their authority, particularly with regard to internal security requirements, he said that the present State and Justice positions would be discussed at the Cabinet meeting next week.

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[1] Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, East-West Exchanges. Secret. The source text was taken from Richards' memorandum of October 16 to Lacy, in which he made the following prefatory remark: "For your information there is quoted below an excerpt from my preliminary and informal notes on the OCB meeting of October 16, 1957."

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Document 104.

During the discussion of the financing of such programs, it was agreed that no attempt should be made to seek funds or supplemental appropriation for FY '58. Without excluding the possibility of some funds being found within the FY '58 exchange program, it was thought best that East-West programs should be presented as part of FY '59. Mr. Macy of the Budget Bureau said that he expects that in the coming election year there will be quicker Congressional action on budget requests.

Mr. John Reilly (Justice) said that he was under instructions from the Attorney General to say that the FBI could not take on the job of surveillance. He also said that it was the view in Justice that there were provisions in the Immigration and Naturalization Act which might preclude group or category waivers.

It was agreed that any East-West program should begin modestly; that the exchanges should embrace not only the USSR but the European Soviet bloc; and that flexibility in approach should be maintained.

Later, the Under Secretary said that some formal action would be required by agreement between the Secretary and the Attorney General or, failing this, a determination by the President, as regards the surveillance and waiver aspects of the exchanges. The Under Secretary asked that Mr. Lacy study this matter to determine precisely the position which should be adopted by the Secretary at the coming Cabinet meeting; also, that Mr. Lacy should set up a briefing of the Secretary on this subject.[4] The advice of L should be sought as regards the interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, especially with reference to the proposed approval of group or category waivers.

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[4] Cutler prepared a memorandum for the record regarding this discussion at the OCB meeting and sent it to Secretary Dulles as an attachment to a letter dated October 16. In the memorandum Cutler stated that the President apparently had forgotten that the security regulations governing exchanges had been discussed by the National Security Council the previous year, and that Cutler believed that it was preferable to continue discussion of the issue, if the Secretary of State and the Attorney General could not reach agreement, at the NSC rather than the Cabinet level. In a covering letter, Cutler wrote that the Attorney General had indicated there had been no discussion with the Secretary of State since the previous year about the regulations. Cutler suggested that Dulles and Brownell meet to work out revisions in the regulations and only if they were unsuccessful would Cutler schedule the issue for discussion at the NSC meeting of October 24. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, East-West Exchanges) No record of further discussion of this issue by Brownell and Dulles has been found, but they presumably were able to agree on revisions in the legislation since the subject was not scheduled for discussion at the October 24 meeting of the NSC or any subsequent meetings during 1957.

114. Editorial Note

On October 28, the first meeting was held in Washington between a Soviet Delegation, headed by Ambassador Georgi N. Zaroubin, and a United States Delegation, headed by Ambassador William S.B. Lacy, on the question of technical, scientific, and cultural exchanges. The opening statements made by Lacy and Zaroubin at this meeting are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 18, 1957, pages 880–883. The proceedings of the meeting and the proposals submitted by the two sides were summarized in telegram 491 to Moscow, October 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 511.603/10–2857)

Subsequent meetings were held on November 4, 8, 12, 14, and 21. The proceedings at these meetings were summarized in telegrams 526, 537, 547, 551, and 574, respectively, to Moscow, all of which are *ibid.*, Central File 511.603.

The negotiations were discussed at the Secretary of State's Staff meeting on November 26, at which Under Secretary of State Dillon presided. According to the notes of the meeting:

"In reply to the Under Secretary's comment on the rapid progress of the exchange negotiations with the Soviets, Mr. Lacy stated that a slowdown of the negotiations was planned. He indicated that the Soviets were eager to obtain the rights for a direct flight over the Pole to the US, whereas we were desirous of obtaining a satisfactory agreement on radio-TV exchanges. Despite the considerable area of agreement there was some doubt in Mr. Lacy's mind as to how faithfully these agreements would be carried out. He felt that we held an unusual advantage in these negotiations since we agreed in principle ad referendum to the appropriate American industry or association which would bear the final responsibility for the support of these exchanges. In response to a query from the Under Secretary, Mr. Lacy said that the negotiations on security regulations were going well and he assured the Under Secretary that he was fully aware of the necessity to refer this matter to the Department of Justice for its concurrence." (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

Another meeting was held on December 4, which was described in telegram 612 to Moscow, December 4. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 511.603/12–457) According to the notes of the Secretary of State's Staff meeting of December 10, Ambassador Lacy reported that the talks "had slowed down to a crawl in order that they could be protracted. Fifty separate exchanges have been discussed, half introduced by the Russians and half by us. About twenty-five have been agreed, generally in the ratio of one to one. The outstanding item the Russians want is the right for direct airflights to the US while the outstanding item we want is the right to present American TV

and radio shows to the Russian people. Mr. Lacy believes that the Russians will accept part of our radio and TV offer in the hope that we will agree to discuss direct airflights. It appears that it may be possible to negotiate an improvement concerning the free admissibility of films to the Soviet Union and improved circulation methods for the magazines *Amerika* and *USSR*. Mr. Lacy noted that there was certain subterranean propaganda from the Soviet side about the progress of the talks. In some instances the Russians had indicated that the talks were progressing satisfactorily, while in other cases they were reported as being dissatisfied with the progress being made." (*Ibid.*, Secretary Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

The Lacy–Zaroubin talks concluded on January 27, 1958.

Cyprus

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS DISPUTE [1]

115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [2]

Washington, January 27, 1955—6:40 p.m.

3865. Department feels Ninth GA's disposition Cyprus question [3] has gained some time which should be used in effort avoid even more difficult situation if matter is raised at next GA. This view expressed informally to British Embassy officer here who reported that within next few weeks, perhaps through planted question in Commons, Colonial Office probably will reveal current thinking on possibilities introducing new constitution in near future. In meantime and before UK has gone publicly on record with new plans, Embassy requested pursue question in similar vein with Fon Off.

Embassy might make following points:

1) US believes Cyprus question will almost certainly be raised by Greeks next GA. Greek Fon Min has already publicly stated this intention and there has been suggestion Greeks might attempt enlist co-sponsors for item. If no progress has been made in improving

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[1] For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 674 ff.

[2] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–2755. Secret. Drafted by Wood, Mangano, and William L. Hamilton of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs. Repeated to USUN and Athens and pouched to Ankara and Nicosia.

[3] During the Ninth Session of the General Assembly, September 21–December 17, 1954, Greece submitted an item concerning the principle of equal rights and self-determination in the case of the peoples of Cyprus. Although the General Assembly included the item in its agenda, it did not adopt any resolution on the subject. For a summary of the disposition of the Cyprus question at the Ninth General Assembly, see *Yearbook of the United Nations 1955*, pp. 77–78.

situation, we would be confronted with more serious difficulties in UN and possibly on island itself.

2) In these circumstances we believe it probably unrealistic expect GA could be prevented from consideration substantive resolution.

3) Eventual US position naturally not yet formulated.

4) Meanwhile we very much hope UK may be able establish better basis understanding with Cypriots.

5) We wish be helpful on this in any appropriate way and would welcome opportunity hear UK plans for improving political situation on island. In that connection would welcome further consultation with British at working level in London or Washington.[4]

Dulles

[4] In telegram 3355, January 31, the Embassy in London informed the Department that in view of the fact that the British Government was aware of the "gravity" of the problem and the extent of U.S. "anxiety" about it, it hesitated in approaching the Foreign Office regarding the substance of telegram 3865. In order to avoid "almost certain risk counter-productivity," the Embassy concluded, "we assume Department will approve our confining our approach at this time to a further inquiry of the Colonial Office as to whether there is anything new in Cyprus." (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–3155) On February 3, the Department informed the Embassy that it was prepared to accept the Embassy's advice that an approach to the Colonial Office be limited to an inquiry, but that it hoped that any conversation would be broadened to encompass the points included in telegram 3865. (Telegram 3980 to London; *ibid.*)

116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

Washington, March 15, 1955—6:25 p.m.

2275. Department impressed restraint parliamentary debate Cyprus. While this apparently reasonable mood lasts and before expected March 25 oratory suggest you consider démarche following lines adapted to your previous conversations.

Department continues follow Cyprus question closely since it continues as cause tension within NATO family. In this connection U.S. Government has been favorably impressed general tenor parliamentary debate. We intend retain reasonably flexible attitude re Cyprus so we will be free exercise our influence usefully. In general we anxious preserve harmony in NATO and are interested seeing

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1555. Confidential. Drafted by Wood. Repeated to London and pouched to Ankara and Nicosia.

orderly and evolutionary development political rights Cypriot people. In balancing these two important considerations we are convinced Cypriot tactic avoiding all contacts and conversations with British is seriously mistaken. Cypriots should understand their aspirations will not be endangered if they adopt a reasonable attitude toward the British. In examining problem U.S. must weigh heavily whether Cypriots willing to adopt constructive long range attitude. Does not appear sign of political maturity to ask that British promise plebiscite before holding discussions. This attitude will only restrict their opportunity develop political experience and responsibility. If Cypriot leaders adopt reasonable and patient attitude there is opportunity real progress.

Cypriots ask sympathy of free world, but should remember that any increase freedom requires equal increase responsibility and cooperation.

FYI Any démarche should scrupulously avoid discussion UNGA aspects this problem.

Embassy will receive copy letter Jernegan to Foster (London) discussing British side question. [2]

Dulles

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

117. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and the Greek Ambassador (Melas), Department of State, Washington, May 25, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Ambassador Melas spoke of the landing of the Greek airmen on Cyprus and of the treatment they received from the British authorities. Without stressing the incident, he indicated that the British would not have acted as they did unless they had general U.S. support on the Cyprus question. As a result of Greek reaction his Government had had to cancel the visit of the British fleet scheduled for June 2.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5–2555. Confidential. Prepared by Wood on May 31.

On the overall Cyprus question the Greeks were exasperated because the U.K. had not given them the island as promised in the past and because of incidents such as the above. However the main source of dissatisfaction was the belief that the U.S. supported the U.K. This was causing a very serious situation in Greece and would affect Greece's support of U.S. policies. The Ambassador believed our position was due to U.K. and French pressure and doubted if it reflected our real feelings. He quoted the President as having told him he was surprised that the U.K. had not found a solution to the problem.[2] The Ambassador spoke sincerely of his admiration for the U.S. and of his belief that with the formation of Western Union, America's freedom of action had been increased. Only the U.S. could do something constructive about Cyprus. He said Greece did not necessarily want public debate and desired to be reasonable. This was a question on which it would be easy for the U.S. to be on the right side.

The Secretary replied that we had sincere friendships for both Greece and the U.K. and that we do not act arbitrarily. We act from one dominant motive: our desire to keep the Free World free and strong. Greece knows this from the time when she was in danger. It is not easy to keep a coalition of free states together. Our actions are not due to favoritism. It is incorrect to assume that our actions are dictated by the U.K. Some things go on beneath the surface.

The Secretary emphasized two points:

1. We pay careful and sympathetic heed to what has been said.
2. Our action will be based on what we think is the best way to meet the overriding peril of our time.

We sympathize with the aspirations of those wanting self-determination. We appeal to Greece to keep this matter within reasonable bounds.

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[2] Not further identified.

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118. Editorial Note

On June 21, Secretary Dulles, attending the Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the United Nations at San Francisco, June 20–26, raised the problem of Cyprus with British Foreign Secretary Macmillan. Dulles expressed United States interest in resolving the problem and in any British proposals toward that end. According to Macmillan,

he had a plan that he could not reveal before Cabinet consideration. The Foreign Secretary added that he hoped that if the plan materialized it would "relax the tension." (Secto 11 from the United States Delegation at San Francisco, June 21; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.006–2155)

119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

Washington, July 1, 1955—2:33 p.m.

4. Your 2853. [2] Greek Ambassador Melas called in emotional state yesterday and denounced UK invitation re Cyprus in bitter terms and at length, due to inclusion of Turkey. He was informed that acceptance was naturally question for Greek Government to determine but we felt his Government should consider matter carefully and we hoped invitation would be accepted. He was reminded that Greece should not make it difficult for her friends to support her and that discussion of defense questions made inclusion of Greece's ally Turkey not inappropriate. He was in no way mollified and went away repeating imprecations against UK for "once more following its policy of divide and rule".

You may inform Greek Government that . . . since our opinion is requested we regard invitation as progressive step and believe it is important to accept the invitation and enter negotiations in good faith. This is first time British have been willing discuss Cyprus with other powers and if Greeks refused offer they would not only lose sympathy but would place themselves in difficult position as members of UN, NATO and Balkan Pact. Acceptance invitation does not commit Greeks on policy matters. Greece, Turkey and UK have primary interest in area and to us it seems eminently reasonable they

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–3055. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Allen. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Nicosia.

[2] In telegram 2853, June 30, the Embassy at Athens informed the Department that it conveyed to the Greek Government the views outlined in telegram 3463. The Embassy also noted that it believed it important to be in a position to convey the "considered" views of the Department to the Foreign Minister and if appropriate to the Greek Prime Minister not later than July 1. (Telegram 2853, *ibid.*; telegram 3463 to Athens, June 29, *ibid.*, 747C.00/6–2955)

should discuss their problems. We favor discussions but take no position on their substance. [3]

Dulles

[3] In telegram 24 from Athens, July 2, Thurston conveyed the U.S. position along the lines outlined in telegram 4 to Panagiotis Canelopoulos. Thurston reported that Canelopoulos read an instruction prepared by him and the Prime Minister that outlined the Greek position on the British proposal. According to Thurston, the "essence" of the Greek position is the acceptance in principle of Britain's invitation with "certain reservations" about the rights of Turkey on the subject of self-determination. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/7–255)

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120. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State [1]

Paris, July 16, 1955—3 p.m.

Secto 20. Re Athens 131 to Department, [2] repeated Paris 3. Secretary met with Stephanopoulos before NATO meeting at latter's request. Stephanopoulos said that at Strasbourg [3] Macmillan had told him that the Cyprus conference might be convened during first ten days of August. Yesterday British informed Greeks that conference could not meet before August 29. It was also obvious that UK and Turks had consulted and agreed before informing Greeks. Stephanopoulos said delaying conference to August 29 would create major public opinion problem in Greece. If the British were unwilling to advance date the Greeks would feel obliged to table the Cyprus question with the UN prior to August 20. Although tabling it, the Greeks would agree not to act on complaint until it was clear that Cyprus conference was not productive. If productive Greeks would withdraw complaint. Stephanopoulos asked Secretary to urge Macmillan to advance date of conference to 10th or 15th and Secretary

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 474C.00/7–1655. Secret. Repeated to Athens. Dulles was in Paris en route to Geneva to attend the Geneva Conference, July 18–23.

[2] In telegram 131 from Athens, July 15, Ambassador Cannon informed the Department that the British decision to set the Cyprus conference for August 29 had greatly distressed Greek officials. According to the Ambassador, these officials had indicated that Greek public and official circles felt that the proposed conference was merely a device to forestall U.N. action this year. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/7–1555)

[3] On June 3 it was announced in Strasbourg that the Greek Government had brought a complaint before the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe accusing Great Britain of human rights abuses on Cyprus.

agreed to discuss with Macmillan. Secretary pointed out if Greeks did not table Cyprus on UN agenda before August 20, they were not debarred from doing so later since they could always raise question in UN under the "urgency" procedure. Stephanopoulos replied if meeting were delayed to August 29 Greeks, for public opinion reasons, would have to raise question at UNGA.

Subsequently Secretary spoke to Macmillan re Cyprus talks. Macmillan said he could not advance the date of the conference and that it was up to the Greeks to do what they wanted re UNGA agenda. He thought that if they put Cyprus on the agenda before the talks it would not be a friendly or constructive act but it was up to them.

Dulles

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121. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

Washington, August 8, 1955—12:33 p.m.

365. Secretary and British Ambassador discussed Cyprus August 1. [2] Makins stressed following: 1. British seriously intend bring tripartite talks to successful conclusion but doubt Greeks equally prepared discuss matter constructively. Hope we will urge Greeks this end. 2. British believe there is evidence Stephanopoulos and Kannelopoulos thought U.S. favored or was sympathetic inscription GA agenda, hope they can be disabused this score. 3. In Greece anti-British propaganda re Cyprus continuing at high level despite Greek assurances it would be toned down. U.K. would appreciate our pointing out to Greeks forcefully as possible this does not help final solution.

FYI Secretary inquired whether British have plan for Cyprus. Makins answered he had no information. End FYI.

You are requested make forceful presentation points contained paragraph 1 above. Manner presentation your discretion, but re point 3 suggest discussion radio broadcasts to Cyprus.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–855. Secret. Drafted by Wood and Baxter. Repeated to London and USUN and pouched to Ankara and Nicosia.

[2] The full text of the memorandum of Dulles' conversation with Makins is *ibid.*, 747C.00/8–155.

You should also point out that continuing demonstrations and disorders in Cyprus will have effect prejudicing Greek position in tripartite talks. By sponsoring Cyprus cause in international forum and claiming right speak for Cypriots with UK, Greece has implicitly assumed some responsibility for Cypriot behavior. Greek Government protestations it has no power influence Cypriots cannot be accepted at face value. This is two way street. If Greek Government policies can be influenced by pressures from Cypriots and ethnarchy it also has responsibility exert influence on population Cyprus through all means available. [3]

Dulles

[3] In telegram 345, August 11, Ambassador Cannon informed the Department that, with the exception of point 2 in telegram 365, he had covered the substance of the Department's instructions to Stephanopoulos in a discussion on August 2. According to the Ambassador, the Foreign Minister had several "interesting" things to say. Among them, Cannon noted, was Stephanopoulos' fear that the Turks might prove "obdurate", his inquiry as to the likelihood of the United States sending an observer to the proposed conference, and the Foreign Minister's belief that a conference was the "only first step" toward a solution. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–1155)

122. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, August 10, 1955—2 p.m.

503. In course of conversation yesterday Permanent Under Secretary [2] stated that HMG's tactics at forthcoming conference regarding Cyprus would initially be to obtain formal declarations by Greece and Turkey of their respective positions. Cabinet had taken no decision about any hard and fast British plan but great deal of thought had been given to problem and many combinations and permutations had been considered. Therefore it could be "played by ear" following Greek and Turkish declarations. He emphasized that HMG certainly did not wish to produce a plan which would be acceptable neither to Greece or Turkey and if Greece's only position was enosis in near future then conference would be abortive. On other hand Kirkpatrick indicated that Macmillan was particularly

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–1055. Secret. Repeated to Athens and Ankara.

[2] Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick.

anxious to reach acceptable solution. He said he understood that Greek cabinet was divided on issue and in this connection he referred to recent articles in Turkish press to effect that if Greece felt free to abrogate unilaterally Treaty of Lausanne [3] there were articles which Turkey for its part might wish to change. This has in turn been taken up in Greek press.

Since British undoubtedly know what position Turkey will take at Conference their tactics are obviously designed to force Greece to define its attitude. If it is arbitrary and unreasonable Great Britain will not have lost Turkey's support. If it provides basis for compromise meeting could well be productive.

Butterworth

[3] On July 24, 1923, Turkey signed a treaty of peace with Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. Among its other provisions, the Treaty of Lausanne resulted in Turkish recognition of Britain's 1914 annexation of Cyprus and the renunciation of Turkey's claim to control the island. For text of the treaty of Lausanne, see the League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 28, p. 11.

123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, August 25, 1955—7:05 p.m.

1057. London authorized inform Foreign Office substance paragraph 2 Ankara's 231 repeated London 38. [2] May wish stress Turks called in our Ambassador and raised subject. If queried re statement "time is on side of Greeks" may explain this our frank long range evaluation in view strong current world opinion favorable self-determination. We have said this to Turks because we feel if they enter talks without some willingness be flexible, talks may well fail. Cyprus situation and British-Greek-Turkish relations would then

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–1855. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Baxter and Wood. Also sent to Ankara and Athens and pouched to USUN, USRO, and Nicosia.

[2] In paragraph 2 of telegram 231, August 18, Warren reported that he informed Foreign Minister Zorlu that the United States "strongly" hoped that the parties would not come to the London Conference with "fixed and irreconcilable positions" and although the Department had not formulated a policy on the question, it believed that "time is on the side of the Greeks". (*Ibid.*)

deteriorate rapidly. If talks fail, prestige Stephanopoulos and Rally [3] will be seriously jeopardized. Turks have stated they desire only continuation status quo.

London, Ankara may convey any or all following: On August 23 Turkish Ambassador Gork saw Secretary and referred Ambassador Warren's remarks reported Ankara's 231 which disturbed Turkish Government because they seemed imply change U.S. policy from last year's position in UN. Also referred indications Greeks believed they would receive U.S. support in UN this year. Gork asked we tell Greeks prior London talks they should not expect such support.

Secretary replied situation changed by U.K. invitation which we welcomed. Hoped all participants would show sincere determination work out solution. Concluded by stating we could not formulate UN position until outcome London talks known.

London, Athens, may convey any or all of following: On August 23 Greek Ambassador saw Asst. Secretary Allen and expressed fears re Turkish obduracy. [4] Allen stated belief time on side Greeks and they could therefore afford be reasonable. Melas apprehensive internal political pressures exerted on present Government. Allen referred Turkish insinuations that if Greece obtained Cyprus, would later demand other Turk territory. Melas strongly denied. Allen reemphasized necessity patience.

On August 24 Greek Ambassador saw Secretary who also urged moderation. Without suggesting Greeks not pursue their aims by legitimate means he referred to progress already made (change in British attitude) and urged Greeks not press so rapidly as to destroy other valuable elements (Greek relations with U.K. and Turkey, NATO harmony). Referred violence Greek press. Reiterated need moderation and desirability recognizing forthcoming talks not final chance resolve differences over Cyprus but forward step in process of peaceful evolution.

British Colonial Office representatives discussing UN questions in Department August 24 informed our position Cyprus would await outcome talks.

London: Department agrees with paragraphs 3 and 4 Athens 409 [5] repeated London 17. Embassy may express substance paragraph three

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[3] A conservative political group established in 1951 by Marshal Alexander Papagos and Spyros Markezinis. The Rally won a plurality of the vote in the elections of 1951 and remained in power since its victory in the 1952 elections.

[4] The text of the memorandum of Allen's conversation with the Greek Ambassador on August 23, is in Department of State, Central File 747C.00/8–2355.

[5] Telegram 409, August 20, contains information on Ambassador Cannon's August 18 meeting with Stephanopoulos and the Embassy's thoughts on Britain's tactics in the proposed conference on Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–2055)

to Foreign Office. Department agrees informal liaison arrangements sufficient (your 556 [6]).

Dulles

[6] In telegram 556, August 15, Butterworth informed the Department that he was "loath to establish a shadow conference" in the Embassy and expressed the hope that the Department would agree to "informal liaison arrangements." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–155)

124. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, September 7, 1955—8 p.m.

929. Foreign Secretary sent for me late this afternoon to describe reaction at today's session tripartite Cyprus conference [2] to his proposals of yesterday (Embel 906 [3] repeated Athens 32 Ankara 31 Nicosia 10). Macmillan indicated that Stephanopoulos had reacted as favorably to proposals as could be expected and in fact Macmillan had advised him privately not commit himself further than this without consulting his cabinet colleagues. Stephanopoulos took line that although Greek Government's views concerning British proposals remained to be decided, he knew his government would be disappointed and concerned over failure of British proposals to give categorical assurance self-government and specific date for promulgation constitution.

On other hand Macmillan said that he had to speak very straight and very forcefully to Zorlu in order to prevent him from breaking up conference then and there. It was obvious that Zorlu was under strict instructions from Menderes and did not feel free to move without Ankara's authority. Both Turks and Greeks had agreed to communicate their governments detailed reactions in writing. Zorlu had carefully avoided commenting on substance British

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–755. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Athens and Ankara and pouched to Nicosia.

[2] Regarding the conference on Cyprus, see footnote 4, Document 284.

[3] Telegram 906 from London, September 6, transmitted a summary of a statement made by Macmillan at a restricted session of the Cyprus Conference on that day. The Foreign Secretary's statement outlined two proposals: first, self-government for Cyprus based on a new and "liberal" constitution, and second, the establishment of a special tripartite and continuing committee to be set up in London to consider problems relating to self-government in Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/9–655)

proposals, indicating that given tension and violence in Cyprus created by enosis campaign pre-condition for consideration was withdrawal by Greece of claim for annexation.

Zorlu asked Macmillan in course of meeting whether United Kingdom believed in all circumstances in self-determination to which Macmillan replied in effect that this was one of basic principles on which British policy founded but it was not necessarily in all circumstances over-riding principle. He cited as example that he had recently at Vienna participated in conclusion of treaty [4] which specifically denied Austria right of self-determination because peace of Europe in matter of Anschluss was more important than right of self-determination for six million Austrians. I imagine that improvisations on this theme will be numerous in days to come.

Macmillan said that he had indicated that as chairman he proposed to "suspend" conference which would give him freer hand after statements of Greeks and Turks are received. This he hoped to have accepted at conference to be resumed tonight when communiqué will be agreed and publication of pertinent documents authorized. In this instance British are pressing for full publication all substantive statements. [5]

Naturally events in Salonika, Istanbul and Izmir considerably clouded today's proceedings. Stephanopoulos expressed profound regret over incident in Salonika and gave assurances Greek Government doing everything possible maintain law and order. Zorlu said regrettable tension over Cyprus had resulted in violence in Turkey—implication being that ultimate responsibility lay primarily with Greeks.

Turk delegation departs tomorrow for Ankara and Greek probably Friday for Athens.

Butterworth

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[4] For documentation on the Austrian State Treaty signed in Vienna on May 15, 1955, see vol. v, pp. 1 ff.

[5] On September 7, the Tripartite Conference was suspended until the Greek and Turkish Governments could consider British proposals for self-government on Cyprus. A summary of the views of the British, Turkish, and Greek Foreign Ministers, including Britain's proposals for Cypriot self-government, and Macmillan's and Zorlu's exchanges on Britain's attitude toward self-determination for Cyprus were made public that same day. Documentation is in Department of State, Central File 747C.00.

125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, September 9, 1955—7:47 p.m.

447. I. You are requested make representations Prime Minister along following lines:

U.S. Government has taken note Turkish Government's statement regarding recent events Istanbul and Izmir and welcomes intention offer full reparations. [2] At same time we wish Turk authorities to know, in all friendliness and frankness, that U.S. Government shocked over these events, especially over apparent lack effective police intervention in what appears to have been result coordinated planning. Concern felt over detrimental effect of quarrel between two members of NATO as well as of Balkan Alliance, with obvious advantage only to USSR. Moreover we are disappointed over apparent failure Turkish Government to recall realistic example of Ataturk [3] in submerging historic animosities in favor of Greek-Turkish friendship and to counter irresponsible and inflammatory press statements.

II. Following views should also be brought attention Turkish Government:

It is our understanding London Conference suspended while UK Government awaiting definitive reply from Greeks and therefore still possible for Turks make further considered reply. In circumstances we wish Turkish Government to know U.S. Government considers three countries most concerned with Cyprus question will best serve their own interests, as well as those of all free world, by maintaining flexible positions and evidencing willingness consider proposals put forward in good faith to ameliorate problem which is becoming dangerous to stability in Eastern Mediterranean. Proposals put forward by U.K. are in accordance principles UN Charter and in our view do not compromise basic Turkish position. We understand British proposed institution tri-partite committee to discuss possible forms self-government for Cyprus. This considered reasonable and fruitful suggestion. Re international status Cyprus, British proposal that three parties agree to disagree records Turkish objection to any

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/9–955. Confidential. Drafted by Crain and Snyder. Repeated to Athens, London, and Paris Topol and pouched to Nicosia.

[2] On September 7, the Turkish Government expressed regret for the damage done to Greek property and promised quick compensation to those individuals who had suffered.

[3] Mustafa Kemal, popularly known as Ataturk, founder and President of the first Turkish Republic.

change in status and in no way infringes Turkish position on this issue.

US Government asks Turkish Government weigh most seriously advantages of continuing negotiations re self-government in tripartite committee against disadvantages providing opportunity for exploitation of issue in UN where countries inimical to West in general and to colonialism in particular would undoubtedly exacerbate problem. In these circumstances UN action may well go beyond moderate modus vivendi possible under U.K. proposals. Such UN action would seem more than likely in view recent events Turkey which have caused world sympathy to redound to Greek benefit. Early, moderate and responsible action by Turkish Government would seem timely when world opinion focused on Turkey. [4]

Hoover

[4] In telegram 381, September 12, Warren informed the Department that, in Menderes' absence, he had communicated to Zorlu the substance of paragraph 1 of telegram 447 and an aide-mémoire incorporating the substance of paragraph 2. According to the Ambassador, Zorlu's reaction was "strong and unfavorable." Turkey could not be asked, Zorlu noted, to make all the sacrifices. However deplorable the rioting in Istanbul and Izmir, Turkey "had already been principal sufferer" and these incidents should not be used to compel Turkey to make substantive concessions contrary to its interests and to the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/9–1255)

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126. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, September 9, 1955—7 p.m.

975. In its reconsideration of situation in eastern Mediterranean in wake of collapse of Cyprus conference and flare-up of ancient Greek-Turkish hatred, Department may wish to take into account following factors affecting British position primarily.

1. Complex of Middle East problems, including failure of MEDO, [2] conclusion of Suez evacuation agreement, [3] and now

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–955. Secret. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

[2] In October 1951, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, in an effort to formulate a regional plan for Middle East defense, proposed the idea of a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) to Egypt. No Arab states were receptive to the initial plan. This plan, sponsored under the auspices of the United Kingdom

Greek-Turkish imbroglio in its present incandescence, in British eyes give Cyprus under firm British control a strategic importance which it has not had since 1878. While some observers here (and not only Labor critics of government's Cyprus policy) challenge this thesis on grounds island has many defects as base under modern conditions, Cabinet's adherence to this view accounts for Macmillan's emphatic repudiation of intention to apply principle of self-determination in Cyprus within foreseeable future. Embassy believes government recognizes Cyprus might be virtually useless as base in event outbreak of third world war but assesses its present vital importance in terms of United Kingdom's peace-time strategic posture toward Middle East and operations short of major war it might be called upon to undertake to live up to its commitments there.

2. Hardly anyone here in or outside government has been or is happy about Cyprus policy but recriminations or cries over spilt milk seem likely to take form that British concessions (willingness to discuss situation with Greeks and liberality of self-government proposals) might have been enough to reach agreement 2 years or even year ago though no British Government could have given up both Suez and Cyprus simultaneously and successfully faced a general election. In existing situation Embassy anticipates bipartisan support for government's contention that any weakening on self-determination issue in near future would not only vitiate usefulness of base but even more serious would invite unilateral Turkish action and communal explosion on island. In other words British flexibility now would evoke disorders rather than calm them.

3. Embassy recognizes of course difficulties in way of realization of British desideratum, namely, attempt to shelve self-determination theme in order to concentrate on development of self-government. Our impression is however that British are in earnest about quickly increasing prerogatives of Cypriots while assuring rights of Turkish minority and will go further than now indicated once they are assured self-government will not mean Communist coup on lines of British Guiana.[4] To best of Embassy's knowledge Turks have not until recently opposed constitutional advances in Cyprus and Greeks

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and the United States, was realized in February 1955 with the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact between Iraq and Turkey. For documentation on the origins of the Middle East Defense Organization, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. V, pp. 1 ff.

[3] On October 19, 1954, the Governments of Egypt and the United Kingdom concluded an agreement regarding the British evacuation of the Canal Zone. Among its provisions, the agreement provided for the complete withdrawal of all British forces from Egyptian territory within 20 months. For text of the accord, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, pp. 248–254.

[4] In 1953, the East Indian-supported People's Progressive Party of Dr. Cheddi B. Jagan came into power in British Guiana. Later the same year he was removed because of British fears that the party had pro-Communist tendencies.

have no sound reason for refusing to increase political experience of their Cypriot blood brothers as prelude to further study of island's future status.

4. If Department concludes that U.S. should intervene directly in this hornet's nest, I suggest that effort to preach benefits of sweet reason . . . is too narrow an approach. More promising would be confidential and discreet approach to both Athens and Ankara on basis: (a) Put aside self-determination for time being; (b) British have belatedly but now evidenced sincere intention to improve political status of all Cypriots and their proposals deserve serious study; (c) Reply to British in noncommittal fashion which will enable Macmillan to reconvene conference after considerable interval to discuss only self-government for Cyprus; and (d) Utilize conference to explore and test British constitutional plans.

5. From Embassy's viewpoint it is most undesirable to leave Greeks with any idea that U.S. believes United Nations discussion of issue could be fruitful or serve to diminish tensions. Whereas last year British were on defensive about their weak position, they now are almost sure (hotly supported by Turks) to reiterate issue is within their domestic jurisdiction and to contend that their proposals for self-government provide a fair and attractive basis for eventual reconsideration of principle of self-determination once representative institutions in Cyprus are functioning democratically and efficiently.

Butterworth

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127. Message From Athens [1]

September 12, 1955—3:11 p.m.

1. The destruction in Istanbul is massive following the anti-Greek rioting on 6 September but vigorous measures are being taken to clean up the city prior to the opening of the IBRD–IMF Bank Conference on 12 September. Preliminary size-up of the situation, which is subject to confirmation as further facts are known, is as follows. After Cypriot-Turkish demonstration in London, the Turkish Government presumably felt it important to have corresponding demonstrations in various points in Turkey. Demonstrations got under way in Istanbul and Izmir particularly, with the acquiescence

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782C.00/9–1555. Secret; Priority.

of the local police. Rioting quickly got out of hand and the police possibly had no instructions to take vigorous action. Meanwhile rabble elements and professional looters took over and looting became indiscriminate.

2. Although the primary target was Greek, the Armenians, Jews and some foreigners had a rough time of it and even some Turks suffered. Finally the army intervened and the mobs dispersed. The army will probably continue to maintain order during the forthcoming Bank conference; it is not probable that the representatives at the conference are in any physical danger. Tanks and troops are very much in evidence and will presumably be held ready to meet any emergency.

3. Long range consequences are hard to judge and might be most serious. Leading Turkish elements are apparently deeply humiliated and distressed and there appears to be an opportunity to reestablish situation without lasting harm to NATO or Balkan Alliance if properly exploited and if Greek reaction remains reasonably tempered. This will require wisdom and restraint in a highly volatile and explosive situation. It is doubtful that the Communists had a directing hand in this situation but they undoubtedly will endeavor to profit by the general confusion resulting from these incidents.

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128. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Greek Ambassador (Melas) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan), Department of State, Washington, September 12, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus

The Greek Ambassador called today immediately after returning from his participation in the London talks on Cyprus to recapitulate briefly the course of the conference and its disappointing outcome. He said that Greece had an absolutely clear conscience as to its behavior. It had gone to London with the sincere intention of making a constructive contribution and it had stated its views with

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1255. Secret. Drafted by Baxter.

such moderation as to evoke praise from the British participants themselves. The Ambassador contrasted the Greek restraint with the "fantastic" charges and wild statements made by the Turks. The Greek record certainly proved, he said, that his country had steadfastly based its policy on the ideals of that great statesman, Venizelos,[2] whose vision had laid the foundations of modern Greek-Turkish friendship. Furthermore, Greece had recently taken the lead in bringing Yugoslavia into a Balkan Alliance when the memory was still fresh of armed Communist aggression on Greece originating from Yugoslav territory. The Ambassador could not accept, he stated emphatically, any imputation that Greece had done anything to threaten the security of Turkey or to justify the hostile Turkish attitude.

The Ambassador said his Government did not envisage success from a conference to which Britain had invited a country which had no right to discuss Cyprus. The Greeks had repeatedly given assurances of special treatment for the Turkish minority, but the basic issue of the self-determination of the Cypriots was a question to be discussed solely by Great Britain and Greece. The Ambassador was convinced that Secretary Dulles, who had worked so hard to get these talks started had at no time envisaged that they would be *tri*partite.

The British proposals, when they were finally made, ostensibly suggested self-government, but they were, according to the Ambassador, the very negation of self-government: they recommended the establishment of a control committee in London. This was nothing but a condominium arrangement, in which the minority and the British would dominate the majority (Greek) interest. As a further indication that the British were not "serious" in their proposals, the Ambassador said that, in the final London meeting, the Turks were "made to ask questions" which elicited answers from the British Government to the effect that the question of the international status of Cyprus or self-determination were not to be discussed in the foreseeable future. This proved that, despite the constructive attitude with which Greece had approached the conference, others, "with encouragement from various sources", had no intention of trying to work out a solution.

In this connection Mr. Jernegan said he must take issue with the Ambassador's interpretation. All of our information indicated that the British had suggested the talks and entered into them in good faith. (The Ambassador obviously refused to accept this.) Mr. Jernegan added that he believed the conference had not been completely negative; the British proposals represented some progress and he

[2] Eleutherios Venizelos, Greek statesman and former Prime Minister.

hoped everyone concerned would give very serious consideration to them.

When the conversation turned to the recent unfortunate anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir, the Ambassador said the fact that demonstrations began simultaneously in widely scattered areas and that "bombs" were set in Greek churches indicated advance planning. He also denied in most vehement terms that the dynamiting of the Turkish Consulate in Salonika was "done by a Greek hand."

Mr. Jernegan said that we were shocked by the outbreak of violence in Turkey. Our views had been made known to the Turkish Government, and at the same time we had urged that they do everything in their power to prevent worsening of their relations within NATO and in the Balkan Alliance. As the Ambassador probably knew, we had informed the Greek Government of our gratification at the steps taken by the Greek Government to prevent retaliatory demonstrations in Greece and to protect Turkish property. However, we were greatly concerned at the growing indications of the revival of old animosities which the Greek Government—and the Ambassador personally—had done so much to suppress. It was understandable that emotions were running high at the present time, but it appeared to us that all of the reasons which had existed in the time of Venizelos for trying to bring about close Greek-Turk friendship still obtained. Any attempt to assess responsibility for the present situation was irrelevant when larger issues were at stake. The gravity of the situation was unmistakable when the Greek Foreign Minister informed us that, if the Turkish Government refused to accept the revised version of a Note which it rejected in its first form as containing unacceptable aspersions on Turkish officials, the Greek Government would sever diplomatic relations with Turkey. The Greek Ambassador was visibly shaken by this information, which he had not heard from his Foreign Office. Mr. Jernegan said that, according to a subsequent message, the Greek Cabinet had, for the time being at least, rejected the idea of a break in diplomatic relations, but the fact that such a step was seriously considered and might still be a possibility indicated the degree to which relations had deteriorated. Mr. Jernegan also referred to the Greek announcement that its forces would not participate in NATO maneuvers. This would be a great blow to Allied unity, and he hoped the Greek Government could reconsider its decision. To justify the Greek position, the Ambassador pointed out the danger of unfortunate incidents if Greek and Turkish units should participate in joint military exercises at this time.

As the Ambassador left he asked Mr. Jernegan how he felt about the forthcoming UN meeting. Mr. Jernegan said he contemplated the prospect of discussion on the Cyprus question with

consternation and fear. He believed further public debate could serve no one's interests and would only exacerbate feelings now at fever pitch. He would hope that the question could be discussed in some other forum than that of the General Assembly. It was noteworthy that Mr. Melas, though not agreeing to this suggestion, did not immediately state that his Government could under no circumstances agree to keeping Cyprus off the UN agenda. [3]

[3] On September 13, Ambassador Melas called on Hoover and Murphy to discuss Cyprus. The Ambassador covered the same ground as he had with Jernegan except that he made a strong plea for the United States to exert pressure on Great Britain and Turkey in an effort to change their attitudes toward Cyprus. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) The following day, Melas discussed Cyprus with Merchant and read a telegram he had received from his government stating that it was necessary that the Cyprus situation be brought before the United Nations. (Memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1655)

129. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, September 13, 1955—4 p.m.

653. Foreign Ministry official who is aware of US representation in Ankara [2] told us today that Greek Government, and most particularly Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos, are deeply concerned over heightening pitch of opposition and press attacks (A) on US for failure make public expression of shock over recent events in Turkey and (B) intensity of campaign to smear Stephanopoulos as US stooge responsible for failure and humiliation at London and subsequent Turkish riots. Official pointed out that Stephanopoulos is carrying all the blame from every quarter and risks having to resign for being too pro-American, an ironical situation which would have been inconceivable a few months ago.

Official made strong plea that US find a way to let Greek people know true feelings of US. He also suggested that it was in US interest to support Stephanopoulos since if he were to go result could only be less moderate Greek position and serious diminution US influence.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.81/9–1355. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Ankara and pouched to Salonika.

[2] Presumably the reference is to the instructions in telegram 447, Document 125.

Comment: There is no doubt US prestige and influence has taken sharp downward turn in Greece. Greece pride has been hurt that leader "civilized" world has not voiced expected humanitarian sense of shock at Turkish actions. Behind this is a real feeling of abandonment and isolation due failure US to speak out which would have encouraged others step up and be counted. We would hope that Department will find way quickly to meet and reverse this mounting tide of feeling. [3]

Thurston

[3] On September 17, in telegram 823 to Athens, the Department instructed the Embassy to deliver a personal message from Secretary Dulles to Prime Minister Papagos. In the message, Dulles indicated that he had followed the "deterioration" of Greek-Turkish relations over the Cyprus issue with "concern" and noted that regardless of the causes of the dispute the unity of NATO must be restored without delay. The Secretary added that over the past decade Greece and Turkey had cooperated to deter "Communist ambitions" in the eastern Mediterranean and noted that he found it difficult to believe that both countries would allow this cooperation to end over the events of the past several weeks. Dulles reminded the Greek Government of the consequences of weakening that strong bulwark and urged the Prime Minister to make sure that the "effectiveness" of the Greek-Turkish partnership was not ruined by present conflicts. An identical message was also sent to the Turkish Prime Minister. Telegram 823 also transmitted the text of a statement that the Department planned to release to the press on September 18. It indicated that the Department had expressed "deep concern" over the violence in Istanbul and Izmir and noted that the Secretary sent personal messages to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey. (Department of State, Central Files, 681.82/9–1755)

130. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, September 16, 1955—6 p.m.

694. Department pass USUN. In exploring areas in which progress might be made on Cyprus issue, we believe NATO and UN mechanisms hold greatest promise.

All responsible Greeks fully appreciate overriding importance for Greece of maintenance NATO relationships and are determined do everything possible to maintain them within limits imposed by Greek public opinion. Nevertheless, Greeks say further public expression of contrition by Turks is essential to progress. View these

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/9–1655. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Ankara, Paris for Knight, and Rome for Maffitt.

attitudes and because army is strongest single element in this country, we should maintain pressure on Greeks and Turks through NATO mechanism. For the moment, however, possibilities for progress through NATO mechanism are additionally limited by fact that in last few days Greek press, including government papers, has intensified anti-NATO campaign. Indications are Greek Government encouraging this line in large measure because they consider it as most likely method pressure US into some public expression reaction to recent events. (As Department is aware, US silence on events in Turkey has become dominant theme here, second only to shock and revulsion at riots themselves in emphasis given by government, opposition, army, press and man in street.) Now, more recently, this plea for public voicing US views on events is coupled with expression of hope that we will not take public position against Greece at UNGA.

With approach UNGA, Greek Government increasingly worried over cumulative effect possible US position at GA adverse to Greece, on top of continued US silence on Turkish events. While government believes it can hold the line until GA convenes, it seems clear that Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos' political future depends on his achieving something in New York. Moreover, Rallis, Minister to Prime Minister, told me yesterday he fears demonstrations here if things go badly for Greece in UN.

Given situation outlined above, we believe UN mechanism offers best immediate hope for progress. Since US attitude is key to problem, we strongly urge that most serious consideration be given to reaffirmation our traditional position by affirmative vote for inscription Cyprus issue on GA agenda, accompanied by explanatory statement expressing US hope that interested parties will devote intervening period of time prior reaching item on agenda to serious exploration (or re-examination as case may be) of British proposals or other fruitful avenues leading to development representative Cypriot political institutions.

Affirmative vote on inscription would not only accurately reflect true present status Cyprus issue as situation clearly involving maintenance international peace and security but also would put US in position to exert useful influence for solution of problem. View London conference and subsequent events, it will be difficult support position this year that Cyprus question falls within scope Article 2 (7) UN Charter. [2]

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[2] Article 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter stipulates that nothing in the Charter authorized the United Nations to intervene in matters that were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.

We suggest possible uses such influence along following lines: US to use its good offices to get Greek and UK delegates together to try and work out a mutually acceptable formula which could then be put up to the Turks in such a way as to make it difficult for latter to reject. Meanwhile, similar quiet efforts could be made with Turks to lead them away from their present intransigent attitude.

We believe both Greek and British sincerely desire find some solution Cyprus issue (strong indication Greek desires this respect contained recent statement by Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos (see Embtel 687 [3])) demonstrates realistic effort prepare Greek public for possible disappointment at UNGA and keep door open for further negotiations with UK. As to British, they appear severely shocked by outcome of events and willing to do something about it. Moreover, they apparently intend to go ahead with constructive steps in Cyprus, if necessary alone. In recent conversation British Embassy officer told us that while his indications are Greeks will turn down British proposals, he thought Greeks would be smart to take more flexible position and leave door open, thus "leaving Turks out on limb." Queried re probable UK reaction such flexible Greek position, he said UK considers Cyprus question as kind of poison in blood stream of Anglo-Greek relations which UK would do good deal to get rid of "if given half a chance by Greeks."

Times and timing call for injection catalytic agent, which only US can supply.

Thurston

[3] Telegram 687, September 16, transmitted the highlights of Stephanopoulos' speech replying to the opposition. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1655)

131. Message From Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Secretary of State Dulles [1]

London, September 15, 1955.

I expect you will have had a full report on the Tripartite Conference on Cyprus from your people here, with whom we have been in close touch. I deeply regret that we were not able to persuade the Greeks and the Turks to accept our proposals for a settlement, but I still hope that with time they will come round to accepting them as at least a basis for further discussion. In our desire to find a way out of this most unfortunate and dangerous dispute, we took an unprecedented step in agreeing to discuss with two foreign governments the internal affairs of an indisputably British territory. We also invited them to join with us in working out a system of self-government. This offer remains open. We are very grateful for the support which our efforts received through your Embassies in London, Athens and Ankara. Meanwhile, although we still await the official reply from Athens, the indications are that the Greek Government are determined to reject our proposals and to go ahead once more with their appeal to the United Nations. I am convinced that it could only make matters worse if the Greeks succeeded in getting the matter debated again in the United Nations. There is no hope that this would lead to a solution, while it is certain that the discussion would further inflame Greco-Turkish relations and increase the strain upon their co-operation in the North Atlantic alliance. It would certainly encourage further disorder and terrorism in Cyprus.

On the other hand, if the Cyprus item can be kept off the General Assembly's agenda, there would be a chance for passions to cool, and progress to be resumed. For our part, we will continue to make it clear that the British proposals still stand; that we are prepared to consider amendments or counter-proposals; and that we intend to resume negotiations with the other two Governments as soon as conditions allow.

For these practical reasons and not simply because of Article 2(VII) of the Charter, we are bound to oppose the Greeks on the inscription of the item. I very much hope that you will take the same view. It is likely that the attitude of the United States Delegation towards inscription will be decisive. This dispute with

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[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Dulles Correspondence 1955–1959. Confidential. An attached note to Dulles from Macmillan reads:

"I am sending you a message about Cyprus today. I do hope you will be able to help me. I hope you have had a good holiday."

Greece is a great sorrow to us in this country, who have such a long tradition of friendship with the Greek people. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that it is the internal exigencies of Greek politics which have inflamed the situation in and about Cyprus and that the trouble will go on so long as the Greeks continue to foment it. The only thing which will make them pause is a clear rebuff by a good majority at the United Nations. We assume that you will support us in any case on the substance of the question as you did last year. But in view of the really grave consequences which could so easily follow from debating Cyprus in the United Nations at the present time, when passions are running high, I do most sincerely hope that you will use your great influence to prevent the item from securing inscription.

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132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, September 17, 1955—7:18 p.m.

1516. In reply personal message to Secretary from Macmillan delivered by British Embassy September 15 requesting US vote against inscription Cyprus item in GA agenda, [2] following letter from Secretary delivered today to British Embassy here for urgent transmittal to Foreign Secretary:

Begin text:

I returned last night from my vacation, and at once considered the Cyprus matter in light of your personal message to me.

It would be contrary to our general policy to oppose inscription. Indeed, I do not now recall that we have ever done so. We are also deeply concerned as to repercussions in Greece and on Greek relations with its NATO partners of a negative vote by the United States. Can you quickly tell me what your Government is planning to say in the General Committee as to your program for Cyprus? If this is to be something reasonably precise and constructive, it would certainly help us in coming to a conclusion. If you have your statement already prepared and can get it to us by Monday noon,

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1755. Secret; Limit Distribution. The text of the message was delivered to the British Embassy in Washington for transmittal to Macmillan.

[2] *Supra.*

that would be useful so that I can discuss it with my associates here before leaving for New York Monday afternoon. *End text.*

Dulles

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133. Message From Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Secretary of State Dulles [1]

London, September 19, 1955.

Thank you for your personal message about Cyprus question. [2] Nutting's statement before the General Committee will be along the following lines.

The United Nations themselves decided that it was inappropriate to discuss this question last year. It is even more so now. It seems to us clear that public debate of this most difficult problem can only make matters worse. The best hope of reconciling the conflicting views of the three Governments primarily concerned and of promoting a settlement must be through diplomacy and confidential talks. It was with this conviction that we took the unusual step of calling a conference to deal with a matter of strictly British jurisdiction. After the first days had revealed the different positions we put before the conference constructive proposals which made the most of the considerable area of common ground.

Nutting will explain these proposals. You will have seen them but I would like to draw your attention particularly to the following points which we will emphasise:

(a) The constitution is to be a liberal one designed very sincerely to lead to the fullest measure of internal self-government compatible with the strategic requirements of the present international situation.

(b) There would be from the outset an Assembly with an elected majority. All departments of the Cyprus Government would be progressively transferred to Cypriot Ministers responsible to the Assembly, with the sole exception of foreign affairs, defence and

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[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Dulles Correspondence 1955–1959. Secret. An attached note from Macmillan to Dulles reads:

"Thank you for your message about Cyprus. I am sending you a long reply which gives the arguments we propose to develop. I hope you will think them, as I do, overwhelming. If the United Nations cannot debate China, nobody here will understand why they should debate Cyprus.

[2] *Supra.*

public security. These must be reserved since the Cypriots could not alone sustain these responsibilities. But otherwise it is certainly our intention to make as rapid progress as conditions allow.

(c) A Cypriot Chief Minister would head the new Cypriot administration.

(d) Since it is only too clear that constitutional progress in Cyprus depends upon the cooperation of [or] at least the tacit assent of the Greek and Turkish Governments, we proposed a tripartite committee with the following tasks:—

(I) To examine the detailed proposals to be drawn up by Her Majesty's Government for new constitutional instruments for Cyprus;

(II) To consider a suitable system of minority guarantees;

(III) To investigate any possibilities for closer links between Cyprus and the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. We had in mind for example ideas which have been mooted for enabling Cypriots to enjoy special status and rights in Greece or Turkey as well as their British citizenship;

(IV) To act as a standing body for consultation and cooperation between the three Governments on Cypriot problems.

Our statement will not deny that the first results of the conference were disappointing. But although formal tripartite discussions seem difficult to arrange at this moment, Her Majesty's Government are determined to persevere with friendly and informal consultation. The conference is suspended not ended. Our proposals stand, and we are prepared to consider amendments or counter proposals at any time.

Finally we proposed that when self-government was in working order the full conference should meet again with the advantage of the presence of representative Cypriots to discuss the whole position.

All these proposals taken together seem to us a fair and generous basis for advance. We feel therefore that discussion at the United Nations can only hinder and not help. The situation is extremely delicate. The relations between friends and allies are strained; if irreparable damage is not to be done, tempers must be given time to cool.

So much for what Nutting will say. He will also have my speech at the conference on September 6 to guide him. Since events have shown that the success of self-government in Cyprus largely depends on the attitude of the Greeks and the Turks it would surely be unwise to go into any further detail especially on such questions as the protection of minorities which will require very delicate negotiation. The Turks believe that our proposals go too far and are premature. Any attempt to go further would meet the sharpest reaction in that quarter.

I know that you do not see eye to eye with us on the principle of opposing the inscription of items of this kind on the agenda of the United Nations. But I do feel that by any standard the case against the inscription of the Cyprus item is overwhelming. We have just received the Greek reply to our London proposals. It is a tendentious document, which chooses to misinterpret our proposals by underrating the constitutional offer and alleging that the tripartite committee is designed to impede rather than promote self-government. The reply refers specifically to the Greek "success" in getting the Cyprus item inscribed on the agenda of the United Nations last year. This, I think, proves how much last year's inscription of the item has had to do with the uncompromising attitude which the Greeks have adopted since. If the Greeks get the same encouragement this year it can only make them more intransigent and, conversely, make the Turks even more rigid. That is why I feel so strongly that it is in the interest of all of us to keep the item off the agenda.

I can assure you that I am as unhappy as you are about the effect of this Cyprus dispute on Greece's relations with N.A.T.O. As regards the internal situation in Greece I think it suffers partly from there being no effective Prime Minister and partly from the shock caused by the tragic events in Istanbul and Smyrna. I do not think that discussion at the United Nations is going to help on either of these points. I must say frankly that I do not see what more we can do to make things better as long as the Greek Government reject our proposals for self-government unless accompanied by an immediate pledge of self-determination. This ignores the facts of life; including British strategic needs and the Turkish determination not to see the last of their off-shore islands pass into Greek hands. In any case I find it hard to believe that the Greek Government's ultimate loyalty to N.A.T.O.—from which Greece derives such immense advantages—really depends upon their having their whole way over Cyprus.

The Greeks themselves recognised during the London Conference that we must retain sovereignty in Cyprus in the immediate future. Any resolution by the United Nations, short of an outright rejection of inscription would, however moderate its terms, make our task in Cyprus that much the more difficult. Rioting and terrorism in Cyprus, and the inevitable measures to suppress them must make Anglo-Greek relations still more difficult. The repercussions in Turkey could be equally grave.

Indeed the position in Turkey gives no less case for anxiety than the position in Greece. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has just told me of a talk he has had with the Turkish Prime Minister. There is no doubt at all that at the moment Cyprus is the essential issue in

Turkish politics. The Chancellor was deeply impressed by the Prime Minister's concern over the internal situation in Turkey. I think we ought to give equal importance to the Turkish as to the Greek aspect of this unhappy business.

For all these reasons I must ask you to use your great influence against the inscription of this item. The present indications are that the vote will be a close one and that the attitude of the United States will probably be decisive. Acting in harmony we could, I believe, prevent further discussion of this vexed problem in an atmosphere which is full of such explosive possibilities.

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134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

Washington, September 20, 1955—10:45 a.m.

840. In present circumstances, I am convinced General Assembly discussion Cyprus question would lead to intemperate debate and might well cause incidents in Greece and Turkey which would destroy remains of Greek-Turkish cooperation. Importance free world unity and threat to NATO far exceeds that of Cyprus question. I have therefore decided we must seek persuade Greece not press for consideration Cyprus item in GA and that we must actively seek prevent inscription if Greeks insist upon pressing consideration Cyprus item this session. In reaching this conclusion I am aware U.S. will be criticized for opposing aspirations dependent people and that SovBloc may take advantage situation. Also realize that for present we will probably lose ability influence Greek Government. However importance maintaining maximum possible free world unity is overriding.

I therefore ask you use best efforts persuade Greek Government not press for consideration Cyprus item this session and suggest approach somewhat as follows:

In U.S. opinion present grave crisis between Greece and Turkey would become even more serious if discussed in GA. We believe this might be fatal blow Balkan Pact and cause grave breach NATO defense which is basis our unity and strength. Also such a public

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–2055. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Wood, Baxter, and Jernegan. Repeated to Ankara and London and pouched to Salonika and Nicosia.

discussion Cyprus question now would make possibility any solution even more difficult. We convinced that after recent deplorable events best and most statesmanlike course is to let question remain in abeyance for immediate present as far as UN is concerned. We do not feel question should be ignored or forgotten. We are not supporting colonialism or opposing self-determination.

It is our belief sincere efforts of parties most concerned to work toward mutually satisfactory solution represents best and perhaps only feasible way of resolving Cyprus problem. This is also within spirit UN, whose members are pledged to employ all possible methods of solving problems among themselves before resorting to UN forum. In our considered opinion recent UK proposals represent progress and development self-government for Cypriot people offers best prospect for ultimate solution acceptable to parties concerned and in interests free world unity. We have been assured by UK that, despite inconclusive outcome London talks, UK prepared proceed with sincere and determined efforts give self-government to Cypriot people and UK further prepared give sympathetic consideration to any amendments or counter-proposals to suggestions they made in London. UK position can be interpreted as carrying implication that international status Cyprus need not remain unchanged in perpetuity. We believe Greek Government, which we know desires eventual application principle self-determination to Cyprus, would be well-advised to cooperate now with UK and use its influence with Cypriot people to participate in orderly steps toward self-government. We can further assure Greek Government that U.S. will actively and vigorously use its influence induce and assist UK to move toward this end.

We hope Greek leaders will continue show statesmanship by remembering free world unity must be placed ahead problems existing between individual members. Since this our conviction, we ask Greek Government not press for consideration Cyprus this session and must state that in view shortness time we cannot delay making known confidentially to other delegations we intend oppose inscription Cyprus item. We hope Greek Government will quickly decide not press question so that we will not have to come into open opposition and actively oppose inscription. If Greek Government agrees, we will do all in our power assist it to carry out this decision with dignity.

There are at least two ways in which Greeks could do this.

1) It would be possible Greeks send letter to SYG informing him Greek intention not press for consideration Cyprus item. President General Committee (Steering Committee of GA) would merely notify General Committee receipt communication by SYG this effect

and no action would be taken on matter in GC or subsequently in GA.

2) Greece could make statement of its position this matter in GC. We would hope such statement would be as non-controversial as possible and would conclude with statement by Greece of its decision not to press consideration Cyprus item at this time with view permit parties renew efforts find solution problem. Statement might also stress Greek desire to maintain free world unity as basis for this desire. No further action would then be necessary by Assembly.

Hoover

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135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

Washington, September 20, 1955—10:59 p.m.

853. Secretary informed Stephanopoulos in New York today [2] that United States, after most careful consideration, had decided to vote against inscription of Cyprus issue on UNGA Agenda. Stephanopoulos predicted, in highly emotional reaction, four immediate results following announcement of vote, probably September 22 or 23: (1) Government would undoubtedly fall; (2) he himself would immediately resign; (3) Balkan Alliance would collapse; and (4) serious anti-American riots would break out in Greece.

U.S. decision will probably become known to Greek public soon. Suggest you notify American civilian and military personnel promptly and advise them to take all feasible precautions. You may, at your discretion, also call on Greek authorities to grant every possible protection.

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff is not alerting service personnel or naval vessels through Service channels because notification through you, as authorized herein, is considered most likely way to avoid precipitating events. If situation warrants, any US naval vessel in vicinity could render assistance.

Immediately following telegram is verbatim text of statement which Secretary read to Foreign Minister and handed him copy. [3] If

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–2055. Secret; Niact; Priority. Drafted by Allen. Repeated to Ankara, Paris, London, Belgrade, and Istanbul.

[2] Highlights of this meeting were transmitted in Delga 8 from New York, September 20. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/9–2055)

[3] Telegram 854, September 20. (*Ibid.*, 320/9–2055)

in your opinion public statements by Embassy should appear desirable, you are authorized to use material contained therein at your discretion, but without attribution to source or verbatim release of text. [4]

Hoover

[4] On September 20, at 12:10 p.m., Dulles telephoned Allen. A transcript of the conversation reads:

"The Secretary telephoned Mr. Allen to inquire about the status of the cables to Greece. The Secretary said he was not clear as to whether he should do anything about them or not. Allen said they had taken care of the basic one instructing Cannon to try to get the Greeks not to press the case. The other cable deals with what line to take should there be a leak.

"The Secretary said we would be working on a statement which Lodge will make on the subject. It would be a better statement of our position. The Secretary said he would rather have that wait until we see what we work out here. Allen said if the thing leaks we can give out a paraphrase. He said the cable on the press statement would be held up." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, General Telephone Conversations)

136. Message From King Paul to Secretary of State Dulles [1]

Athens, undated.

This is a private message for your personal information owing to my deep concern about the present situation.

My talks with the Government and leaders of the opposition have reinforced my conviction that your assistance in securing inscription of the Cyprus question at the United Nations would be the most effective means by which the United States can help to

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–2055. Top Secret. A memorandum to Dulles transmitting this message noted that it had been delivered by the King with the request that it be forwarded immediately to the Secretary. A notation on the source text indicates that Hoover telephoned Dulles in New York at 1:07 p.m. on September 20 to read him the text of the message. A record of the conversation follows:

"Mr. Hoover said there was a message in from King Paul of Greece, a private one, about inscription. He said that the Greek people felt they were being abandoned. He said there was more than we realized in the way the Greeks felt about this situation. The Secretary said he feared we were committed re inscription. Hoover said we were going to have to put our thinking caps on as to what line to take to make up for this action. The Secretary agreed, saying what we said in this connection would have a great deal of significance. They also discussed the Secretary's conversation with George Allen this morning and about holding up the statement." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) See footnote 4, *supra*.

stop an alarming trend towards neutralism in Greece. There is general bitterness towards NATO. The positive sign of friendship evidenced by your support at the United Nations would counteract this disturbing tendency at a time when the serious illness of the Prime Minister is also likely to cause a political crisis in the near future.

The feelings of indignation of the Greek people with respect to the Turkish atrocities and feeling of abandonment by our friends run far higher than you may realize.

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137. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, September 21, 1955—4 a.m.

752. Department pass USUN. Attention Baxter (GTI). Deptel 840 [2] decoded at 11 pm and I talked with Canellopoulos, Deputy Prime Minister, shortly after midnight leaving him at 1:30.

I told him of Under Secretary's decision and, in course of long discussion punctuated by many bitter but not emotional rejoinders, I marshalled all pertinent arguments. After bringing him away from three successive attitudes, none of which was acceptable even to himself, we centered talk on what might be productive under UK assurances backed by US promises of inducement and assistance (paragraph 4 reference telegram). He said this was only possible stand on which Greek Government would dare to face people if inscription position abandoned. He said these assurances as stated in reftel would be scornfully rejected in present tense atmosphere, and 11th hour pressures in form of promises after recent bitter experiences, would be highly suspect even though personally he, and he thought Stephanopoulos, would like to work with US on that basis. Nonetheless he would ask Stephanopoulos to explore with Secretary whether more specific and concrete proposals can be obtained as only possible alternative government could defend before public.

Note that immediate decision is not possible. Stephanopoulos recommendations must be debated before Council of Ministers and if accepted must have approval of bedridden Field Marshal, itself a major task since he is unable to participate in discussions and

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–2155. Confidential; Niact.
[2] Document 134.

perhaps in no condition to grasp some of considerations involved. Message to Stephanopoulos however going forward still tonight.

Following are my personal observations:

Department telegram does not take into account gravity of situation here. Reaction to Secretary's message on Turkish outrages delivered Sunday [3] has been most violent and inscription is now basic issue in both foreign and domestic policy. Canellopoulos said flatly and with no hysterics that with abandonment inscription on no better grounds than presented in reference telegram, government would not last one hour and I believe him. That by itself might be tolerable, but the alienation to [*of*] Greece might not be as temporary as assumed in reference telegram. To me this would be great blow to our entire post-war foreign policy which found both concrete and symbolic expression in Greek-American cooperation leading to expulsion of Communist guerrillas from Greece in 1947–1949. Our intervention in Greece in 1947 marked turning point in steady expansionism of Soviet in post-World War II years. As a symbol of US determination to stand firm against Soviet Communist power, Greece is unique.

Greece, contiguous with Soviet Eastern European bloc, has many historical, religious and cultural affiliations with countries in that bloc. We can hardly assume that given a deterioration in US-Greek relations, Greece could not by process of peaceful infiltration become either a people's democracy or a neutralist fellow-travelling state. Greece is already the object of a two-sided though not necessarily coordinated campaign from Belgrade and Moscow. Social and economic conditions here are such as to constitute no real obstacle to the loss of Greece to the Communist bloc if we allow our own influence to be destroyed by an insensitive unrealistic policy.

The fall of the present government at this time would open field to leftist and anti-US elements. The more moderate and pro-US political leaders who might under other circumstances form a new government would be completely discredited and silenced. In short, in opposing Greek request for inscription, we take great risk of setting in motion forces which will seriously threaten entire system of security in this part of world without active cooperation of Greece is beyond our comprehension. Spectacle of US abandoning Greece will have worldwide repercussions.

While question of US position in UN generally falls outside purview of US-Greek relations, we cannot help wondering whether taking a position that question which demonstrably is disturbing international peace and security should not be discussed would at some future time come to haunt us in UN deliberations. For exam-

[3] September 18; see footnote 3, Document 129.

ple, since a year and a half our protestations that we are not opposing self-determination have met only cynical response. Is it not in our interest to maintain the principle in connection with captive nations now under Soviet control on a question which we might one day wish to press within UN framework?

We are equally concerned with possibility that despite efforts of US to prevent inscription of Cyprus issue on UN agenda, question might nevertheless be inscribed by virtue of support that Greece may receive from Afro-Asian, Soviet and Latin Americans. Canellopoulos mentioned this and, as for himself, rejected with disgust the thought that Greece could so be separated from her allies on whom her future welfare as well as her moral standing in world depend. A successor government may well decide differently. If in present strained situation Greeks find they can achieve success for their national effort through support from those countries against opposition of their NATO allies, it is not difficult to conjecture where opportunistic foreign policy might lead them.

Cannon

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138. Editorial Note

On September 21, at the request of Greece, the General Committee of the General Assembly opened discussion on the question of including the Cyprus issue on the Assembly's agenda. That day in his address before the committee, Ambassador Lodge stated that inscription of the Cyprus issue at this time would not contribute toward the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The text of Lodge's statement is in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 3, 1955, pages 545–546.

On September 23, the General Assembly, by a vote of 28 to 22 with 10 abstentions, adopted the General Committee's recommendation not to inscribe the Cyprus question. Both the United States and the United Kingdom voted against inscription.

139. Message From President Eisenhower to King Paul [1]

Washington, September 21, 1955.

In the present difficult situation, I desire to assure Your Majesty that I remain deeply convinced of the paramount importance of the ties of strong friendship which unite Greece and the United States. Even if there are differences of opinion over how the Cyprus question should be handled, we shall not let this one issue trouble our deep friendship and sympathy for Greece. [2]

With kindest personal assurances,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–2155. Secret. Transmitted in telegram 325 to Athens, September 21, which is the source text. The Embassy was instructed to deliver the message to the King and to inform him that he was at liberty to make it public if he so desired. The Department added that it would not release the message unless King Paul indicated his approval.

[2] In telegram 839, September 30, Ambassador Cannon reported that the President's message had been delivered to King Paul the previous day. According to the Ambassador, the King was "pleased and impressed" with the message and was "disposed" to make it public. Cannon added, however, that in view of the present "diplomatic political crisis" in Greece, the King was reserving that decision until after consultation with the two Deputy Prime Ministers. (*Ibid.*, 611.81/9–3055)

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140. Editorial Note

On September 26, Secretary Dulles met in New York with Foreign Secretary Macmillan, who raised the question of Cyprus. According to the memorandum of conversation prepared by Dulles the next day, the following exchange occurred:

"Macmillan took me aside, and said he wished to express his deep appreciation for our help on the Cyprus matter. He said that he had sent me a written message, but he wanted to reinforce it personally. I said that it had been a difficult decision to take, but having taken it, we went through with it in helping to get the votes necessary to succeed. Otherwise, the British would have been defeated. Macmillan said he was well aware of that fact. He went on to say he was determined to carry the thing through to a successful conclusion, and would make some constructive proposals in the very near future." (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

141. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Secretary Macmillan [1]

Washington, October 5, 1955.

DEAR HAROLD: I wish to thank you for your friendly and helpful messages of September 19 and 20 on the subject of Cyprus. [2] Although the Greek Government has received a serious blow, it is certainly better, in the present atmosphere, that the subject was not allowed to drag on in the General Assembly. However, after our conversation in New York on September 27, [3] I know you will agree with me that the Cyprus situation remains a cause of concern not only on the island itself, but as it affects NATO and the Balkan Pact. I realize the importance of the move which the United Kingdom has made in seeking to work towards a solution of the problem in consultation with the Turkish and Greek Governments, but I fear that neither of them are likely to agree on any steps towards self-government in the near future. Such steps would be too much for Turkey and not enough for Greece. Therefore I am glad to have heard from you that the United Kingdom will soon decide on its own initiative to take some steps towards self-government. Also, I recall the Eisenhower–Churchill Declaration of June 29, 1954 that they would "earnestly strive by every peaceful means to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire and are capable of sustaining an independent existence. We welcome the processes of development, where still needed, that lead toward that goal." [4]

I have written frankly, believing that this is the best basis for working out mutually satisfactory positions on this matter. I need not emphasize the traditional and popular feelings in the United States on colonial questions. I sincerely hope that we shall both find the means to continue our cooperation on the Cyprus question.

Sincerely yours,

Foster

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1955. Secret. Drafted by Wood and Dulles.

[2] The September 19 letter is printed as Document 133; the September 20 letter is in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Eden–Macmillan–Lloyd Correspondence 1955–56.

[3] No record of Dulles' conversation with Macmillan concerning Cyprus has been found in Department of State files. According to Dulles' Appointment Book, the Secretary met with Macmillan, Shuckburgh, and Russell on September 27 at 4:40 p.m. to discuss the situation in the Middle East. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[4] For the full text of the declaration, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 12, 1954, pp. 49–50.

142. Letter From Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Secretary of State Dulles [1]

London, October 21, 1955.

DEAR FOSTER: It was good of you to let me have, in your letter of October 5, [2] your thoughts on Cyprus. I agree entirely with you that the Cyprus situation remains a cause of concern both in the island itself and because of its effects elsewhere.

The rejection by the Greek and Turkish Governments, for opposite reasons, of our proposals for self-government in Cyprus is bound to remain a cause of real difficulty. There are perhaps grounds for hope that the new Greek Government may be less uncompromising than its predecessor. But there remains the Turkish objection to any form of self-government until the Greek demand for self-determination has been withdrawn. This is a formidable obstacle.

Nonetheless we have every intention of doing whatever is possible to break the deadlock in Cyprus. The new Governor has lost no time in consulting the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities. He has also explained the meaning of the British proposals in a broadcast of which I enclose a copy. [3] I commend to your attention especially the concluding passages of this broadcast, in which Harding makes it clear that we are closing no doors.

To our regret (and perhaps also to his own) Archbishop Makarios has told the Governor that he cannot accept our formula as satisfactory. This is unfortunate, the more so as there is some reason to believe that the Archbishop personally may now be willing to consider some compromise solution. But so long as the extremists are dominant and men of goodwill are intimidated, it is hard for the leaders to be conciliatory. Thus our first task in Cyprus is to restore conditions of security and order in which reason and conciliation can gain a foothold.

However, the new Greek Foreign Minister [4] has asked to see me in Paris, and we have heard from our ambassador in Athens that he

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–2155. Secret. The typewritten source text signed by Macmillan was apparently delivered to Dulles in Paris; see footnote 1, *infra*.

On October 24, the Embassy in London transmitted the text of Macmillan's message in telegram 1652. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10–2455)

[2] *Supra*.

[3] The text of the broadcast by Field Marshal Sir John Harding, appointed September 25 as Governor of Cyprus, is not printed.

[4] On October 6, following the death of Papogos, Constantine Karamanlis organized a new government with Spyros Theotokis as Foreign Minister; see Document 287.

would like to take a more helpful line. I am not without hope that the talks with the Archbishop may be resumed.

Meanwhile we are working on the details of the constitutional arrangements which I outlined at the London Conference last month. Just when these will be published must partly depend on circumstances, including political developments in Cyprus and any changes in the attitudes of Greece and Turkey. But, despite the obstacles, it is our firm intention to press forward, and in this I know we can count on your continued understanding and support.

Yours ever,

Harold Macmillan

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143. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador's Residence, Paris, October 24, 1955, 7:30 p.m. [1]

USDel/MC/1

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*Greece*
The Secretary	Mr. Theotokis
Mr. Merchant	Alexis S. Liatis
Mr. Russell	

SUBJECT

Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister

The Greek Foreign Minister opened the conversation by asking the Secretary whether he felt confident about the success of the coming discussions in Geneva. The Secretary said that he thought there was about an even chance that some good might come out of them although he was not encouraged by the recent course of action of the Soviets in the Middle East.

Mr. Theotokis said that he wished to speak about a few developments concerning Greece and that he regretted things were not as good as they could be. Public opinion in Greece had been extremely disturbed since the unfortunate outbreak in Turkey a month ago and, with the prospect of new elections in Greece, the

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 564. Secret. Drafted by Russell on November 1. The location of the meeting is from a copy of the memorandum *ibid.*, Central File 396.1-GE/10-2555. Dulles was in Paris en route to Geneva to attend the Foreign Ministers Meeting, October 27–November 16.

Communists were exploiting the situation. The Communist Party in Greece is a strong one and used with skill from Moscow. The government is anxious to reestablish the situation as nearly as possible as it was before last month. To do this it needs help, both moral and material. On the first score, the Greek Government appreciates the help which the U.S. furnished in convincing the Turks to take the various steps which they did. Mr. Dulles remarked that unfortunately a number of things which we said in voicing our repugnance at the things done by the Turks were never adequately reported by the Greeks; for example, the letter which the Secretary sent to Senator Capehart [2] and statements made in the UN. The Greek press portrayed the U.S. as indifferent and as equating the victim and the wrongdoer. Mr. Theotokis said that the press in Greece is not subject to government discipline and that the things which the Secretary mentioned did not reflect the spirit of the government. In reply to the Secretary's statement that there was undoubtedly a strong tendency on the part of the Greek people to feel deserted, Mr. Theotokis said that the Greeks are a sentimental people; sometimes this sentimentality is an obstacle and sometimes an advantage. It is up to us now to exploit it to our advantage and it must be made clear to the Greek people that the moral part of the situation has been set straight. The Secretary commented that the ceremony that day at Izmir [3] had been a fine idea for which he congratulated the Greek Government.

Mr. Theotokis then referred to the present financial difficulties of the Greek Government. He said he understood that the Turks have asked for aid. The Secretary commented that they have been asking for aid for some time but that we had not been persuaded it was necessary. Mr. Theotokis said he did not wish to imply that it might not be necessary but that any action to assist the Turks should be considered in the light of the Greek financial problem. The Secretary said he could give Mr. Theotokis assurance that the United States will do nothing precipitate and that we will do nothing in this respect without relation to Greek sensibilities. He said a telegram would be sent immediately to the Department informing it of this assurance. [4] Mr. Theotokis said that because of the relationship of the Greek financial picture to Greece's responsibilities in the NATO organization, he had informed Ambassador Perkins that unless Greece received financial help it would have

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[2] Not found in Department of State files.

[3] On October 24, the Turkish Government, in an attempt to compensate for the damage resulting from anti-Greek disturbances of September 6 and 7, sponsored a ceremony at Izmir to honor the Greek flag.

[4] Transmitted in Secto 19, October 25. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 564)

difficulty in maintaining its present economic index figure, balancing its budget and supporting its currency. He said that he had taken up with Ambassador Perkins the consideration of offshore procurement of munitions in Greece which is an important item in Greek manufacturing. He said he had also presented the full picture to Ambassador Cannon. He expressed the hope that the Secretary would consider the problem as urgently as possible, since delay would create a situation that would affect the Greek elections next year. He commented that the Greeks know Communists from several years of guerilla warfare and that it was clear that the next election would be fought on the question of international relations.

Mr. Theotokis said that the last matter he wished to raise was Greek relations with the British. He commented that the gap between the British and the Archbishop of Cyprus is deep but not very wide and that he was seeing Foreign Minister Macmillan tomorrow. The Secretary said that he felt the Cyprus situation had gone sour because the Greek Government had pushed it too hard and fast and because the British had moved too slowly. Mr. Theotokis said he was asking the U.S. to help in getting the negotiations between Field Marshal Harding and Makarios resumed. [5] Such negotiations are the best way to proceed. If the meeting is handled from Greece it makes the Cypriot nationalists traitors. Mr. Theotokis said that while the negotiations were going on the Greek Government might hold discussions with the British behind the scenes. He said he might later ask the Secretary to intervene to give the negotiations a final push. The Secretary said he would try to honor any reasonable request of that nature. We had said in the UN that such negotiations were the best way to handle the problem. He could not, however, guarantee that he would act because he did not know what the exact nature of the request might be. Mr. Theotokis said that it was important to get the Cyprus question settled because the Communists were using it as they always did the colonial issue. The Secretary agreed that it was the type of thing the Communists were eager to exploit. In the U.S. our sentiments are almost always on the side of colonial peoples, although sometimes we have to keep our sentiments under control as we also have ties with colonial powers. It is important to find peaceful solutions to colonial issues. If they break out into violence the Communists know how to use that. Mr. Theotokis said it was important for Macmillan to understand that the Greek Government has its public pressures just as Macmillan has

[5] On September 25, the Colonial Office announced that Field Marshal Harding had been appointed Governor of Cyprus to replace Sir Robert Armitage. Early in October, Harding arrived in Cyprus and had a series of discussions with Makarios on October 4, 7, and 11. On October 11 and 12, Harding and Makarios, in separate statements, indicated that they had been unable to reach agreement.

his. The Secretary said critics of the present British Government were attacking it for giving up the Suez base and pointing out that no sooner had the base been taken over by Egypt than the Communists had moved in. Similarly, with respect to Cyprus, it is important to make sure that it did not pass under Communist control.

Mr. Theotokis said that he expected that he would be queried by the press about his conference with the Secretary and that he intended to say that this was the first opportunity he had had to meet the Secretary and that they had discussed a broad range of matters, including the forthcoming conference in Geneva.

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144. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State [1]

Paris, October 25, 1955—midnight.

Secto 25. Following NATO meeting October 25, Secretary met with Macmillan. Latter said he was seeing Greek FonMin October 26. Macmillan believes Cyprus situation is ready for next round and has indications they would like to have it calm down. First meetings between Harding and Archbishop went well. Harding said much same thing British had said before making effort find new formula for resolving issue between elections and self-determination. Harding trying drive wedge between Moderates presumably represented by Archbishop and two types extremists, Communists and ultra-Nationalists. Macmillan says he will tell Greek FonMin British desire reopen discussions. British position will be self-government now and willingness consider question self-determination later. They will aim at elections within next year or so, which might show strong Communist vote. This might help sober Moderates. While British want agreement with Greeks they must be careful to handle in way not to arouse Turks who have not been helpful.

Secretary said Greek FonMin made good impression on him in meeting previous day [2] and that we have high regard for Greek PriMin; combination as good as likely to get. Secretary expressed hope progress could be made in Cyprus discussions. On question of self-determination, Secretary recalled Potomac Charter signed by

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[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 615. Secret. Repeated to London and Athens.

[2] See *supra*.

Eisenhower and Churchill which contains phrase supporting independence those people capable sustaining it.[3] Secretary suggested that phraseology might be basis of formula. Secretary also said he had mentioned to Greek FonMin many conflicting interests and cited as reason for caution British experience Suez Base where British moved out and Migs moved in as reason for caution. Secretary said he believed Greeks were aware of problem and he felt formula could be found combining principle with reality.

Dulles

[3] The text of the Potomac Charter, June 29, 1954, is in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 12, 1954, pp. 49–50.

145. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State[1]

Athens, November 10, 1955—4 p.m.

1226. Reference: London's 1907 to Department.[2] In conversation with me October 19, before Harding's departure from Cyprus for consultation in London, Prime Minister Karamanlis made strong plea for exercise by U.S. Government of its influence with UK in order bring about resumption of talks between Makarios and Harding. He pointed out that initiative in this respect should come from British side. Since press accounts indicated Harding consultations would probably lead to resumption of talks with Makarios we refrained from recommending US intercession on that point.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–1055. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Geneva.

[2] In telegram 1907, November 8, Aldrich informed the Department that the Greek Ambassador at London had asked him to approach the Department and the Secretary in hopes that some formula might be found to resolve the situation in Cyprus. According to Aldrich, the Greek Ambassador found this a particularly opportune time in view of the fact that British officials, including Prime Minister Eden, were discussing the Cyprus question in London. Ambassador Aldrich informed the Department that he had told the Greek Ambassador that he was certain that in view of the strategic importance of Cyprus, Macmillan and Dulles would have the problem of Cyprus on their minds in their forthcoming talks in Geneva. The Ambassador added that all he could do was to inform the Department that Field Marshal Harding would soon be returning to Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/11–855)

Assuming from London's reftel that Cyprus may come up in Secretary's talks with Macmillan Embassy submits following general observations.

Cyprus question is becoming central national issue of Greek electorate in approaching elections. Whatever may have been true in earlier years, I am convinced Cyprus question is genuine political and national problem of paramount importance in both Greek internal and external policy. We have done our best to warn Greek authorities of danger to Greece of permitting Cyprus question to become touchstone of their relations with outside world and particularly of their relations with US, which are of such tangible benefit to Greece in economic and military spheres. Leader of present government is fully aware of this danger but is perhaps at moment even more keenly sensitive to deep-seated sentiments of electorate on which he will depend so soon for his political future. . . .

Because of this situation it is of utmost importance that we be as clear-headed as possible as to fundamentals of our position on Cyprus question and that we not be tempted to take positions either diplomatically or publicly which we may later have to modify or abandon. While present Greek bitterness and resentment over our position on Cyprus is largely irrational and unjustified, they do have some grounds in reproaching us for, as they see it, our strong pressure in inducing them take part in London tripartite talks since they reason that we should not have done so unless we had sufficient assurances re British and Turk intentions to make sure conference would not be the unmitigated failure they felt it to have been.

As a case in point I would refer to Deptel 840, September 20,[3] which, as part of our endeavor to persuade Greeks not put Cyprus on UNGA agenda, authorized me to assure Greek Government that "US will actively and vigorously use its influence induce and assist UK to move toward" self-government. I did so inform Greek Government. In US "talking paper" handed to the Greek Foreign Minister at about same time in New York,[4] the US merely pledged itself "to continue to interest itself in the Cyprus situation". Similarly restrained language was used by Ambassador Lodge in his public presentation before UNGA general committee.

That we shall continue to interest ourselves in Cyprus question is obvious. If, however, we intend to adopt an active and vigorous policy, that is another matter. These differentiations are not lost upon Greeks.

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[3] Document 134.
[4] Not found.

The same talking paper refers to deep embarrassment of Turkish Government over anti-Greek riots and its disposition seek amends, and accepts this assertion as an argument in favor of Greece's pursuing quiet policy on Cyprus. Turkish Government has recently made it known that its position on Cyprus remains unchanged. We have also noted that in Macmillan's letter to the Secretary, October 21,[5] Turkish objection to any form of self-government until Greek demands or self-determination withdrawn is described as "a formidable obstacle". If Turkish position remains as stated and is accepted by British as virtual veto, there would appear to be little point in encouraging Greeks to believe that a solution is in sight. Moreover fact that British Government persists in belief that it is "internal exigencies of Greek politics which have inflamed situation in and about Cyprus and that trouble will go on so long as Greeks continue to foment it" (Macmillan's recent message to Secretary) shows that British Government appraisal of situation fundamentally different from ours. (See paragraph 3 above.)

Unless we have intention and capability of giving Greece effective support on Cyprus issue within the limits of a formula including early self-government plus some assurance for an evolution which could lead to self-determination, we should refrain from risky course of holding out hopes which British and Turks can frustrate.

Deptels 1364 and 1365[6] just received appear to make more cogent value of careful delimitation scope our efforts henceforth.

For Department only. This message should be considered as follow-up to paragraph 2 (B) Embtel 1136.[7]

Department repeat other interested posts at discretion.

Cannon

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[5] Document 142.

[6] Telegram 1364, November 9, contained instructions to repeat Delga 231, from New York, November 7, to Athens. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–755) Delga 231 contained Lodge's recommendation that Aldrich call on Eden to urge his support for Harding's plan that Cyprus be given dominion status. Lodge added that Aldrich should point out that it would be impossible for the United States during an election year to assume the "strong anti-Greek" position that it took the previous year. (*Ibid.*)

In telegram 1365 to Athens, November 9, the Department replied that in view of Dulles' past representations to Macmillan for progress on the Cyprus issue and the Foreign Secretary's "clearly expressed" intentions to make headway on the issue of self-government for Cyprus, further representations to the British before Macmillan had a reasonable time "to make good" would be counterproductive. The Department instructed the Embassy to inform the British that it considered "closing no doors" and continuing discussions between Governor Harding and the Cypriots the best way to resolve difficulties in view of the problems of the tripartite approach. (*Ibid.*)

[7] Paragraph 2(B) dealt with Cyprus. Telegram 1136, November 2, is not printed. (*Ibid.*, 781.00/11–255)

146. Letter From the British Ambassador in the United States (Makins) to Secretary of State Dulles [1]

Washington, November 21, 1955.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: As I expect Harold Macmillan told you, Her Majesty's Government, following on the talks between the Governor and Archbishop Makarios, have been working on a new formula for the settlement of the Cyprus question.

The Archbishop has just returned to Cyprus from Athens, and the Governor is accordingly communicating to him today the text of a formula (of which I enclose a copy).

I am asked to emphasise the need for absolute secrecy on this matter until the formula is published by Her Majesty's Government.

Yours sincerely,

Roger Makins

[Enclosure]

Her Majesty's Government adhere to the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Potomac Charter and the Pacific Charter, to which they have subscribed. It is not therefore their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategic situation and on account of the consequences on relations between NATO powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. They will therefore have to satisfy themselves that any final solution safeguards the strategic interests of the United Kingdom and her Allies.

Her Majesty's Government have offered a wide measure of self-government now. If the people of Cyprus will participate in the Constitutional development, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to work for a solution which will satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyprus, within the framework of the treaties and alliances to which the countries concerned in the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean are parties. Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to discuss the future of the island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself a workable proposition and capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–2155. Top Secret.

147. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, November 23, 1955—8 p.m.

1315. Reference Deptel 1478 [2] and Embtel 1297. [3] In relaxed post-prandial atmosphere last night, I had opportunity discuss recent Cyprus developments at some length with Karamanlis and Theotokis. There was little need to dwell on favorable features latest British formula since Prime Minister and Foreign Minister share our belief that it represents real step forward. Uppermost in their minds now was the problem facing them as result of rejection of the British proposal by Makarios about which they had heard from Peake. They greatly feared that any attempt on their part to change negative Makarios attitude would be exploited to jeopardize their chances of success in forthcoming elections. . . .

Theotokis did say that he would be prepared include in Greek Government public statement opinion that British formula represented progress but that this would have to be qualified by expression to effect that decision in matter up to Cypriot people.

In latter part of conversation Theotokis inquired whether it would be possible to bring American influence more directly to bear upon Makarios. He thought this could take both public and private forms. He seemed to have in mind that whatever was said by the US Government publicly on latest British formula should be devised with eye to possible impact on Makarios and his followers in Cyprus.

Re "private approach" he wondered whether appropriate American official might not be able to convey to Makarios a warning that Cyprus case could hardly expect to receive any wide support in UN now if such forward move by British should be rejected so summarily. Asked whether he thought any American advice would be effective with Makarios, Theotokis recalled that he and Makarios had recently discussed possibility that at some difficult stage in negotiations American assistance might be required, and Makarios had agreed that this might be beneficial.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–2355. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.

[2] Telegram 1478, November 21, transmitted the British formula on Cyprus printed as an enclosure to Makins' letter, *supra*.

[3] Telegram 1297, November 22, contained a report of a meeting between Peake, and Foreign Minister Theotokis concerning the British proposal on Cyprus. Commenting on the meeting, Ambassador Cannon noted that the British formula, "though less specific than some people hoped, is definite step in direction sought by Greeks and, if saner judgment could prevail, by Cypriots themselves." (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–2255)

While I made it clear to Theotokis that course he was suggesting was untried and would require careful weighing of implications, and I therefore gave him no encouragement, there may in fact be some merit in such intercession with Makarios at appropriate time, perhaps through some suitable unofficial American having background which would facilitate mission. [4]

Cannon

[4] In telegram 1507, November 24, the Department informed the Embassies at Athens, Ankara, and London and the U.S. Consulate at Nicosia that the British Ambassador asked the Secretary of State to instruct Ambassador Cannon to urge the Government of Greece to recommend the Cyprus formula to Makarios. The Department instructed Cannon to make this approach as well as any other moves that would keep the British plan alive. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/11–2455)

148. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the British Ambassador (Makins) and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, November 30, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Sir Roger called at his own request on the Secretary this morning. He handed the Secretary the attached copy of the Greek Prime Minister's letter to Sir Anthony Eden in connection with the latest British proposal on Cyprus, [2] together with a copy of the reply which Sir Anthony was dispatching to the Greek. [3] Sir Roger said that London was extremely grateful for the effective and active support which had been given to the British initiative in this matter both by our Ambassador in Athens and our Consul on Cyprus. He

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–3055. Secret. Drafted by Merchant.

[2] The letter from Karamanlis to Eden, November 28, noted that although the British formula acknowledged the right of self-determination, Karamanlis could not recommend it to Makarios because it had "no chance" of being accepted by the people of Cyprus. The full text of the letter is attached to a note from Robert G. Barnes to Allen, November 30. (*Ibid.*)

[3] Eden's reply to Karamanlis, dated November 28, was found attached to the note from Barnes to Allen cited in footnote 2 above. Eden wrote "We find ourselves unable to understand your reference to 'impediments on the road to self-government.' There are none. It has been made plain that we are ready at any time to institute a wide measure of self-government and to discuss the working of it with representatives of the people of Cyprus." (*Ibid.*)

asked that they be instructed to continue their support since Sir Anthony believed that it should be possible by keeping the pressure on (which his reply was designed to do) and with some help from us the Greek Government might change its position. He described the government as well-intentioned but weak.

The Secretary replied that he would consider this request but that he could not give an immediate reply. He mentioned the impending Greek elections as one element which must be taken into account in deciding whether or not in our view additional pressure on the Greek Government would be productive. [4]

[4] In telegram 1962 from Rome, December 1, Ambassador Luce informed the Department that during an informal dinner for King Paul, the King had remarked that he had done his best to persuade Karamanlis to accept the British proposal. According to Luce, he indicated that although Karamanlis found the formula to be a "reasonable" basis for discussion, the Greek Prime Minister concluded that he could not commit himself before the elections because the opposition would make "great political capital" out of the "'national unity'" theme. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–155)

149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, December 3, 1955—3:58 p.m.

3113. Re Athens 1381, rptd London 113, Nicosia 26. [2] Department encouraged by indications reftel that Karamanlis and Makarios remain anxious seek some understanding with Harding. Also it is politically important for Karamanlis make some progress re Cyprus before elections. Feel stiff tone Eden message November 28 [3] may be fatal unless we move rapidly.

Accordingly request London promptly tell Foreign Office we have indications that despite apparently negative attitude Karamanlis and Makarios they desire achieve an understanding by talks between Harding and Makarios. We aware British do not intend go beyond formula but feel would be proper hold talks for purpose clarifying formula and exploring method application. Theotokis has told us (reftel) that if HMG can assure him door open to clarification and discussion he would recommend to Makarios that he approach

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–155. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood. Also sent to Athens and repeated to Nicosia and USUN.

[2] Dated December 1, not printed. (*Ibid.*)

[3] See footnote 3, *supra*.

Harding before Commons debate. We suggest most earnestly this opportunity not be lost. We hope HMG will promptly instruct Peake to make approach (with Thurston if desirable) to Theotokis and/or Karamanlis to assure that door remains open and that in HMG's view Harding–Makarios talks for purpose clarification (but not expansion) formula and its application are desired and that indeed purpose of formula was to elicit such talks. Thurston hereby instructed support any request that GOG recommend to Makarios he see Harding before Parliamentary debate.

London should also discuss possibility rephrasing formula along lines reftel not to expand it but to make Makarios acceptance easier.

Athens authorized promptly inform GOG that we are approaching HMG to request they show willingness leave door open and discuss clarification but not expansion. Accordingly U.S. Government strongly urges GOG and Makarios avoid public comments formula and take no steps which would reduce possibility of progress.

Department will await suggestions from Athens re further approaches by Courtney to Makarios but feels preferable present initiative come only from GOG without apparent U.S. coordination. [4]

Dulles

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[4] In telegram 296 from London, December 5, Aldrich informed the Department that he had met with Macmillan on December 4 regarding telegram 3113. According to the Ambassador, the Foreign Secretary had instructed the Foreign Office to prepare a telegram to Athens that would follow the suggestions contained in the second paragraph of telegram 3113. Macmillan also included a paragraph in the proposed telegram that indicated his view that the Greek Government was attempting to "hustle us" into making changes in the British formula. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–555)

In telegram 1405 from Athens, December 5, Thurston informed the Department that he had conveyed the contents of this telegram to Karamanlis and that the Prime Minister expressed "warm appreciation" for active U.S. interest in the Cyprus problem; referred to the Greek Government's decision not to submit the Cyprus question to the U.N. General Assembly on an emergency basis in this session; indicated that a reply to Eden's latest message was being prepared; pressed Thurston for his views regarding the nature of new British approaches; and expressed the hope that the debate on Cyprus in the House of Commons on December 6 would be "low key" with an "emphasis on fluidity and delicacy of present situation." (*Ibid.*)

150. Telegram From the Consulate at Nicosia to the Department of State [1]

Nicosia, December 8, 1955.

Informant mentioned my unnumbered telegram November 26 [2] told me he had long talk . . . with Archbishop December 3. Said following:

1. Archbishop unquestionably desires reach agreement soon with British and now prepared try obtain it by further negotiations from present offer.

2. Makarios apparently had almost decided to go to London and seek negotiate there. Informant strongly advised him stay here where he can retain command his own forces and continue discussions initiated by Governor. Believed he had succeeded in so persuading him.

3. Archbishop now more confident he can control extremists and support for negotiated settlement. This connection informant considered EOKA promise to follow Archbishop reported Contel 111 [3] genuine and significant. On other hand Makarios (despite his contrary assertion to me as to others) concerned over threat from Communists: this a reason impelling him seek settlement.

4. At time this meeting Archbishop had not heard from Greek government but was not in fact distressed its reported rejection of request for UN appeal nor prospect it would seek to support continuance negotiations.

5. Makarios mistrust of British of course basic. He had higher regard for Harding than any other Britisher he had dealt with. (Archbishop had said to me he did not doubt Harding's good will and faith.)

6. Makarios not only gratified but genuinely encouraged to seek compromise by both nature US interest and manner its expression. Informant characterized our action as "excellent." He also urged that I call on Archbishop again soon, if only "socially," to display continuing interest.

7. Archbishop's ultimate objective is to achieve complete independence for Cyprus with freedom to make its (his) own choice—not necessarily simple enosis on Greek terms. This of course on presupposition he retains position of national leader. He did not in

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[1] Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 766. Top Secret. A notation on the source text indicates it was received on December 9 at 8:45 a.m.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

[3] Telegram 111, December 2, reported that new EOKA leaflets indicate that the organization is prepared to accept any solution that Archbishop Makarios considered satisfactory. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–255)

fact want to face any personal challenge whatsoever in an election and he is not anxious for early plebiscite.

8. Informant strongly counseled Archbishop (a) that present British proposal was his opportunity and (b) he should avoid historic fatal mistake of over reaching himself. Felt he may have made impression re (a), doubted whether he convinced him of (b).

End informant's statements.

I believe they were in good faith.

Department doubtless has noted contrast between some of Archbishop's public remarks December 4 and November 30, as well as different tone of *Ethnos* December 4 and *Alithia* December 5. (Contels 110, 114, 115 [4]) Also believe Archbishop's statement yesterday (Contel 117 [5]) does not close door. Do not know whether any move made toward further Harding–Makarios meetings. Have not discussed matter with Governor for several days. Suggest if other considerations make it advisable another call by me on Archbishop on appropriate occasion could be useful. Such occasion might occur if British had advance proposal relating rewording of formula. Department please pass this information to other interested posts as desired.

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[4] In telegram 110, December 1, the Consulate reported that Makarios had charged that the British were imposing "totalitarian rule" in an effort to prolong their control. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–155)

Telegram 114, December 5, noted in part that the Archbishop had indicated in a sermon on December 4 that British force could only prolong the occupation but could not establish "normality". (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–555)

In telegram 115, December 6, the Consulate transmitted the statement of the nationalist weekly *Alithia*, which appealed to the British to accept Makarios' plan to acknowledge and implement self-determination for Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–655)

[5] On December 7, Makarios issued a statement that no settlement of the Cyprus problem would be acceptable unless it secured self-determination. (Telegram 117 from Nicosia, December 8; *ibid.*, 747C.00/12–855)

151. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State [1]

Paris, December 17, 1955—1 a.m.

Secto 7. At luncheon meeting with Secretary December 15, Macmillan said that Greek Government had been weak and timid in recent discussions on Cyprus and he hoped Secretary would tell Theotokis that point had been reached where necessary for them to agree on something and not keep discussions going forever. Theotokis should be urged to tell Archbishop to see Harding and move on toward agreement. Secretary said his reports indicated there had been encouraging progress and he hoped UK as well as Greeks would continue to bear in mind essentiality of early agreement.

Secretary saw Greek Foreign Minister Theotokis this morning. Latter said British proposals put in such a way as to be practically unintelligible. Macmillan had stated UK position in satisfactory form in House of Commons debate. Formula should be couched in such a way as to be understandable by public. Principal objections were to double negative in first paragraph, dependence of future action toward self-determination upon views of other countries in area and absence of specific length of time at end of which decision would be made re self-determination.

Secretary said he could not get into middle of question of drafting. That was for Greece and UK to work out. He felt that double negative was awkward but that rest was not too bad. He said present draft represents tremendous advance in substance from which Greek Government could take great satisfaction. It had achieved substance of victory and should not risk losing it by striving for too much perfection in wording. Extremely important get matter settled quickly.

Subsequently Macmillan agreed with Secretary to eliminate double negative.

Dulles

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–1755. Secret. Repeated to London and Athens. Dulles was in Paris to attend a Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on December 15 and 16.

152. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Prime Minister Karamanlis and the Chargé d'Affaires in Greece (Thurston), Athens, December 19, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus

The Chargé d'Affaires called on the Prime Minister on December 19, 1955, at 11 a.m.

Mr. Thurston said he had been instructed by his Government [2] to ask the Prime Minister to be good enough to exert his influence over Archbishop Makarios in order that the Archbishop might resume his negotiations with Marshal Harding. Mr. Thurston added that the American Government felt that the revised formula put forth by the British [3] offered good hope for the attainment of a solution of the Cyprus question, and that it would be most desirable that negotiations be resumed at this time. The Prime Minister replied very curtly that he did not think so at all. Had the British formula been a good one, Makarios would have already resumed negotiations. Mr. Thurston reminded the Prime Minister that the revised formula was a distinct improvement over anything that had been offered by the British so far, since it assured self-government at once and self-determination in the future. The Prime Minister remarked that he had no means of bringing pressure upon or even influencing Makarios to resume negotiations. He wished Mr. Thurston to understand that this was not a case for his Government to decide upon. Had it been so, everything would be much simpler. He would have been able to take decisions himself and on the spot. He pointed out to Mr. Thurston, should the Archbishop turn down any such recommendation, that would automatically blow up his Government. He went on to say, . . . that nothing would have pleased him more than the resumption of discussions between Makarios and Harding, but that as things stand at present there is nothing he can do to influence Makarios. He, the Prime Minister, . . . is forced to work for almost 22 hours out of every 24, and 6 to 8 hours a day are devoted to Cyprus. He cannot possibly continue in this way, and

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–2155. Secret. Drafted on December 21 by Thurston and Stephen Calligas, Embassy interpreter. Transmitted to the Department on December 21 in despatch 581. (*Ibid.*) Thurston also transmitted the substance of this conversation to the Department in telegram 1557, December 19. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–1955)

[2] Transmitted in telegram 1629, December 9. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–555)

[3] The text of the revised formula is attached to a note of December 8 from Barbara Salt to Chalmers Wood. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–855)

particularly on the eve of elections. He referred to the difficulties in communicating with Makarios as another exasperating factor.

At this point Mr. Thurston said he would venture to quote certain excerpts from a report concerning a conversation with Makarios during the first week of December.[4] This Mr. Thurston did in confidence and added that the source was a reliable one. Mr. Thurston stated that according to this report, Makarios unquestionably wished to reach an agreement soon with the British and was ready to try to obtain it by further negotiations of the present British offer. Furthermore, Makarios was reported as being on this occasion more confident that he could control the extremists and get support for a negotiated settlement. In this connection he was not disturbed by the prospect that the Greek Government would seek continuance of negotiations. It would appear, said Mr. Thurston, from what Makarios had said in the course of this conversation, that the Archbishop might be prepared to resume his talks at this time, particularly after the clarifications made by the British in their revised formula. Mr. Thurston laid some emphasis on that part of the conversation with Makarios in which the Archbishop had said that he had great esteem for the personal integrity of Governor Harding. It could be, added Mr. Thurston, that Harding is the man with whom Makarios would prefer to pursue his negotiations. If that were the case, the Prime Minister asked, why had Makarios not already done so? Mr. Thurston remarked that—perhaps the Archbishop has felt all this time that something is happening and has purposely postponed the resumption of talks—or, it could well be that he is just waiting for a word of encouragement from the Greek Government.

The Prime Minister expressed great interest in this estimate of Makarios' attitude . . . . He said that he had asked the Foreign Minister this morning to look into the possibility of resuming negotiations with the British on the basis of their revised formula and of his own memorandum of December 5.[5] He added that he would ask Mr. Theotokis to get in touch with Mr. Thurston on this subject.

The Prime Minister said that he was greatly concerned over the new rise of anti-American feeling amongst the people in the course of the last two or three days. This, he thought, was a most aggravating symptom, particularly after the very great effort he had made personally to calm public opinion during the last two months. He asked Mr. Thurston very earnestly to realize that it is of the

[4] Presumably a reference to the conversation reported on in Document 150.

[5] The text of the British memorandum was transmitted in despatch 542 from Athens, December 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–655)

utmost importance that the Greek people should always believe that the U.S. are at their side . . . . It is of the greatest importance not for himself or for the sake of his Government, but for Greece as a whole, as well as for Turkey and for the Balkan Pact. It is the only way for Greece to remain faithful to her alliances. What Greece needs at present is a little "patting on the back". With the feeling of bitterness and hatred which exists toward the British, the Turks, the French, and others, nothing will stop the people from turning toward Russia if they should be led to believe that the U.S. no longer stands at their side. The Prime Minister had just asked the Foreign Minister to make a public statement denying the reports which had appeared in the press of the last two days in connection with the NATO talks in Paris, with a view to dispelling the fears and doubts which had again begun to seize the people. [6] Mr. Thurston remarked that surely the Prime Minister remembers the assurances given on numerous occasions of the sympathy with which the U.S. Government views the Cyprus issue, as well as the belief that time is working on Greece's side, while at the same time his Government reserves for itself the right to use its own judgement as to the advisability of this or that policy or method followed by Greece. He assured the Prime Minister that the U.S. Government will continue to use its influence in all directions with a view to bringing about a relief of tension and an ultimate satisfactory settlement for all parties concerned. Proof of the continued interest of Mr. Dulles himself is that even after his meeting with Mr. Theotokis and with Mr. Macmillan, the Secretary again used his influence with the result that an improvement is in prospect with regard to the wording of the first paragraph of the revised British formula.

The Prime Minister said he would soon send an envoy to Makarios. At the same time, he asked Mr. Thurston for his Government's assistance in convincing the British to resume negotiations on the basis of their revised formula and of his recent memorandum. Mr. Thurston made an appeal to the Prime Minister for the resumption of negotiations at this time. The Christmas holidays are approaching, he said, and the Western world is in bad need of some good news, particularly in the light of recent Soviet moves. His Government feels that this is a historic opportunity which should not be lost. If allowed to drag on, there is no way of knowing what the present situation may lead to. Governor Harding may be forced to take still further measures, and bombs now exploding in Constitution Square are certainly not going to help matters for any one of the parties concerned. Mr. Thurston asked the Prime Minister how

[6] Not printed.

the Greek Government could now assume the grave responsibility of refraining from encouraging Makarios to resume talks.

The Prime Minister referred to the deterioration in Greece's relations with Turkey. The statements recently made in Ankara had been very badly received by the people (he was obviously referring to the recent Menderes–Inonu debate in the Turkish Chamber). He was concerned about the disclosures made by the judiciary of Salonika with regard to the explosion in the Turkish Consulate. Unfortunately, he said, the judiciary had rendered their decision. . . .

Just as the Chargé d'Affaires was taking his leave, the Prime Minister remarked very casually that he did not think a solution would be found for the Cyprus issue until after elections. He asked Mr. Thurston if he agreed with him. Mr. Thurston replied that he believed that the sooner negotiations were resumed and a solution found, the better it would be for all concerned. The Prime Minister did not seem to think that would be possible. Anyway, he said, it would not be long before elections are held. He had almost made up his mind either to have an election or to resign in a fortnight or so. He went on to say that he liked to get things done and that he could not put up with the present state of affairs much longer. Everything was at a standstill, he said. In the course of the next fifteen days he would either decide on elections or he would resign.

The interview terminated at 12 noon.

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153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

Washington, December 23, 1955—3:43 p.m.

1785. I am seriously disturbed at reluctance Greek Government to accept what seems to me a substantial victory for Greece in Cyprus problem. I believe modified UK formula represents such a victory and will lead inevitably to self-determination for people of Cyprus. Differences between UK and Greek positions are too small to permit continuation of dispute which may jeopardize long-term

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–2355. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Allen and Baxter and signed by Dulles. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Nicosia.

interests of Greece and endanger vitally essential free-world alliances.

I have done my best to urge UK to bring its policy more in line with Greek and Cypriot desires and I believe my efforts have borne fruit. However it will be difficult for me continue to argue Greek case with conviction if Greek Government is unable accept a formula which concedes the application of eventual self-determination or if Greek Government and Makarios insist on definite time schedule.

Cannot Greek Government take position that in getting UK to offer such a formula it has won recognition of principle of self-determination for Cypriot people? I fear Greeks would really lose many of their friends if it became known they refused a British formula which would generally be interpreted as reasonable.

Furthermore this may be high tide for Greece on Cyprus problem and if Greek Government does not try to ride into harbor now, it may find no such favorable opportunity for some years to come. Present British Government and future ones might not be willing make such a good offer as now stands. Certainly a worsening of situation on Cyprus will make concessions by either side more difficult.

Unless you perceive objections I should like you to express orally and in your own words to Prime Minister and Foreign Minister such foregoing views as you deem appropriate.

If in your considered opinion approach along foregoing lines would be futile or counterproductive I would like your recommendations as to alternate courses of action. Do you think Karamanlis genuinely desires solution now or prefers keep problem open until after elections?

Even if he prefers keep question open for political reasons he should at least do everything in his power to terminate violence and bloodshed during interim. [2]

Dulles

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[2] In telegram 1626 December 24, Cannon informed the Department that he had personally conveyed the contents of telegram 1785 to Karamanlis. The Ambassador reported that the Prime Minister was "agonizingly anxious" that the Cyprus talks be resumed and that he would indicate to Makarios the need for "constructive, flexible and patient" attitude in the negotiations; that Karamanlis noted that he had two "main obstacles"—distrust of Britain's good faith and increasing domestic tensions as Greece approaches elections. Cannon added that the Foreign Minister asked him, in the name of the Prime Minister and himself, to express to Dulles their "deep appreciation" for his "personal interest and great effort on Greece's behalf". (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–2455)

154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, December 28, 1955—7:23 p.m.

1072. Department seriously concerned at steady deterioration Greek-Turk relations. Tone and nature recent exchanges between these two NATO and Balkan Pact partners, if not moderated, may lead to extreme positions from which neither country can retreat. Department recognizes both governments extremely sensitive to local public opinion in view upcoming Greek elections and recent Turk Cabinet crisis. However, in our view both governments must share blame for utilizing radio and press to openly criticize acts considered internal affairs by Greece Turkey respectively. Department wishes Ambassadors in both capitals continue appeal to statesmanship respective government leaders and impress upon them need for greatest possible restraint in official statements to prevent further aggravation already tense situation.

Embassy Ankara should take appropriate occasion commend Foreign Office for recognizing Greek actions in coming weeks will be greatly influenced by electoral campaign issues (ref Embtel 1043 [2]). At same time you should point out in US view there is one serious stumbling block to improvement Greek-Turk relations, i.e. lack prompt action in reasonably concrete form on reparations issue. Department recognizes Turk Cabinet crisis held up presentation pertinent legislation but believes now new government installed and GNA in full swing enabling legislation should be promptly introduced in order renew Greek confidence in Turk bona fides and give Greek Govt something to use in placating Greek public opinion. In this connection you may refer to declaration by Minister of Finance November 24 (Ankara's Embtel 883 [3]) and Koprulu's recent confirmation of Turk intention to introduce necessary legislation. Aside from beneficial effect such action would have on Greek-Turk relations, it could be expected considerably influence public opinion in third countries and help restore Turk prestige.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 681.82/12–2855. Confidential. Drafted by Brewster and Crain. Also sent to Athens.

[2] In telegram 1043, December 23, the Embassy transmitted the highlights of a discussion with Nuri Birgi. Among other things, Nuri Birgi indicated that the Turkish Government agreed that there was little hope of an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations until after the upcoming Greek elections. (*Ibid.*, 781.00/12–2355)

[3] In telegram 883, November 30, the Embassy reported that the Finance Minister had informed the press that a Turkish Committee of inspectors was presently examining the various declarations of losses and that the draft bill under preparation for the Turkish Assembly would authorize the government to compensate losses not covered by the aid committee. (*Ibid.*, 782.00/11–3055)

Embassy Athens in anticipation early concrete action by Turk Govt may wish on appropriate occasion appeal to Greek Govt leaders to deal with sensitive Greek-Turk relations, and more generally Balkan Pact and NATO matters, in dignified and enlightened manner with due regard for Greece's best long-term interests. US recognizes considerable heat will be generated in forthcoming electoral campaign and opposition candidates can be expected cause Karamanlis serious trouble by exploiting Cyprus issue and Greek-Turk relations. In view fact elections not to be held for two months, possibility maintaining uneasy status quo until then seems dim. Greek Govt faces genuine internal difficulties on Cyprus issue but prospects for détente with Turkey appear feasible. Assuming Turk expressions of desire restore harmonious relations made in good faith, which we have no reason to doubt, Department believes Karamanlis might increase his stature with Greek public if he could make acceptable progress in this field.

Dulles

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155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, January 9, 1956—7:35 p.m.

3757. Personal from Secretary for Selwyn Lloyd.

When Harold Macmillan and I discussed Cyprus question in Paris at last NATO meeting Harold asked me to use my good offices with Greek Foreign Minister. I then talked with Theotokis at Palais de Chaillot and reported to Macmillan, who sat next to me at Council table, that Theotokis had made three objections: (1) the double negative; (2) the possibility that Turkey might have veto power; and (3) the vagueness of the timing.

Harold told me that they could change the double negative, that there was no basis for inferring a Turkey veto power and that timing could not be made definite. [2]

Thereupon immediately following Council meeting I talked with Theotokis, reported the above and urged Greek acceptance of the formula with the double negative eliminated. Theotokis said they

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–956. Secret; Priority.

[2] See Document 151.

would think it over. It was my impression that Harold knew I would report to Theotokis, as above, and desired me to do so, although of course all of this took place in somewhat hurried and very informal atmosphere and it is possible a misunderstanding may have occurred. In any case I continue to believe HMG should give serious and urgent consideration to alternate phraseology which, in my view, would not alter substance of formula. I suggest that this controversial sentence in formula could be redrafted and if necessary lengthened so that HMG's offer to meet wishes of Cypriots could be set forth more positively and more clearly; having in mind that it will one day become public. Frankly, I understand that Greek Government is somewhat suspicious of present wording. Finally, in event question again comes before UN, I believe such change would improve HMG's position.

Ambassador Cannon believes that if Harding and Makarios meet, it would be helpful if they could agree on a joint communiqué summarizing the considerable progress which has already been made, based on the facts that during the past year direct talks have occurred; principle of self-determination has been recognized as applicable at some time to Cyprus; it has been agreed both that self-government should be established as a first step, and that final solution should be worked out between HMG and the elected representatives of the Cypriots taking into account complex of strategic and political considerations.

I realize present situation on Cyprus very difficult, but hope you will not desist in your efforts. [3]

Dulles

[3] The Embassy at London transmitted Lloyd's reply in telegram 2809, January 11, which reads: "Thank you very much for your personal message conveyed to me today by Mr. Barbour. I am carefully considering it and will answer more fully in a day or two. Harding had a not unprofitable discussion with Makarios yesterday." (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–1156)

156. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

Washington, January 13, 1956—6:45 p.m.

1963. Athens 1743 rptd London 153 Ankara 179 Nicosia 53. [2] Nicosia 155 rptd Athens 89 London 81. [3] Department has reviewed reasoning reftels and it is appreciated that Courtney should not appear too closely identified with British. This depends on his timing of visit to Makarios and nature his démarche. Department doubts too much reliance should be placed on Makarios commitment consult GOG prior any final break. Not clear why approach to Harding re joint communiqué would make visit Makarios unnecessary. Department aware if formula fails and U.S. publicly identified as supporting it, U.S. may be criticized. In Department view revised formula represents fair offer and in U.S. interest to continue work for understanding based on it, despite risk adverse publicity. If we use our good offices rather than co-sponsor formula, we can avoid some of this odium.

Center gravity Cyprus question has now shifted to Cyprus, a development U.S. has long favored and it appears Harding and Makarios both desire reach an understanding.

In view these considerations Courtney authorized approach Makarios with Governor's consent. Coordination with Embassy Athens desirable if time permits. In any discussion with Makarios, Courtney should seek primarily increase Makarios confidence British good faith. Might review situation without appearing take sides or go into details. Explain U.S. believes in principle self-determination and Department is of opinion HMG has now publicly recognized principle for Cyprus. Having done this HMG cannot indefinitely delay application due to pressure of world opinion (UN) and especially opinion in England. Department has had extensive discussions with HMG re Cyprus and believes British offer made in good faith. Department appreciates Makarios has come long way in past year to meet British. U.S. Government has pushed HMG on this question for some time and Department extremely doubtful British will yield further. Understand if some basis for agreement not reached soon, Harding may feel compelled take more repressive measures. This

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–1356. Secret. Drafted by Wood. Also sent to Nicosia, repeated to London, and pouched to Ankara.

[2] In telegram 1743, January 7, the Embassy recommended to the Department that any decision on Courtney seeing Makarios after the Archbishop had resumed talks with Harding be postponed until those discussions were under way. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/1–756)

[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/1–556)

would only lead to more bloodshed and violence which no one desires. Gap now narrow and Department believes Makarios has prestige and strength to reach an understanding and to convince his people that it is acceptable. Such an understanding resulting in decrease in bloodshed and opening way to eventual self-determination would do him great credit as churchman and statesman.

Above may be used by Courtney as he thinks best.

Re timing, next few days might be good choice while discussions suspended and no irrevocable decisions taken. Since Harding apparently awaiting further instructions from London, Courtney would not appear to be acting in concert with British.

Athens comments requested.

Courtney also authorized inform Governor substance Secretary's message to Selwyn Lloyd (Deptel 3757 London rptd Athens 1926 Ankara 1126 Paris Topol 796 Nicosia 111 USUN 439 [4]) to show Secretary's thinking on double negative and more especially on joint communiqué.

Courtney may wish ask Governor whether it would be possible explain to Makarios that while HMG convinced in view NATO relations and Cyprus proximity that Turkish views must be given most careful consideration, HMG does not intend that Turkey or any other country should have veto power. [5]

Dulles

[4] *Supra.*

[5] In telegram 1818, January 14, the Embassy at Athens informed the Department that it agreed that the center of gravity of the Cyprus issue had shifted to Cyprus and added that it is in the interest of all concerned that it be kept there "to fullest possible extent". The Embassy also noted that the type of approach for Courtney to make to Makarios outlined in the third paragraph of telegram 1963 represented an excellent way of avoiding the danger mentioned in telegram 1743. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–1456)

157. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 16, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Miss Barbara Salt, British Embassy
Mr. MacArthur, C

In the course of a call on the Secretary about several unrelated matters, Sir Roger Makins mentioned that the Secretary had sent a message to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd on Cyprus, and that the latter had sent an interim reply through our Embassy in London. [2] Sir Roger said he now had a further reply for the Secretary from Mr. Lloyd, and handed it to the Secretary (see Attachment A [3]). The Secretary glanced at this message from Mr. Lloyd but did not comment on it.

Sir Roger then said that in addition, he was instructed to give the Secretary an account of two meetings Sir John Harding, the Governor General of Cyprus, had had with Archbishop Makarios on January 9 and 13. Sir Roger indicated that he thought the most satisfactory way to inform the Secretary of these two meetings was to give him copies of Sir John's reports, which he then handed to the Secretary (January 9 meeting is Attachment B; January 13 meeting is Attachment C [4]).

Sir Roger summarized these two meetings briefly by saying that at the first one Sir John and the Archbishop had had a go at a formula, and that the Archbishop had raised three points which HMG had taken into account in revising the formula discussed at the January 9 meeting. At the second meeting on January 13, the revised formula (Attachment D) had been given to the Archbishop, but Sir John had reported that this meeting was profoundly unsatis-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–1656. Top Secret. Drafted by MacArthur.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 155.

[3] Lloyd's message, dated January 15, expressed Britain's disappointment with Makarios' attitude toward British proposals on the Cyprus question. According to Makins, Makarios continued to find major objections with British revisions in the formula. Lloyd believed that the chances of agreement would be increased if Dulles would instruct the American Consul to see Makarios before his next meeting with Harding and to express the view that the United States hopes that the Archbishop would accept the formula as a "fair basis for cooperation and political development in Cyprus."

[4] Neither printed.

factory. The Secretary inquired whether the three points raised at the January 9 meeting by the Archbishop were the same three points which had been raised with him by the Greek Foreign Minister in Paris (i.e., the double negative; Turkish veto; and vagueness of the phrase on timing). Ambassador Makins said the Archbishop had not raised the double negative and that the points mentioned at the January 9 meeting were different from those which the Greek Foreign Minister had raised with the Secretary in Paris. All this, he said, was clear in the report of that meeting which he had given the Secretary.

Sir Roger then said he wished to sum up Field Marshal Harding's conclusions as follows:

1. Sir John Harding is convinced that the Archbishop will not accept any formula which recognizes Turkish interests;
2. Sir John is also convinced that if the formula given the Archbishop on January 13 is amended, the Archbishop will raise further objections. In other words, if the British amend the formula further, and risk a violent adverse objection by Ankara, the Archbishop will simply raise further objections and will not accept a reasonable formula;
3. Sir John is profoundly dissatisfied with the Archbishop's attitude regarding the use of violence and terrorism, and is convinced that the Archbishop will not give up terrorism as one of his negotiating weapons;
4. Sir John recommends that HMG stand pat on the formula put to the Archbishop on January 13, and instruct him to make it as the final UK offer.

On this basis, London instructed Sir Roger to approach the Secretary and to stress the Archbishop's attitude on terrorism. The British Government is not asking the US Government to take any new position. It is grateful for the instructions which have already been sent to Consul Courtney on Cyprus to support the Governor General.[5] The Governor General is in touch with Consul Courtney and has said that if Courtney could intervene and could see the Archbishop just before Harding's final meeting with him to put the January 13 formula as the final UK offer, it would be very helpful. Sir Roger stressed that HMG was not suggesting that the US Government take a new position, but that it authorize and instruct Consul Courtney to see the Archbishop again just before Sir John makes his final offer on the basis of his present US instructions.

The Secretary asked Sir Roger's view as to what extent the Archbishop is operating on his own and to what extent is he working with the Greek Government. Sir Roger replied that he could not answer this precisely. The Archbishop had his own council. He

[5] *Supra.*

believed that the Greek Government was not prepared to put pressure on the Archbishop to go further than the latter was willing to go. In other words, in this matter the Archbishop was the tail wagging the Greek dog. Sir Roger added that the UK Ambassador in Athens had been instructed to give the Greek Government a full account of Sir John's meetings with the Archbishop on January 9 and 13.

He also said that the UK Government agreed with Sir John that they were getting to the end of the discussions with the Archbishop. UK public opinion would not understand why talks were going on when terrorism involving British deaths was continuing unabated. The British Government could not justify the negotiations dragging on indefinitely and believed the time had come to bring the discussions to an end on the basis of making the January 13 formula as a final offer.

Sir Roger then asked the Secretary his reaction to what he had said, and the Secretary replied that he could not give him an immediate reaction but would have to study the papers and memoranda which Sir Roger had given him. The Secretary said that during the 1930's he had written a book on war, peace, and change,[6] pointing out that when change was indicated, it was necessary to go out to meet the situation and not to let it wait, because the longer it waited, the more difficult it became. If changing situations could be recognized in advance, and met, frequently solutions could be obtained on a basis which was no longer practicable as the situation deteriorated. The French had not recognized this, and this had been to a considerable extent responsible for the difficulties in Indochina and North Africa. The Secretary said he was not prejudging the British position with respect to Cyprus, but was stating a general principle in which he believed.

Sir Roger said he agreed with this principle and the British had followed it in many places including, most recently, Malaya. He said the British were taking a serious risk in Malaya and Kenya by moving toward self-government when terrorism was still continuing, but this risk they felt obliged to take to keep in step with the times. The Cyprus situation was different, however, in that it did not just involve the simple problem of colonial rule in dependent territory evolving toward self-government, since Turkey was involved. There were limits beyond which the British could not go without having the Turks blow up, which would create real UK-Turkish problems, increase the present difficulties between Greece and Turkey, and hence impair and undermine the whole NATO foundation.

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[6] Reference is to Dulles' book, *War, Peace and Change* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939).

It was left that the Secretary and the Department would study the papers and would communicate with the British in due course, particularly with respect to their request that the US Consul in Cyprus be instructed on the basis of his present substantive instructions, to approach the Archbishop just before Sir John Harding saw the Archbishop again. [7]

Attachment D

CYPRUS

The following is the text of the formula presented to Archbishop Makarios on January 13 by Governor Harding. This text was revised to take into account points raised by the Archbishop at his interview with the Governor on January 9. Insertions and deletions are shown by means of underlining and square brackets—those parts in brackets being the old, and those underlined the new text.[8]

"Her Majesty's Government adheres to the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Potomac Charter and the Pacific Charter, to which they have subscribed. It is not, therefore, their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition, [both] on account of the present strategic and *political* situation [and on account of the consequences on relations between the N.A.T.O. Powers] in the Eastern Mediterranean.

"Her Majesty's Government have offered a wide measure of self-government now. If the people of Cyprus will participate in the constitutional development, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to work for a final solution consistent with *existing* Treaty obligations and strategic interests of Her Majesty's Government and their allies, which will satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyprus. Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to discuss the

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[7] On January 19, during a discussion of Cyprus at the Secretary's Staff meeting, the following exchange occurred:

"The Secretary asked Messrs. Merchant and Rountree what action had been taken as a result of the British Ambassador's recent call regarding Cyprus. Mr. Rountree said we had instructed our Consul at Nicosia to coordinate his activities with General Harding to ensure that the talks were not broken off and to make a further approach to Archbishop Makarios if necessary. The Secretary asked whether we had indicated our view that the present British proposal is an extremely negative document. Mr. Rountree said we had advised Embassy London and our Consulate at Nicosia of this view and that our present task is to convince General Harding that if the document were less negative Bishop Makarios would back it." (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

The Department's instructions to London and Nicosia are in telegrams 3950 to London and 115 to Nicosia, January 18. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 747C.00/1–1456)

[8] Underscoring printed here as italics. All brackets in this document are in the source text.

future of the Island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself [a workable proposition and] capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community."

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158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate at Nicosia [1]

Washington, January 28, 1956—4:04 p.m.

123. You are requested see both Archbishop and Governor earliest. Although order which you see them left your discretion if you see Harding first you should seek obtain from him as much detail as possible regarding points set forth numbered paragraphs below.

You should inform Makarios US views as follows. US Government firmly convinced both he and UK desire settlement current difficulties in Cyprus. This evidenced by very considerable concessions both sides during past year. Believe in view good faith shown by both parties, settlement is well within reach. It would in our view be tragic if, having come so close, two parties could not bring talks to successful conclusion. US Government therefore hopes most earnestly Makarios will be able accept British proposals.

Inform Harding of contents your démarche to Makarios and say US fully sympathetic to Harding's desire bring halt to terrorist activities Cyprus, achieve restoration order and proceed to institution self-government, but hopes he will consider following points in "clarifying sessions" with Archbishop.

1. From examination his report January 13 meeting with Archbishop, [2] and Archbishop's own report that same meeting, [3] would appear chief remaining obstacle in context present proposed formula is phrase re treaties. It would seem reasonable for Harding explain which treaties meant and repeat that there are no secret clauses involved.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–2856. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Crain. Repeated to Athens, London, and Ankara.

[2] Not printed, but see *supra*.

[3] Telegram 168 from Nicosia, January 15, contained Courtney's impressions of an "informant's" account of the Archbishop's meetings with Harding on January 9 and 13. According to the informant's report, Makarios' account accorded "fairly closely" with Harding's version. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–156)

2. Department concurs in considerations explained Athens telegram 1937 [4] and urges that full weight be given Makarios' judgment on how he can best use his influence to stop violence. We believe Archbishop should be given sufficient opportunity consider text his public undertaking in reply to Governor's letter. This connection we reassured by Harding's remarks to Courtney reported paragraph 2 Nicosia's 178. [5]

3. Moreover, we think pressure for reply by February 1 might have effect of enhancing violence in Makarios' eyes as bargaining weapon, and give exaggerated impression British concern.

In view coming Greek elections and threat posed by formation popular front electoral coalition including commie front party, we hope that it will be possible avoid any publicity indicating negotiations have been or may be suspended.

Dulles

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[4] In telegram 1937, January 25, the Embassy at Athens informed the Department that it considered the British intent to instruct Harding to modify the objectionable wording of the revised British formula, provided Makarios denounced terrorism and cooperated on self-government, a "constructive step." The Embassy added, however, that it was concerned about the attempt to force the Archbishop to "denounce" terrorism, as it was not realistic to expect the Archbishop to condemn publicly the Cypriot nationalist movement as "terroristic". The desired result might be achieved, the Embassy concluded, if Makarios could give the assurance that he would use his influence to end the violence on the island. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/1–2556)

[5] Paragraph 2 of telegram 178 from Nicosia, January 27, reads:

"Harding said he would make quite clear that discussions could be kept open for purpose further clarification, if necessary, and that he was not presenting time ultimatum. At same time he wished also make clear to Makarios that initiative for response would now rest with latter, and Harding would suggest that if possible Makarios might give him some answer by, say, February 1. (Possible advantage to that, from British viewpoint, would be that Eden could be informed of answer while still in Washington.) He recognized of course that Archbishop might consult with Greek Government, which might entail more time." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/1–2756)

159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate at Nicosia [1]

Washington, February 1, 1956—3:59 p.m.

126. Your 185. [2] After discussing general idea of following with Governor you should, unless you believe it would not be helpful, talk to Makarios along following lines:

In Department's view Archbishop would be well advised in interest improving over-all situation on island to make clear his acceptance of principles of formula as means by which Cypriots and British can start work of evolving form self-government which would be fair to all groups on Cyprus. By doing this he would reserve full rights Cypriots negotiate for type self-government best suited their needs. Negotiations on constitution would be test of whether principles in formula will actually be implemented. He also would ease present dangerous tensions by giving public indication progress already made. Reduction tensions would facilitate future negotiations.

You may add that Archbishop in approving general principles embodied in formula would not commit himself in advance to any particular form of constitution. This would be subject future negotiations within framework principles of formula. Also, if form of constitution is evolved through gradual negotiation it more apt to be useful than if Archbishop and his advisors hastily lay down conditions on which they require advance assent.

Department appreciates Archbishop's desire see constitution before supporting formula, but suggests he would be in stronger position should he accept formula and reserve right negotiate on form self-government. If he publicly states in advance conditions under which self-government would be acceptable, he would be exposed criticism from extreme nationalists on grounds he did not

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–3056. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Wood. Repeated to Athens, London, and Ankara.

[2] Telegram 185, January 30, reported a meeting between Makarios and Courtney. Among other things, the Archbishop indicated that as a statement of British policy, which he was not required to endorse, the British formula was now acceptable. Makarios noted, however, that the formula could not be "detached" from the nature of the proposed constitution and on this subject the British had not shown "good will". (*Ibid.*)

ask for enough and from communists who would take same line in order stir up trouble and reduce chances acceptance. [3]

Dulles

[3] In telegram 190, February 2, Courtney reported that he had met with Makarios and conveyed the Department instructions set forth in telegram 126. The Consul informed the Department that Makarios had indicated that he knew "beyond question" that London had no intention of implementing genuine self-government for Cyprus. According to Courtney, the Archbishop was not convinced by the Consul's arguments that an acceptance of the principles of the British formula would be the first step toward the realization of that goal, would fully reserve Cypriot rights, and would result in negotiations which would provide a test of implementation and afford an opportunity to develop the best form of a constitution. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/2–256)

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate at Nicosia [1]

Washington, February 3, 1956—7:25 p.m.

131. Re Cyprus: In Department's view effort at this point should be avoid breakdown negotiations and subsequent public recriminations. Addressee posts requested make this point to governments as seems best. May wish consider following:

London: Embassy may inform HMG that while it is realized Makarios' reply discouraging, it does not close door. We earnestly hope means be found keep negotiations alive. Hope HMG will consider some way publicly assuring Cypriots proposed constitution is democratic and representative. It is believed basic difficulty is Cypriots doubts re British intent permit democratic constitution. We inclined to think eventual agreement should be possible without meeting Makarios' exorbitant demands. [2]

Athens: Karamanlis letter to President indicated acceptance possible if formula changed, but now Makarios raises new and far-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–356. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood. Also sent to London and Athens and repeated to Ankara.

[2] Telegram 3247 from London, February 4, informed the Department that the Embassy had conveyed the substance of this telegram to the Foreign Office. It reported that the Foreign Office took note of the Department's hope that the discussions would not breakdown and the suggestion that Great Britain might consider giving possible public assurances regarding the "democratic character" of the proposed constitution. The Foreign Office noted, however, that in its view the British had already made it clear on several occasions that they considered the proposals "democratic and representative". (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/2–456)

reaching demands re constitution. In Department's view this may well cause breakdown negotiations and thus increase Karamanlis difficulties before elections. Although not directly involved, US has tried to be helpful because Cyprus question threatened broad interests free world. In our view Greece as member NATO and free world must now take its proper share responsibility to resolve this problem which has troubled Eastern Mediterranean for many years and now, after long negotiations, balances precariously between grave deterioration and achievement reasonable understanding. Situation now so difficult we urge GOG again attempt influence Makarios to avoid breakdown negotiations. [3]

Nicosia: Approach Governor as suggested to London. Believe there should be no further approach Makarios this time. [4]

Dulles

[3] In telegram 2141, February 7, Cannon informed the Department that he had met with the Greek Foreign Minister and urged the Greek Government, along the lines of this telegram, to use its influence with Makarios to prevent a breakdown in negotiations. According to the Ambassador, Theotokis seemed ready to help, but wondered what could be done since the Greek Government was under heavy attack for its reported pressure on the Archbishop. Cannon told the Department that it was unrealistic to expect the Greeks to do anything "but follow Makarios" until after the Greek elections. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/2–756)

[4] In telegram 199, February 7, Courtney informed the Department that he had met with Governor Harding as instructed in this telegram. According to the Consul, Harding had no intention of permiting the negotiations to breakdown and even appeared optimistic about their chances for success. According to Harding, Makarios did want an agreement, would compromise, and would finally agree to British proposals with some bargaining. (*Ibid.*)

161. Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Karamanlis [1]

Washington, February 20, 1956.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I have read your letter of January 25, 1956, [2] on the subject of Cyprus with close attention and

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–2056. Transmitted in telegram 2456 to Athens on February 20 with instructions that the Embassy recommend to the Greek Government that it not release the letter on grounds that the United States could play a more useful role in the Cyprus dispute "without publicity". Pouched to London, Ankara, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, and USUN.

[2] Not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

interest. The emotions of the people of Greece in this question find a ready response among Americans, who have always treasured the ideals of freedom and self-rule.

Your letter was timely, since it enabled me to have your thoughts at an appropriate moment. The Joint Declaration [3] issued during Prime Minister Eden's visit stated our belief in "the basic right of peoples to governments of their own choice." This pertains to the people of Cyprus as well as to any other.

At the same time, it is our view that the legitimate interests of our allies and of all the groups on the island must be respected. On appropriate occasions we have sought to reconcile the various points of view through quiet diplomacy rather than through public debate.

I believe that the Cyprus question can be solved only when those who are primarily concerned have come to the point where they trust and understand each other sufficiently to cooperate in achieving a just solution. In this vital respect, I congratulate you on the real progress which is being made. We shall continue our active interest in the question.

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, my personal regards and good wishes at this important time in the affairs of Greece. [4]

Sincerely yours,

[3] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 13, 1956, pp. 231–232.

[4] In telegram 2289, February 22, Cannon informed the Department that he had delivered the President's message to Theotokis and Karamanlis. According to the Ambassador both were "genuinely pleased and expressed deep appreciation". He added that the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister had informed him they would acquaint Makarios "in confidence" with the substance of Eisenhower's letter in the hope that it would be helpful. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–2256)

162. Telegram From the Consulate at Nicosia to the Department of State [1]

Nicosia, February 28, 1956.

216. Reference: Deptel 142. [2] I read to Archbishop in confidence

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–2856. Secret. Repeated to London, Athens, and Ankara.

[2] In telegram 142, February 24, Courtney was instructed that since the basic problem continued to be "mutual distrust", he might wish to read to Makarios Eisenhower's letter to Karamanlis, and to emphasize that no agreement could be reached until each party was willing to trust the other. The Consul was also asked to indicate to Makarios that the Department had observed the negotiations closely and it

President's letter to Karamanlis [3] and in course hours discussion urged repeatedly and as strongly as I could that if agreement now to be reached, which we firmly believe possible, each side must place necessary degree of trust on other. Department's caution was timely and he was at pains to make explicit that US was not underwriting British offer; nor was I either advocate for British or attempting to act as intermediary. Makarios said he had not been advised by Greek Government of President's letter.

Makarios turned immediately to question of constitution and concentrated with great earnestness on point of proportionate representation in legislature. He asked if I could tell him what form of constitution US Govt would regard as providing genuine self government. I said that I could not of course give him either official statement or personal opinion on specific constitutional provisions, but as he knew and President said Americans believed fundamentally in ideal of self-rule and right of peoples to governments of their own choice. Moreover, again there was no doubt in my mind what British intended and there was no rush carry out intention to give wide measure of self government and, in their words, work for final solution which would include satisfaction of wishes of people of Cyprus. I understood British position to be that exact definition of composition of legislature was one of several matters which could be accomplished only in open discussions and they had stated principles which they believed constitution should contain in such way as to make possible necessary cooperation of all elements. Makarios acknowledged that mutual trust was required but insisted that permission merely of "an elected majority" was not sufficient guarantee, only opened up danger of dispute with Turks later, was not necessary for Turk's agreement now to cooperate, and did not give him sufficient reason for his confidence and understanding which I was requesting. He said this several different times in different ways but did not deviate at all from his contention, and said this was a fundamental matter of substance. Repeatedly he asked "if British intend government to be self government why can they not now make clear statement on this point?" He indicated no wish to bring up any other constitutional points and virtually said this was only remaining difference.

On question of amnesty he apparently now was quite flexible dismissing it as "subject for later discussion and agreement reached

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"firmly" believed that agreement could be reached if each side would show some trust. In making these remarks, the Department added, Courtney should not be drawn into implying that the United States would underwrite the British offer. (Telegram 142 to Nicosia, February 24; *ibid.*, 747C.00/2–2356)

[3] *Supra.*

on constitution" and at least implying that he could not expect it to obstruct cooperation.

Comment: So far as this discussion with Makarios was concerned I could see no reason to think he meant anything less than he said. (Although it may be reflected that Makarios was quite categoric in his statements to me Feb 23 re amnesty—Contel 211 [4]—whereas he now appears to be much more moderate.)

Believe fact that British spokesman at September London Conference (Macmillan) used phrase "proportionate representation" and they have since eliminated it, is a direct factor in reviving Makarios mistrust and has, besides, weakened their bargaining position vis-à-vis him (however necessary it might be for bringing Turks along at this juncture).

Moreover, whether Makarios right or not in contending that acceptance now of elected majority provision would mean difficulty later with Turks, it would seem dangerous if British do actually intend that Greek Cypriots should have majority in Assembly (which I believe they do) but at same time allow Turks to have impression that protection their minority rights could include device of numerically equal legislative representation.

Courtney

[4] During a discussion with Makarios, Courtney learned that in the Archbishop's view, "total amnesty" meant that no death sentence for "political" offenses would be carried out; all sentences for "political-criminal" activities set by regular courts would be reviewed; all sentences imposed under emergency regulations would be lifted; and all political prisoners and detainees would be released. (Telegram 211 from Nicosia, February 23; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–2356)

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163. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles [1]

London, undated.

We have decided that we must make a statement of our position on Cyprus in the House of Commons early next week. This will almost certainly be on March 5. [2]

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Corres. with Secy. Dulles/Herter 7/54 thru 3/57, vol. I Incoming. Transmitted under cover of a note from Makins to Dulles, March 1.

[2] The text of this statement is in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1956, pp. 686–687.

I know how anxious you were lest a statement on Cyprus should prejudice the Greek elections.[3] These are now over and despite the most earnest efforts on our part, including a visit by the Colonial Secretary to Cyprus,[4] there are evidently still difficulties in the way of full agreement between the Archbishop and ourselves, though until the Colonial Secretary has returned and been able to report in person, we cannot tell just how wide the gap still is.

In all the circumstances we cannot delay further before making our position public. Parliament is deeply interested in this question and has shown great forbearance. They should not be kept in the dark longer than is absolutely necessary especially since there have been many leaks from the Greek side. The correspondence with the Archbishop, which we intend to publish in full with the Archbishop's agreement, will show the extent of common ground as well as the remaining differences. It may thus be expected to reassure the moderates in Cyprus and so strengthen the Archbishop against the extremists. I am also mindful of the positions of the Greek and Turkish Governments both of whom have their internal difficulties.

Our objective remains of course to reach agreement with the communities in Cyprus. Meanwhile I think our statement will have the advantage of clearing the atmosphere and I hope it will be beneficial not least in making apparent the sincerity of our position.

I am indeed grateful for the assistance you have given us in this long and difficult negotiation. I was especially grateful for your support over the important amnesty question.

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[3] See footnote 2, *infra*.

[4] Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd visited Cyprus February 26–29. For text of his statement to Makarios on February 29, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1956, pp. 687–688.

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164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece[1]

Washington, March 2, 1956—4:25 p.m.

2565. You should urgently inform Prime Minister of following US views:

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–256. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood and Baxter. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Nicosia.

In our opinion chances Cyprus settlement are remote unless Greek Government assumes greater responsibility for achieving understanding on island within next few days. Situation likely to go over to extremists unless Greek Government takes firm and courageous action which Prime Minister indicated he would be able undertake after elections.[2] Without agreement now emotions will intensify and extremists on island likely seriously impair Makarios influence. Unsettled situation likely to continue unresolved for indefinite future, seriously weakening prestige Karamanlis Government and jeopardizing its chances achieve constructive government program.

US has done everything possible to reconcile opposing views and cannot see anything further it can do to bring about rapprochement of parties primarily concerned. Greek Government should in our opinion assume responsibility and act now if it wishes avert gravely adverse consequences. Although US cannot take official position on British proposals it is our informal view that offer is one which gives Cypriot people possibility of orderly steps toward self-government within framework which may eventually lead to complete self-determination and that Cypriot people should capitalize on present UK offer. It is also our belief that when full explanation of British offer made public in Parliament world opinion will interpret it as generous and enlightened policy in colonial field meeting legitimate claims put forward by Cyprus and by Greece on behalf Cypriot people.

London should inform Foreign Office after Athens reports approach has been made that US has urged Greek Government support for proposals. British should not be told precise line taken in view possibility we might at some later time have suggestions to make to them if some modification position would without impairing essential British interests contribute to settlement.[3]

Dulles

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[2] On February 19, Karamanlis' National Radical Union won 161 seats of a total 300 in the Greek Chamber of Deputies.

[3] In telegram 2378, March 3, Cannon informed the Department that in the absence of the Prime Minister, he had conveyed the points contained in this telegram to the Foreign Minister. Among other things, the Ambassador urged Theotokis to

165. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, March 9, 1956—8 p.m.

3861. Shortly after news broke on ticker Foreign Office informed Embassy Makarios, Bishop of Cyrenia and two others had been deported from Cyprus. [2] Seychelles as destination to be kept secret for time being. Sec and Department to be informed today and given explanation of British action.

Foreign Office regretted lack of advance information. Plan had been to inform Department as soon as Archbishop off island but delay in transmission of Governor's cable caused news to appear first on ticker. Late this afternoon Colonial Office issued long press statement emphasizing Harding continued negotiations over 5 months during which direct and circumstantial evidence accumulated pointing to Makarios direct involvement in terrorist EOKA organization.

Foreign Office added that action taken on Harding's recommendation who argued no purpose served in continuing negotiations with individual who refused to halt violence and was deeply implicated with terrorists. Commons will debate Cyprus March 14 on Labor resolution deploring government's failure in negotiations especially "after major issue of self-determination has been resolved".

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obtain Karamanlis' permission to make it clear to Makarios that Greece needed to take advantage of every possible improvement in the Cyprus situation. Of the three major differences that had emerged out of the recent negotiations—amnesty, public security, and legislature—Cannon noted the latter was really the most crucial and the one which aroused Greek and Cypriot mistrust. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–356)

On March 5, Cannon, reporting on what the United States could do to mitigate the consequences of the current break in the Cyprus negotiations, noted:"

"We can also show that problem has been narrowed to few points. In describing these we can help British get Turks off their high horse on crucial demand for "equal" representation. Latter point goes to heart of question since there can be no solution if British continue to let Turks retain their hidden veto over a forthright expression of HMGs true intent." (Telegram 2395; *ibid.*, 747C.00/3–556)

In telegram 3733 from London, March 5, the Embassy informed the Department that it had made the approach as indicated in this telegram. The Foreign Office's only comment was that the Greek Government was taking the same line as Makarios—accusing the British of being intransigent and causing the breakdown of the discussions. (*Ibid.*)

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–956. Secret. Repeated for information to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

[2] On March 9, British authorities on Cyprus, claiming that Archbishop Makarios was involved in the terrorist campaign organized by EOKA, arrested the Archbishop and began steps which would lead to his deportation to the Seychelles. Documentation on the British action and U.S., Greek, and Cypriot reactions is *ibid.*, 747C.00.

Government's actions in Cyprus since March 5 statement [3] particularly deportation before Parliament has reviewed situation will probably evoke violent labor party reaction.

Barbour

[3] See footnote 2, Document 163. The text of the communiqué issued by Harding on the deportation of Makarios is in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1956, p. 689.

166. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, March 12, 1956—9 p.m.

2505. I wish to supplement recent Embassy factual reports on local developments with personal assessment showing significance and prospects immediately ahead. Sequence of events may well be drawing Greece into real crisis in its relations with Western allies and we must expect that US relationship with Greece will be subject severe strain in coming months.

Breakdown of Cyprus negotiations and arrest Makarios have created atmosphere even more inflamed and embittered than that which followed Istanbul riots last September. Prospects that Karamanlis Government would have opportunity get itself organized and get down to work now jeopardized as popular passions mounting to peak which some local observers say unknown since Italian invasion 1940. Thus far government has kept cool head and police and military authorities are in control of situation, but government leaders are finding themselves impelled to give consideration to courses of action in foreign policy which likely prove injurious US interests.

For example, serious study being given proposal to send Cabinet Minister on special mission to Arab Capitals to make sure Arab support for Greek-Cypriot cause. Greek church has, as previously reported, appealed to Moscow Patriarch for support. Greek journalist has been informed by Yugoslav military Attaché that Tito trying to arrange meeting with King Paul in Corfu (where King arrived today).

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1256. Secret; Niact.

Under pressure of violent press and popular emotionalism government will thus find it hard not to risk some dramatic move aimed at showing "independent" Greek foreign policy. I feel sure Greek Government will not yield to this temptation if provided with some tangible evidence that Greece is not isolated or "abandoned" by all her allies. Now even more than last September the key to Greece's remaining firmly within NATO family lies in US willingness to accord to Greece a generous degree of moral support and understanding.

In connection with foregoing I noted with special interest comments made by Department (Deptel 2665 [2]) to Greek Chargé and was able to draw upon them in an informal meeting yesterday with a large visiting group of US newspaper and radio personalities. Embassy has prepared a brief summary of my remarks for release to local press which has been clamoring for official US reaction. Of course, if Department planning issue public statement US position current Cyprus impasse in immediate future, this would have far greater impact than what I propose do locally tomorrow. Could Department give me niact some indication its reaction?

Cannon

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[2] Telegram 2665, March 10, informed the Embassy of calls by the Counselor of the British Embassy and the Greek Chargé regarding the deportation of Makarios. Regarding a conversation with the Greek Chargé, Department officers reported that while they "refused to be drawn into position of passing judgment on latest British move", they stressed that the United States recognizes that the "breakdown of negotiations and British arrest of Makarios are tragic setbacks in path toward solution" and that the United States hoped that "all diplomatic decisions will be weighed carefully in light of ultimate objective of restoring atmosphere in which meaningful negotiations can be resumed." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/3–1056)

167. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the President [1]

Washington, March 13, 1956.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

In commenting on recent developments in the Cyprus question, the Department has maintained impartiality as between the British and Greek positions and, without assigning blame to either, has focused United States concern on the ultimate objective which is the re-establishment of an atmosphere in which negotiations could be resumed. A statement along those lines read to the press on March 12 is enclosed. [2]

On the following day, after an interview with the Greek Foreign Minister, Ambassador Cannon issued a statement in Athens (enclosed). Although we are confident Ambassador Cannon intended to follow the Department line of impartiality, the tone of the statement and certain phraseology give it a partisan ring, which is capable of exploitation as an implied criticism of British moves. We understand that the British Foreign Office has instructed Ambassador Makins to ask for an explanation of this statement. [3]

In order to set the record straight, you may wish to make a statement along the lines of the enclosed draft at your press conference on March 14. [4] If you do not consider it appropriate to issue the statement yourself, I hope you will authorize its release by the Department of State.

Herbert Hoover, Jr. [5]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1356. Drafted by Baxter.

[2] Printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 26, 1956, p. 505.

[3] On March 13 at 8:50 p.m., a Department spokesman, presumably in an effort to clarify Cannon's statement, made an official statement about Cyprus; for text, see *ibid.*

[4] Not printed. At his press conference of March 14, the President noted that "we are ready to do anything that is reasonable and practicable to help in reaching some solution, but the solution itself is going to have to be reached by the people most greatly concerned." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1956*, pp. 301–313)

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

[Enclosure]

STATEMENT RELEASED BY AMERICAN EMBASSY, ATHENS

March 13, 1956

American Ambassador Cavendish W. Cannon called on Foreign Minister Theotokis shortly after noon today to discuss matters of mutual interest. He took occasion to express the sympathetic concern of the United States Government and the American people over the recent developments in Cyprus and to convey to the Foreign Minister the text of the statement issued in Washington yesterday by the State Department.

This statement emphasized that the United States Government had no advance information of the deportation of Archbishop Makarios. It disclosed that the United States is making a careful study of the situation and expects to make certain recommendations when that study is completed. It recalled the continued interest of the United States in the establishment of a government truly representative of the people of Cyprus, and said that until the negotiations were interrupted recently the United States had been encouraged by the steady progress made during the last few months.

The Ambassador himself, in reviewing this progress, recalled that agreement had been reached on the principle of self-determination, on a wide measure of self-government as a transitory stage and on satisfying the aspirations of the Cypriot people in the final solution.

The Ambassador expressed the confident belief that, taking into account the very substantial progress along the lines of these broad principles, a way could surely be found to work out the details and the timing, complicated and difficult though these may be. The important thing is to re-create an atmosphere in which the questions can be calmly re-examined.

Finally, Ambassador Cannon said he had taken particular note of the dignity and statesmanship with which the Greek Government had dealt with the current situation.

168. Memorandum of a Conversation, London, March 15, 1956 [1]

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office
Mr. George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State, Washington
Mr. Walworth Barbour, American Minister, London
Mr. Evan M. Wilson, First Secretary, London

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Mr. Allen asked whether the Foreign Office saw any signs of a solution of the Cyprus question. [2] Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick said that he was very concerned over the problem of "squaring the circle", by which he meant how to reconcile Turkish and Greek interests. . . .

Sir Ivone continued that the Turkish point of view was not sufficiently appreciated in the United States. The plain facts were that Cyprus could not be given to Greece without provoking a war between Greece and Turkey. Sir Ivone said he wished to make it plain that he was not defending the Turkish point of view. Mr. Zorlu and Mr. Birgi had taken the position at the London conference that Turkey did not want either self-determination or self-government for Cyprus and that if the British did not agree with the Turkish position, Turkey would have to reconsider its relations with Britain. Birgi had said as much right in Sir Ivone's office and Sir Ivone had had to reply "with some acerbity". The Turks insisted on equal representation for Turks and Greeks in any legislature that was set up in Cyprus. At the same time, the Archbishop in the negotiations had insisted on a Greek majority and the negotiations had broken down when the British, having in mind their pledge to the Turks to consult them regarding this point, had had to tell the Archbishop that they could not agree to his conditions in advance of the proposed constitutional consultations which were to be carried out by Lord Radcliffe.

Sir Ivone commented that as far as the Turkish attitude was concerned it was necessary to recall that for five hundred years the Greeks had been "shouting it from the house tops" that they would like to conquer and dismember Turkey. It was natural in view of this history that the Turks should oppose the cession to Greece of

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1556. Confidential. Drafted by Wilson.

[2] Allen accompanied Dulles to Karachi to attend the SEATO Council sessions. On March 12, he left the Secretary's party, departing from Colombo for Cairo, then to Paris, and finally to London.

the last remaining block of Greek-speaking people outside Greek possession. Mr. Allen said that he was aware of this feeling on the part of the Turks but he wondered how justified it was. Sir Ivone replied that regardless of the justification, the feeling existed. . . .

Sir Ivone went on to read from a telegram in front of him which gave the text of a proposed U.S. Senate resolution regarding Cyprus, in which reference was made to the traditional American support of the principle of self-determination. He said that he would like to point out that the United States had not always supported the principle of self-determination in every given case, any more than had Great Britain. There were cases where national security or the preservation of world peace were overriding considerations. He cited the Sudeten Germans, Trieste, and Austria as instances in which the United States had not supported the principle of self-determination. . . . Mr. Barbour and Mr. Allen took issue with Sir Ivone's comments regarding the exceptions which he had cited, pointing out that the Trieste problem had been solved along lines which very largely gave the Italians to Italy and the Slavs to Yugoslavia and that the United States had not been a party to the 1938 Munich agreement on Czechoslovakia. Mr. Allen agreed with Sir Ivone that Austria presented a difficult problem but expressed the personal view that if in the future the Austrian people should decide overwhelmingly that they wanted to join Germany it would be hard to deny this. Sir Ivone rejoined that while it was true that the Trieste problem had eventually been settled more or less along ethnic lines, neither the United States nor Great Britain had been very worried about the wishes of the inhabitants of the Zone at the time of the 1948 Italian elections, when we had come out in favor of the entire territory going to Italy. As far as the Sudetens were concerned, he thought that our concurrence in 1945 in the return of the territory to Czechoslovakia was proof of our real attitude.

Mr. Allen commented that while there might be some exceptions, it was certainly true that in the vast majority of cases the United States had been in favor of self-determination. With regard to the deportation of Archbishop Makarios to the Seychelles he said that some people in the Middle East and Asia were concerned over this development since they thought of other nationalist leaders like Zaghloul[3] who had been sent to the Seychelles and who had eventually returned to their countries with increased stature. Sir Ivone remarked that he did not think it was possible for the Archbishop to have greater stature than he already possessed in

[3] Sa'd Zaghlul, Egyptian politician and prominent nationalist, who was exiled on two occasions for his nationalist activities—once to Malta in 1919 and a second time to Aden and Gibraltar in 1922.

Cyprus, and in Greece, where he was able to give orders to the Greek Government. He said that one thing which had struck him in talking to the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, after latter's return from a recent trip to Cyprus, was the extent to which it was commonly believed all over the Island that the Archbishop was behind the terrorists. Whatever the actual connection of the Archbishop with the terrorists the point was that this was the general impression in Cyprus. This of course greatly increased the standing of the terrorists in the community.

Mr. Barbour inquired whether it would not be possible to make public more of the evidence which the British Government apparently had, linking the Archbishop with the terrorist movement. Sir Ivone said he could see Mr. Barbour's point, but the release of the information might raise certain difficulties. At all events, there was enough evidence, he felt, to show that the Archbishop was supporting the terrorists and was supplying them with money, especially money which he obtained in the United States, although whether he was actually directing the terrorist operations was another question. He was probably more the "chairman of the board" than the "managing director".

Mr. Allen inquired regarding Sir Ivone's reference to the collection of money by the Archbishop in the United States and said that he did not recall this. Sir Ivone said that the last time the Archbishop had gone to the United States, about eighteen months ago, he was reported to have raised and brought back considerable funds.

Mr. Allen said that he wanted to assure Sir Ivone that we fully understood the fact that the British were dealing with an immensely complex problem in Cyprus and that we were anxious to be as helpful and sympathetic as possible in bringing about a reasonable solution. Sir Ivone expressed his appreciation for this statement.

169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

Athens, March 20, 1956—12:08 a.m.

2765. You should at time you consider most propitious and in manner you deem most effective inform Theotokis and Karamanlis that while USG recognizes restraint GOG has used in maintaining order in Greece since deportation Makarios in face highly inflamed public opinion, we think positive efforts to exert influence in cause amicable settlement are also needed. In view USG participants were very close to agreement. As subsequent developments have shown Makarios' refusal condemn violence was regrettable and resultant British decision deport him served further aggravate situation. Both decisions basically caused by mutual mistrust. USG still believes both sides want agreement and British offer was made in good faith and as evolved during negotiations remains fair basis from which further negotiations might proceed.

While realizing difficulties faced by GOG during pre-election period, USG regrets that GOG did not feel it could use its influence with Makarios more firmly during negotiations and hopes GOG as well as other interested parties and friends will use every possible influence abate violence on island and create atmosphere conducive settlement issue of grave concern to all western allies. As minimum at present USG would hope for avoidance by GOG of any acts tending further aggravate situation. This would be first step in reversing downward trend. USG sympathetically aware political difficulties which GOG now faces, but there is no doubt present situation demands greatest courage.

Responsible Greek leaders must realize that without such courage present situation with implication of possible withdrawal from NATO and weakening of Greek resistance to Communism threatens very basis Greece's own freedom and sovereignty.

Since there can be no real solution Cyprus without trust between parties, goal all concerned should be considered steps reestablish trust.

FYI In view your tel 2538 [2] Dept realizes GOG probably feels it

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1456. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Taylor G. Belcher of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and Wood. Also sent to London and repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, USUN, and Paris for USRO.

[2] In telegram 2538, March 14, Cannon reported that on March 13, the Greek Foreign Minister had indicated that national feelings on the Cyprus question could no longer be kept under control. According to Theotokis, the government was under pressure to "cut loose" from NATO, break relations with Britain, and establish more open and "equal" relations with "other great powers". (*Ibid.*)

cannot take positive action now. However to restore position impartiality which USG needs to be useful in this situation, it is believed our first move should be to GOG. Embassy London will then be able inform Foreign Office general substance this démarche. Also this would be responsive to Nutting representations (London's 3964, Athens 119).[3] End FYI.

For London: You may inform Foreign Office after Athens reports this approach has been made and in doing so also make following points:

As foregoing indicates we do not think public statement requested by Nutting can be helpful at this juncture. We are concerned that HMG as well as British press are apparently confusing our position on negotiations and responsibility for their break off with our attitude toward developments following deportation. As reflected through our instructions to Courtney, we fully appreciate and have supported British efforts reach an understanding with Makarios. We agree it regrettable Greek Government did not undertake more constructive role in negotiations. Our statements since deportation were designed solely to restore atmosphere permitting resumption negotiations and to keep sights set on future to extent possible. Recognition of GOG's internal problem and effective measures taken to prevent public demonstrations (which Communists were ready to exploit) from getting out of hand, was complementary to that effort, as was recital of our belief that progress had been made and solution could be found.

Hoover

[3] In telegram 3964, March 14, Ambassador Aldrich reported that during a discussion with Nutting, the latter suggested that when a suitable occasion arose, the United States might consider issuing a statement to the effect that the British proposals on Cyprus seemed "reasonable and fair." Nutting also noted that the British were not responsible for breaking off the negotiations, that the Greek Government never helped in the discussions with Makarios, and that Cyprus was of great strategic importance to the United Kingdom. (*Ibid.*)

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey[1]

Washington, April 4, 1956—12:59 p.m.

1638. Polto 1621.[2] Dept has been giving careful thought to question of NATO assuming role in Cyprus dispute. In so doing we have taken account views various member countries as expressed NAC Mar. 14, Athens 2602[3] and Ankara's 1591.[4] We recognize growing feeling NATO should not sit idly by while this divisive dispute continues with all its implications for future unity and cooperation. At same time we feel we must realistically assess prospects for NATO playing constructive role in solution of problem before committing Organization's prestige and setting in train procedures which might sharpen already divisive tendencies. In particular we are impressed by following considerations:

1. US has consistently taken position that Cyprus dispute is primarily matter between UK and population of British Crown Colony.

2. Any procedure which could be unanimously agreed in NATO would have to be on basis recognition there are three parties to dispute (i.e. UK, Greece and Turkey). We doubt prospect for solution of problem would be enhanced by such recognition, since we would be creating situation in which Greek Government might well reject any solution which did not clearly provide for eventual union between Greece and Cyprus. By same token we would probably invite Turkish veto any solution which did not deny possibility Greek-Cyprus union.

3. No solution Cyprus problem could be justified which does not take views of Cypriot population into account and command its support. We find it most difficult envisage how this aspect of problem could be handled without involving NATO directly in whole question of return of Makarios or, alternatively, trying to find other Cypriot leaders whom Greeks Turks British and local population would accept as representative.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–356. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Palmer. Also sent to Ankara, Athens, London, and Paris for the Permanent Representative to NAC.

[2] Polto 1621, March 15, transmitted the highlights of a meeting of the North Atlantic Council devoted entirely to the question of Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/3–1556)

[3] On March 21, in telegram 2602, Cannon reported that a number of Greek Foreign Office officials had indicated that they were "cool" regarding the prospect of NATO intervention. Among their objections was their view that NATO consideration of the Cyprus question would allow the United Nations to "back away" from the issue. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/3–2156)

[4] Dated March 23. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/3–2356)

4. Discussion within NATO of procedures for dealing with Cyprus problem might well lead to further substantive discussion. By much same process of reasoning as that contained Athens 2602 Dept fears that such discussion, with attendant bids for support by three parties, might lead towards situation in which weight of support would gravitate toward UK primarily because of colonial issue. Should this happen Greece would tend feel isolated within Organization, thereby increasing its sense of frustration and prejudicing its cooperation.

. . . . . .

Dulles

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171. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Greek Ambassador (Melas) and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, April 5, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus

The Secretary commented briefly on his recent trip. [2]

Ambassador Melas thanked him and then made the following comments on the Cyprus question: The British move involving Archbishop Makarios had been sad and unexpected. As a result things were now at a total standstill and the situation was worsening. The Government of Greece was seeking to be moderate.

The Secretary's efforts during the negotiations had not been without result; Makarios had played a moderate role in the negotiations.

The Government of Greece was grateful for the statements which were made after the deportation by Ambassador Cannon and

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–556. Secret. Drafted by Wood.

[2] Dulles attended the SEATO Council meeting in Karachi, March 6–8. Following the meeting, the Secretary traveled to India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan before returning to Washington on March 21.

the State Department; President Eisenhower's remarks had been especially appreciated.[3]

The Government of Greece was now showing its loyalty by its participation in the NATO maneuvers at Malta and it was being attacked for this by the opposition in Greece. Prime Minister Karamanlis had recently made his first major policy speech to the Greek Parliament. This was a very important statement. It reflected Greece's admiration for the United States and the importance which it attached to full participation in NATO.

Ambassador Melas then referred to the debate on Cyprus in the British House of Commons and mentioned the statements of Messrs. Clement Davis and Noel-Baker as indications that Makarios had negotiated in good faith.[4]

Ambassador Melas next spoke of a press interview held on March 18, 1956 at the Turkish Embassy in Washington which was attended by the Turkish Ambassador, Görk, and Ambassador Sarper. The reports of this meeting indicated that Turkey would be willing to go to war if Cyprus became independent or was granted self-determination. Ambassador Melas said that with the previous knowledge of Mr. George V. Allen he had issued a press communiqué in reply which Mr. Allen had acknowledged to be moderate.

In general Ambassador Melas said his Government felt negotiations had come so close to success that it was regrettable that they were now in abeyance. Ambassador Melas wondered when the British Government would commence real self-government on the Island of Cyprus in which each community would be proportionately represented. He concluded by emphasizing that only two things were needed to restore the situation: first, the restoration of Archbishop Makarios, whom no one could replace; and, secondly, real self-government for Cyprus.

The Secretary replied that these developments had occurred while he was away, but that he had since tried to acquaint himself with them. It had seemed that for a moment agreement was very close. He did not want to express judgment as to the responsibility for the breaking of the negotiations, but it was certainly regrettable. He believed that the ground which had been gained could be recaptured and further advances made.

It was important to do away with the mood of terrorism and violence. He hoped the Government of Greece could contribute as this would help to achieve the result which they wanted. He said

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[3] For text of the President's remarks on the Cyprus question at a news conference of March 14, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956*, p. 56.

[4] For texts of the statements, see *H.C. Debs*, 5th series, vol. 549, cols. 1715–1723.

that the Government of Greece had shown a responsible attitude on the whole, but did feel that the radio broadcasts had been inflammatory. He asked that the Government of Greece do all it could as he was confident the matter could be pushed through to a successful conclusion.

Ambassador Melas replied that the Greek Government was not pulling the strings which caused the EOKA violence on Cyprus. He mentioned British methods on the island, such as the deportation of the Archbishop, the use of dogs in searching Cypriot churches, and the curfew, as things which in themselves were contributory to the violence.

The Secretary replied that he did not mean to suggest that this was one-sided. Referring to Greece's participation in the Malta maneuvers and to Prime Minister Karamanlis' statement, the Secretary said that Greece had made a real contribution.

Ambassador Melas referred to President Eisenhower's statement in his press conference of April 4, 1956 to the effect that peace could only be preserved in the Middle East if all the people of that area had the opportunity of achieving their legitimate aspirations.[5] The Ambassador supposed that this would apply to Greece and Cyprus.

After the meeting Mr. Wood asked the Ambassador what the Greek Government was planning to do about the inflammatory broadcasts to Cyprus. The Ambassador said that he had no comment.

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[5] For the full text of Eisenhower's news conference of April 4, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956*, pp. 368–378.

172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, April 28, 1956—5:04 p.m.

6504. Re London's 4673, [2] rptd info Athens 142, Ankara 130, Paris Topol 101.

1. London should advise FonOff U.S. has no intention raising Cyprus at NATO Ministerial meeting, nor have we indication any other NATO country has decided do so. FYI Dept does not feel it would be wise attempt dissuade other NATO countries from discussing Cyprus, although we doubt that at present juncture such discussion would be helpful, and might well increase Greek feeling of isolation. (You will recall recent bitter discussion in Council in Europe.) At worst it could be exploited by Greek opposition parties to effect Greece cannot expect justice in NATO, etc. End FYI.

2. If Cyprus is in fact introduced into discussion, any U.S. statement would be based on following considerations: Cyprus important question and it in NATO's interest that progress should be made as soon as possible. NATO could of course only play a helpful procedural role if there was unanimous agreement among members primarily concerned. We consider responsibility for settlement rests with parties primarily concerned, but we willing offer any practical assistance, or participate in practicable NATO role. We hope any Council discussion can be kept in low emotional key, emphasizing harmful effect Cyprus dispute on NATO unity, need for progress toward constructive solution, and readiness NATO to play procedural part. FYI Dept feels any attempt force a "NATO solution" at present time, arising out of feeling that NATO as an organization must respond to an admittedly serious situation, would be counterproductive. NATO may well be able play useful role if and when lines of a solution have been developed through private diplomatic channels. [3] Otherwise premature NATO initiative risks having

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–1656. Secret. Drafted by Timmons and signed by Dulles. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and Paris for the Permanent Representative to NAC.

[2] In telegram 4673, April 16, the Embassy at London reported that the Foreign Office was acting on the assumption that Cyprus would be raised at the NATO Ministerial meeting to be held in Paris in early May. The Embassy added that a Foreign Office official had inquired if the Department anticipated that Cyprus would be raised at the meeting and in that event what position the Department planned to take. (*Ibid.*)

[3] On April 27, during discussion at the Secretary's Staff meeting, Cyprus was raised. According to the minutes of the meeting, the following discussion occurred:

"Mr. Allen said that he believes the time has come when we must press the UK to take some steps in the solution of the Cyprus question and that they should be informed that unless some progress is made, the US may be obliged to take a

Greeks and Turks reiterate their well-known positions, with additional twist that neither could accept a "NATO solution" which did not fully meet its demands. End FYI.[4]

Dulles

different position on the question when it comes up in General Assembly. In this connection, Mr. Hoover mentioned that the Secretary believes that this is perhaps a question which could be most effectively handled within the NATO framework rather than in the UN." (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

[4] In telegram 4978, April 30, the Embassy at London reported that NATO members, "not well briefed" on the Cyprus dispute, but eager to expand the organization's role might cause "harmful substantive intervention". (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 747C.00/4–3056)

173. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State[1]

Paris, May 4, 1956—3 p.m.

Secto 14. Secretary accompanied by Rountree met May 3 with Theotokis assisted by Greek Ambassadors to Paris, London and NATO. After brief exchange re need for NATO to adapt itself new Soviet economic and psychological offensive and undertake planning for countermeasures, discussion related entirely to Cyprus.

In general Theotokis pursued line taken May 2 in meeting with Perkins which reported Polto 2006, May 3.[2] He repeated in substance comments upon Greek Turk relations, apparent lack good faith on part of British during negotiations with Makarios, and three points re elements of possible settlement based upon assumption Makarios released.

Secretary commented that while Theotokis' views appeared logical he had some doubt re establishing date for self-determination (point 3 Polto 2006[3]). Aside from fact that this would impose new condition which would be difficult to negotiate, United States' experience in Philippines had shown us trouble in establishing any

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5–456. Secret. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and London. Dulles was in Paris for the NAC meetings, May 4–5.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/5–356)

[3] In point three Perkins reported that Theotokis indicated that there would have to be a fixed date for self-determination. Although the Foreign Minister noted that Makarios had dropped the insistence on a fixed date, the Greek view was that Cyprus issue could never be resolved until some date had been set.

such timetable since situation might arise whereby it would be impractical strictly to adhere to it. Theotokis thought that date might be established with "force majeure" clause and would be implemented in absence overriding considerations.

In reply Secretary's question, Theotokis said he was ready present Cyprus case to NATO Council if it advisable, but felt unless something constructive could be expected it would be unwise particularly since airing dispute between Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom would be exploited by Soviet propaganda and perhaps weaken NATO. Secretary agreed it not wise raise question for debate since it would not advance solution to problem. He might himself refer to issue in passing merely to identify the kind of problems with which we were confronted. He said discussion of issue was not end in itself but merely means to an end, and thought Theotokis wise in not precipitating debate unless it would be helpful. He felt matters of this nature should be of concern to NATO, but at much earlier date. Situation should never have been permitted to reach present state, and in planning for future of NATO we should endeavor avoid possibility disputes this nature reaching stage where free world collaboration impeded.

Theotokis asked that United States endeavor improve Turkish attitude, and hoped we could inform United Kingdom that if Cyprus again raised in United Nations they could not expect United States attitude would be same as in past. He also hoped we would urge upon British necessity for finding prompt solution. He said Greeks did not want to take matter to United Nations since that might create new strains in relations between NATO members, situation of which USSR would take full advantage.

Dulles

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174. Message From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Secretary Lloyd [1]

Washington, June 6, 1956.

DEAR SELWYN: I continue to be apprehensive with regard to the many facets of the Cyprus question which are of the utmost

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–656. Secret. Transmitted in telegram 7372 to London.

importance not only to Britain, but also to the entire Western Alliance. As you know from our several talks on the subject I am well aware of the difficulties which it presents to you. I have clearly in mind the importance of Cyprus as a British base.

I would greatly appreciate hearing from you with regard to the results of any further examination of this problem which you and your colleagues may have made in light of our conversation in Paris,[2] and of recent events in Cyprus and Greece.[3]

It would seem that now, even more than when we spoke about it on May 3, would be a propitious time to take steps which might break what appears to be a deadlock between violence and its suppression. In considering such steps I hope that the possibility of finding some way to resume negotiations with Archbishop Makarios will not be excluded. I realize that this presents very great difficulties, but it seems to me improbable that another person can in present or foreseeable circumstances carry on negotiations in his absence with any degree of support among the Cypriots. Such a person would have to win away the loyalty which the Archbishop now receives from the Greek populace and, during a time when passions are high, achieve a reasonable understanding which would be supported by the people.

I am taking the opportunity to write you again on this unhappy subject in the earnest belief that a frank exchange of views is in our mutual interest. I would also reiterate that we stand ready to use our best influence to facilitate the attainment of an understanding.[4]

Sincerely yours,

Foster

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[2] Reported in Secto 8, May 4. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/5–456)

[3] Presumably a reference to the increase in terrorism and communal tension on Cyprus in April and May. On May 27, as a result of opposition to the Greek Government's policies on Cyprus, Theotokis resigned. The government was accused of failing to support the case of self-determination for Cyprus.

[4] In telegram 5664, June 7, Aldrich informed the Department that he had delivered Dulles' message to Kirkpatrick in Lloyd's absence. According to the Ambassador, Kirkpatrick emphasized two points: first, that the "Turkish factor" had not been given sufficient consideration, perhaps because the Turks were less "vociferous" than the Greeks; second, that from the British point of view, the restoration of public order was essential. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–756)

175. Letter From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower [1]

London, June 7, 1956.

DEAR FRIEND: John Harding is here and we have had some long talks over this anxious Cyprus business. I would like to give you for your own personal information one or two conclusions which emerge. First, as to the security situation. We have now reached the stage at which we are able to hit back at the terrorists, and to continue this process. Our forces had a marked success against the guerilla bands about a week ago. The whole operation was planned with great care and was well executed. As a result we have broken up two of the bands and have captured the leaders of two more. Harding estimates that there are probably five or six more bands, of moderate size, in various parts of the island, but their total strength is probably not more than sixty full-time terrorists. Therefore this aspect of security should continue to show improvement over the next few months.

On the other hand, there has always been a real anxiety about Greek and Turkish communal riots in Cyprus. Though the Turks say less than the Greeks it does not mean that they feel less, and their anxiety about their future has put them into a highly excitable state. They are violently determined against Enosis. There is also a considerable population of Turkish-Cypriots in Turkey itself which plays its part in moulding Turkish opinion. I believe they number a quarter of a million or more. If anything in the nature of widespread communal disturbances were to break out this would put a heavy and most disagreeable task upon our forces which would have to try to keep the parties apart and restore order. This could be more costly in casualties than anything we have to cope with now, and would divert our forces from operations against the terrorists.

We are of course also discussing the various political aspects of this problem. The truth is that the offer which we made to Makarios at the end of our last negotiations went beyond what the Turks themselves thought we should have offered. This the Turkish Prime Minister has said publicly. To attempt to get results by offering more in this direction would inevitably entail strong Turkish reactions which would have very serious consequences for the security and stability of the Middle East as a whole. Nor would I feel confident of facilities in Cyprus under present conditions unless we had control of internal security. Athens Radio has made it plain

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Transmitted under cover of a note from Makins to Eisenhower on June 7.

enough that the Greeks would not in any event be willing to allow our facilities in Cyprus to be used for any purposes connected with the Middle East. That is just what we might want them for. A N.A.T.O. base by itself would meet only part of our needs.

I do not think that either of our countries would be really happy if we were only able to counter a threat to vital oil supplies in the Persian Gulf from landing grounds in Arab lands.

You will know that Kuwait by itself has now twenty per cent of the proved oil reserves of the world, and all the indications are that the economy of Western Europe will increasingly depend on oil supplies from that area over the next twenty years or more. I just cannot take the risk of finding ourselves unable to protect these supplies should the need arise. But I did want you to know that I am working hard and will attempt to find some means of reconciling our needs with rival Greek and Turkish aspirations in the island.

If any new thought emerges from all this effort I will not hesitate to let you know, and of course Selwyn Lloyd will keep in touch with Foster.

John Harding asks to send you respectful greetings. [2]

Kindest regards,

Yours ever

Anthony [3]

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[2] On June 7, at 4:30 p.m., Dulles met with the President. Among the topics of conversation was Cyprus. According to the memorandum of conversation, the following exchange occurred:

"We went over the letter from Eden about Cyprus which we agreed was not very informative. We discussed generally the weakening British position, both political and economic.

"In the course of a somewhat rambling discussion, the President raised the question as to whether it was feasible to separate the Turkish population from the Greek. I said my recollection was that this was not regarded as practical because they were working in the mines and were part of the general life of the island. We discussed the proximity of the island to Turkey and the strong opposition that Turkey would have to its becoming Greek." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

In telegram 5670, June 8, Aldrich reported from London that Kirkpatrick had shown him a copy of Eden's message to the President and that he was struck by the length and lack of substance of the Prime Minister's communication. According to the Ambassador, the message was an attempt to impress the President with the fact that Britain was giving serious consideration to a solution of the Cyprus problem. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–856)

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

176. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, June 18, 1956—5 p.m.

5818. Eyes only for Secretary. Selwyn Lloyd called me to FonOff today and advised for your strictly confidential information, since he said he was not authorized by his colleagues to do so, that the Cabinet has approved proposed next step on Cyprus forecast in my telegram 5803. [2] However, there was one significant change in procedure, namely that British approach to Turks would be undertaken before you had an opportunity to comment. Cabinet felt that you might prefer not to be associated with the approach to the Turks and thus be in a position to deny foreknowledge. Lloyd was concerned that this procedural development might be contrary to promise he had given me that no steps would be taken without first receiving US comments. It was of course one of main purposes my conversation reported Embtel 5803 to head off British action without reference to Washington. On other hand he did make clear on that occasion that views he was expressing and the substance of the proposal were yet to be determined by cabinet.

Only substantive addition to proposed statement resulting from Cabinet meeting appears to be that, in addition to other stipulated conditions for eventual transfer sovereignty, it would also be provided that a security treaty relating to the island would be concluded

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1856. Secret; Priority.

[2] In telegram 5803, June 15, Aldrich reported that during a meeting with Lloyd he had learned of a proposed British approach on the Cyprus problem. The British planned to make a public statement on Cyprus that would indicate they were prepared to proceed with the formulation of a constitution and that Lord Radcliffe was ready to travel to Cyprus for that purpose. Aldrich reported that the constitution would provide a bicameral legislature with the first chamber on a proportional basis according to population and the second divided equally between Greeks and Turks. Unless the Turkish reaction to the proposal was so negative as to make it completely unacceptable, Aldrich continued, the British planned to indicate that after a suitable period, possibly 10 years, they might refer the matter to NATO to discuss whether transfer of sovereignty of the island, if approved by a plebiscite, would be "strategically feasible." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/6–1556)

between the British, Greeks and Turks. This designed assure Turks that they would ultimately have major say in transfer together with UK and Greece.

British Ambassador Ankara has been instructed to raise proposed statement with Turks today, and if he is successful in reaching them, British anticipate instructing Makins to see you tomorrow. With regard to British course in the event of a strongly adverse Turkish reaction, Lloyd said that he anticipates the Turks may "go through the roof". If they do so, British will, as forecast Embtel 5803, revise statement to omit section on self-determination. However, before making such revision they will wish to take into account estimate of British Ambassador in Ankara, on whose judgment they rely heavily. If he really considers statement on self-determination would result in Turkish withdrawal from NATO, statement will be revised. Lloyd's attitude implied, however, that if the Turkish reaction seems likely to entail almost anything less drastic than withdrawal, British will proceed with statement as now contemplated.

Aldrich

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177. Editorial Note

On June 16, William P. Boteler, American Vice Consul at Nicosia, was killed by a bomb thrown by an unidentified assailant in a restaurant in the Old City of Nicosia. Three other Americans were injured in the attack. According to preliminary police reports, there was no evidence that Boteler or any other American was selected as a target. (Telegram 372 from Nicosia, June 19; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1956)

178. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 19, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

British Plan for Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Chargé d'Affaires Coulson, British Embassy
Miss Barbara Salt, Counselor, British Embassy
Chalmers B. Wood, GTI

Mr. Coulson presented the Secretary with a statement (enclosed) [2] which outlined the British proposal for a solution of the Cyprus question. The Secretary read this proposal very carefully.

He asked what was the relative size of the Turkish population on the Island and was told that it was about one-fifth. He said that this would then not give the Turkish Cypriots a veto on the question of self-determination since a two-thirds majority was required. Mr. Coulson agreed. The Secretary then observed that this was obviously an important statement which he desired to study and on which he would want advice. Minister Coulson then described the statement as being the absolute limit to which the British would go. He said it was imaginative; that it might, with the support of our friends, win world opinion. He continued by saying that the British Government had shown it to the Turkish Government yesterday and that it had had a "rough reception." The Turkish Foreign Minister had said he wished to study it but felt the plan was dangerous since it was apt to make the Greeks more intransigent.

The Secretary then asked if the treaty provisions of the plan did not give the Turks in effect a veto, since if they did not adhere, the plan would not commence. Mr. Coulson agreed that this was so.

Mr. Coulson said that, acting on instructions, he had two questions to ask:

1. Can you make any useful approach to the Turks?
2. Is ten years too short a time?

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1956. Secret. Drafted by Wood.

[2] Not found attached. The British statement, dated June 19 (*infra*), was attached to a note from Coulson to Dulles, June 19, transmitting a message from Lloyd to Dulles. The message indicated that the main British problem in handling Cyprus was the Turks. According to Lloyd, the new British proposal provided "reasonable safeguards" for the Turkish position, but the Turks would need "a lot of persuading" if they were to accept this. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Corres. with Secy. Dulles/Herter 7/54 thru 3/57 Vol. I Incoming)

The Secretary answered that in order to understand the proposition better he would like to ask a few questions himself. He asked whether the defense treaty would run on beyond the date of "so called self-determination?" Mr. Coulson replied in the affirmative. The Secretary then asked whether if at some future date the Island wanted to join Greece would the United Kingdom still be responsible for external defense? The answer was "Yes." The Secretary then asked about the provision that the question of self-determination should not be raised or discussed publicly or between the three powers involved. Minister Coulson answered that this was to prevent the Greeks from pressing the question. He believed something of the sort had been done for the Saar. Miss Salt added that this provision was for the benefit of the Turks and to prevent the question from being raised in the United Nations.

The Secretary asked whether the British had had an exchange of views with the Greeks. Minister Coulson replied "No," because the British Ambassador in Athens had reported that the Greeks would want to negotiate immediately. The Secretary observed that we have no voice in this question except as the British Government desired us to have one. Mr. Coulson replied that the British Government was very anxious to hear our answers. The Secretary said that we would like time to think the matter over. Mr. Coulson indicated that they expected a formal answer from the Turks fairly soon. Miss Salt added that there was already a good deal of accurate press speculation and that the British would have to act fairly quickly. The Secretary indicated that he would attempt to give an answer the following day.

Mr. Coulson then asked if the Secretary would agree not to give any details of this plan to the Greeks or our Embassy in Athens since there was a considerable danger of leaks. The Secretary indicated that he would restrict the information as requested. [3]

[3] On June 19, Dulles transmitted the substance of his earlier conversation with Coulson to the Embassy at London and informed Aldrich that it was his initial impression that the United States would not want to be in the position of endorsing the plan unless there were some reasonable chance of its acceptance by Greece. Dulles concluded that he thought the plan had little chance of acceptance unless discussed privately with the Greek and the Turkish Governments. (Telegram 7620 to London, June 19; *ibid.*, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1956)

179. Text of Statement To Be Made by Her Majesty's Government on the Cyprus Question [1]

Washington, June 19, 1956.

Her Majesty's Government intend to press ahead with the framing of a constitution for Cyprus on the lines which have been previously offered for consideration. For this purpose they have decided to ask Lord Radcliffe as Constitutional Commissioner to start work forthwith on the framing of a constitution. It is their hope that, at an early stage, the Constitutional Commissioner will be able to bring into consultation representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus.

Her Majesty's Government will put such a constitution into effect as soon as possible, provided that terrorism has been eliminated and law and order have been fully restored.

As regards the future status of the Island, Her Majesty's Government have already accepted the principle of self-determination. It shall be a condition of any change in the international status of Cyprus that a treaty shall be concluded between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, regulating in their common interest the use of Cyprus for military purposes. Such a treaty, which would be terminable only by agreement between the parties, would provide that the United Kingdom should continue to be responsible for the external defence of Cyprus and to enjoy such facilities in the Island as may be necessary for this purpose and for that of discharging British Treaty obligations in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Middle East. Provision would be made in the Treaty for defence zones over which the United Kingdom would retain permanent sovereignty.

It shall similarly be a condition that the implementation of a decision to change the international status of Cyprus would be made dependent on a special treaty arrangement by which the interests of minority racial groups were fully safeguarded.

At the end of ten years from the date on which the new constitution comes into effect, Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to raise with their fellow members of N.A.T.O. the question whether, in the situation then obtaining, a change in the international status of Cyprus would be compatible with the interests of Western defence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

If not fewer than two-thirds of the members of N.A.T.O. answer the question put to them in the affirmative and the treaties referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above have been concluded, a plebiscite will be

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret.

held with satisfactory safeguards against improper political or personal pressure on those entitled to vote. A majority of not less than two-thirds of those voting would be required in order that a decision involving a change in international status should take effect.

It is an essential element of this plan that:—

(i) The question of self-determination shall not be raised internationally by the three governments, or be discussed between them, during the intervening period of ten years, and

(ii) All parties concerned shall cooperate sincerely in the restoration and maintenance of law and order in Cyprus.

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180. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 22, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
EUR—Mr. Elbrick
NEA—Mr. Rountree

During a meeting between the Secretary and Ambassador Makins on June 22, in the course of which various other subjects were discussed, the Ambassador raised the question of Cyprus. He referred to the meeting which Mr. Coulson had had with the Secretary on June 19 when Mr. Coulson presented the draft text of a proposed British announcement which already was under discussion with the Turks. (The Secretary had at that time made certain observations concerning the British proposal but said that he wished to consider the matter further before expressing his considered judgment. Mr. Coulson called on Mr. Allen, in the Secretary's absence, on June 20 [2] and was informed of the Department's reaction to the suggestions

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–2256. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

[2] The highlights of the Department's reaction to the latest British proposals on Cyprus were transmitted to London in telegram 7694, June 21. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/6–2156) Among the Department's objections to the proposal was the statement that no move in the direction of self-determination should be made before the conclusion of a British-Turkish-Greek defense treaty. This condition, the Department argued, would be interpreted by Greece as an attempt to give Turkey a "built-in veto" with which to block any progress toward self-determination.

which had been put forth by the British. Ambassador Makins wished to pursue this discussion with the Secretary.)

The Ambassador said that the British thus far had received no answer from the Turks, although there were indications that the Turks would be most reluctant to acquiesce in the proposals. He said that, as he understood it, three reservations had been expressed by the Department: (1) upon the wisdom of the "built-in veto" which the Turks would have over the implementation of the self-determination feature of the proposal after the expiration of a ten-year period of self-government; (2) upon the British view that the plan should not be discussed with the Greeks before it was made public; and (3) regarding the arrangements for assuring an elected majority in the Parliament under the proposed Constitution.

Continuing, the Ambassador said that it was extremely difficult to evaluate the Turkish position since, on the whole, they were extremely inarticulate and often failed to make a case for themselves. It appeared, however, that the Turks felt that the safeguards incorporated in the plan were inadequate for their purposes.

The Secretary observed that the principal objection to the British proposal, as he saw it, was the provision that settlement of the question of self-determination would depend upon a British-Greek-Turkish treaty, even in advance of NATO consideration of the problem. He said that at present the Turks would have no legal basis to obstruct a settlement, but that under the terms of the proposals, if they were accepted by the Greeks and Turks, they would know that they would have the legal power to stall the implementation of the self-determination feature. Thus, the British would be depriving themselves of their present sole legal responsibility in the matter and would bring about a divided authority which might cause trouble in future years.

The comment was made to the British Ambassador that, aside from the question of the Turkish attitude, it might be conceivable that the situation in ten years would be such as to render it inadvisable for the Greeks themselves to have the veto power implicit in the proposals. The plan as now worded would, for example, effectively preclude the establishment of Cyprus independence under dominion status or as part of the Commonwealth if the political situation in Greece or the attitudes of the Cypriots themselves in the years ahead should render it otherwise feasible to consider a solution along those lines. The Secretary remarked that the British goal was highly commendable, that he fully appreciated the difficulties confronting the British Government in trying to work out a solution to this enormously complicated problem, and that he knew the proposals put forward had been formulated in good faith and in an earnest effort to find some satisfactory course. He was, nevertheless, seriously concerned over the possible implications.

The Ambassador commented that he thought neither the Greeks nor the Turks could effectively block implementation of the plan at the expiration of the ten-year period in view of the fact that they could not withstand the international pressures for a just solution. He remarked, in this connection, that NATO itself would be seized with the problem and would apply pressures against the Greeks and the Turks to undertake the proposed treaty.

The Secretary commented that neither the Greeks nor the Turks were nearly as sensitive to international pressures as the United States or Great Britain; he doubted that it would be safe to rely upon this as an assurance that the treaty would be concluded. He pointed out that, according to his understanding of the proposals, the matter would not be referred to NATO in the absence of the treaty itself; thus it would be difficult to envisage a situation in which NATO could effectively pressure the Greeks and Turks to come to an agreement.

The Ambassador said that while some difficulties might be involved in concluding the treaty, a ten-year period was provided for an introduction of a constitution and the establishment and refinement of self-government. That in itself would be a great gain. He indicated, in response to the Secretary's question, that the self-government aspects of the proposals could go forward in the absence of a Greek-Turkish agreement either to undertake a treaty for the defense of Cyprus, or an agreement on the part of the Greeks and Turks not to raise the question of self-determination during the ten-year period mentioned in the proposals. The Secretary observed that he had not understood the proposed statement to indicate that to be the case.

Responding to further questions by the Secretary, the Ambassador expressed his understanding that Greek and Turkish agreement was not needed to put into motion the self-government provisions, but that they merely had to "acquiesce." The Secretary asked what the situation would be, for example, if two years following the institution of self-government, the Greeks should press the question of self-determination and ask that this matter be inscribed on the agenda of the UN. The Ambassador's reply was that the British would naturally oppose inscription, but he was not clear as to the effect such Greek action would have upon the time schedule for carrying out the self-determination feature of the plan.

The Secretary said that he assumed the primary question which had been put to him was whether we would urge the Turks to accept the British proposals. The Ambassador responded that it was whether we would use our influence with the Turks in this matter and persuade them to acquiesce in the proposals. The Secretary said that he frankly had grave reservations about the merits of the proposals. He believed that confusion would be compounded if an

arrangement were concluded whereby the concurrence of both Greece and Turkey would be needed before any determination were made on self-determination, rather than maintaining a situation in which the UK would retain its present rights. He thought that under the plan both Greece and Turkey would be given legal rights which they do not now possess, and that this would greatly decrease the flexibility of the British in disposing of the problem. He repeated that he appreciated the great effort which the British were making and realized that, from the British viewpoint, they had proposed a considerable step forward. From his viewpoint, however, he frankly doubted that the plan would work.

At this point, the British Ambassador commented with a smile that he was inclined to say "What would you have us do?" The Secretary, also jokingly, replied, "While you may be inclined to do so, you have not asked the question." The Ambassador responded that he did not have instructions to put this question to us.

The Secretary summed up his position by saying that he did not think it was a good idea to diffuse the present role of the British and create a situation in which three powers, rather than one, would have legal authority for agreeing to any course of action. He felt that even if Greece and Turkey should accept the present plan, which appeared unlikely, it would create a situation which ten years hence would be more insoluble than that existing at the present time. He expressed considerable doubt that, even if Turkey should acquiesce, the Greek Government would do so. In the circumstances, he questioned the wisdom of the US undertaking to persuade the Turks to accept the plan.

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181. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden [1]

Washington, June 23, 1956.

DEAR ANTHONY: Thank you very much for your letter of June seventh concerning Cyprus. [2] Despite my present physical difficulty, [3] I have studied it with much interest. I know your deep concern with this problem and it is a concern which I, too, share.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret.

[2] Document 175.

[3] On June 8, President Eisenhower suffered an attack of ileitis which required surgery on June 9. The President remained at Walter Reed Hospital until June 30.

Foster has told me of the statement which you propose to make on the Cyprus question. He has, I think, some questions which he has raised with Roger Makins. Is it wise, I wonder, for you to dilute your own authority by giving both Greece and Turkey what amounts to an indefinite veto power over any future change in the international status of Cyprus? Might not that further complicate a problem already complicated enough? Of course, they have legitimate interests which should be taken into account. But it seems to me important that the United Kingdom should retain a sufficient initiative and flexibility in its own hands to meet the changing circumstances which are bound to occur in a situation as complicated and as charged with emotion as is this one. Could you not therefore avoid giving an inflexible veto power to anybody?

I know it is much easier to put questions than to answer them. But I want you to know of my interest and our desire, as far as I properly can, to help at the right moment and in the right way to achieve some acceptable solution which will relieve NATO of the great risks which have developed around the present situation.

At last I can report that I seem steadily to regain my strength.

With warm personal regard,

As ever,

Ike E.[4]

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

182. Memorandum of Conversations Between the British Ambassador (Makins) and Secretary of State Dulles, Dulles' Residence, Washington, June 23 and 25, 1956[1]

June 23, 1956.

The Ambassador called pursuant to my telephone call to him in order to pick up the message from the President to Sir Anthony Eden about Cyprus.[2]

I said to the Ambassador, in giving him the message, that I thought he should know that this was not a perfunctory message,

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Dulles.

[2] *Supra.*

but that the President had given considerable thought to the problem and that we had discussed it together over the telephone. I also said that while I had made a first draft of the message, the President himself had changed it around so that it would, he thought, accurately reflect his thinking in the way he would like to express himself.

The Ambassador spoke of the "leak" of our criticism of their proposed Cyprus statement on the ground of a "built-in veto".[3] He said the Foreign Office was much upset by the fact that it had become known that they had consulted us on this and that we had been critical of it.

I expressed my surprise that there should have been any such "leak", which the Ambassador said was in the *London Times*. I said I would look into the matter.

June 25, 1956.

Following the signature of the Agreements regarding St. Lucia and Ascension Islands, I told the Ambassador I had looked into the matter of the "leak" regarding the Cyprus situation. I said that what had happened was that a Reuter's correspondent had come into the Department and seen a very junior officer, bringing with him a Drew Middleton dispatch about Cyprus. This Middleton dispatch itself disclosed a considerable amount about the British intentions. The correspondent then tried to draw out the Departmental official as to what the attitude of the United States would be. I was reliably informed that he had said he had no idea, but there then followed what the officer thought was a purely informal conversation about the Middleton dispatch, in the course of which this officer had expressed it as his personal view that such a plan as Middleton reported might be deemed objectionable because it gave the Turks a built-in veto against a change in the international status of Cyprus.

I said that while I greatly regretted what had happened, it was not a "leak" of anything that had taken place between the Ambassador and me, as to which the officer in question was totally ignorant.

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[3] In telegram 5924, June 23, Aldrich reported that Lloyd had asked him to call regarding an article in the *London Times*, which indicated that the Department had been kept informed of British moves to break the Cyprus deadlock. Lloyd noted that reference to the idea of a "built-in veto" in the article, suggested that the writer must have had a direct conversation with someone in the Department. According to Aldrich, Lloyd was requesting Makins to express to the Department Britain's grave concern on this matter. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–2356)

183. Letter From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower [1]

London, June 26, 1956.

DEAR FRIEND: Thank you so much for your message about Cyprus. [2] I feel distressed that you should have been inflicted with this at this time.

Harding is making good progress in restoring law and order, but he has told us that if he is to get a constitution working, the issue of self determination must in some way be put into cold storage. Hence the period of years and a submission to NATO on certain conditions at the end of it.

You will have heard that the initial Turkish reaction to our proposals was sharp and tough. [3] Although it was more violent than I expected, I am not entirely surprised. The Greeks are good talkers, the Turks are not. But they have a habit of boiling slowly inside. When the lid of the kettle finally blows off, it can be very unpleasant for anyone nearby. Our Ambassador has warned us of the danger of a serious crisis in Anglo-Turkish relations.

All this is troublesome to us because we certainly need the Turks both for the Baghdad Pact and for NATO. Indeed I am sure that you will agree that if anyone holds a strategic position it is they.

However we have done all we can to put arguments for our proposals to them and expect to have their considered reply in a day or two. It may be that they will produce some suggestions of their own.

Meanwhile I do not propose to make any kind of public statement, difficult as it will be to refuse our Parliament any information.

It was because I am sure that we will never get this matter solved without agreement on military matters that we introduced the conception of a Tripartite Treaty. I do not think that there is anything very new in this.

Our formula has much to recommend it to the Greeks. No doubt they will always ask for more. But, all else apart, I am sure

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Transmitted under cover of a note from Makins to Eisenhower, June 26. A notation on the source text in an unidentified hand reads: "State will handle any reply on diplomatic level".

[2] Document 181.

[3] In telegram 2169 from Ankara, June 22, the Embassy transmitted the preliminary reaction of Foreign Ministry Secretary General Birgi to the British proposals. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–2256)

that we cannot go further in placating them without disaster in our relations with the Turks.

The best news of all is of your improving health. It gladdens the hearts of millions here, and especially,

Yours ever,

Anthony

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184. Editorial Note

On July 4, Vice President Nixon, on a trip to the Far East visited the Philippines to participate in the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of Filipino independence. Returning to the United States, Nixon stopped overnight in Ankara on July 9 and 10. On July 10, the Embassy in Turkey informed the Department that the question of Cyprus was among the subjects discussed in an informal exchange of views among Nixon, President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Acting Foreign Minister Etem Menderes, Foreign Office Secretary Nuri Birgi, and Ambassador Warren. According to the Ambassador, both Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes stressed the importance of Cyprus from a political, strategic, and national point of view and expressed Turkey's determination to prevent the island from passing to the Greeks. Both leaders emphasized that Turkey was satisfied with the status quo under the British and would not accept the transfer of Cyprus to Greece. Ambassador Warren reported that he had the impression that the Turkish Government would not yield on this matter and would act decisively "with possible serious consequences" before it would permit the island to be transferred to Greece. (Telegram 80 from Ankara, July 10; Department of State, Central Files, 782.5–MSP/7–1056)

On July 12, at the 290th meeting of the National Security Council, Nixon briefed the Council on his trip to the Far East. During the discussion he referred to his visit to Turkey:

"Apropos of his visit to Turkey, the Vice President said that he was amazed to find that the Turks had a positively pathological attitude on the Cyprus problem. The Prime Minister had even gone so far as to suggest that if Cyprus was joined to Greece, the Turks would go to war to prevent it. He had subsequently modified this statement. The reason for Turkish alarm over Cyprus, said the Vice President, was rather the closeness of the island to the Turkish

mainland than concern for the Turkish minority living on Cyprus." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Memoranda of Discussion)

185. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 13, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Miss Barbara Salt, Counselor, British Embassy
The Secretary
Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor
George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary, NEA
William O. Baxter, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
William C. Burdett, Acting Director, NE

When the British Ambassador called this afternoon he said he would like first to bring the Secretary up to date on the latest Cyprus developments. The British Government had felt that it must try some new initiative in this matter and had worked out a plan which it had hoped would be acceptable to Turkey. The British Government would have liked United States support for its proposals with the Turks and eventually with the Greeks. The Ambassador wished the Secretary to know that all available arguments had been used with the Turks to obtain their acceptance but without success. The British had often thought the United States under-estimated the depth of Turkish feeling on Cyprus, but the Turkish reaction had been so strong that it appeared even the British may have been guilty of the same fault. The Turkish response to the proposals, though courteous, was exceedingly strong. In fact, they put the blunt question as to whether it was British policy to abandon Cyprus.

When it was apparent no progress could be made along these lines, the British Government had reluctantly decided to abandon this attempt. Finally Mr. Eden made this position clear yesterday in Parliament and at the same time announced the British intention of moving ahead with the drafting of a constitution and the immediate

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–1356. Secret. Drafted by Baxter.

dispatch of Lord Radcliffe to Cyprus for preliminary soundings.[2] This move involved a calculated risk because it was embarked upon without awaiting the complete cessation of terrorist activities and might be interpreted as a weakening of British policy with respect to Cyprus. HMG hoped to find some support from the United States in this new move.

The Secretary said that he would be prepared to give support to what appeared to be a sound and constructive step forward. He was sorry that we had not been able to support the previous proposals with the Turks but he doubted whether, even with United States support, the Turks could have been persuaded to agree. The Ambassador knew, the Secretary said, of our reservations on the proposals, which appeared to give both the Greeks and Turks a permanent power of veto and which therefore restricted British freedom of action and flexibility in moving ahead on the question. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador had any concrete suggestion as to the form of United States support for the new British step. The Ambassador indicated that a public statement would be most welcome, and the sooner the better. The Secretary said he saw no reason why one could not be issued at once.

In reply to a question about Archbishop Makarios, the Ambassador referred to Eden's statement yesterday that, if Makarios were willing to condemn violence, a new situation would be created. In this connection Sir Roger mentioned secret minutes of Ethnarchy Council deliberations recently captured by the British which seemed to indicate clearly that Makarios had not been negotiating in good faith. He also referred to the Department's earlier comments[3] on the section of Eden's statement which referred to the Lausanne Treaty. He had called our comments to the attention of London but apparently the text had not been changed. He pointed out that Eden had not stated a British position but had merely summarized the Turkish view on the Lausanne Treaty, which was that any change in the status of Cyprus would, by invalidating one provision of the Lausanne Treaty, open up other provisions. In this connection, they had specifically mentioned Western Thrace, the Patriarchate and Greek community in Istanbul, and the Aegean Islands.

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[2] For text of Eden's statement of July 12, see *H.C. Debs.* 5th series. vol. 556, cols. 595–602.

[3] Not further identified.

186. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Greek Ambassador (Melas) and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, July 16, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus

The Greek Ambassador called today at his request to inform the Secretary that the statement issued by the Department on Saturday (attached) [2] had greatly disturbed his Government, which felt that it denoted an alarming change in United States policy on the Cyprus question. He considered it at variance with the earlier friendly remarks of President Eisenhower at the time of the Makarios exile, when he said that the United States stood ready to help its two friends, Britain and Greece, who were at odds over the Cyprus question. This new pronouncement, taken within the context of the Eden statement, seemed to support the British and Turkish view that Turkey had a right to have the deciding voice regarding the fate of Cyprus. The Ambassador referred to the "pre-arranged proposals" which had been discussed with the Turks and not with the Greeks.

The Secretary informed the Ambassador firmly that he was incorrect if by "pre-arranged" he meant to imply that the United States knew about these proposals before they were made to the Turks. He emphasized that we had no knowledge of them or their content until after they had been presented in Ankara by the British. The Ambassador hastily explained that he meant the proposals had been pre-arranged between the British and the Turks in order to make it appear to the world that no self-determination could ever be granted to Cyprus.

On the question of the statement, the Secretary said that the British also objected to our statement, but for different reasons, because it did not indicate support for anything in the British policy except the offer of early self-government. The Secretary said that our position with respect to self-government was well known: that we wanted more self-government everywhere in the world where people were far enough advanced to have a voice in running their own affairs. The United States, he thought, was entitled to have its policy on this matter without regard to the opinions of other governments, and to state publicly at any time our support for

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–1656. Confidential. Drafted by Baxter.

[2] Not found attached. The statement released on Saturday, July 14, reads: "The United States welcomes the intention of the British Government, as announced by Prime Minister Eden, to proceed with the development of self-government on the island of Cyprus." (Telegram 171 to Athens, July 14; *ibid.*, 747C.00/7–1456)

moves toward self-government. He assured the Ambassador that United States policy toward Greece remained unchanged.

The Ambassador, after thanking the Secretary for his assurances, commented that the Turks were "getting out of hand." They had been making threatening and belligerent statements during recent weeks which went quite beyond the limits of comprehension. He referred to the communiqué just issued by the Assembly group of the Turkish Democrat Party, which stated that, if Greece attempts to annex Cyprus, Turkey will lay claim to Western Thrace and the Dodecanese. The Ambassador pointed out that of course there was no question of "annexation" and spoke emotionally of Turkey's having renounced categorically and in perpetuity any rights to Cyprus when it signed the Lausanne Treaty. Turkey now pretended that any change in the status quo on Cyprus would permit Turkey to ask revision of other articles of the Lausanne Treaty, specifically those dealing with Western Thrace, the Aegean Islands and the Patriarchate. The Secretary indicated that his legal advisers were inclined to believe there was no sound basis in international law for the thesis that modification of the status quo on Cyprus would automatically reopen the Treaty.

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187. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President [1]

Washington, July 20, 1956.

SUBJECT

Skouras Talks with Eden on Cyprus

Spyros Skouras has requested that you be informed of talks on Cyprus which he has had with Prime Minister Eden and with Prime Minister Karamanlis of Greece. Since you are interested in the question and since he may wish to discuss it with you, a summary follows:

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–2056. Secret. Spyros Skouras, President of Twentieth Century Fox Films, had undertaken, on his own initiative, a mission to persuade the Governments of Greece and Turkey to disengage from the Cyprus problem and to allow the British and the Cypriots to settle the issue. Although Skouras had contact with Eisenhower and Dulles as well as other Department of State officials, his mission was undertaken as a private citizen. Skouras saw Eden on June 20. A report of Skouras' conversation with Karamanlis was transmitted in telegram 53 from Athens, July 6. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/7–656)

Eden said that a satisfactory solution depended on (1) an end of terrorism, (2) some means of satisfying the Turks and (3) British sovereignty over base areas to be retained permanently following self-determination.

Skouras transmitted this to Karamanlis and obtained the following reply:

Greece believes a solution would be possible if the British (1) clearly recognized self-determination, (2) agreed to a plebiscite within eight years (date to be determined by NATO considering the international situation), (3) returned Makarios in time to sign agreement, (4) retained only Foreign Affairs and Defense during the period of self-government and granted a progressive amnesty.

If the plebiscite favored union with Greece, Turkish interests (according to the Greeks) could be secured by (1) a NATO limit on Greek forces on Cyprus, (2) creation of a free port to protect Turkish trade, (3) Turkish civil rights to be protected by the UN.

In reporting the above to the British Ambassador to Athens, Skouras put in the suggestion that Makarios could be returned to London instead of to Cyprus.

Comment: Only after we learn the results of Mr. Skouras' visit to Ankara [2] can we evaluate the prospects of agreement that may be developed from this series of conversations.

John Foster Dulles [3]

[2] A notation at this point on the source text in an unidentified hand, but bearing Dulles' initials in quotation marks reads: "if he is admitted". For Skouras' report on his travels, see Document 196.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

188. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, August 13, 1956.

SUBJECT

Cyprus: Our Goals and Steps To Attain Them

Discussion

As you requested, [2] I attach a paper setting forth our intermediate and eventual goals in the Cyprus question and the steps we think we should take to reach them.

We believe the controversy is now at a point where the disputants are unlikely to come to any settlement unless they have outside help. If you agree, I feel strongly that Julius Holmes should be asked to undertake as soon as possible the secret, high level talks outlined in Part III of this paper as necessary to achieve a solution of this problem.

Recommendation

That you approve the procedure suggested above. [3]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–3056. Secret. Drafted by Williams, Wood, and Laingen and sent through S/S and G.

[2] On August 8 at 11:30 a.m., during a conversation with the President, Dulles raised the subject of Cyprus. A memorandum of the discussion reads:

"In connection with the attitude of Greece, I spoke of the Cyprus matter and said that there was a recommendation to me that the US should try to get into the solution of the Cyprus problem and take some initiative and offer its good offices to the three principal parties. The President said this was all right if we had what we thought was an answer. However, we should not get in unless we had some pretty clear idea as to where we could come out." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

[3] There is no indication on the source text that Dulles approved the memorandum.

[Tab A]

Paper Prepared in the Department of State [4]

Washington, undated.

I. Goals in the Cyprus Dispute

A. Our Intermediate Goals

1. To have talks between the parties resumed and in such a state of progress before the November United Nations General Assembly that acrimonious conflict in the United Nations can be avoided.

2. To achieve a success in promoting a Cyprus solution that can be presented as a tangible accomplishment of NATO, thus giving encouragement for the future of the alliance.

3. To relieve the Karamanlis Government in Greece of serious dangers from an opposition that is subject to neutralist and communist appeals based on this issue.

4. To strengthen the Allied position in the area and to free the British forces now tied down in Cyprus for general defense operations in the Middle East.

B. Our Eventual Goals

1. To end the Cyprus controversy as a divisive element affecting both NATO and the Balkan Alliance.

2. To guarantee that bases in Cyprus will be at the permanent disposal of Great Britain . . . for protecting its interests to the East.

3. To provide the inhabitants of the Island with guarantees of their rights of self-determination with full protection for minorities.

4. To insure for the future that Cyprus will not be considered by the Government of Turkey as a threat to its security.

II. Proposed Plan for Cyprus Settlement

In order to achieve these goals, the United States should take the initiative, without delay, in presenting privately to the British, Turkish and Greek Governments a concrete plan which may have a good chance of leading to a solution of the Cyprus problem.

Such a plan has been set forth in the Holmes memorandum (Tab B). In brief, it would provide for the following:

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[4] Drafted by Williams, Wood, and Laingen.

Self-Government:

A. Election of a Constituent Assembly for Cyprus

1. Call by the UK for election of a Constituent Assembly to frame a Constitution, based largely on Lord Radcliffe's investigations, for immediate self-government. Election to be under supervision of a Commission of from three to five NATO members, not including the UK, Greece or Turkey.

B. Drafting of Constitution

1. To assure Turkish cooperation in electing Assembly, general lines of Constitution, providing adequate safeguards for Turkish minority, would be laid down in advance of elections.

2. The UK would announce its intention to reserve control over only foreign affairs and defense and the right to intervene to restore public order. Exercise of this right might be made to depend upon a finding by SACEUR.

3. Agreement would need to be reached on Amnesty and Cessation of Violence.

C. Establishment of Self-Government

D. Return of Archbishop Makarios to Cyprus

1. The Archbishop would have been kept advised of the constitutional discussions and his assent obtained to final draft. Conditions for his return would have to be clearly established.

Self-Determination:

A. Plebiscite to Determine Future International Status of Island

1. At time of calling elections above, UK would announce that at end of ten years of self-government, plebiscite would be held under NATO supervision to determine future of Island.

2. Plebiscite would permit choice of any of following:

a. Union with Greece
b. Local autonomy under the Greek Crown
c. Full Independence
d. Self-government within the Commonwealth

Safeguards:

A. Military Use of Island

1. Announcement by UK that specified areas in Island would remain, in perpetuity, under UK sovereignty for the maintenance of military bases.

2. It would be understood that the UK, if it chose, could make joint-use agreements for the use of these areas by any other NATO country (for example the US).

3. Even should the plebiscite result in union with Greece, Greek forces would not be stationed on the Island, unless requested by NATO.

B. Protection of Minorities

1. Negotiation of a Tripartite Treaty between the UK, Turkey and Greece, providing guarantees for minorities on the Island in addition to those guarantees spelled out in the Constitution.

2. There should also be a provision for the minority's appeal, on questions involving constitutionality of legislative acts, to higher authority, such as a panel of eminent jurists named by the NATO powers.

C. International Guarantee

1. The entire settlement to be guaranteed by the NATO countries.

III. Procedure

1. We should designate an emissary who will be empowered to undertake discussions with British, Turkish and Greek authorities at a high level. These discussions must be secret, with every precaution against the publicity that can arouse popular emotions and force the governments concerned into rigid positions. Our envoy should have appropriate cover.

2. The first step might be to have our representative sound out the British, starting with an informal exploratory approach to Ambassador Makins in Washington. If in Makins' view, HMG may see merit in the plan, our envoy should go to London to seek British support and British assurances that HMG will press the Turks at the appropriate time to accept a reasonable solution.

3. If the talks in London are successful, he should go to Athens, where there is a growing disposition to accept a compromise solution. . . .

4. Our emissary must line up his strongest arguments for his talks in Ankara, where opposition to the plan will be most intense. He must seek Turkish agreement by using the following main arguments:

a. The plan provides concrete guarantees against Cyprus falling under military control hostile to Turkey.

b. The plan does not necessarily lead to Enosis. (The economic argument here is a powerful one.) The inhabitants of the Island will have ample opportunity to choose another destiny, which at end of

a ten-year cooling-off period might well be something other than Enosis.

c. The Turkish minority, in any case, will be afforded ample protection under international guarantees.

d. Turkey must recognize that in the interests of NATO and Western defenses, the United States and United Kingdom must go ahead with a settlement and that Turkey has no legal or moral right to block it. The Allied Powers are doing all possible to safeguard Turkey's legitimate interests.

5. In Turkey our envoy may find it useful to discuss variations on the plan in order to find an arrangement suitable to Turkey. . . . He may also discuss other means of fixing a date for the self-determination plebiscite in lieu of the ten-year limit prescribed in Part II.

6. At one point in the negotiations, British, Greek and, possibly, an American representative should go secretly to the Seychelles Islands to obtain Makarios' approval. Timing of this trip might be determined in consultation with Greek authorities.

7. If agreement is reached, it should first be made public by NATO in order that that body may get appropriate credit.

[Tab B]

Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Holmes) to the Secretary of State [5]

Washington, July 30, 1956.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

I recommend that we take the initiative in an attempt to bring about an early settlement of the dispute over Cyprus. It is not likely that the disputants will be able to reach an agreement without outside help, and if a solution is not found the damage to the NATO alliance and to the British position in the Middle East will be very great. There is every advantage in finding a solution before the next General Assembly of the UN and before the report of the

[5] Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that Dulles saw this memorandum.

Committee of Three is considered.[6] Events in Egypt make a settlement more urgent and more likely of attainment.[7]

The benefits to be derived from an early settlement are very great. If a solution can be brought about under the NATO aegis and announced to the world as a NATO settlement, it will go far toward meeting the universal expectancy that some striking result will emerge following the creation of the special Committee of Three Foreign Ministers. Such an important, tangible success would give great encouragement and confidence for the future of the coalition. Another beneficial result would be to assure the United Kingdom of a strong military bastion in the Eastern Mediterranean not plagued with local hostility. The British position in the Middle East has been seriously weakened and it is vitally in the interest of the West that it be salvaged and strengthened. If this is not done, the availability of Middle East oil to the UK and Western Europe may be seriously threatened.

We should commence by discussing prospects of settlement secretly with the British, and if general agreement is found, subsequently with the Greeks and Turks. The latter will be the most difficult. At some point it would probably be necessary for representatives authorized to speak for the UK and Greece to go secretly to the Seychelles Islands and obtain the approval of Makarios to any agreed solution. I suggest that discussions be begun based on the following:

A general election called by the sovereign power, the United Kingdom, should be held, under NATO supervision, of a constituent assembly; the Committee of Supervision to consist of from three to five members, not including British, Greek or Turkish representatives. After the election, the constitution would be written and self-government given to the island; the British Governor reserving only control over foreign affairs, defense, and the right to intervene to restore public order in the event of a really serious threat. (If necessary to obtain Greek agreement, this right might be further qualified by making its use dependent on a finding by SACEUR that the disruption of public order was of such character as to endanger Western defense.) The constitution would include the usual, recognized guarantee for minorities to protect the Turkish population.

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[6] At the Ministerial meeting of the NAC in May 1956, a Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation was established to advise the Council on ways to improve and promote cooperation in nonmilitary areas and to encourage greater unity within the NATO community. The committee, often referred to as the "Three Wise Men", was composed of the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Italy, and Norway—Lester B. Pearson, Gaetano Martino, and Halvard Lange.

[7] Presumably a reference to Egyptian President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956.

Additional protection and assurance to the Turkish Government could be given by provision in the constitution which would accord the minority in the legislative assembly the right to appeal against certain categories of legislation, the broad definition of which would be any act which discriminated against the minority. I believe it is possible for qualified constitutional lawyers to produce definitions of such legislation. As it is probably not feasible to create a Supreme Court with power to pass on the constitutionality of legislative acts, a substitute could be found in a panel of eminent jurists named by each of the NATO powers. A prescribed number of these jurists would be empowered to give a binding decision on the appeal. A petition signed by a pre-determined percentage of members of the legislature, calculated to represent a majority of the number of Turkish representatives, would constitute a judicial appeal.

It would be agreed that this period of self-government would run for ten years during which time there would be no change in the international status of the Island. At the end of the ten year period, a plebiscite would be held, again supervised by NATO, under which the population of Cyprus would have the right to vote for: (1) union with Greece; (2) local autonomy under the Greek crown; (3) full independence; or (4) a self-governing status under British sovereignty, all to continue minority guarantees. . . .

The British would agree to concentrate their military establishments in a given area which I believe they are already doing, including adequate port facilities. This area would continue to remain under British sovereignty regardless of the outcome of the plebiscite. As these bases would be sovereign British territory, it would be understood that the UK would make arrangements for joint use of any facility with any NATO nation. In return for the specific recognition by the British of the right of self-determination, the Greeks would agree that even in the event the plebiscite resulted in union with Greece, Greek armed forces on the Island would be limited to police. They would agree not to fortify or to send troops except at the request of the NATO Council or on agreement by the NATO Council.

The entire settlement would be guaranteed by the NATO powers. This would have to be done by individual governments—we should have to go to the Senate—but the guarantee should be made to appear to be a collective action in so far as possible. It might also be found necessary to include the island in the NATO area, although this is not likely.

A further protection for the Turkish minority might be provided by a Tripartite treaty among Great Britain, Greece and Turkey.

The general settlement would also have to include arrangements for amnesty and the cessation of terror. It would probably be

necessary and even advisable for the British to agree to Makarios's return to Cyprus.

Domestic political pressures impel the British and Greek Governments to seek a genuine solution. On the other hand domestic political pressures impel the Turkish Government to oppose any solution. It is strongly committed to the continuance of the British presence on Cyprus, failing which it claims the Island should revert to Turkey. In the troubled domestic political and economic situation in Turkey, this is the one subject on which all elements agree. The Turks object to another Greek island so close to their coast and to Greek domination of the Turkish minority on Cyprus. They claim that the Treaty of Lausanne created a balanced pattern for the Eastern Mediterranean which should not be disturbed. They insist on a "maintenance of the status quo". They are stubborn.

However, they are also realists and will probably accept a changing situation if they realize it is inevitable. When it appeared that the Harding–Makarios talks might succeed last winter, their attitude was described by the British Ambassador at Ankara as "grudging acceptance of a fait accompli".

Before a plan is proposed to the Turks, a concerted effort should be made to convince them that we consider they have a legitimate, but not decisive, interest in the evolving political situation on Cyprus. This interest is based on geography and the Turkish minority, not on the Treaty of Lausanne. We consider it unrealistic to talk of maintaining the status quo. The Island has already changed in two years from a peaceful British Colony to a place where 18,000 British troops are having difficulty in keeping order. British public opinion will not indefinitely support the use of so many troops for this purpose and therefore the situation will inevitably continue to change. We fully support the British intention of maintaining troops on the Island and share the British belief that to restore stability the population must be allowed, under British and NATO supervision, to work out its own political problems. If this evolution is encouraged to proceed peacefully, we believe that tensions on the Island will decrease . . . . It could also be pointed out that the extensive Turkish minority in Metropolitan Greece has been well treated by the Greek authorities.

If the Turks make a point of the Treaty of Lausanne, we will have to make clear that this Treaty simply recognized British sovereignty over Cyprus which had existed de facto since it was annexed by the British on November 5, 1914. We consider that Lausanne

gave the British complete sovereignty including the right to make any changes in its status which it may wish.

. . . . . .

The elements of this approach which should appeal to the disputants:

1) *To All Three:* End to a bitter quarrel. Not only the saving of the NATO Alliance from disruption but giving it a new lease on life.
2) *To the United Kingdom:*

a) The elimination of bitter domestic criticism not only by the opposition but by British public opinion in general.
b) The end of terrorism in Cyprus, thus freeing the forces there for their proper function.
c) The assurance of a strong military base in the Eastern Mediterranean.
d) Restoration of good relations with Greece and Turkey.

. . . . . .

f) Granting the principle of self-determination would reduce criticism from anti-Colonial sources.

3) *To Greece:*

a) An explosive political problem would be substantially eliminated.
b) The right of the Greek population of Cyprus to self-determination would be acknowledged.

4) *To Turkey:*

a) The British military position on the Island would be assured for the indefinite future.
b) Assurance would be obtained that Cyprus would not become a Greek military base.
c) The Turkish minority would be protected.

. . . . . .

Recommendation:

I recommend that this plan be discussed informally with Roger Makins to obtain his personal views as to its feasibility. Depending on his reaction, we could consider subsequent steps. [8]

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[8] This memorandum was approved by Elbrick, Bowie, and Allen. There is no indication on the source text of Dulles' approval.

189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, August 24, 1956—6:32 p.m.

1325. Following instructions are based on assumption Secretary did not make suggested démarche to HMG re Cyprus. [2] If he did present instructions should be modified your discretion.

In Department view recent events Cyprus will result slipping away unexpected opportunity offered by EOKA truce for progress toward settlement. Believe it of importance to prevent loss this opportunity by some rapid UK move designed appear as positive response EOKA truce without appearing as concession to violence. British surrender terms alone seem likely to lead to renewed violence and increased Greek and Cypriot distrust (Athens 669 [3]).

You should inform HMG of above plus following:

UK position has been no further negotiations possible until violence ended. Violence has ended but main UK response has been what amounts to, in eyes EOKA, additional demand for complete surrender, resulting in confirmation Greek distrust British motives. While weakened state EOKA (Nicosia 55 [4]) may mean this threat is only bluff, Greek and Greek-Cypriot attitude has now hardened reducing chances for progress (Athens 675 [5]). If no positive UK response soon EOKA may indeed resume violence regardless present strength.

You should urge UK consider immediate announcement, preferably from London and from highest level, reiterating that it would be unfortunate if present improved prospects for progress toward

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–2356. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Laingen, Wood, and Williams. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, Ankara, and pouched to Paris for USRO and to USUN. Dulles was in London for the Suez Canal Conference, August 16–23.

[2] On August 22, in Tedul 19, the Department suggested that Dulles' visit to London might provide an opportunity to test Britain's receptivity to the proposed U.S. plan on Cyprus as outlined in Holmes' memorandum of July 30 and Rountree's of August 13 (*supra*). The Department added that the present halt in violence called by EOKA might support Britain's view that it could solve the problem on Cyprus and that London might be in no mood to consider the U.S. plan. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–2256)

[3] Dated August 23. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–2356)

[4] In telegram 55, August 20, Courtney reported from Nicosia that Governor Harding had indicated to him that the EOKA truce resulted from the organization's own recognition of its weakness. British operations waged against it, Harding noted, had harassed and disrupted EOKA's campaign of terror. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–2056)

[5] In telegram 675, August 23 (subsequently renumbered as 674), the Embassy informed the Department: "We believe precipitate British advance from truce to surrender may have seriously compromised chances for progress toward solution. As was to be expected, latest British move being seized upon by opposition to charge government with complicity, if not treason." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–2356)

self-government resulting from truce are now lost by renewal violence as threatened by EOKA. For this to be convincing to Greeks and EOKA, such announcement might be accompanied by indications from UK that surrender terms do not constitute condition which must be met before further progress made but are part of machinery providing opportunity for terrorists extricate themselves from present circumstances and eventual return to normal life, either in Greece or Cyprus. (Would be preferable if three-week limitation were not mentioned.)

In addition some UK compromise gesture, if nothing more than reaffirmation intention press ahead with proposals for self-government coupled with announcement of early Radcliffe return to Island seems essential.

In absence some such British moves now there is danger increased bitterness both sides likely remove any possibility progress before next Session GA.

Hoover

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190. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, August 28, 1956—9 p.m.

732. Prime Minister asked me call this morning to discuss the crisis he and his government face as result recent developments Cyprus issue. Throughout two hour conversation he was calm and deadly serious, at times I detected a note of despair.

He said recent events in Ankara (penetration of Greek Embassy files [2]) and London (publication of EOKA documents [3]) obliged him either to formulate a definite policy as to how his government

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–1856. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, Paris, and London.

[2] In telegram 505 from Ankara, August 29, the Embassy informed the Department that according to press reports unknown person or persons had entered the Greek Chancery on August 25 and removed four "unimportant" files. (*Ibid.*, 601.8182/8–2956)

[3] On August 26, the British Colonial Office announced that it had possession of a diary of Colonel George Grivas, leader of EOKA. According to British authorities, the diary entries indicated that Makarios was intimately involved with the founding of the organization and its operations. The Colonial Office subsequently published extracts from the diary.

should face Cyprus issue, or to step down, leaving the task to others who might be better able to cope with it. If he stays, one policy would be to accept the humiliations heaped upon Greece and to abandon Cyprus cause. This he excluded. The other would be to "fight back" and to accept support from any quarter. He was now weighing his second line of policy.

Noting that British had sought absolutely no contact with him since February elections and that he was completely in dark re their intentions, and that he is definitely not threatening to turn toward Russia, he stated that it was only natural that he should turn to US Government for help and protection. What is US point of view on how solution can be found, and what is US willing to do about it? He wished me convey to my government his request that US undertake role of mediation between Greece–UK on Cyprus. Could he have an answer within one week? What ever nature of reply or even if no reply forthcoming, he had within next week or ten days to make fundamental decisions re his future course.

In replying to Karamanlis I reviewed many occasions on which US active interest Cyprus question had been manifested and assured him our efforts were not at an end. He asserted belief we have failed influence British and expressed doubt latter wanted solution. This led to discussion in which I stressed damage done to Greek position by EOKA terrorism and Athens radio broadcasts. Karamanlis categorically denied that his government in any way involved in EOKA violence. Wherever responsibility for violence might be, it was resorted to because British refused give democratic self-government to Cypriot people. Where was Radcliffe's famous constitution? If British really intend to give self-government to Cyprus, why have they taken so long to produce this document? Its publication would prove British bona fides in an instant. Instead they offer life sentences and concentration camps.

Key to problem is liberal constitution and amnesty. Self-determination can be postponed indefinitely and be worked out over years between Cypriots and British or by NATO. Cypriot people may in end not wish sever British tie for economic and other reasons. Perhaps they will decide for independence in Commonwealth, ... There is impressive range of solutions and Greek position not inflexible. But only political solution will stop violence and further deterioration in Greek-allied relations.

Embassy attaches importance this plea from . . . Prime Minister. While not advocating kind of formal mediation Karamanlis requesting, we do believe that personal message from Secretary to Karamanlis indicating our intentions pursue this matter vigorously would go far help control situation here. Acceleration of British

plans for self-government (London's 30 [4]) would in Embassy's view be most expedient move at this time.

Thurston

[4] Telegram 30, July 23, reports on an unrelated matter. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–2356)

191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

Washington, September 3, 1956—4:45 p.m.

855. Athens tels 755, 733, [2] 732, [3] 609, [4] Despatch 66. [5]

Athens: Deliver following personal message to Averoff from the Acting Secretary and emphasize request that text be treated as confidential:

"In the absence of the Secretary I should like to acknowledge your message of August 18 concerning the Cyprus situation. Our Chargé, Mr. Thurston, has reported on the conversations which the Prime Minister and you held with him on August 28, and I am also informed of the proposals which you transmitted through Ambassador Cannon.

I would like to assure you that we are at this moment considering the Cyprus question urgently. Although some of the recent developments have been discouraging, we are fully determined to do what we can in the endeavor to find a solution. We recognize the real importance to all of us that some concrete improvement be achieved as soon as possible.

We are gratified at the attitude of the Greek Government reflected in the proposals which you gave to Ambassador Cannon, as

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–2856. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Rountree, Wood, and Laingen. Also sent to London; repeated to Ankara, Paris, and Nicosia; and pouched to Belgrade, Vienna, and Naples.

[2] Regarding telegram 755, see footnote 6 below. Telegram 733, August 28, is in Department of State, Central File 747C.00/8–2856.

[3] *Supra.*

[4] Telegram 609, August 19, transmitted a message of August 18 from the Foreign Minister. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–1956)

[5] Despatch 66 from Athens, July 30, contained a memorandum outlining Greek conditions for a solution to the Cyprus dispute. Among other things, the memorandum called for unreserved recognition of the principle of self-determination, granting of a "truly liberal" constitution, a general amnesty, and endorsement of the plan by Makarios. The original of the memorandum was given to departing Ambassador Cannon for transmittal to Dulles. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/7–3056)

supplemented by your remarks to Mr. Thurston. We are also assured of the British desire to improve the situation on Cyprus. In the circumstances there should be a considerable possibility of a better understanding.

We will be in touch with you again soon to convey our further thoughts.

Please convey my respects to Prime Minister Karamanlis. Sincerely."

London: You may inform HMG that GOG has requested US "mediation" in Cyprus question but we have no plans to accede. You may at your discretion inform British of general substance message above. You should then make strong request that HMG seek reestablish contact with GOG and give latter some indication its present plans. . . . You should seek answer from HMG. Department would also appreciate receiving from HMG as complete information as possible UK plans and intentions for Cyprus (Athens 755).[6]

FYI It our view Cyprus problem not likely be solved by formal mediation, since prior consent our intervention by all concerned needed. We therefore not giving consideration Karamanlis request. Appears GOG also does not expect this (Athens 755). Department actively studying other possible US action meet worsening Cyprus and Greek Government situation. End FYI.[7]

Hoover

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[6] Telegram 755, August 30, expressed the Embassy's view that there was a need to "smoke out true British intentions." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–3056)

[7] In telegram 963 from Athens, September 19, Thurston reported that the Acting Greek Foreign Minister had informed him that the Prime Minister was anxious to receive a progress report on Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/9–1956) In telegram 1072, September 21, the Department replied that it was sympathetic to the Prime Minister's desire for information on the U.S. position, but that Karamanlis could not be given any additional information at this time. (*Ibid.*)

192. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, September 4, 1956.

SUBJECT

Procedure for Dealing with Cyprus Question

Background

This paper is an attempt to evaluate the basic factors and probable development of the Cyprus question as affecting the United States and NATO and to assess whether there is any useful action which the United States should take.

Discussion

A. Present Situation

The United States as the leader of NATO is witnessing a dispute which for a year has made real cooperation between two NATO members and a third member impossible. It has weakened NATO internally and has also weakened outside respect for NATO as a cohesive group.

The differing positions of the three members have become so hardened by mutual mistrust and by mutual public condemnation that agreement is unlikely without outside assistance. Certainly the history of the Cyprus question for the past two and a half years shows steady deterioration. A permanent improvement is unlikely unless these countries are helped to reestablish contact, discussion and some understanding. For the past year there have been no useful discussions between Greece and the United Kingdom or Turkey. Even if the British are now able to restore order and to offer a fair constitution, it is unlikely that the Cypriots would accept it without considerable encouragement from Greece. Greece and Turkey almost certainly cannot extricate themselves from their present public positions and assume more useful roles in finding a solution without an active display of American interest. All this would be worsened by a third and more vehement quarrel in the U.N. General Assembly.

B. Possible U.S. Role

Thus the Cyprus situation will almost certainly not be improved unless the U.S., as the leading power in NATO, assumes a more

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–456. Secret. Drafted by Williams, Wood, and Rountree on September 1.

active role in bringing its allies together. The following considerations would bear upon the decision as to what the United States might do:

1. Both the British and Greek Governments are under pressure to achieve some form of settlement and seem to desire a settlement.
2. The Turkish position has hardened since the United States has been less active in recent months and as the Greek attitude has become more flexible. Turkish realism would probably dictate a less intransigent attitude if faced by joint US-UK proposals for a reasonable settlement which would take into account Turkish interest in and sensitivity over the matter.
3. The general feeling among all NATO members that the difficulties emanating from this relatively small island should be settled could probably be turned to good account.

Experience has demonstrated that the mere dispatch of messages to the several parties in the dispute is not an effective means of dealing with the matter. It is also clear that a meeting of the three powers would probably be counterproductive and would lead to highly publicized intemperate oratory. It would seem in the circumstance that the United States should designate an experienced officer to go to London, Athens and Ankara to have talks quietly and informally.

This officer should seek to find and widen such common ground as may form the basis for a solution. He should report on his findings before committing U.S. prestige to any major understandings. He should avoid publicity and for this purpose a NATO cover might be useful.

The officer will see that the two main focuses of dispute have been (a) the Greek and Cypriot demand for immediate self-government for the island and (b) the Greek and Cypriot desire for self-determination. (There is little real dissension on continued use of British bases.) Of the two, the issue of self-determination is the more difficult since the Turkish Government has taken a strong stand against it. On the other hand, the British Prime Minister has publicly recognized that the principle of self-determination is applicable to Cyprus under certain circumstances. Our own position is defined by the President's letter to Karamanlis (Tab A [2]) stating that "the basic right of peoples to governments of their own choice" (Joint Declaration of Washington) is applicable to Cyprus. The Greek Government, moreover, has indicated its willingness to put settlement of this matter aside for ultimate disposition by the British and Cypriots or by NATO. It may be possible with U.S. assistance

[2] Not found attached, but printed as Document 161.

to reduce to manageable proportions the emotions involved in the self-determination issue.

On the issue of self-government, our negotiator will find considerable common ground. The U.K. already has asked Lord Radcliffe to draft a constitution. The Greek Prime Minister has said that requirements for a solution are a liberal constitution and amnesty for the revolutionaries. If the British can expedite the promulgation of a liberal constitution with a minimum of power reserved to the British Governor, our representative may find that the Greeks can be persuaded to accept such a solution. The Greeks, moreover, may come to see that the gap between a full measure of self-government and self-determination is not great. As for the Cypriots, there is reason to believe that Greek influence over the Cyprus Ethnarchy may now be sufficient to obtain acceptance and to bring an end to the current violence. The Turks, we believe, should be urged by us to agree on at least two important grounds: (a) that self-government has now become a cardinal principle of British colonial policy, from which there should be no exception in the case of Cyprus; and (b) that self-government is a right that can hardly be denied in the free world which the Atlantic Community protects. It must, of course, be recognized that Turkish agreement regarding self-government would depend upon the nature of the protection afforded to the Turkish minority.

. . . . . .

Recommendations:

In sum, the present impasse may result not so much from the absence of a common ground for a settlement as from the absence of a channel through which the parties can privately explore a solution without the obstruction of public confrontation and popular demagogy. We, therefore, recommend:

1. that an experienced officer be designated to explore this problem unobtrusively in London, Athens, and Ankara with a view to discovering or tactfully inducing sufficient common ground to produce an acceptable solution;

2. that Mr. Julius Holmes be the officer designated for this mission. [3]

[3] A notation on the source text by Rountree indicates that Dulles approved this memorandum.

193. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, September 6, 1956—5 p.m.

1328. Vienna for Penfield. Regarding Deptel 1602. [2] I had long conversation today with Kirkpatrick and set forth U.S. concern at deterioration Greek Government position, referred to reports of recent conversations of Greeks with our Embassy Athens in which Greeks appeared prepared to take more reasonable attitude than heretofore with regard to Cyprus and emphasized our feeling that any opportunity to capitalize on such Greek conciliatory attitude toward solution of Cyprus problem should in our view be seized upon. I informed him that Greeks sent message to Secretary asking U.S. "mediation" but that U.S. has no present plan to accede to such request. I summarized substance Acting Secretary's response, specifically our expression gratification at attitude Greek Government reflected in current proposals they have made to U.S. which I noted are largely consistent with British position as set forth to me by Kirkpatrick on various occasions. . . . Regarding Cyprus I inquired extent of British current contact with Greek Government and whether British have any plans to take advantage present atmosphere to confer with Greeks specifically in regard to steps toward self-government on island.

Kirkpatrick . . . . confirmed that reports reaching British from Greek sources, including those from British Embassy Athens, suggest that Greek Government is currently taking line that it is prepared to support more reasonable arrangement for self-government than heretofore and not to insist on implementation of self-determination at this time. . . . practical steps would be either for Greeks to make their position public or at least to make known their attitude to Ethnarchy and Greek Cypriots. At present he said there is every evidence that Greek Government is continuing to take contrary line publicly and with Greek Cypriots. I suggested it might be difficult for Government of Greece to take public line until they are aware of whole nature of self-government package which is to be presented to Greek Cypriots but that it seemed to us that British might well explore possibilities more directly and more specifically with Greek Government now on basis of current indications of its attitude. I asked whether British have any intention of discussing with Greek Government Lord Radcliffe's proposals for constitution. Kirkpatrick

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–656. Secret. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Paris, and Nicosia.

[2] Printed as telegram 855, Document 191.

replied in negative. Radcliffe's plan is to proceed to Cyprus second time within next 2 weeks and to endeavor to discuss his concepts with Greek Cypriots and other elements on island. Kirkpatrick said he would hope that if Greek Government's attitude is genuine it might be possible for that government to facilitate such discussions rather than as at present letting it be known on island that Greeks coming forward for such discussions are traitors to Greek cause.

. . . . . .

. . . Kirkpatrick emphasized that British have not made any decision to go to UN. They are apparently concerned at possibility UN consideration would give Soviets undesirable opportunity to raise issues regarding Malaya and other empire areas. I reiterated United States concern that if Cyprus is taken to UN, United States and United Kingdom may find themselves separated on colonial aspects of problem, and inquired how British would envisage presenting case to UN in such fashion as to contribute to solution rather than as purely negative commendatory action.

Specifically I asked whether British would envisage seeking resolution favoring self-government. He doubted British would be prepared to go that far and again stated that no decision has been taken and matter still under consideration.

Conversation then turned to extent British current contact with Greek Government which I had mentioned earlier. Kirkpatrick said Embassy Athens has relatively normal contact and that there is some indication that Greeks are considering re-establishing Ambassador in London. He noted Greek opposition circles have been criticizing government on grounds that its views on Cyprus are now largely represented in London by British Parliamentary opposition elements and urging that Greek Ambassador return to London. I again took occasion to emphasize United States conviction that, whatever reasons for apparent more conciliatory attitude Greek Government and even if attitude is more apparent than real, interest of all dictate every effort be made to take all possible steps to ensure that no opportunity is overlooked to advance Cyprus problem toward solution. While I am not wholly sanguine that British disposed move ahead this matter as fast as we would like and while it is obvious that Suez developments have an impact on British thinking tending to make them even more cautious in taking any steps which would prejudice firmness of their control over Cyprus base at this time, it is my view that they are in fact steadily moving toward some sort of realistic constitution for island and that Lord Radcliffe's efforts in that direction are being expedited. Subsequent to drafting the foregoing, Eden told me at lunch today that Harding is returning London

next week to discuss constitution with Radcliffe. Eden agreed Greeks appear more conciliatory this moment and, although noting Cyprus problem not of importance Suez, professed concur my view that no opportunity should be lost to move toward solution and that critical situation regarding Suez itself makes progress in Cyprus issue more necessary. Have just received Deptel 1647.[3] Believe substance thereof covered in my conversation with Kirkpatrick. I went over with him Greek proposals as set forth to us, specifically (1) reaffirmation of British acceptance principle self determination at appropriate time which seemed to be covered by Harding's broadcast; (2) reservation to British of police powers for some period in addition to indefinite continuance defense and foreign affairs in British hands to reassure British and Turks that self government is not step on slippery slope to enosis, and (3) bi-cameral parliament with upper house having veto over minority rights, education, religion, etc. I indicated this position seemed generally close to line British have been taking for some time. As indicated above Kirkpatrick's response was to effect that Greek professions in this direction would be more valuable and could be taken more seriously if they were prepared to state this position publicly or effectively to Greek Cypriots.

Barbour

[3] Not printed.

194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, September 8, 1956—4:14 p.m.

907. Holmes and principal officers only. Following message for Julius Holmes:

Secretary authorizes you explore Cyprus problem secretly and at highest level with Governments concerned along lines suggested in NEA memorandum September 4[2] which you saw before your departure. You should be present with Senator George in Paris at time answers to US questionnaire are discussed with Wisemen September

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/9–856. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Williams, Wood, and Rountree. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Nicosia.

[2] Document 192.

17.[3] We believe you could undertake Cyprus mission at any time thereafter. You should seek for and attempt widen such areas of common understanding as exist and may form basis for solution. You may find progress on Cyprus being hindered more by lack private communication than by lack common ground. You should base yourself on general US position set forth in President's letter February 20, 1956 to Prime Minister Karamanlis[4] and NEA memorandum of September 4. These documents being pouched to you separately Paris. Ben Wood available as you require him.

You should not attempt formal mediation which would require prior consent all parties, but suggest rather your mission should in beginning be primarily exploratory. You should talk with HMG before going to Athens or Ankara and should proceed latter capitals only if British do not object. Suggest use NATO cover as appropriate, perhaps indicating visits Athens and Ankara for orientation purposes in connection your NATO responsibilities. You should of course report on your findings and give us your suggestions before assuming commitments.

Other addressees: Existence above authorization must be kept absolutely secret. Assist Holmes as needed. Background by pouch.

Dulles

[3] Senator George was appointed by Eisenhower as the President's personal representative and special ambassador to advise him on the activities of the Committee on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO. The Committee of Three had circulated questionnaires to the member states to solicit their views and announced it would hold meetings in Paris to discuss the replies. The U.S. Delegation was composed of Senator George, Ambassador Perkins, and Julius Holmes. The delegation left for London and Paris on August 31.

[4] Document 161.

195. Editorial Note

On September 6, during the course of a discussion with the President, Dulles raised the problem of Cyprus. According to the memorandum of conversation, the following exchange occurred:

"I discussed the Cyprus matter with the President along the line of the recommendation to me of Mr. Rountree of September 4, 1956. I referred to the prior talk I had had with the President when he said that before we got in we should have some idea where we might perhaps come out. I said it seemed the Greeks might now be willing to settle on a basis which would deal with self-government

but leave at status quo the question of self-determination. If so, this might provide a basis for settlement. Certainly the present Government was the best one to deal with and unless something could be worked out with it it might fall and a government with considerable Communist influence take its place.

". . . The President agreed that under the circumstances it would be in order to proceed. I said I assumed we would talk first with the British and not go further unless they were acquiescent. I said the recommendation was that Julius Holmes be asked to take this. The President thought he would be a good negotiator for the purpose." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

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196. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Spyros Skouras and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, September 10, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Skouras on Cyprus

Mr. Skouras had two purposes in calling on the Secretary:

First, he gave the Secretary a brief review of his travels this summer. During these travels he had called first on the British Prime Minister and the British Foreign Minister.

On June 20th Prime Minister Eden hinted to Skouras that the British had a plan which would lead to eventual self-determination. This referred to the British proposals which were submitted to the Secretary on June 19th. [2] Skouras said that later these plans had appeared in the British press and that there had been a strong Turkish reaction against them. Next Mr. Skouras saw Prime Minister Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Averoff in Athens on about July 5th. He gathered from them that the Greek Government felt heavily burdened by the Cyprus question and was looking for any reasonable solution which would permit them to save face and not be weighed down with this problem. Finally he saw Mr. Koraltan, President of the Turkish Parliament. He explained to Mr. Koraltan the Greek proposals as contained in Athens Embassy Despatch No. 66. [3] He said that Mr. Koraltan was interested. Mr. Skouras was

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/19–1056. Secret. Drafted by Wood on September 11.

[2] See Documents 178 and 179.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 5, Document 191.

unable to see Prime Minister Menderes or President Bayar and admitted that the Turkish attitude was extremely stiff. He attempted to show them that good relations between Greece and Turkey were infinitely more important than the Cyprus question and urged that the Greeks and Turks should try to work this problem out between them. This suggestion does not appear to have been taken up.

The second point in Mr. Skouras' discussion was that as a result of his trip he had become convinced that the only way in which the Cyprus question could be solved would be to give the island Commonwealth status. He realized that HMG felt Cyprus was too small to be a Commonwealth, but he felt this consideration should not be conclusive. He pointed out that if Cyprus were given Commonwealth status within the British Commonwealth of Nations Turkey could not reasonably object and he was sure that the Greek Government would accept. He also claimed that the Cypriots would accept. He said this latter belief was based on what Prime Minister Karamanlis had told him. It was pointed out to Mr. Skouras that if Cyprus were to be given Commonwealth status it would have the right to leave the Commonwealth and that in effect this might be the same as eventual enosis.

Mr. Skouras said that he would submit a full report to the Secretary later. [4]

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[4] In a letter to Dulles, September 14, Skouras forwarded a report on his activities and noted that a similar report had been submitted to the President. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1456)

197. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 26, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

British Request for Information regarding United States Position on Cyprus in the General Assembly

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Miss Barbara Salt, Counselor, British Embassy
The Secretary
Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, EUR
Mr. Chalmers B. Wood, GTI

Sir Roger said HMG remained anxious to avoid a Cyprus debate in the General Assembly. It was avoided last year mainly due to the decisive assistance which HMG received from the United States. Now the question had again been inscribed by Greece and there was considerable risk that there would be a damaging debate. However, if the United States were able to give HMG the same support as last year, it might be possible to avoid a debate. On the other hand, if this was not to be the US position, the debate might result in a diplomatic defeat for HMG. To avoid this HMG might put an item of its own on the Agenda to show Greece's role in the Cyprus question. HMG had not yet decided but, if it were to inscribe such an item, it would have to do so by October 12 and would have to make its decision about ten days before October 12. Sir Roger realized this was difficult for the United States, but it was important for HMG to know since the American attitude would be decisive.

The Secretary pointed out that there had been a big change in the composition of the General Assembly which would probably result in increased support for Greece. Miss Salt agreed, although HMG had not analyzed the situation in detail. The Secretary asked if the Department had analyzed the question of our ability to prevent inscription and was told this had not been done. He pointed out to Sir Roger that the item could be submitted after October 12 as a matter of urgency and emphasized that this had been done a good many times before. Miss Salt replied HMG was thinking in terms of an indictment of the Greek Government for inciting violence on Cyprus by Athens Radio and by other means, which had occurred over a long period. It would thus be difficult to maintain that an emergency had arisen after October 12. The Secretary asked if the item could not be inscribed now in general terms. Miss Salt

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Wood.

replied that, in view of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter [Intervention in Matter of Essentially Domestic Jurisdiction], [2] it would have to be aimed specifically at Greece.

The Secretary said he could not now say what our position would be. Generally, our basic view on inscription was pretty liberal and last year's decision to oppose inscription had been difficult; also, there was the practical question of how many members of the General Assembly could be persuaded. He said the Department would analyze the situation in terms of the chances of keeping the question off the Agenda. Sir Roger asked if he could receive an answer in a week or so. The Secretary said within a week he could probably go over with him our analysis of the situation as compared with that of the Foreign Office. . . . There might possibly be some developments in the solution of the question itself. . . . [3]

. . . . . .

[2] Brackets in the source text.

[3] On October 2, an addendum to this memorandum was prepared by Wood. It reads:

"The Secretary concluded to Sir Roger that it also would not seem to be wise to campaign actively against the inscription of the Cyprus question unless there was a good chance of success since an unsuccessful effort would deplete any reserve of good will with other nations without compensating advantage." (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

198. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, September 26, 1956—8 p.m.

1692. Paris for Dillon and Perkins only. Athens and Ankara principal officers only. Barbour and Holmes met yesterday evening with Lloyd, Lennox-Boyd, Nutting, Kirkpatrick, Peake (British Ambassador to Greece) and Young (Head Southern Department). Agreed cover was call on Nutting to discuss NATO affairs.

Holmes briefly explained mission and then raised question of whether in light of Suez situation, Her Majesty's Government anxious for early solution of Cyprus or whether it was considered in British interest to hold line on island and proceed in unhurried

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.154/9–2656. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Athens, and Ankara.

manner with Radcliffe constitution. There was no direct answer to this question, which probably indicates that relation Cyprus and Suez had not been thought through.

Lloyd mentioned British query to Department concerning our attitude inscription of Cyprus item by Greece on provisional agenda General Assembly. It was explained that one objective our suggested informal examination of situation was to determine U.S. position in U.N. Speaking direct to Lloyd, Nutting said he thought it essential that British complaint against Greece should be inscribed before final date of provisional agenda October 12. Lloyd and Lennox-Boyd seemed to agree and although British may delay until near deadline, there seems no doubt they will submit their complaint. They feel their case against Greece is a strong one and that there is a possibility that its inscription may result in a negotiated removal of it and the Greek item or the postponement of both to the tail end of the agenda.

Lennox-Boyd reported that Radcliffe had departed for Cyprus and would return in about a week. He expected that within 4 or 5 weeks from now Radcliffe would submit his draft constitution to Her Majesty's Government. If the government approved the draft, he was willing to show it to the Greek Government before promulgation. In response to questions, he stated that personally he would be willing to accept Greek comments, and if there was real evidence of good faith by Greece, he would be willing to allow non-substantive changes if by so doing Greece's ability to influence the Ethnarchy would be strengthened. Although he could not predict what Radcliffe's recommendations would be, he felt certain that his draft constitution would be a truly liberal one.

Lennox-Boyd then volunteered his position with respect to Makarios: it was never intended that the exile would be permanent; if the Archbishop would denounce terrorism now and for the future, he would be allowed to return to Cyprus, but only after the new constitution was in force and working; if even after constitution in force and working, he still failed to denounce terrorism he would nevertheless be released, free to go where he chose, except he would be barred from Cyprus.

The Colonial Secretary then said he saw some possibility of a settlement if Greece would completely separate self-government and self-determination, settling now for the former, and if Turks could be convinced that self-government was not an open door to self-determination and that minority really protected.

Holmes pointed out that from what Karamanlis and Averoff have told our representatives in Athens, the appeal to the U.S. to mediate remarks by Averoff to Committee of 3 in Paris and to Senator George and him, it was our opinion that Greek Government

is very anxious for settlement, fears its political position and feels that when circumstances right it can influence Cypriots. Peake opinioned that Karamanlis is in no great danger of being ousted and that talk of losing power and painting black picture of what might succeed him was designed to "make our flesh creep". No one expressed agreement with this view.

There then followed general discussion of how Greek sincerity and influence with Cypriots might be tested. Kirkpatrick suggested that they might be asked to send word secretly to Bishop of Kitium that leading Cypriots respond to Radcliffe's invitation to consult on constitution.

The meeting lasted an hour and of course there was much more general conversation of the complex subject under discussion. It ended with Lloyd saying that they would discuss the matter, think it over and communicate with us as soon as possible.

The meeting was cordial, serious and our desire to be helpful was clearly appreciated. [2]

Aldrich

[2] In telegram 1254, October 5, for Holmes and principal officers only, the Department made a number of comments on telegram 1692 that were intended for possible use in discussions with the British. Among its comments, the Department noted that if the United Kingdom was determined to inscribe the item regarding Greece's intervention in the Cyprus problem, it might be best to make the item of a general character without naming Greece. With respect to Makarios, the Department added, any proposals must be ultimately acceptable to the Greek Cypriots whose representatives insist that there can be no progress without the Archbishop. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/9–2656)

199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, September 29, 1956—5:48 p.m.

2340. For Holmes and principal officers only.

Holmes may make following points to HMG re Cyprus in manner he considers most suitable:

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/9–2956. Top Secret; Priority. Limited distribution. Drafted by Wood and Williams. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia and pouched to USUN.

1. Secretary has informed Holmes Makins démarche September 26 (Deptel [2] this subject). He authorizes Holmes carry on discussions this topic in order avoid risks misunderstanding and delay which might result from simultaneous talks in Washington and London.

2. HMG has inquired whether US would again undertake lobby actively against inscription Cyprus by GOG. As HMG aware campaign against Greek inscription would be contrary our policy not opposing our allies when they wish raise subject in UN which they consider important. Last year we reluctantly decided oppose GOG at last moment on grounds quiet diplomacy could be more fruitful than heated public debate. After fourteen months we would probably not be able use this argument effectively unless quiet diplomacy had led to real hope successful steps would be taken on Cyprus towards implementing "basic right of peoples to governments of their own choice." (Quote from Washington Declaration of February 1, 1956. [3])

3. Furthermore if we should nevertheless decide oppose inscription, we do not believe such argument would be as convincing as last year and are not inclined to adopt it without real possibility success. Vote last year 28 against inscription, 22 for, 10 abstentions. As HMG has indicated we may have been able to influence the few votes needed for this majority, but since our argument will have been weakened by time and since composition of General Assembly has been considerably changed, we do not believe we could attain same result if attempted. Our preliminary analysis shows that if vote were as favorable as possible from UK viewpoint it would go against UK by narrow margin. Would appreciate British assessment. More on this later.

4. However unless we decide make such attempt, which would be both contrary to our principles and not likely to succeed, we understand HMG may decide submit item to show GOG violated Article 2(7). [4] While understanding HMG's desire avoid what Makins described as "diplomatic defeat" in General Assembly, we must point out that British decision indict Greeks in UNGA might delay still longer solution HMG is seeking in Cyprus question. Whatever else might result, it is our belief that such a move would so harden attitude of GOG and Greek Cypriots that any progress would be impossible for indefinite future.

5. It is US view that there are many possibilities between extremes outlined above. Main factors for success some intermediary course would appear to be time and determination. For present we request understanding HMG will not submit item against Greece

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[2] Telegram 1152 to Athens, September 28, repeated to London as telegram 2321, transmitted the highlights of Dulles' conversation with Makins on September 26. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/9–2856)

[3] For text of the Declaration of Washington issued by Eden and Eisenhower in Washington, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 13, 1956, pp. 231–232.

[4] Article 2, subparagraph 7 of the U.N. Charter reads: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." For text of the Charter, see 59 Stat. 1037.

until latest moment since it could be inscribed as "important and urgent" question even during session.

6. Delay will provide time for Holmes proceed with mission and determine what possibilities exist for solution acceptable to Greeks, Turks, Cypriots and British. He may find grounds to justify UK-Greek agreement to defer or at least remove sting from UNGA debate.

FYI 1. Department will send comments on your 1692, [5] but for present consider most urgent problem is to obtain from British more time for your mission.

2. On September 11 Greek UN Rep submitted item re "violations of human rights set forth in the UN Charter." This likely be Greek move permitting them to attack British re Cyprus indirectly should their motion for inscription Cyprus item be defeated. It adds to importance of seeking obtain some understanding between British and Greeks before UNGA meets. End FYI. [6]

Dulles

[5] *Supra.*

[6] In telegram 1776, October 1, the Embassy at London reported that Barbour and Holmes met with Nutting to discuss the points raised in this telegram. Nutting noted that the United Kingdom was agreeable to the Holmes mission as long as discussions were confined to self-government on the basis of a liberal constitution with the issue of self-determination "indefinitely postponed" although the principle itself reaffirmed. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/10–156)

200. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, October 5, 1956—2 p.m.

1158. Paris for Dillon and Perkins; London, Ankara and Nicosia for principal officers only. Holmes and I spent 3½ hours with Karamanlis today going over Cyprus question. In morning session, which had to be broken off so that Prime Minister could attend memorial services marking first anniversary of death Papagos, Karamanlis gave strongly subjective and sometimes vehement account Greek side of question. Though he made clear his distrust of British, he readily recognized their vital interests deeply involved and ex-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/10–556. Top Secret; Priority. Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, and Nicosia. Holmes arrived in Athens on October 2.

pressed opinion that important to West in general and Greece in particular that they remain strong in this part of world. He was most appreciative of US interest and efforts and fully understood significance Holmes mission and need for his viewpoint as well as other parties to maintain strictest secrecy. In more relaxed evening session he indicated increased confidence his own political position.

Though atmosphere and substance of Karamanlis' conversations somewhat different from talk with Averoff yesterday (latter engaged in no histrionics, took softer line on implementation self-determination principle, felt amnesty could be worked out along lines recent Harding proposals, and stressed efforts he making to influence Cypriot opinion in order prepare it for settlement short of self-determination), discrepancies not important as obviously deep desire of both for settlement of Cypriot issue.

From conversations to date Greek position on Cyprus problem emerges as follows:

1. *Immediate introduction of self-government based on majority principle.*

Greeks appear to have intimation that Radcliffe constitution will be liberal and are principally concerned with need that they be shown document in advance of publication in order make use this fact to strengthen their position with Greek public opinion, with Makarios, and with the Cypriots. They flatly state they will be willing to agree to any safeguards for Turkish minority. They accept without question reservation Defense and Foreign Affairs powers to British and recognize necessity for British continue have jurisdiction over internal security but would like understanding that after a stated period (three years was suggested) discussions take place between HMG and Cypriot Government for gradual turn-over of police power to Cypriots with British to retain indefinitely right to intervene in event emergency.

. . . . . .

3. *Amnesty*

Though Averoff critical of Harding's recent "surrender terms" he agreed that in connection broad political settlement similar arrangement might be acceptable if stated in somewhat different terms. He felt those affected would rather come to Greece as national heroes than remain in Cyprus and be tried for murder. He insisted that apart from Grivas very few Greeks were involved EOKA. Karamanlis' attitude on amnesty was to emphasize that along with inauguration full self-government amnesty essential to stop fighting. Asked about Harding terms, he replied that best solution would be simple blanket amnesty for all concerned. He indicated willingness, however, give further consideration matter which he

recognized not as simple as he put it and expressed confidence amnesty solution could be reached if British really well disposed and anxious for settlement.

4. *Makarios*

Karamanlis and Averoff both believed it virtually impossible bring Cypriots to accept settlement without some form of blessing by Makarios. . . . Karamanlis quite clear, however, on readiness (even eagerness) Greek Government send emissary to Seychelles posthaste if grounds of agreement found between British and Greeks and to authorize emissary to pursue strong pressure tactics on Makarios. . . .

In conversations Greeks showed no apparent awareness of British intention to inscribe complaint against them in UNGA. They fully cognizant, however, that in UNGA debate British will attack them vigorously and would like to avoid it if at all possible. Unless solution can be found within next two or three weeks, however, Greek Government feels impelled press for inscription on final UNGA agenda.

While not admitting Turkish right to have determining voice in Cyprus matter, Karamanlis fully understood Turks have to be taken into account and expressed desire improve Greek-Turkish relations. He felt that if substantial Anglo-Greek agreement achieved, Turks would make necessary adjustments in their position.

At end second session with Karamanlis, Averoff joined us and there was brief discussion of tactics and procedures. Greeks stressed need to avoid unilateral announcement by British of any settlement and strongly advocated simultaneous announcements in both capitals. They again placed great weight on need for consultation concerning Radcliffe constitution.

Just prior Averoff's entry on scene, Holmes, bearing in mind need bring Averoff's helpful influence to bear, had obtained Prime Minister's consent to procedure under which we would draw up brief summary of Greek Government position (with view of showing it to British) and to going over this paper first with Foreign Minister. Objective this procedure to reconcile differences between positions of two Ministers and to obtain a clear and agreed statement of Greek position without asking for formal commitments this time. Text paper will be cabled Washington when it takes final form after it has been reviewed by Averoff and a probable last going over with Karamanlis.

Holmes believes that in light discussions here it would now be more productive to return to London before proceeding Ankara unless Department has contrary view. Should be able complete work here today and to fly London this weekend.

Reference: Department's 751 to Ankara,[2] Holmes recommends that Embassy Ankara start preparing Turks along lines suggested therein without, of course, making reference Dr. Holmes visit. Both Holmes and this Embassy appreciate need avoid appearance presenting Turks with fait accompli although if it is found possible to achieve broad agreement between London and Athens, this should strengthen Holmes hand with Turks.[3]

Thurston

[2] Telegram 751, October 3, noted that the Department was concerned over the "increasing vociferousness of the Turkish attitude on Cyprus" and indicated that it was still the U.S. view that Turkey must be prepared to modify gradually its position. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10–156)

[3] In telegram 1271, October 6, the Department concurred that, Holmes should return to London before proceeding to Ankara. (*Ibid.*, 120.1540/10–556)

201. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary's Office, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, October 7, 1956, 7:30 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

US Side:

The Secretary
Ambassador Lodge
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Tyler

UK Side:

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Coulson, British Embassy
Two Other Advisers

Mr. Lloyd said that although it had been possible to defeat inscription of the Cyprus item last year, he thought that this year would probably not be possible.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.001/10–756. Secret. Drafted by Tyler. Dulles and Lloyd were in New York to attend a Security Council meeting on the Suez Canal situation.

The Secretary agreed and said that it looked as though that would be the case. Mr. Lloyd said that if the battle for inscription were lost this would hamper the prospects for peace. Therefore, the UK intended to put forward a counter-item, which would be directed against the Greek broadcasts and Greek help to terrorists. He said that while the UK did not want "a public wrangle" on the subject, he hoped that each item would cancel the other out and that this would discourage the Greek Government from pressing its item. The title of the item the UK had in mind was "Support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus".

Ambassador Lodge questioned this title which suggested that the Greek Government was being indicted.

The Secretary suggested something like "Support from *Greeks* of terrorist activities in Cyprus". He said that the US is satisfied that the present Karamanlis government is sick to death of the Cyprus business. At the same time it is subject to pressure by Greek public opinion. He did not exclude the possibility that something might be worked out between now and the time at which the General Assembly convened which might lead to a settlement. But if an item were inscribed under an inflammatory title it would place the Greek Government in a position vis-à-vis Greek public opinion where the Greek Government would have no freedom of action. He, therefore, hoped that the UK would find a title which would not inflame them. He understood the reasons why the UK might feel compelled to put forward a counter-item but suggested that if they had to do so it might be something like "Support from without Greece of illegal activities within Cyprus".

Mr. Lloyd questioned whether the US was psychologically right in its estimate of the situation. He thought that perhaps the prospects for a settlement would be improved if we seemed prepared "to beat Greeks over the head".

The Secretary repeated that it was our view that the present Greek Government is sick of the whole Cyprus business and was groping desperately to find a way to settle matters. . . . He questioned the advisability of publicly appearing to challenge a government's integrity and honor.

Mr. Lloyd said he was inclined to agree and suggested another variant: "Support from overseas of terrorism in Cyprus". This, he said, would not be provocative and would leave the Greeks concerned about what might be said. After a little further discussion with his advisors, Mr. Lloyd said he would suggest to London the formula: "External support for terrorism in Cyprus". He added that he would see what support he could get for the above title from London.

202. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, October 7, 1956—1 p.m.

1181. Paris for Dillon and Perkins. London, Ankara and Nicosia for principal officers only. Device of putting down on paper our understanding of Greek position on Cyprus following talks reported Embtel 1158 [2] had interesting repercussions. . . . They endeavored to introduce language . . . and providing that within 8 years NAC would be definitely obligated to set date for plebiscite.

When it became clear from talk with Averoff yesterday that he was having difficulty in obtaining Prime Minister's approval of our initial draft, Holmes and I suggested joint meeting with both Karamanlis and Averoff which took place today and lasted more than 3 hours. As agreed, I took strong line at outset that Holmes here because of impression gained by Embassy in many meetings with Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister that only small differences existed between positions Greek and British Governments, and that Greek Government was fundamentally prepared to go ahead with self-government now and to postpone application of self-determination principle to indefinite future. If this was not, in fact, Greek position, then Holmes was wasting his time. Latter then stated that in his opinion British would not agree to any proposal which committed them definitely to hold plebiscite.

This approach had good effect, and session ended with Karamanlis dictating to Averoff statement of Greek position for Holmes to give British. . . . Upshot this procedure was Greek paper text of which being cabled next following message. [3] Holmes authorized transmit this to British; he also will convey orally following points:

1. Regardless outcome plebiscite UK military facilities to be guaranteed in perpetuity by Greece.
2. In event plebiscite results in enosis Greeks would agree to NATO control militarization island including presence Greek forces.
3. In event Greek emissary sent to Makarios would have authority exert strong pressure.
4. Greeks would exert their best efforts obtain Turkish concurrence.
5. In event enosis Greeks would accord generous economic privileges to Turkey and Britain.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/10–756. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, and Nicosia.

[2] Document 200.

[3] See footnote 2, *infra*.

In final go-round with Averoff late last night he was generally optimistic (conversation with Iksel reported Embtel 1178[4] had given him more hopeful attitude re Turkish position). However, he expressed personal belief that if agreement reached, political crisis would be inevitable. If election forced, he was confident Karamanlis would fight hard and succeed.

Holmes raised question whether anything could be done now by Greek Government to improve climate while negotiations proceeding. For example, if return Radcliffe were made occasion for favorable public utterance by British, could Greeks respond by sending their Ambassador to London? Averoff said he had been seeking opportunity do just that but with UNGA imminent it was very difficult for Greek Government to "break vicious circle". Public suspicion would be aroused that Greek position weakening. This would lead to internal political complications.

Meetings were discreetly held in private houses and Holmes' presence in Athens has not been noted.[5] There has been no inquiry from press and it has not been necessary to use NATO cover. Holmes flying London today.

Thurston

[4] Telegram 1178, October 6, reported that during a discussion between Iksel and Averoff, the latter indicated it might be possible to postpone the question of enosis for the future. Iksel noted that this might be a way to resolve the problem. (Department of State, Central Files, 601.8281/10–656)

[5] In telegram 810 from Ankara, October 11, the Embassy informed the Department that it was likely that the Turkish Foreign Office was well aware of Holmes' mission and of his recent travels and talks. The Embassy expressed its concern that the "recent procedure" had greatly reduced the likelihood of achieving a satisfactory formula regarding Cyprus at this time. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10–1156)

203. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State[1]

London, October 8, 1956—9 p.m.

1918. Principal officers only. Paris for Dillon and Perkins. Barbour and Holmes with Nutting and Kirkpatrick this afternoon. Holmes gave an account of his impression of the Greek attitude with

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/10–856. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia.

regard to the Cyprus question with special emphasis on the vulnerability of Karamanlis vis-à-vis opposition and public opinion, concluding with the statement that he was convinced that Greeks are genuinely anxious for settlement.

Holmes handed Nutting copy of Greek position which had been authorized by Karamanlis.[2] He then added the points which the Greeks had authorized him to convey orally (Athens nos. 1181[3] and 1182 to Department[4]).

There followed a general discussion consisting principally of comments that the three-year period was too short a time for self-government to begin to function properly, and paragraph 7 of the Greek paper which was considered as giving Makarios veto power over any Anglo-Greek agreement which might be reached. Holmes said that he thought it might be possible to obtain a longer period than three years from the Greeks if a counter proposal did not depart too radically from the basic formula on self-determination. He went on to say that he had told Averoff that he doubted that the British would accept the proposal concerning consultation with Makarios as set forth in paragraph 7. A discussion then followed as to the advisability of insisting with the Greeks that if an agreement is reached with them it will be applicable regardless of the final attitude of the Archbishop.

Holmes then told the British that he had been authorized by Averoff to say that Greeks felt it imperative to go ahead with the inscription of their item on the GA agenda, that Averoff had stated he thought they would be successful in obtaining inscription but that he would make a formal commitment that the Greeks would immediately move to place the item at the end of the agenda. Averoff pointed out that this would give 2 or 3 months during which a negotiated solution might be reached. Nutting said that the British had definitely decided that they had no alternative but to inscribe their complaints against the Greeks. Holmes suggested for British consideration that they inform the Greek Minister advance of their intention to inscribe, saying that they understood the Greeks would move to have their item placed at the end of the agenda and that if this were confirmed British would do likewise. Nutting appeared to be impressed by this suggestion.

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[2] The text of the Greek position was transmitted in telegram 1182 from Athens, October 7. Among the points enumerated in the Greek position were direct and unreserved recognition of the principle of self-determination, application of self-determination to be made by a three-fifths vote in the NAC or by the British Government and the elected government of Cyprus, and the granting of a liberal constitution. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10–756)

[3] *Supra*.

[4] See footnote 2 above.

There were several remarks made about the difficulty of the position which the Turks would likely take particularly on the formula on self-determination but nothing new emerged in this part of the discussion.

The general reception of the Greek terms was non-committal but was not negative. Nutting said that the matter would be considered by HMG and he would communicate with Embassy as soon as possible.[5] Department may care pass UN portion this message to New York.

Aldrich

[5] See *infra*.

204. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State[1]

London, October 25, 1956—7 p.m.

2280. Paris for Dillon and Perkins. Principal officers only. Barbour and Holmes met with Nutting, who was accompanied by Young this afternoon. Nutting was profuse in his apologies about delay, saying that he literally had not been able to get the appropriate ministers together to consider the Greek proposal. He also expressed regret that the reply was so negative in character.

He handed over a memorandum, the text of which is being transmitted in the next following telegram.[2] It was interesting to note that the copy handed Barbour had as a heading the following: "revised formula for reply to Mister Juliett Holmes", while the original did not bear this heading.

After reading the memorandum, Holmes observed that the 3-year period proposed by the Greeks, as compared with the 10-year period in HMG's proposals of last June, was obviously a starting point by the Greeks and was certainly susceptible of negotiation. He also took issue with the statement that the Greek proposal did not take into account British continuing interest in Cyprus and the

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–2556. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

[2] Telegram 2281, October 25, transmitted the text of the British rejection of the Greek proposals, which noted that the proposals did not "form a realistic basis for a settlement." (*Ibid.*)

eastern Mediterranean or of Turkish interests. Clarification was asked on these and other points in the text, but none was forthcoming. Nutting said at this point that the Greek proposals were also less favorable than the British plan of last June in that they did not contain the security pacts. Holmes observed that he had no reason to believe that the Greeks would not be willing to accept such pacts.

Both Barbour and Holmes tried repeatedly to get over the point that it might be worthwhile for the British to make a counterproposal which would be acceptable to them and which would be as nearly acceptable to the Turks as possible. These suggestions met with no response.

Nutting made a great deal of the known adamant attitude of the Turks, bringing out a memorandum of conversation between Lloyd and Birgi shortly after the conclusion of the last Suez conference in which Birgi recited the well-known Turkish opposition to any change in the status quo.

Nutting indicated that it was a substantially firm decision by HMG that they would go ahead with the Radcliffe constitution, saying that it was better to take one step at a time. He felt certain that the truly liberal constitution which would be developed would be unsatisfactory to the Turks and they expected a serious disagreement with them about it. In response to a question, Nutting said that Radcliffe would probably submit this report and draft constitution to the government within about 10 days time. Holmes then asked whether or not it was the intention of HMG to consult with the Greeks and Turks or at least to show them the constitution before its promulgation. Holmes suggested the possibility that prior consultation with the Greeks might win their support for the constitution, and through them it might even be possible to get Makarios' approval and hence contribute to the cessation of terrorism and the acceptance of the constitution by the Cyprus population. Nutting replied that no decision had been made on the question of consultation but gave it as his personal opinion that it would probably be better to promulgate the constitution unilaterally, possibly with showing the text to the Greeks and the Turks an hour in advance.

It was clear that the British have decided not to attempt a negotiated solution at the present time but on the contrary intend to proceed unilaterally. Presumably they believe that by the publication of a liberal constitution their public position will be improved.

There followed some discussion about the inscription of the Greek and British items on the agenda of the UN, and in response to a direct question, Nutting replied that although the Greeks had been notified in advance of the British intention to inscribe, there had been no understanding with them to postpone both items to the end of the UN Agenda. He said that although HMG had not yet decided

on the position it would take, he felt that it might prove to be advantageous to have the debate early in the General Assembly. To Holmes query as to whether or not this meant that the British had given up any hope of a negotiated settlement, Nutting replied that even if the debate occurred at the end of the session, the time available would be only 3 months and he doubted that there was any chance of getting a settlement in that period of time.

We believe that the attitude described above is a part of the current British mood of self-assertion in anything having to do with the Middle East. As has been shown in the Suez matter, they have taken the position of "thus far and no farther". All arguments tending to show the advantages of an agreed settlement met with no success.

Nutting asked Holmes whether or not he intended to go to Ankara for talks with the Turks. Holmes replied that he was not inclined to discuss the Greek proposals with the Turks in the light of the flat British rejection of them. He felt that it might be worthwhile to make a general sounding of the Turkish position, that he would decide about this later and let Nutting know whether or not he intended to go to Ankara.

Holmes feels that it would nevertheless be desirable to discuss these developments generally with Turks. If any appreciable give in Turkish attitude should be forthcoming, we would be justified in going back at British in view of importance for British position they have represented as attaching to Turkish adamancy. Another reason for doing this is the fact that according to report from Embassy Ankara, Birgi has a good idea of Holmes omission and it not be in US interests to fail to consult with the third principal party to the Cyprus controversy. Unless instructed by the Department to the contrary, Holmes will proceed to Ankara on Sunday.[3]

We feel that some statements should be made immediately to the Greeks with regard to the reception of their proposal in London, and suggest that if Department agrees instruction be sent to Allen to tell the Greek Government that the British have not found the Greek position acceptable, that one of the important considerations in reaching this attitude was British conviction that the Turks would find them wholly unacceptable, and that Holmes is going to Ankara

[3] October 28.

to have a general discussion of the problem with the Turkish Government.[4]

Aldrich

[4] On October 26, the Department informed the Embassies at London and Athens as follows:

"To London: Approve suggestion penultimate paragraph Section 2 reftel. Department envisages Holmes returning to London for further attempt persuade HMG reconsider. May wish stop Athens en route Ankara to London for exploration with GOG British objections re time period and Turk interests.

"To Athens: Approve suggestion last paragraph Section 2 reftel." (Telegram 1498 to Athens, October 26; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–2556)

Subsequently the Embassy at Athens informed the Department that Karamanlis and Averoff were both in Salonkia until October 30 and suggested that Holmes proceed to Ankara. In telegram 939 from Ankara, October 30, Warren informed the Department that Menderes would not be able to meet with Holmes before November 1. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10–3056)

205. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State[1]

Ankara, November 3, 1956—8 p.m.

1002. Principal officers only; Paris for Dillon and Perkins. Holmes and I had an hour's conversation alone with Prime Minister evening of second.

Holmes explained mission and Menderes response was immediate and cordial, saying that it was understandable that the "head of the family should take the initiative in settling a family row". He went on to say that Turkey was anxious to bring the Cyprus dispute to a successful conclusion and, although Turkey's interests in the problem were vital and that the issue had become one of first importance in terms of internal politics, Turkey, nevertheless, was prepared to do everything possible to contribute to a solution. Menderes confirmed reports from Athens that Hacopulos, a Greek member of the Turkish Parliament, was acting as go-between in an endeavor to get Prime Ministers of Turkey and Greece together in hopes of making progress on Cyprus and improving relations in general. He said that Hacopulos was in Ankara and was to depart November 3 for Athens to transmit agreement for meeting. Prime

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–356. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, and Nicosia.

Minister said that it would not be possible for him and Karamanlis to meet without publicity but that arrangements would probably be made for Etem Menderes, Acting Foreign Minister, to meet Averoff, possibly some place in Europe on latter's return from UNGA. He went on to say that it might later be decided for Etem Menderes to attend GA, in which case he and Averoff would have ample opportunity for discussion in New York. Prime Minister intimated that this exchange with Greeks was on Turkish initiative and pointed to this fact as evidence Turkish desires to improve situation.

Holmes outlined his personal opinion as to present Greek and British attitudes, saying that he was convinced that Greeks were very anxious to dispose of Cyprus matter and prepared to accept any reasonable formula which Karamanlis could justify with Greek public opinion. He pointed out that the British were proceeding with Radcliffe constitution and that in his view UK would inevitably be obliged institute self-government Cyprus as soon as local conditions would permit. He offered purely personal suggestion that delay in coming to grips with the problem would benefit no one and that it might be advantageous to assist the present British Government in setting a pattern of self-government, particularly in the light of the public commitment of the British Labor Party to self-determination and the possibility, at least, that should Labor come to power a solution favorable to Turkey might be more difficult of attainment than with the present Conservative government. Menderes attitude was extremely friendly, including repeated assurances of the importance to Turkey of the NATO alliance and particularly the relationship with the US. He said he would discuss our conversation with the President and his colleagues, and see us again November 3.

Holmes and I were called to the Foreign Office at noon today and had an hour and a half with Acting Foreign Minister Etem Menderes and Birgi. Much of the conversation of the evening before was repeated with Birgi acting as interpreter. Holmes went a little further in offering as his own purely exploratory idea of a possible formula which would consist of the UK consulting both Greece and Turkey with regard to the Radcliffe constitution and giving both these governments an opportunity to comment. The purpose of this consultation would be to permit Turkey and Greece to approve the constitution. This would perhaps enable the Greek Government, having once agreed, to persuade Makarios to support the self-government plan and to call on the Greek Cypriots for a cessation of violence. The British Government would make a public statement reaffirming the applicability of self-determination to Cyprus but saying that circumstances do not permit its application now; that the problem must be approached in a gradual and orderly manner and the first step would be self-government; that after self-government

had proved a success and when political and strategic conditions in eastern Mediterranean permitted, HMG would address itself to the problem of self-determination. This formula would have the virtue of postponing the question of self-determination to the indefinite future but would set the pattern for a period during which self-government could be developed, peace would reign on the island, and an opportunity would be had for a reestablishment of friendly relations between Greece and Turkey and between the UK and Greece.

Preceded by a long explanation of the background of Greek behavior and the deterioration of Greco-Turkish relations, wherein all the blame attached to Greece, Etem Menderes said that in his view such a formula would not be accepted by Turkish public opinion as it would be construed only as a corridor leading to Enosis.

. . . . . .

After more general discussion, Holmes asked Menderes whether or not he agreed that the Cyprus problems should not be allowed to run on and that steps should be taken forthwith to finding a settlement. To this he agreed, which is at least a step away from rigid position of no change in the status quo which the Turks have taken up to now. The Prime Minister's attitude was more conciliatory and forthcoming than the Foreign Minister's position today. Whether this balance was introduced by design, it is difficult to say. It may be significant that Birgi was not present at the conversation with Prime Minister but was present with the Foreign Minister. It should be noted that in this last discussion, Birgi acted as interpreter and made little or no contribution of his own to the discussion.

The interview ended with an invitation from the Foreign Minister for Holmes and me to dine with him and Birgi privately evening of November 4. He expressed hope that the Prime Minister could join us. I shall do what I can to encourage the Prime Minister's

attendance as we believe the meeting will be more productive if he is there. [2]

Warren

[2] In telegram 1015 from Ankara, November 5, Warren reported the substance of a November 4 meeting among Holmes, Acting Foreign Minister Etem Menderes, and Birgi. At the meeting the Turks expressed a willingness to arrange a meeting between Averoff and Etem Menderes in Europe after the Greek Foreign Minister's return from the General Assembly. Warren noted: "Our assessment of the Turkish attitude as presented last night is that there is definite move away from the rigidity heretofore expressed. We believe that direct US interest in this matter has influenced them to be somewhat more forthcoming in working toward settlement." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/11–556)

In telegram 1027, November 6, the Embassy at Ankara reported that Holmes left for Athens that morning. (*Ibid.*, 120.1540/11–656) That evening Holmes met with Averoff to convey his impressions of his talks with the Turks. According to Ambassador Allen, Holmes informed the Greek Foreign Minister of the genuine Turkish desire to effect a settlement of the Cyprus problem. Averoff reportedly agreed and added that arrangements had been made for him to meet with Etem Menderes in Paris. (Telegram 1632, from Athens, November 7; *ibid.*, 120.1540/11–756)

206. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, November 13, 1956—5 p.m.

2664. Paris for Dillon and Perkins. Principal officers only. Barbour and Holmes met with Kirkpatrick today for discussion of Cyprus matter.

Holmes described his conversation with Turks and Greeks, particularly former, reporting that although their basic position concerning their contention that any form of self-government was a "corridor to Enosis" had not really changed, he found a less intransigent attitude than they had previously displayed. He told Kirkpatrick of the arrangement for a secret meeting between Etem Menderes and Averoff in Paris on the latter's return from the UNGA. Kirkpatrick said that about a week ago the Turkish Ambassador had informed him of this arrangement and had made a formal request on behalf of his government that the British not publish the Radcliffe report until after the Greeco-Turkish meeting takes place. Kirkpatrick had referred this request to Ministers but as yet it had not been considered. When asked concerning HMG's intentions

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–1356. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia.

regarding publication Radcliffe report, Kirkpatrick replied that it had not yet been considered by Cabinet and no decision has as yet been made. Upon further questioning, he said that it had not been decided whether or not the Greeks and Turks would be consulted on the constitution prior to publication. Barbour and Holmes both urged that this be done. Holmes asked Kirkpatrick whether or not he was right in assuming that in fact HMG had not put its mind to the Cyprus problem. Kirkpatrick replied that this was so, but added that he felt that they mean do so without further delay.

Kirkpatrick said that he felt that HMG would not be inclined toward partition as a solution, or in any event would much prefer self-government. He then asked Holmes whether or not in his opinion the Turks could be brought to approve of self-government with the question of self-determination left for the very indefinite future. Holmes reply was that although it would be difficult to obtain Turkish concurrence, he felt that it was very much worth trying and that if other circumstances were right, strong representations from the United States and United Kingdom might bring the Turks around. Kirkpatrick said that he suspected that the Turks hoped to make some progress in the secret meeting with the Greeks and then proceed to partition as a solution. He agreed with Holmes that it would be useful to get Greeks and Turks talking, and that even consideration of partition as a possible solution might tend to move them both from their present positions.

Kirkpatrick said that as far as he knew HMG had not decided on its tactics in the GA and presumed that this would be decided by Lloyd on the spot. Although he personally favored adjournment of both the Greek and British items to the end of the agenda, he was not sure that the British delegation would act to bring this about. He pointed out that the memorandum which was tabled by the British delegation yesterday was one of explanation required by United Nations procedure, and that it should not be construed as British intention to force an early substantive debate on Cyprus.

We believe that it is clear that the negative attitude expressed by Nutting and reported in London's 2280 to Department [2] is explained by the fact that the British decision to intervene in Egypt had at that time been made. Although Nutting may not have been

[2] Document 204.

privy to the decision, the Cabinet had clearly decided not to touch the Cyprus question at that time.

. . . . . .

Holmes feels that there is nothing more for him to do until (1) the British have decided what they are to do regarding the Radcliffe report, (2) until the Averoff–Menderes meeting takes place, and (3) until the Cyprus position in the United Nations is more clear. He therefore feels that he should return to Washington to report to Department and unless instructed to the contrary will leave London Wednesday evening. [3]

Aldrich

[3] November 14.

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207. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) [1]

Washington, November 13, 1956.

DEAR CABOT: As you know, the problem of Cyprus has been under intensive discussion in diplomatic channels, and I thought it would be useful to review briefly what has been happening before the Assembly convenes.

If present plans materialize, Prime Minister Karamanlis of Greece should arrive in New York on November 10 [2] for the opening of the Assembly's regular session. Foreign Minister Averoff arrived on the eighth. Karamanlis originally planned to remain until about November 19. He is very anxious, however, to call on the President while here and will stay on after the 19th if necessary to suit the President's schedule. The Department hopes that the President will be able to see him and has sent a memorandum to the White House requesting an appointment.

One of the reasons for Karamanlis' decision to head his delegation is to strengthen himself at home by enhancing his prestige

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–1356. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Laingen on November 9.

[2] Apparently no change was made here in the language drafted on November 9.

internationally. He will undoubtedly make a speech during the general debate. He evidently is confident that the Greek request for inscription of the Cyprus question will succeed, and he therefore intends to follow a moderate course here. He apparently thinks that British policy in the Middle East area is so unpopular that he can safely demonstrate restraint in his public pronouncements at the UN with respect to Cyprus and still be sure of sufficient support for inscription. He also will probably want to make some general statements on the world situation . . . . Further, the Greek Government, which refrained from participating in the Suez conferences, now has informed us that it will support our efforts to seek a peaceful settlement through the UN. The Greeks are interested in sending a contingent to the international police force.

If these are Karamanlis' intentions, you will probably wish to encourage him. The Department has already suggested to Ambassador Allen in Athens that Karamanlis be urged to follow a moderate course in his statements at New York. (Deptel 1643 to Athens, repeated info to USUN.)[3]

If we can get this sort of restraint from Karamanlis, and from British and Turkish delegates as well, it should help a great deal, both to get the delay we are hoping for in substantive debate on Cyprus until late in the session and also to help in bringing about some progress in the interim toward a settlement of the Cyprus question through other channels. You are acquainted with our recent efforts. Surprisingly there has been very little leakage. We think things are going fairly well, in spite of the setback caused by British rejection of proposals advanced privately through us by the Greek Government. We do not know what the effects of the recent Middle East developments[4] will be on the British position, but Karamanlis has indicated much discouragement to Ambassador Allen over their present attitude.

On the other hand, there are grounds for optimism in indications from both Greek and Turkish leaders that they are increasingly aware of the fact that a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question is dependent in large part on direct Greek-Turk contacts and improved relations between them. I refer particularly to Athens 1632 and Ankara 1015.[5] Previously the Greeks have tried to ignore the Turks and pretend that a solution depended entirely on the British. Ambassador Allen has reported that he has made progress with both Averoff and Karamanlis in convincing them of the need for such

[3] Dated November 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–2956)

[4] Presumably a reference to the October 29 Israeli attack in Sinai and resulting British and French military operations against Egypt.

[5] Neither printed, but see footnote 2, Document 205.

direct contacts. (Athens 1526 [6]) He hopes that we will continue the process of so convincing Karamanlis and Averoff while they are in the United States. We certainly subscribe to this suggestion, and hope there may be occasion for such talks during the Assembly session.

Karamanlis also wants to talk about general economic aid problems and has asked if appropriate Washington officials might come to New York to discuss this subject. (Athens Telegram 1649 [7]) If he raises this with you, you might indicate that this is being arranged.

Sincerely yours,

Francis O. Wilcox [8]

[6] Dated November 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–256)
[7] Dated November 8. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/11–856)
[8] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

208. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 15, 1956, 10:30–11:10 a.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Constantine Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece
George V. Melas, Greek Ambassador
Phedon Cavalierato, Counselor, Greek Embassy
Robert Murphy, G
William M. Rountree, NEA
C. Burke Elbrick, EUR
Walter N. Walmsley, IO
Ernest A. Lister, BNA
Owen T. Jones, GTI
Murat W. Williams, GTI
Chalmers B. Wood, GTI

The Prime Minister emphasized the justice and moderation of the Greek position. "Everybody knows we are right, but by talking about it we give people a headache." He had held to a moderate course and done nothing "to hurt a solution" for fourteen months.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–1556. Confidential. Drafted by Wood. Karamanlis arrived in New York on November 10 to head the Greek Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Time was running out. He asked if Mr. Murphy had any suggestions.

Mr. Murphy said we were not in a position to offer a solution, but we felt talks between Greece and Turkey were important.

The Prime Minister avoided this and cited as an example of Greek reasonableness their willingness to let NATO decide on the nature of guarantees for bases and minorities on Cyprus. This could be done by NATO two, three or four years after self-government was established. At this time the question of how and when to hold a plebiscite could also be decided. In reply to a question he said he did not intend to discuss Cyprus at the NATO Council Meeting in December.

He cited the British deportation of Makarios a week after his election and said, "this was the work of our allies."

Mr. Murphy agreed that this had been hard on the Greek Government and said the US supported the idea that people are entitled to their own government. It was a question of procedure.

The Prime Minister mentioned that after the use of Cyprus as a base for operations against Egypt, the question of using Cyprus as a base has become more difficult for Greece.

As to the UN, he expected the debate would not take place until after Christmas. If there was no substantial improvement by then, Greece would have to fight in the UN. He raised the question of US support for Greece in the UN and suggested that the US inform the British that a settlement was definitely possible and that if the UK did not move quickly towards such a settlement, the US would have to oppose the British in the UN.

Mr. Murphy said we questioned the value of an acrimonious public debate, which would be exploited by the Soviets. We understood the factors involved and would support every effort to reach a settlement.

The Prime Minister said that if the British wanted a solution, they would start by releasing Makarios.

Mr. Murphy replied that events in the Middle East had not lightened the British load.

The Prime Minister said that Makarios had sufficient prestige to lead the Cypriots in any decision he made. It would be difficult for the Greek Government to find a solution without him. If the British wanted to prove their good faith to the Americans and to the world, they could begin with such a gesture. It would improve the situation by fifty percent.

Mr. Murphy said, "We may explore this with our friends."

Mr. Karamanlis said he would continue to do his best, but did not know how long he could stand. The day before (November 14) in the Steering Committee he had given orders to avoid debate

although if he had fought, it would have been very popular in Greece. The Cyprus situation was becoming more serious the longer it remained unsettled. Time was important.

In conclusion Mr. Murphy replied, "Your approach shows you are exercising great statesmanship. We have nothing to gain by the prolongation of this unhappy crisis between our three friends. Time is important and although the overall situation is not favorable for a settlement of the Cyprus situation, we will do our best."

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209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, November 15, 1956—8:05 p.m.

1102. Principal officer only. Embtel 1115. [2] Memorandum conversation October 24 sent Ankara recounts Rountree Gork conversation Cyprus. [3]

As Department indicated Deptels Ankara 901, 772 and 748, [4] inscription Greek British items re Cyprus anticipated. US position traditionally is not to oppose discussion question of interest several nations. In this specific case, US also recognized fact inscription practically assured. US opposition would produce nothing positive and reduce reservoir of goodwill for US on grounds we opposed discussion cardinal US principle right of self-determination. For these reasons it was decided at highest level support both Greek British items. Department hopes Turks as practical men will appreciate logic US position. (Department's conclusion inscription likely was borne out when General Committee by common consent November 14 recommended (1) combining Greek and British items as sub-items "Question of Cyprus" and (2) inscription on GA agenda. Sarper did

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–1556. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by John F. O'Grady of GTI. Repeated to Paris, London, and Athens and pouched to Nicosia.

[2] In telegram 1115, November 13, the Embassy at Ankara reported that the Turks were disturbed by reports that the United States might not oppose inscription of the Cyprus item on the agenda of the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly. The Embassy added that, in its view, inscription of the Cyprus item might endanger Greek-Turkish relations, interfere with the Holmes mission, and not serve Western interests. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/11–1356)

[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10–2456)

[4] Dated October 23, 5, and 3, respectively. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/10–2356, 747C.00/10–556, and 747C.00/10–356)

not oppose inclusion but expressed fear GA debate would worsen Greek-Turkish-UK relations, to which Turkey attached great importance.)

Dept continues hope debate on Cyprus items will be delayed until near end of session in order afford opportunity for some agreement be reached in interim. Department and embassies should advocate restraint with Greek Turk governments and express our hope all parties will endeavor reach early solution Cyprus problem.

Hoover

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210. Editorial Note

On November 14, in a briefing memorandum prepared for the President regarding the visit of Prime Minister Karamanlis and a luncheon reception planned for the following day, Hoover noted that the United States had not supported Greece as firmly as that country wished on the issue of Cyprus; nevertheless Greece had remained "firmly aligned" with the United States. The Under Secretary referred to the Holmes mission and noted that although there was no agreement between Greece and Turkey, officials seemed willing for the first time to have secret talks. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

On November 15, President Eisenhower gave a luncheon reception for Prime Minister Karamanlis at the White House. On November 17, during the course of a conversation with Secretary Dulles, the President referred to his talk with the Greek Prime Minister, a conversation that presumably occurred during the luncheon. According to a memorandum of the conversation:

"The President reported briefly on his conversation with Prime Minister Karamanlis of Greece. The Prime Minister had said that it was essential that in the near future the British make a generous gesture with regard to Cyprus. He had also stressed that the British attitude was the key to the situation. If they wanted a settlement one could be reached. The Prime Minister did not anticipate any great difficulty with the Turks if the British genuinely desired a settlement." (*Ibid.*)

211. Memorandum From the President's Special Representative (Holmes) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

Washington, November 19, 1956.

SUBJECT

Report on Cyprus Mission

Pursuant to instructions contained in Department's top secret telegram 907 to Paris, September 8, [2] and oral instructions received from the Secretary in London on September 21, I undertook to explore the positions of the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey with respect to the Cyprus dispute. Cables which I sent from Missions abroad contain a record of my discussions and this memorandum-report will be brief. I visited London three times; Athens twice; and Ankara once.

The Suez crisis occurred in the midst of these conversations and was, in my opinion, the principal element which handicapped progress. It is now clear that at the time of my first substantive discussion with the British [3] the decision had already been taken to intervene with the French in Egypt, and they were unwilling to discuss Cyprus which was their base for the military operation.

My estimate of the positions of the three disputants follows:

The controlling factor in the British attitude is that the members of the Government have been giving their undivided attention to the Middle East situation and have not put their minds to the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Cyprus. The Radcliffe Constitution and report have been completed and transmitted to HMG. At the time of my departure from London on November 14, they had not yet been considered by Ministers. The question of when a constitution for Cyprus would be promulgated had not been decided nor had the proposal to consult the Greeks and Turks about the constitution been considered. This indecision was brought about not only by preoccupation with Egypt but also by the absence of Ministers, Nutting's resignation, etc. . . . I believe, however, that such a settlement would not commend itself to HMG except as a last resort.

. . . When I got down to specifics with Karamanlis and Averoff, ... they did give me a proposal which I was authorized to present to the British and which might have served as the beginning of a negotiation had the British felt able to make a counteroffer. Although the Greeks appear willing to settle for self-government

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–1956. Top Secret.
[2] Document 194.
[3] See Document 198.

now with the question of self-determination put off to the future, they would insist on some definite commitment that the principle of self-determination would be applied to Cyprus at some time. I think there is no doubt that, although the Greeks are prepared to take a reasonable attitude for the time being, there is no doubt of their ambition to incorporate Cyprus into Greek sovereignty. I have the impression that Karamanlis now feels that he has the British at a disadvantage because of the criticism leveled at the UK for its action in Egypt.

I found the Turks, particularly the Prime Minister, considerably less intransigent than their previous utterances had led us to believe. Although much less adamant in their statements, I found them unwilling to agree to any formula of self-government accompanied by anything that resembled a commitment with regard to self-determination for the future. Even the suggestion of the mildest kind of statement which might be made by the UK was immediately construed as being "only a corridor to Enosis". . . .

Although there is no specific progress toward agreement to report, I believe that certain favorable results have emerged from my conversations.

(1) Relations between British and Greeks and Greeks and Turks had become so strained that there had been no recent attempt to approach agreement. They all, particularly the Greeks and Turks, were pleased at this informal attempt on the part of the United States to be of assistance and as a consequence spoke quite freely. I feel that all three of the Governments involved now understand the attitudes of the other much better than previously.

(2) The fact that the Secretary had sent a special representative to discuss the Cyprus question impressed the Turks particularly, and I believe was influential in softening their attitude.

(3) There is some prospect of an improvement in Greco-Turkish relations as an agreement has been reached for a secret meeting between the Turkish Acting Foreign Minister and the Greek Foreign Minister in Paris where Averoff will stop on his return to Athens from the General Assembly in New York.

(4) As a result of this mission, it is reasonable to expect that none of the disputants will take any radical action without consultation with us.

(5) I think that this mission contributed to the calming of positions at the UN and that we may reasonably expect that debate on the Cyprus issue will be postponed until toward the end of the

General Assembly,[4] thus giving additional time to try for a negotiated solution.[5]

[4] On March 13, 1956, Greece requested that the General Assembly place the Cyprus issue on the agenda at its Eleventh Session. On October 12, the United Kingdom requested that an item entitled, "Support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus", be placed on the Assembly's agenda. On November 14, the following item was placed on the General Assembly agenda: "Question of Cyprus: (a) Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus; (b) Complaint by the United Kingdom of support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus."

[5] Hoover responded to Holmes in a letter of December 1 that he found this memorandum a useful and timely summation of the situation and that this difficult problem deserved all the attention Holmes could give it. (Attached to a memorandum from Rountree to Hoover, November 29; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–2956)

212. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Paris, December 12, 1956.

Dulte 14. Eyes only Acting Secretary for President.

Dear Mr. President:

The NATO Council spent this morning mostly in a wrangle about Cyprus which was inconclusive. However, during noon recess I had a good talk with the Greek Foreign Minister.[2] He strikes me as being very reasonable. He indicated that the Greeks were prepared to support the constitution, which presumably will be proposed by the British, and apparently not press at this time for any action on self-determination. He said however that the result would depend very much upon whether Makarios supported it or not. He said if Makarios supports a bad settlement, his view will prevail, and if he opposes a good settlement, then, too, his view will prevail. He was very anxious that the British should consult Makarios and said they

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/12–1256. Top Secret. Dulles was in Paris to attend the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, December 11–14.

[2] According to Dulles, Averoff noted that the Greek Government was willing to agree to any "reasonable" solution to the Cyprus question and added that the Karamanlis government had taken political risks in attempting to maintain a flexible position. Averoff asked for U.S. assistance in urging the United Kingdom to consult with Makarios and the Greeks on Radcliffe's proposals for a constitution. Dulles agreed to speak with Lloyd. (Secto 16 from Paris, December 13; *ibid.*, 747C.00/12–1356)

would, if permitted, send someone to Makarios to urge him to come out in support of the present British plan. Also, he indicated that if the Turks wanted partition, the Greeks would be willing to consider that.

I hope to get a chance to talk to Selwyn Lloyd about this before we break up.

[Here follows the remainder of Dulte 14.]

Dulles

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213. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State [1]

Paris, December 14, 1956—9 a.m.

Secto 20. (Telegram based on uncleared memorandum of conversation.) [2]

During meeting with Secretary December 13 Menderes and Birgi discussed Cyprus at length. Menderes asserted some solution must be found to avoid debate in United Nations which could only make situation more complicated and perhaps more dangerous. Secretary said he had received today copy of Radcliffe constitution and understood Greeks and Turks had also. Constitution did not prejudge issue of self-determination and he hoped Turkey would find it an acceptable basis to get over present crisis. Menderes insisted that question of self-determination must be settled now. If left open it would only cause trouble for future and Turkish people would think Greece had received gift. . . . He stressed importance of Cyprus to security of Turkey. Turkey could accept Radcliffe proposal as draft provided it understood at same time that when self-determination implemented it would be through partition. He thought British desire for haste in making public statement on constitution would only create added difficulties. . . . Said he recognized that constitution could not be total solution. He stressed importance of immediate proposal. Said he hoped Turkey could look favorably now at Radcliffe constitution leaving partition for future. Menderes replied he would consider matter.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–1456. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, and Nicosia.

[2] The memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 181.

Secretary gave Menderes copy of Department reply to Turkish memorandum (Deptel 2210 to Paris [3]). Said Turkey could count on United States taking more active part in Middle East and making its presence more felt than before. Had just issued firm statement on Baghdad Pact. Did not exclude possibility adherence to Pact at some later time but question of ratification by Senate posed difficulties. Although no decision had been reached we considering joint congressional resolution giving President authority to use our forces in area. We would like to see Saudi Arabia in area grouping since confident King Saud anti-Communist, anti-Nasser and willing work with UN. King in difficult position and to some extent unable to do all he would like. Menderes also thought Saudi Arabia with West but in difficult position. He described instability in Arab countries with Syria almost Soviet satellite. He said must express again his deep conviction that if United States joined Baghdad Pact, it would bring tranquillity to area and greater safety.

Menderes referred to Nehru's coming visit to United States. [4] He described Nehru as able but most dangerous man, champion of Baghdad Pact opponents and intent on isolating Pakistan.

Dulles

[3] Printed as telegram 1339, Document 352.
[4] Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited Washington December 16–20.

214. Editorial Note

On December 14, Dulles was approached by Greek Foreign Minister Averoff. According to the memorandum of conversation, the following exchange occurred:

"The Greek Foreign Minister spoke to me after the meeting this morning and said that his Government, after having studied the British report for a Cyprus constitution, felt that it was totally unacceptable and virtually reserved plenary powers for the Governor. They were bitterly disappointed.

"I asked what the Greek thinking was about partition, and he said they were giving some sympathetic study to that possibility.

"He strongly urged United States "neutrality" in the forthcoming United Nations debate. He said of course he would like United States support but knew how difficult it would be for us to oppose the United Kingdom." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 814)

Later that day, the Secretary of State reported the following to the Department of State in Secto 22:

"Averoff told Holmes this morning that he had read Radcliffe Constitution and was very disappointed. He said that although he was the most conciliatory person in the Greek Government on Cyprus he could not recommend its support. He felt confident that Makarios would never approve the document. Averoff stated that in order for such a constitution to work the governor would have to be a saint as so much power was reserved to him. He said that he was going to telephone Karamanlis in Athens to give his opinion. Holmes recommended against hasty judgments based on one reading and suggested that further study of draft constitution might well lead to more favorable reaction. Averoff agreed to look again but restated his conviction that Radcliffe plan unsatisfactory." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 747C.00/12–1456)

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215. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Greek Ambassador (Melas) and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, December 21, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Radcliffe Proposals for Constitution for Cyprus

In his call on the Secretary today, the Greek Ambassador severely criticized the Radcliffe proposals for a constitution for Cyprus, terming them a "mockery" and "very sad". He said that on instructions from his Prime Minister he wished to ask the Secretary to reconsider the apparent intention of the Department to issue a statement that might be construed in any way as favorable to the proposals.

In reply, the Secretary said that we must make some kind of statement. However, he assured the Greek Ambassador that whatever statement we made would be kept on a very low key. The Secretary added that we had hoped that the Greek Government would not feel it necessary to reject the Radcliffe proposals out of hand. When the Ambassador retorted that they had studied them fully, the Secretary replied that the proposals could not have been given very much study since the Foreign Minister had told him last week almost immediately after the proposals had been received that Greece could not accept them. The Secretary added that he thought in such matters as these the

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–2156. Confidential. Drafted by Williams.

test was often in the administration of a constitution. He also thought that in the Radcliffe proposals there was at least a basis to ask for further clarification. The Secretary was sorry that the Greeks had felt they had to reject them so hastily without seeking that clarification.

The Greek Ambassador responded by again denouncing the proposals as offering a "phony constitution".

The Secretary advised him that in these matters the important thing was to get the momentum started or, in other words, to get a foot in the door of independence. The Secretary also referred to the British Government's present difficult situation which must be recognized as a fact that did not provide a good climate for a Cyprus solution. Referring again to the possibility of a public statement, the Secretary agreed that we might be able to postpone it until further Greek views were presented, but he reiterated to the Ambassador that some sort of statement would have to be made. It was suggested that we could hold off for at least a day or two. The Secretary further said that he would like to see more analyses—both Greek and our own—of the Radcliffe proposals.

In reply to a question from the Secretary regarding our study of the proposals Mr. Williams stated that we had made an analysis and had found some features which were good and others not so good such as the fact that the whole matter of education seemed to be entirely in the Governor's hands.[2] In general we felt that a great deal would depend upon the manner of administration.

In leaving, Mr. Melas undertook to obtain promptly from his Government its further views regarding the statement we felt impelled to make.[3]

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[2] In a December 21 memorandum to Dulles, Rountree noted that the Radcliffe proposals included only draft recommendations for a constitution. The British would retain full control over external affairs, internal security, and defense. Greek Cypriots would have an elected majority in the legislature. Rountree added that the proposals did not discuss self-determination. (*Ibid.*) A study prepared by the Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa on the Radcliffe proposals is attached to a memorandum from J.D. Iams to Wood, December 19. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–1956)

[3] On December 19, the Department informed the Embassies at Athens, Ankara, and London that the British Foreign Secretary had requested that the United States issue a public statement expressing support for the Radcliffe proposals. The British believed that such a statement would assist Greece with respect to public opinion in taking a position of greater flexibility vis-à-vis the proposals. Although the Department noted that its estimate of the situation was "less sanguine" it instructed the Embassy to inform the Greek Government that the U.S. Government felt obliged to issue a statement that in its view the Radcliffe proposals offered an opportunity "to take important step in direction of self-government and eventual peaceful and satisfactory solution Cyprus problem." The Department added that it believed it would be against the interests of all parties for the proposals to be "summarily" rejected. (Telegram 2329 to Athens, December 19; *ibid.*) In telegram 2246 from Athens, December 20, Allen, in reply to telegram 2329, noted that if the United States issued a statement supporting the Radcliffe proposals at this time, Karamanlis would "very probably" resign. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–2056)

216. Editorial Note

On December 27, Lincoln White, Acting Chief of the Department's News Division, made the following statement to correspondents:

"The United States has noted with sympathetic interest the long and earnest labors of Lord Radcliffe to find a formula for self-government for Cyprus. The making by the United Kingdom of proposals for self-government could be the first step toward an eventual peaceful and generally acceptable final solution of the Cyprus problem. The formula now produced by Lord Radcliffe seems to be unacceptable in certain respects by some who are concerned with the matter. Nevertheless, the United States still hopes that our three allies who, together with the people of Cyprus, are deeply concerned with this issue, will strive to agree upon a way of moving together toward a solution which is so important to themselves and to the entire free world." (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 14, 1957, page 54)

On December 29, Allen reported from Athens that Averoff, on instructions from Karamanlis, had asked him to call on December 28. According to the Ambassador, Averoff made a "strong but friendly" protest against the United States statement on the grounds that the United States had taken sides with Turkey and the United Kingdom against Greece. According to the Foreign Minister, the statement had caused great embarrassment to Karamanlis. Allen informed Averoff that he had personally opposed the statement, but that there were bound to be differences among nations and if every nation protested each time another took a position in the United Nations or elsewhere, "we would spend all our days protesting". (Telegram 2324 from Athens, December 29; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–2956)

On January 18, Secretary Dulles had a conversation with Foreign Minister Averoff. A memorandum of conversation reads:

"At the Greek Ambassador's dinner for the Greek Foreign Minister, I spoke alone to the Foreign Minister before dinner during the cocktail period, saying that I was greatly surprised that the Greeks had interpreted the State Department's statement about the Radcliffe Plan as endorsing that plan. I said that, in fact, it did not do so and to do so had not been our purpose. Mr. Averoff passed the matter off merely saying that we were here for a social dinner and not to discuss business, and the Cyprus matter was not again mentioned either before dinner or after dinner during our talk." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/1–1857)

217. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, January 28, 1957—6 p.m.

2632. During long discussion of Cyprus with Prime Minister this morning, at his request, I believe progress was made toward narrowing gap here between Greek and Turkish positions. . . . He said he could accept any solution Cyprus people wanted. He doubted that many Cypriot Turks wanted partition but he was ready and anxious to find out what they wanted through plebiscite. I said I did not believe Turkey was demanding partition but merely plebiscite offering partition as one possible alternative. . . .

I asked whether Greece would ask for UN troops to supervise plebiscite. He said that while UN troops would not be necessary, some kind of UN commission would have to be authorized to conduct or perhaps supervise or observe plebiscite.

Karamanlis said Averoff's latest reports from NY were discouraging because he had not been able to obtain any indication what attitude US would take in UNGA debate. I reminded him that British and Turkish Governments were undoubtedly equally anxious to obtain this information and I doubted Averoff had any more reason for discouragement than they.

Karamanlis reemphasized that if US takes negative position against Greece during UN debates, demand for new elections here will be irresistible. He said he was not concerned whether his government stayed in office or not but he was deeply concerned about future orientation of Greek foreign policy. He predicted that if solution is not found to Cyprus now, problem will become very much greater international issue within 3 to 6 months and might even jeopardize new Eisenhower doctrine re Middle East. I asked why. He said Arab States, with strong support of Moscow, would demand independence and demilitarization of Cyprus to prevent its being used again as military case against Arabs.

I said I felt confident US would not take position hostile to Greece in UNGA but was concerned that if we did not support Greek position 100 percent, local press and politicians would construe this as hostile. . . .

Allen

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–2857. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, London, Paris for USRO, Nicosia, and USUN.

218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, January 28, 1957—9:07 p.m.

5201. Re Cyprus in UN General Assembly.

1. During last year's UNGA debate US pledged "to continue an active interest in the Cyprus question." It would be consistent for US, especially in present Cyprus impasse, to take positive initiative. Present trend Cyprus increasingly harmful and in US interest continue seek constructive approach.

2. Therefore to maintain control over Cyprus UNGA discussion, and forestall proposals unacceptable to parties involved (e.g. possible Greek self-determination declaration, British condemnation Greek intervention, Indian proposal calling for independence of Cyprus), believe US should initiate immediate consultations on basis draft resolution, with objective endorsing direct discussions between British and Cypriots. Resolution emphasizing renewal of direct negotiations does not commit US to any of controversial "solutions" e.g. independence or partition, and amounts to UN suggestion that UK attempt settlement without substantive role by UN or participation any of its members (i.e. Greece or Turkey).

3. Resolution along following lines would appear serve above purpose:

"*The General Assembly*

"*Noting* that earnest efforts through several procedures have been made in order to reach agreement on the Cyprus question

"*Expresses* the hope that renewed negotiations between the British authorities and representatives of the principal segments of the population of Cyprus, may lead to concrete progress in achieving a solution."

4. Unless objection perceived Embassy London hereby instructed promptly discuss with HMG.

5. Embassy should inform UK that in conjunction with such approach US disposed consider its opposing amendments of type that might be submitted by Greece, Turkey or others which would involve UN directly in subsequent discussions Cyprus or tend favor any particular type solution. For example, Department assumes

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/1–2857. Secret. Drafted by Brown and Wood and signed by Dulles. Repeated to USUN, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia and pouched to Paris for USRO, Rome for McSweeney, and Valetta.

(Athens' 2487 [2]) GOG may propose add language re self-determination. Present language aimed at fact a beginning needs to be made in negotiations and does not exclude any eventual solution. US would therefore probably oppose such amendments when debate commences.

If HMG refers to Radcliffe proposals, Embassy should say basis for talks should be decided by HMG.

Embassy should convey following:

We realize HMG does not wish release Makarios from Seychelles until he condemns violence, but it is now 22 months since violence started, 10 months since Makarios deported and many more months may be required restore law and order. Meanwhile continuation violence will inevitably cause further hardening and distrust on both sides rendering eventual achievement any understanding increasing difficult. We therefore urge HMG seriously consider resumption talks with Makarios and leaders other Cypriot groups with understanding HMG desires continue talks until agreement reached. We also urge clear announcement promising eventual self-determination.

In making such suggestions emphasize Department view that if no progress re Cyprus when UNGA reconvenes in September 1957 it then will be, in our view, more difficult to handle successfully in the Assembly. For this reason if negotiations with Cypriots have not been fruitful within reasonable time US will seriously consider how NATO might play useful role and will be prepared take initiative. At present we are informing HMG, but no other Government, of this possibility.

After approach to HMG, [3] Athens and Ankara will be instructed promptly inform the Governments and our efforts should thereafter be centered in New York. There should be no discussion above with representatives Governments other than UK until further instructions received.

Dulles

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[2] Telegram 2487, January 14, transmitted the highlights of a meeting among Karamanlis, Averoff, and Allen on the Cyprus question. Allen reported that according to Averoff, the Greek demand for self-determination for Cyprus would only be for "home consumption". Karamanlis argued that any resolution acceptable to Greece would have to call for the release of Makarios or at least negotiations with him. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/1–1457)

[3] In telegram 4012, January 30, the Embassy at London informed the Department that Barbour had discussed with Kirkpatrick the Department's views on the U.N. Cyprus item in accordance with this telegram. Although Kirkpatrick reportedly expressed no significant objection to the U.S. position, he noted that it would only provide Britain with a temporary respite. He expressed a personal preference for a resolution calling on the three governments to resume negotiations. (*Ibid.*, 320/1–3057)

219. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles [1]

London, undated.

I am worried at the effect upon Anglo-American relations of the forthcoming debate on Cyprus in the United Nations. We agree, I know, that it would be much better to have no debate at all, but it would appear most unlikely that that will be achieved. The fact of Greek support for terrorism is generally acknowledged here. A hundred United Kingdom citizens as well as a large number of Cypriots have been murdered in this campaign of deliberate violence. Therefore if the United States vote against a Resolution calling for the cessation of Greek activities, it will be regarded here as an unfriendly act and will cause most unfavorable comment. I cannot prejudice the question whether the British Resolution will be pressed to a vote but I do hope that the United States Delegation will make it clear beyond doubt in the course of the debate that the United States Government does not condone the Greek behaviour and urges that it should stop.

Forgive me troubling you with a personal message on this matter, but I am most anxious that nothing should happen to hinder the development of our good relations. [2]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Corres. With Secy Dulles/Herter 7/54 thru 3/57 Vol. I Incoming. Confidential. Sent under cover of a note dated February 8 from Caccia to Dulles.

[2] On February 10 at 1 p.m., Dulles telephoned Rountree regarding Lloyd's message on Cyprus. According to the transcript of the conversation, the following occurred:

"Re Lloyd's message on Cyprus. The Sec said what are we going to do about that. The Sec said he thought we would abstain. That we would say we had worked hard to find a resolution that would be constructive but have not been able to do so; we have no resolution of our own and will abstain from any resolutions with substantive implications. The Sec said of course it is always possible in the course of the debate to change our minds but that is the way we feel now.

"The Sec said R. was to be sure to get some rest; he was to do no more work that day. We would be in real trouble if he collapsed.

"Re the Lloyd message again, the Sec asked if he had to answer it or only acknowledge it. . . . The Sec asked when the Cyprus question would come up at the UN. The Sec said Lodge was trying to get extra time on the Israeli matter. If Algeria was finished Monday, probably Cyprus would come up Tuesday [Feb. 12]." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations—General)

220. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 9, 1957 [1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Nuri Birgi, Secretary General, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Fatin Rustun Zorlu, Deputy, Turkish Grand National Assembly
Nehat Erim, Special Advisor to Turkish Prime Minister on Cyprus
The Secretary
William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Owen T. Jones, GTI

Mr. Zorlu opened the meeting with a brief reference to proposed Turkish revisions to the United States resolution on Cyprus that had been circulated by the United States Delegation in New York last week. The Secretary did not comment on the Turkish suggestions. Instead he expressed doubt that it would be wise for the United States to present any proposal. He pointed out that we had tried hard to help the parties in arriving at a solution to the Cyprus problem and that all our efforts had come to nought. It was tragic to see this dispute go on for it not only involved the solidarity of NATO but threatened the position of the present Greek Government and endangered the entire Mediterranean area. These, he said, were the real stakes here. The three interested parties were putting something of lesser importance ahead of the greater issue and until they were prepared to make some compromises he did not feel the United States had any responsibility to continue its efforts to find a solution.

Mr. Zorlu responded by saying that he thought it was a good idea for the United States not to put forward a solution. He contrasted the passive Turkish attitude on the Cyprus matter over the last two or three years to the manner in which the Greeks had pressed the matter, supported terrorism, and maintained inflammatory radio broadcasts out of Athens. The Greeks had persisted in this course of action in the face of Turkish pleas that the present equilibrium not be disturbed. The Turks, Zorlu asserted, have more rights and are making more sacrifices on the Cyprus issue than the Greeks and they want to see this matter quieted down. . . .

The Secretary then asked his Turkish visitors if they were satisfied that, given a continuation of the present situation in Cyprus, a Western-oriented government in Greece could be expected to

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–957. Confidential. Drafted by Jones on February 11.

continue. Mr. Zorlu asserted that the Greeks were only exploiting their internal political situation to attain their objectives in Cyprus and that public opinion would not be aroused in Greece if the Greeks did not get their own way on Cyprus. The Secretary declined to accept this judgment. He took a grave view of the Greek situation. He pointed to the serious implications of a Greek shift from the West and cautioned the Turks not to come to the United States for help if the United States were proven right in its estimate. Dr. Birgi broke in to acknowledge that Greek political disturbances growing out of the Cyprus issue were possible but went on to say that political instability was inherent in Greek political life and that even if the Cyprus problem were solved another situation would be created to feed this chronic restlessness. The Greeks had put their pretensions too high. . . . Dr. Birgi emphasized that Turkey is not seeking the defeat of Greece on this matter but rather a reasonable solution that would provide safety for the Turkish Cypriots and security for Turkey itself. The Secretary closed this part of the discussion by again pointing out that disaster was impending that was so great that Cyprus paled in comparison. The Greeks, Turks and British apparently did not share this view. They may be right. Since no one else shared our view on the gravity of the situation, the United States should then sit back and watch.

At this point Dr. Birgi asked the Secretary what was his advice to Turkey at the present time. The Secretary replied that first of all the UNGA debate should be kept as calm as possible. Birgi and Zorlu agreed with this and with the view that any substantive action by the UNGA would be damaging. After the UNGA debate, the Secretary suggested that the matter might be taken up by NATO. It was essential, he said, that NATO be capable of dealing with its own problems. It had expressed an interest in a lot of problems far away, such as Formosa, but had thus far shied away from immediate vital problems such as Cyprus. When Mr. Zorlu pointed out that NATO discussions had thus far been friendly and had been on subjects on which there had been a wide range of agreement and that the injection of the Cyprus issue would therefore be dangerous, the Secretary replied that if NATO was so fragile that it could not discuss matters vital to its future then this in itself pointed to a vital weakness in NATO. He went on to say this highlighted again the fact that the three countries were putting second things first and until the magnitude of the peril inherent in the Cyprus situation was realized no solution was possible.

When Dr. Erim referred briefly to the Radcliffe proposals and stated that the Greeks want only Enosis, the Secretary disagreed. The Secretary thought the Greeks would accept self-government, perhaps even without assurances of self-determination, but the point

in the Radcliffe proposals that worried the Greeks was the broad powers reserved for the executive. The Secretary went on to say that it was hardly possible to prepare a constitution without some provision calling for the invasion of the rights of one branch of the government by another in the event of an emergency. If because of the lack of trust and confidence every such constitutional ambiguity were regarded as a booby-trap, then no effective constitutional framework could be established. The core of the present problem was this lack of mutual confidence.

The Secretary closed the meeting by paying tribute to the wisdom, orientation and dependability of present Turkish leadership. He lauded Dr. Birgi's effective work at the London Conference and expressed the hope that on the Cyprus problem the Government of Turkey would manifest the same mature statesmanship.

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221. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 11, 1957 [1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. Rountree, NEA
Mr. Williams, GTI
Mr. Nunley, EUR
Ambassador Caccia, British Embassy

Ambassador Caccia called at the Secretary's request. The Secretary told Ambassador Caccia that Mr. Rountree plans to see Mr. Coulson and bring the British up to date on the recent discussions between US officials and King Saud. [2] The Secretary also reviewed briefly his talk with Ambassador Eban of Israel and described certain assurances which the US would be willing to give Israel if Israel will promptly withdraw from Egyptian territory.

The Secretary then opened a general discussion of the Cyprus problem, with particular reference to its current status in the UNGA.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–1157. Secret. Drafted by Nunley.

[2] King Saud of Saudi Arabia made an official visit to Washington January 30–February 1.

He referred to his recent talks with representatives of the Turkish Government and also made reference to the message from Foreign Minister Lloyd urging the US not to vote against the proposed UK resolution calling for a cessation of terrorist activities in Cyprus. The Secretary pointed out that the US has tried in various ways to be helpful on the Cyprus issue but has thus far been unable to find any satisfactory approach. Therefore, the present disposition of the US Government is to announce at the beginning of the Cyprus debate that the United States will not vote on any resolution at all. In other words, the US is inclined to abstain on any substantive resolution concerning Cyprus, whether sponsored by the Greek Government or the British Government.

Ambassador Caccia asked whether it will be possible for the US representative, during the course of the debate, to make a statement indicating US opposition to terrorist activities and external interference in Cyprus, perhaps along the same general lines as the statement made by Ambassador Lodge in the debate on Algeria. The Secretary replied that some general statement on terrorism may be possible. He added, however, that the US may also have to express its general support for the principle of self-determination, in approximately the same terms used in the Potomac Charter.[3] Ambassador Caccia expressed the hope that any expression by the US on self-determination would include a recognition of the fact that the Radcliffe proposals are aimed at the achievement of self-determination for Cyprus. The Secretary said it would be impossible for the US to pass judgment on particular constitutional proposals, since the value of any constitutional system depends primarily upon its practical application. He pointed out that any constitution is capable of abuse, and made reference to the Soviet Constitution. The Secretary indicated that the content of the US statement has not yet been determined, but stressed the impossibility of dealing with any single aspect of the Cyprus problem outside the context of the total situation and said the principal purpose of any US statement will be to avoid making a bad situation worse.

The Secretary went on to emphasize the grave dangers to the whole Western world inherent in the present Cyprus situation. Unless some kind of solution to the Cyprus problem can be found, he said, Greece may be lost to NATO. This would breach the southern flank of NATO and might permit the Communists to cut across the Mediterranean. The Secretary expressed the view that there has been far too much emotionalism associated with the

[3] For text of the Potomac Charter, a Declaration by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, June 29, 1954, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 12, 1954, pp. 49–50.

Cyprus question—so much, in fact, that the governments concerned have been unable to consider the issue in a broad perspective and seem unwilling to subordinate minor considerations to major considerations.

The Ambassador asked whether the Turks had indicated willingness to make any concessions on the Cyprus question. The Secretary replied that he has observed no definite indications of this kind, but feels there is some possibility that the Turks would be willing to accept a "NATO solution". The Secretary expressed the view that it would be far better for all parties to deal with the problem through NATO than through the UN. He added that the Turks seem willing to agree to a solution based on partition.

Ambassador Caccia asked whether the Turks and others have considered the practical consequences of partitioning an island as small as Cyprus. He suggested that a proposal for partition is a "council of despair" and should be considered only as a last resort.

The Secretary then repeated the basic US objectives in the current UNGA debate on Cyprus. He pointed out that we do not believe any UNGA action is likely to contribute to a solution of the Cyprus problem and said that we may make a statement to this effect at the beginning of the debate. He reminded Ambassador Caccia that the US long opposed subjecting this issue to public debate, and now hopes that the debate can be terminated with a minimum of acrimony and without perpetuating UN involvement. For these reasons, the US is disposed to abstain on any substantive resolution presented, although the final US position will depend upon the course of events. The US may undertake some new initiative if it appears that doing so will serve a useful purpose.

Mr. Rountree emphasized the important difference between the current US disposition to abstain on any substantive resolution and the earlier US position, which was to oppose actively any such resolution. Ambassador Caccia, however, did not comment upon the implications of this change in US intentions.

222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, February 12, 1957—7:42 p.m.

619. Following is Department's present thinking re Cyprus:

As friend of parties involved and in earnest effort be helpful in developing arrangements which would have least adverse effects upon NATO and cooperation among its allies, US in recent past has put forward for consideration various proposals all of which have been strongly opposed by either Greeks British or Turks. These developments have underlined reluctance of Greeks British and Turks to make necessary compromise essential to agreed solution. In our view major issues of preserving NATO solidarity and forestalling communist penetration of Mediterranean are being subordinated to lesser issue of Cyprus and more narrow interests of three parties concerned therewith. Unless and until parties recognize magnitude of peril involved in continuation of Cyprus stalemate and are prepared make necessary compromises, US efforts toward finding solution will continue be frustrated.

Department has concluded that in present circumstances it cannot, without jeopardy to more important considerations, play affirmative role at this time with respect proposals which have been put forward by parties. It had intended making clear at outset GA debate that we would vote against any condemnatory resolution (such as British condemnation of Greek Government for interference Cyprus) or any other resolution of substantive character (such as one calling for immediate self determination). In view opposition to this position US now disposed abstain on any such resolutions and at appropriate stage in UN discussions we would explain our position. As debate develops it might prove advisable for US to take some initiative. We have in mind that future attitude would depend largely on development opportunities for constructive action and on whether our friends are able to avoid taking extreme and harmful positions. We would be governed mainly by our continued desire keep debate in low key and minimize US involvement in Cyprus.

Secretary on February 9 met with Birgi, Zorlu, Erim and Gork at Turk request and spoke along foregoing lines. He emphasized extreme dangers in Greek situation and importance to Turkey of Western oriented Greece. Turks declared they were not seeking

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–1257. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Jones and Rountree and signed by Dulles. Also sent to Athens and repeated to Ankara, London, and Paris Topol and pouched to Nicosia, Rome for McSweeney, and Valetta.

impose difficulties upon Greece and asserted history of Cyprus question shows Turkey has played issue in lower key, has more rights and has made more sacrifices than Greece. Turks endorsed US not putting forward resolution itself and agreed debate should be kept to minimum and hoped no substantive action would be taken. They hoped that as various resolutions submitted our respective delegations would keep in touch on tactics. (Separate telegram contains fuller account this conversation. [2])

On February 11 Secretary met with British Ambassador Caccia and discussed Cyprus matter in context personal note from Selwyn Lloyd [3] asking in very strong terms that US not vote against resolution condemning Greek support of terrorism. Secretary reviewed situation as above and informed Caccia present US attitude re abstaining not only on UK condemnatory resolution but also on other substantive resolutions. Caccia asked whether US would in its statement say something in opposition to terrorist practices. Secretary thought we could do "something of the sort" but made no specific commitment. He indicated we probably would like to say something also of general character as in Potomac Charter re rights of peoples to governments their own choosing. (Separate telegram contains fuller account of conversation. [4])

Department has not discussed its latest thinking with Greek representative. Foreign Minister Averoff has requested appointment with Secretary and it planned meeting will be arranged within few days. He plans speak along lines taken with UK and Turk representative but will not give assurances that US will abstain on all resolutions as debate develops. He will thus avoid any basis Greek claim that subsequent US attitude contrary to assurances given to GOG. Secretary will express hope any Greek resolution and manner in which it put forward will be as mild as possible and will express opinion preferable that UK not be named. He will emphasize that in final analysis solution Cyprus question will be understanding achieved outside UN among parties concerned. If one party takes extreme position it will be harder reconcile others later. Ambassador Allen may wish discuss matter along similar lines with GOG, emphasizing that while we wish be as helpful as possible to Karamanlis Government, situation is such that we cannot at this juncture give assurances which they have requested, including abstaining from voting.

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[2] Telegram 1854 to Ankara, February 12. (*Ibid.*)

[3] Document 219.

[4] Telegram 5614 to London, February 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–1257)

Suggested US statement Cyprus debate will be contained in subsequent telegram.[5]

Dulles

[5] Transmitted in telegram 641 to USUN, February 18. (*Ibid.*, 320.5747C/2–1857)

223. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 13, 1957[1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus and the UNGA

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Evangelos Averoff, Greek Foreign Minister
Ambassador George Melas, Greek Embassy
The Secretary
Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary, IO
Mr. Murat W. Williams, Deputy Director, GTI

When Mr. Averoff called on the Secretary this afternoon, he said first that he was grateful for Mr. Wadsworth's message yesterday[2] regarding American neutrality in the Cyprus debate. He appreciated the delicacy of the problem for the United States and therefore asked only our *neutrality* and not our support. Of course, from a friend, Greece would have preferred support.

He added that the present problem in the United Nations was to get out of the debate without damage to a settlement and with some help towards it. "We want," he said, "to have a discussion without insulting each other too much."

The Foreign Minister said Greece must, of course, press its resolution for self-determination for Cyprus. As a second choice, he would want a resolution favoring renewal of negotiations. He insisted that a resolution calling for three-power talks with Turks and British would be dangerous, because Syria and Egypt were already insisting that they should be included since Cyprus was strategically important to them as well as to Turkey. Mr. Averoff reiterated that

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–1357. Confidential. Drafted by Williams.

[2] In Gadel 137, February 8, the Department instructed the Mission at the United Nations to make clear to the British, Greeks, and Turks that the United States planned to take no further initiative at this time. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/2–657)

the best negotiations would be between the British Government and the Cypriots. A resolution to this effect should be sought, with a provision that the Secretary General should report to the next Assembly on the progress of negotiations.

Beyond the Assembly, he recognized Turkey's three main arguments against self-determination and against possible enosis for Cyprus: (1) the strategic argument that Greek islands would "besiege" Turkey, which he would meet by proposing demilitarization of Cyprus with only NATO bases; (2) the argument of Turkey's trading interests, which he thought could be met by arrangements for a customs union; and (3) the minority argument, which could be settled by providing to the Turkish minority all the privileges that Turkey herself wanted to fix under a UN guarantee, with possibility of dual nationality and protection against military service in Greece.

Mr. Averoff then said this was a period of high fever and one must seek to reduce the fever. If that is possible, one can—with good will—solve the problem.

He referred to the question of bases and said that though Greece in the past had not been opposed to British bases on Cyprus, Greece now felt that the bases on the island should be NATO bases, since UK bases only caused "foreign irritation". (He reported that Nasser had said he had nothing against NATO bases in Cyprus, though he objected to British bases there.) Averoff also said the bases and the island might come under some NATO administration.

Steps towards a solution could be taken, said Mr. Averoff, either through NATO, which required "quiet, old-fashioned diplomacy" or through the return of Archbishop Makarios, whose influence was obviously very great on the island.

. . . . . .

In response to Mr. Averoff's presentation, the Secretary remarked that the Greek Foreign Minister had gone much more deeply into the substance of the Cyprus controversy than he himself was prepared to go and had demonstrated the wide range of the problem. The Secretary added that he had been particularly impressed by Mr. Averoff's remark that one must get the temperature down.

The Secretary made the following additional points:

(1) Debates in the UN were most useful if they avoided emotional attacks and merely exposed problems to world opinion. The educational value of debates was often much greater than the advantage gained by pushing through some resolution by a narrow margin.

(2) In the past few days we had told both Turkish and British representatives that in this matter big issues were being lost sight of and too much heat was directed to minor issues. If each party is

ready to make concessions, the harm to them individually would be much less than the harm that might come to all from the greater dangers.

(3) Mr. Averoff's willingness to find a solution within some NATO framework was welcomed.

(4) Although Mr. Averoff had remarked that in this dispute between our three friends there might be some embarrassment, we had shown lately that in order to do the right thing we were willing to take sides even against a friend.

The Secretary further remarked that Mr. Averoff had spoken in a spirit of great moderation.

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224. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, February 19, 1957.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Discussion:

The GA Political Committee began discussing Cyprus February 18. Three resolutions have been submitted: a Greek proposal asserting the right of self-determination for the Cypriots; a British proposal calling for Greece to take measures to prevent support for terrorism; and a Greek proposal calling for establishment of a fact-finding committee to investigate the UK charges of terrorism against Greece. [2] It is currently unclear whether the UK would still regard a vote against its terrorism resolution as an "unfriendly act" or whether it would accept a negative vote as the price for a negative US vote on the Greek self-determination resolution and the Greek resolution on a fact finding commission. [3]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–1957. Confidential. Drafted by Elizabeth A. Brown of UNP

[2] For texts of these three resolutions, see U.N. Docs. A/C.1/L.168, A/C.1/L.170, and A/C.1/L/169, respectively.

[3] On February 19, during the course of the Secretary's Staff meeting, Walmsley raised the question of Cyprus in the United Nations. The notes of the meeting read:

"Mr. Walmsley reported that the British called on Mr. Wilcox yesterday and asked that we reconsider our present position of abstaining when the UK resolution and the two Greek resolutions come to a vote in the UNGA. Mr. Walmsley said the

Meantime our Delegation in New York will make clear in its statement, without, however, disclosing how the US will vote, that the US does not believe any of the resolutions, irrespective of their possible merits, would contribute to a solution, and will express the hope their sponsors will not press them to a vote. Our estimate is that the Greek resolution on self-determination would be adopted if the US abstains. In its present form the Greek resolution would set a dangerous and undesirable precedent that any territory may determine its own future independently of other interests involved.

In these circumstances there are two alternatives; the first is preferable:

(1) If the UK can accept a negative US vote on its proposal or decides not to press it to a vote, the preferred course would be for the US to initiate, preferably through others, but if necessary itself, a procedural-type resolution which would refer to the necessity of good relations between nations and peoples and express the view that appropriate negotiations should be undertaken to achieve a solution. Whether the US or others submit the resolution, we should make sure we can maintain control of its content.

(2) If the UK continues to insist that the US not oppose its proposal, we should seek to persuade Greece, as the price for a US abstention, to accept amendments to its self-determination resolution that will rephrase it to include the need for the restoration of peaceful conditions; to refer to the legitimate interests of those concerned; and to place the principle of self-determination in its Charter context.

The attached telegram [4] instructs the Delegation in this sense, and includes the texts of suitable resolutions to cover both alternatives.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached telegram.

British now recognize it would be better if we voted against all three resolutions, for they have come to the realization that if we abstain, the Greek resolutions will in all likelihood be approved. The Secretary said we must approach this issue with caution since he had received a note from Foreign Minister Lloyd that a US vote against the UK resolution would be considered 'an unfriendly act.' The Secretary also noted that we had announced our position privately to the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers and Ambassador Caccia and said that if we change our position at this juncture it will be necessary to take it up with all three parties. Mr. Rountree remarked that the British and Turks would welcome such a change but the Greeks would be infuriated. He also emphasized the need for a quick decision since the matter could come to a vote in the General Assembly today. The Secretary reiterated that he wanted this matter handled with great care." (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

[4] Gadel 149, February 20, not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 320.5747C/2–2057)

225. Editorial Note

Between February 18 and 22, the First Committee of the General Assembly held ten meetings to consider the Cyprus item. During the course of the discussion, four draft resolutions submitted by Greece, the United Kingdom, and Panama were considered by the Committee. No vote was taken on any of the resolutions. On February 22, India introduced a resolution (1013 XI) that was approved by a plenary session of the General Assembly on February 26, by a vote of 76 to 0. The resolution noted that the General Assembly hoped that a "peaceful, democratic and just solution" would be found to the problem of Cyprus. It also expressed the hope that negotiations would be continued toward this end. For a summary of developments at the United Nations and the full text of the resolution, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956*, pages 121–124.

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226. Editorial Note

On February 21, at the 313th meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles, in his review of significant world developments affecting United States security, raised the question of Cyprus.

"Mr. Dulles turned to the critical situation of the Karamanlis Government in Greece. As a result of the Cyprus debate in the UN, the chances of the survival of this government were very poor. . . ." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Memoranda of Discussion)

227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

Washington, March 2, 1957—5:56 p.m.

3194. Principal officer. Athens 2956. [2] Before deciding whether to dispatch Holmes on another exploratory trip Department would like to have Embassy London's estimate of British intentions re Cyprus. We desire info (a) specifically re any changes of view on return of Makarios to London or Cyprus and plans for instituting self-government, and (b) whether the British consider the termination of the UN debate provides psychological opportunity to press for settlement. Also desire info re restoration of peaceful conditions on island. Even if indications are that our intervention might be useful at this point, Holmes would probably not be sent unless British wished him to undertake again such a mission.

In planning our next move, it would be desirable also to have further info on any change in Greek or Turkish attitude . . . . Athens may particularly inquire as to FonMin proposals for independence with anti-Anschluss guarantee. We appreciate advisability of taking advantage of present lull in mutual recrimination, but Department is not prepared to make any new commitment before learning views of British. Athens may wish to reiterate our desire implement offer made by USUN to assist in constructive manner. Department prepared to consider any suggestions including some form assistance through NATO.

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–2857. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Williams and Marcelis Parsons, Director of BNA. Also sent to London, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris Topol.

[2] In telegram 2956, February 28, Allen informed the Department that as far as Greece was concerned, this was the "psychological moment" to create a more "constructive" atmosphere for the consideration of the Cyprus question. According to the Ambassador, a "prompt" move on the part of the United States might now be useful. (*Ibid.*)

228. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, March 13, 1957—11 a.m.

3060. Prime Minister Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Averoff asked me to meet them at Prime Minister's house today for long discussion on Cyprus. Prime Minister handed me personal letter from King Paul to President Eisenhower (being transmitted under covering letter to Secretary) which expresses appreciation for US offer of good offices in Cyprus question and urging President to request Macmillan during Bermuda talks to release Makarios. [2]

Prime Minister emphasized that next two months will provide best opportunity to settle Cyprus issue. Advantage should be taken of UN resolution to act now and avoid complications which arise every year beginning in June or July regarding further Cyprus debates in UN. Prime Minister re-emphasized that release of Makarios is only possible way to achieve results and expressed confidence that following such release acceptable solution will be found. It is clear that both he and Averoff are now thinking almost exclusively along lines of independence. Karamanlis said he was confident Makarios himself preferred independence to Enosis and that as soon as GOG could make contact with him it would make useful suggestions to him.

Averoff is confident that British are looking [for] face-saving formula to give them excuse for releasing Makarios. British Ambassador asked him last week what GOG could do to make this possible. In parliamentary debate last night, Averoff expressed confidence that fighting in Cyprus would stop if Makarios were released. Opposition is attacking him today on ground that he has offered to bargain for release of Makarios, and he admits that this was purpose of his statement as assurance that Greek Government would make every effort to obtain cease-fire if Makarios is released. Karamanlis added that more and more people, including President of UNGA, are pressing British to release Makarios and that everyone concerned with Cyprus question would feel great surge of enthusiasm if this step taken. I expressed doubts that Turks would show much pleas-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1357. Secret. Repeated to Paris Topol, London, Ankara, and Nicosia.

[2] A copy of this letter is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Referring to Makarios, King Paul noted: "According to the Greek mentality, there is no other personality or authority that could be found in Cyprus or Greece, under present circumstances, to take any decisions that could ever be accepted by all concerned." Eisenhower was scheduled to hold discussions with Prime Minister Macmillan on Bermuda, March 21–24.

ure since they do not regard him as spokesman for all Cypriots. Averoff said Turks also want satisfactory Cyprus settlement and must be aware that no progress towards either partition or independence is possible without Makarios.

I said I believed most Americans thought Makarios should be released but question was how strongly this be pressed on Government of UK. Karamanlis said we should stand up for our political principles.

Comment: I have come with some reluctance to conclusion that British hope of finding more tractable elements to deal with in Cyprus have proved unjustified. Makarios appears to be gaining strength among Greek Cypriots, much as exiled Sultan did among Moroccans. Makarios has achieved too well-established position among Cypriots to be either supplanted or put aside. Since British must eventually deal with him or else continue to have sullen, uncooperative and quarrelsome majority on Cyprus even after organized resistance is put down, they would save much trouble for themselves and everyone else by bringing Makarios to London now.

I am still not happy about independence as solution and reminded Prime Minister today that Soviets would start intriguing in Cyprus at first possible opportunity. Moreover, many Cypriots will continue to agitate for Enosis and internal turmoil result, much as it did in Texas, where annexation of Republic finally brought on war with Mexico.

Despite foregoing I agree that Cyprus problem must be solved some way and if Greece and Turkey are willing to accept guaranteed independence, . . . if supported by Makarios, with whom British should reopen talks as first order of business under UN resolution.

Allen

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229. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, March 15, 1957—11 a.m.

4891. Limit distribution principal officers. In considering possible next steps regarding Cyprus and reports of views, suggestions

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1557. Top Secret. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris Topol.

and comments from various sources involved (Department telegram 6197,[2] Athens 3060[3] and 3067[4] and related), it seems to us that undue emphasis may be centering on procedural aspects of the problem with a view to reactivating negotiations between the parties, without at the same time our having a clear idea of the substantive aspects of the solution we should seek or our having sufficient evidence of the acceptability of such a solution to all parties to warrant our seeking means to achieve it. We have in mind that the proposed NATO establishment of a team of wise men,[5] the release of Makarios from exile, efforts to agree on a cease-fire with Grivas, are all designed to set the stage for further negotiations envisaged in the UN resolution. Meanwhile, however, we have no reason to believe that, if the stage is so set, the Greek, Turks and United Kingdom are any more likely than heretofore to negotiate for a given solution, for example, self-government with integral self-determination after reasonable period, which is the United Kingdom and Turkish position, of some concept of independence, toward which the Greeks appear to be moving and we wonder whether it might not be a more fruitful line of approach for United States to endeavor to narrow the substantive issues than to concentrate on procedural aspects of further negotiations between United Kingdom and Cypriots (Makarios), which in view of the history of this problem do not seem likely to be successful if renewed substantially on the same basis as where they left off.

We confess that the above reasoning is to some extent conditioned on the shifting positions that it seems to us the Greeks (read also Makarios) have taken in previous rounds of negotiation which we fear might well be rationalized by the Greeks as the optimum strategy toward their manifest long-term objective of enosis. In addition to record of direct negotiations with Makarios we are

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[2] In telegram 6197 to London, March 8, the Department suggested beginning negotiations on self-government with the Cypriots rather than initiating tripartite talks with the Greeks and the Turks. The Department added that if a de facto truce could be arranged with EOKA, then it might be possible to bring Makarios to London in an effort to see whether he would urge the continuation of nonviolence. If he agreed, then negotiations might begin with leaders of the Cypriot communities. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/3–457)

[3] *Supra*.

[4] Dated March 13, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1357)

[5] In Polto 2135, March 12, Perkins reported from Paris that during a conversation with Ismay, the Secretary General noted that he planned to write letters to the three Permanent Representatives to the NAC from Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in order to initiate procedures for settlement of the Cyprus dispute. According to Perkins, Ismay planned to propose appointing three "outstanding citizens" to perform "good offices". (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/3–1257) Polto 2252, March 22, transmitted the text of Ismay's letter to the Department. It contained Ismay's idea of a three-man commission. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/3–2257)

mindful Karamanlis insistence last autumn that Greeks could accept self-government with nod towards future self-determination and their present talk of independence. . . .

In circumstances, we question whether progress can be made toward solution by working, essentially procedurally, for improvement atmosphere until we ourselves anyhow determine what substantive solution we are aiming at, are prepared to try to hold the Greeks to and to sell to the United Kingdom and Turks. We would, therefore, recommend that United States (1) determine solution we believe most desirable and durable in light all factors of situation, and (2) embark on campaign to achieve its acceptance by all parties.

Realize this suggested re-direction course our efforts involves more direct involvement in problem than would be desirable if we could avoid it. However, if we estimate importance of solution is sufficient to warrant play for stakes risks would seem to be acceptable. In absence some such United States leadership we see no end to matter and United Kingdom imposed self-government with consequent continual Greek agitation and further exacerbative interallied feud.

Whitney

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230. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

Washington, March 20, 1957—7:16 p.m.

3415. Your 3154. [2] You should strongly urge GOG reserve its position re NATO initiative Cyprus on grounds (if public statement necessary) GOG will not reject any reasonable offer leading towards constructive solution. As member NATO alliance GOG determined work out solution Cyprus problem not only for benefit Cypriots, but also to restore NATO unity.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–2057. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Ankara, Paris Topol, Rome for McSweeney, and Bermuda for the Secretary with the U.S. Delegation and pouched to Valetta.

[2] In telegram 3154 from Athens, March 20, Allen reported that during a conversation with the British Ambassador to Greece, the Ambassador noted that Britain was prepared to make a statement indicating that Makarios would be released if he renounced violence. (*Ibid.*)

You may point out that as member NATO GOG would be in poor position if it refused cooperate in attempt being made within alliance restore unity of members, especially if refusal occurs before there has even been chance to explore what role NATO may play, which exploration itself Greeks may find helpful to bring about UK-Cypriot talks.

It is our understanding Ismay intends proceed cautiously and with consent governments involved therefore GOG views will be thoroughly respected. It is our hope British-Cypriot negotiations re immediate steps towards self-government may develop simultaneously with NATO explorations re long range problem of eventual status Cyprus. We would envisage that any agreement on eventual status would give Cypriots full opportunity express their desires. We believe settlement eventual status an international affair and may be possible work it out less painfully within NATO than by direct confrontation of British Greeks and Turks. We do not regard NATO as substitute for British-Cypriot talks on self-government, but rather as necessary complement since self-government question probably cannot be settled until there is also understanding re eventual status. FYI only. In this connection if British-Cypriot negotiations commenced on self-government, NATO might at same time play useful role in persuading the three countries and possibly some other NATO members to join in treaty whereby within fixed term of years (say 7 to 10) there would be plebiscite to determine future status Cyprus. Prior to plebiscite signatories and representatives principal segments Island's population would meet on equal terms to agree on terms of plebiscite. Treaty might also provide that if signatories and representatives Cypriots cannot agree, question would be taken to NAC. Such meeting might lead to plebiscite whose choices might include some form guaranteed independence (i.e. Cyprus government and some or all of NATO powers would sign treaty declaring that Cyprus would not become a part of any other country without consent signatories and that its independence would be protected by the signatory powers) or independence within Commonwealth. End FYI only.

Our hope is to encourage simultaneously British-Cypriot negotiations on self-government and long range arrangement within NATO which will lead to clearer definition of eventual status Cyprus and will allow Cypriots proper opportunity exercise eventual choice. If GOG rejects latter, we will be disinclined continue press HMG on former.

Re paragraph 1 your 3134[3] we do not consider that NATO role in Cyprus question as outlined above would in any way be contrary requirements UN resolution, which did not specify shape negotiations should take.

USDel Bermuda may wish utilize pertinent arguments from foregoing during discussion Cyprus item.

Herter

[3] The first paragraph of telegram 3134 from Athens, March 19, reads:

"Karamanlis told me last night he had instructed his Ambassador to NATO to return to Athens for consultation in order to gain time before making definitive answer to Ismay's letter re Cyprus. He has rejected Ismay's approach preliminarily and expects to reject it outright since NATO involvement would lead to negotiations between governments, including Turkey, whereas UN resolution called specifically for negotiations between UK and Cypriots. He suspects British are trying to use NATO channel to avoid carrying out clear requirements of UN resolution." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/3–1957)

231. Editorial Note

On March 20, during the course of dinner conversation at the Mid-Ocean Club in Hamilton, Bermuda, Eisenhower, Macmillan, Dulles, and Lloyd discussed the Cyprus problem. A memorandum of the conversation reads:

"Mr. Macmillan stated that they were growing more and more doubtful as to the strategic value of Cyprus. With the increasing range of aircraft, Cyprus became less important and he did not know that it was worth the risks. President Eisenhower raised the question of Malta and indicated that he felt that with Malta plus Turkey and perhaps Libya, the UK–US position would be adequately served. Mr. Macmillan said that Malta was by no means a sure thing for the long-range future; there were problems. . . . Mr. Macmillan suggested that Greek-Turkish relations were now so intertwined in so many places that each in a sense had a hostage in terms of the interests of the other and that he hoped would be sufficient to prevent a war breaking out between the two about Cyprus." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 865)

232. Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, March 21, 1957, 3:45 p.m. [1]

[Here follow a list of participants and discussion of unrelated matters.]

The question of Cyprus was discussed next. Selwyn Lloyd began by stating that the British welcomed Ismay's initiative, but unfortunately the Greeks turned it down although their reply may not be final. He believed that the Turks would accept Ismay's initiative, and mentioned the other details of the British statement on Cyprus just made in London. [2]

The President said that he had received many representations from various sources emphasizing that if Makarios were returned to Cyprus, real progress toward a solution of the present problem could start.

Selwyn Lloyd replied that Makarios had been the origin and foundation of terrorism in Cyprus, that there were now indications that this terrorism was failing, and that not all Cypriots are prepared to accept Makarios as their spokesman. The British think that terrorism is much weaker now than before, and that the populace of Cyprus is getting fed up with it. Lloyd added that the British believe that the Turks take Cyprus very seriously and would be unwilling to let Greece have this island, which is so close to their coast. The British therefore regard themselves as a sort of "trustee".

The Prime Minister confirmed that the British are not greatly interested in Cyprus except for the military importance of the island, a factor which is changing and probably now less than before. Were it not for the Turks, the British probably would have gone much further by now toward a solution. Macmillan also emphasized that he is not without hope that Makarios may accept the latest British offer.

. . . . . .

The Prime Minister and President agreed that the military importance of Cyprus today has become rather less, though it was still useful to have a base there.

The Prime Minister urged that the US should try and influence the Greeks to accept Ismay's initiative.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 866. Secret. Extract. Drafted by Morris.

[2] Lennox-Boyd noted that the British were prepared to release Makarios if he agreed to renounce the use of terrorism. For text of the Colonial Secretary's statement, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1957, pp. 411–412.

The President indicated that he would certainly be willing to consider doing this, and urged the British to free Makarios. In any case, he added, the US believes what the British leaders have just said about their real aims regarding Cyprus, is sympathetic with the British problem in Cyprus, and would certainly do its best to try and help.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

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233. Editorial Note

On March 21, the President wrote a diary entry recording his impressions of discussions held that day at the Bermuda Conference. It reads:

"The Prime Minister outlined the major factors in the whole Cyprus problem. They are quite complicated and he asserts that Britain wants nothing more to do with the island except to keep its base there, but any action that the British can suggest up to this moment antagonizes either the Greeks or the Turks. The British believe that the antagonisms that would be created by dropping the British responsibility in the island might even lead to war between the Turks and the Greeks.

"I told them that I had certain important messages, particularly from the Greeks, asking me to urge upon Macmillan the importance of freeing Archbishop Makarios. I told them that in my opinion I didn't believe they were gaining much by keeping him prisoner, so I would just turn him loose on the world. At the very least this would prove to the world that the British were trying to reach a solution to this problem. My impression is that they are probably going to turn him loose, but subject only to his agreement not to go back to Cyprus and to abjure violence." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

234. Memorandum for the Record, by the Secretary of State [1]

Bermuda, March 23, 1957.

The President let Mr. Macmillan read the cable from George Allen (from Athens to Department 3204 [2]) with reference to Cyprus and Makarios. The President urged him to let Makarios go. Macmillan said that they had received a long and contentious communication from Makarios. [3] He was, however, personally disposed to put the most charitable interpretation on it and to let him free. He was cabling the Cabinet to take no contrary action pending his return. The President urged that the UK stature would be enhanced if they dealt with the matter in a broad and liberal way. The President said that Macmillan was on the whole quite pleased with the contents of the Allen cable. [4]

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 868. Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that the memorandum was read to Rountree.

[2] Dated March 22. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 747C.00/3–2257)

[3] The text of Makarios' statement of March 22 is printed in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1957, pp. 412–413.

[4] A memorandum of a March 23 dinner conversation among the President, Dulles, Macmillan, and Lloyd on Cyprus reads:

"Mr. Macmillan brought up the question of Cyprus, indicating his strong hope that the US could in some public way express its support of the initiative of Lord Ismay, the former NATO Secretary General. Neither the President nor I made any response to this request, hearing it in silence, and Mr. Macmillan did not press the point." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

235. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

Washington, March 29, 1957—2:47 p.m.

3526. Presidential handling. Please deliver following message from the President to King Paul. Confirm date and time of delivery.

"March 29, 1957.

Dear King Paul:

I would like to tell you that I very much appreciated your letter of March 15, 1957. [2] Your views on the Cyprus problem, especially with respect to Archbishop Makarios, were of great value to me and

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–2957. Secret; Priority.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 228.

my associates at Bermuda and during the Conference I took the opportunity of urging that the Archbishop be released.

It is encouraging to learn that the Archbishop has recently been offered the opportunity of leaving the Seychelles. His release presents a great opportunity and, as you stated in your letter, marks 'a definite step toward a possible solution of this thorny problem'. I sincerely hope that with your advice and encouragement the Greek Government will do everything possible to use this opportunity for the purpose of creating an atmosphere which will lead to constructive negotiations between the leaders of the Cypriot communities and the British authorities.

Further, I would urge you to consider the possibility that NATO could at the same time play a useful role in considering the international aspects of this question. If the domestic and international aspects of the problem could be more clearly separated, and if they are approached with courage and resourcefulness, I believe that this painful problem can gradually but certainly be solved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Thank you again for your letter. Please accept the best wishes of myself and Mrs. Eisenhower and convey our greetings to Queen Frederika. [3]

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower"

Dulles

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[3] In telegram 3267, April 1, Allen reported:

"King Paul was highly pleased to receive President's message, which I delivered to him at Tatoi last night. We asked if he could show it to Prime Minister Karamanlis. I said President would undoubtedly expect him to show it to Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Averoff but that existence of this exchange of letters should be held secret in absence of agreement to contrary. In order to draw King out I asked to what extent he felt he could give advice and encouragement to GOG. He said President's letter would enable him to advise Karamanlis to be more willing for NATO to consider international aspects of Cyprus problem. He said he would call Karamanlis to palace today to discuss President's letter.

"King noted with obvious relish President's statement that during Bermuda Conference had urged release of Makarios." (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–157)

236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, March 29, 1957—4:54 p.m.

6822. Presidential handling. Please deliver following message from the President to Prime Minister Macmillan. Confirm date and time delivery.

"March 29, 1957.

Dear Harold:

I have noted with great interest your decision to release Archbishop Makarios. I know that this entailed great difficulty for you. I earnestly hope that his release will bring about a substantial improvement in the atmosphere relating to Cyprus, with greater prospects for a satisfactory settlement of this problem.

I want you to know that we will do all we can to encourage others concerned to approach the matter in a constructive and conciliatory manner so that the opportunities afforded by this action on your part will not be lost.

With kind regard,

Sincerely,

D.E."

Dulles

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower to Macmillan Correspondence 1957–1958, Vol. II. Secret; Priority.

237. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower [1]

London, March 31, 1957.

DEAR FRIEND: Thank you for your letter about Archbishop Makarios. [2] As you say, this was a difficult decision for us and you will have seen that it was not taken without loss to the Government. I do not believe that the Archbishop has changed his views in the Seychelles; he is the Bourbon of Cyprus. But events in the island

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Transmitted under cover of a note from Caccia to Eisenhower, dated March 31.

[2] See telegram 6822, *supra*.

and in the world are surging past him. Harding has beaten terrorism militarily, and the world now recognizes that Cyprus is an international problem.

I am sure that your aid in persuading all concerned to face reality could be of decisive help. Of course my right-wing assume that we released the Archbishop at your request, so private pressure by you would be better than public statements.

Warm regards, as ever,

Harold Macmillan [3]

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

238. Editorial Note

On March 22, the Department instructed the Embassy at Ankara to raise with the Turkish Government the United States views that all the parties should try to overcome past resentments; that it did not seem possible that the problem could be settled without simultaneous negotiations between the British and the Cypriots and between the concerned governments, possibly within the framework of the NATO conciliation plan; and that the history of the problem indicated that negotiations could not succeed without the objective of reaching some understanding regarding the status of the island. (Telegram 2220 to Ankara, March 20; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–2257)

On March 25, Ambassador Warren called on Melih Esenbel and reported to him the substance of telegram 2220. Among other things, Esenbel noted that the Turkish Government did not agree to summoning a conference in which the leaders of the various Cypriot communities would participate, that Makarios and other Cypriot leaders should be excluded from the conference, and that the Government of Turkey had accepted Ismay's proposals in principle. (Telegram 2234 from Ankara, March 28; *ibid.*, 747C.00/3–2857)

On April 4, the Embassy at Ankara transmitted the text of a Turkish aide-mémoire on Cyprus that had been delivered to the Embassy by Esenbel that day. The aide-mémoire indicated that the Turkish Government was in complete agreement with the United States regarding the need to solve the Cyprus dispute in a peaceful manner. It also noted that the Greek Government and Makarios, and

the "terrorists" were still working to attain enosis and as long as these attitudes and actions persisted, unilateral acts of good faith would be of no avail. (Telegram 2290 from Ankara, April 4; *ibid.*, 747C.00/4–457)

In telegram 2353 to Ankara the Department transmitted an aide-mémoire in response to the Turkish aide-mémoire of April 4. The Department noted that the Turkish aide-mémoire was still under study and that the United States hoped that all parties agreed on the need to solve the Cyprus dispute in a peaceful manner. (*Ibid.*)

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239. Editorial Note

On April 14, the Embassy at Ankara transmitted the text of a note that the Turkish Government delivered to the Government of Greece regarding Cyprus. The Turkish note indicated that the Government of Turkey considered that the "enosist designs" of Greece were aimed directly at Turkey, and that the Greek Government was in "close collaboration" with Makarios. The note also added that the attitude of the Greek Government, which was to make declarations in international organizations and then to deny them "before its proper public opinion", is "a manifest proof of its ill-intentions." (Telegram 2371 from Ankara, April 14; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–1457)

On April 16, during the course of discussion at the Secretary's Staff meeting, William Rountree raised the matter of Cyprus. According to the notes of the meeting, the following exchange occurred:

"Mr. Rountree reported that relations between the Greeks and the Turks have reached an even more acute stage as the result of a very strong note delivered by the Turks to the Greeks on the subject of Cyprus and Makarios. Mr. Rountree said that . . . he felt that the Greeks were now aware of the seriousness with which the Turks regarded the situation. The Acting Secretary indicated he felt we had a definite responsibility to do what we can to resolve this situation. Mr. Rountree said that he was thinking of sending a communication to the Greeks noting that Makarios' release was due to our intercession and that in return the Greeks should attempt to exercise some restraint on their part. However, he said we are stopped from doing this because of the strong British objection to any indication that the US played a role in arranging the release of Makarios. He felt the only channel open to us at the moment was to King Paul and some

consideration was being given to a further approach through him." (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

On April 17, at the 320th meeting of the National Security Council, Director of Central Intelligence Dulles in his review of significant world developments affecting United States security, raised the subject of Cyprus. A memorandum of the discussion reads:

"The return of Archbishop Makarios to Athens has stepped up the tension between Greece and Turkey. The Greek Government is seriously worried over the outbreak of trouble with Turkey as a result of inflammatory speeches and pronouncements by Makarios." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Memoranda of Discussion)

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240. Editorial Note

In an April 15 letter to President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Macmillan wrote:

"It was a great grief that Bobbety Salisbury felt unable to agree to let out Archbishop Makarios. I am bound to say I don't much like letting him out, and he will be a great nuisance when he gets to Athens, and still more when he comes to London. I expect he will turn up in New York and Washington too. But I don't quite see how we could have kept him in Seychelles indefinitely, and the break in the EOKA morale seemed a very good moment to throw this fish back in the sea.

"As for the long term solution of Cyprus, we are working hard on this, but it is not easy to find just the right thing to do. However I am quite hopeful that we shall be able to have a definite plan and I would like to write to you about it as soon as I can." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower Correspondence 1957–1958 Vol. II. On March 29 Salisbury resigned because of the decision to release Makarios.)

President Eisenhower responded to Macmillan's letter on April 28 as follows:

"I share your disappointment that Lord Salisbury resigned because of the release of Makarios. While I think that the latter is far from a statesman and can probably stir up quite a bit of mischief, still I think that Britain, as a great country, is in better position in the matter than she was with him as a prisoner. Certainly you have taken away from demagogues one of their chief arguments against you. . . . To conclude—I hope that Lord Salisbury comes back into the fold." (*Ibid.*, Eisenhower to Macmillan Correspondence 1957–1958, Vol. I)

241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, April 16, 1957—4:10 p.m.

7312. In view heavy Turk pressure (Ankara's 2324 and others[2]) to obtain more definitive US–UK views on future Cyprus, suggest London consult with HMG and indicate that we have given GOT preliminary reply (Deptel 2353 to Ankara [3]), and that we plan to have Amb. Warren discuss matter further upon his return Ankara April 22. [4] We feel, despite excitement being generated, GOT's Aide-Mémoire (Ankara's 2290 [5]) provides useful basis for further discussion by way of follow up to Deptel 2220 [6] to Ankara. Unless HMG has serious objections, we plan present following views to GOT orally stating at that time that we have also discussed with HMG without indicating HMG's reaction to Turks. For the present we do not plan similar approach to GOG. We would, however, plan keep both Ismay and Spaak informed generally. Until we have first exchanged views with HMG, we would prefer hold matter closely between our two Governments.

This proposed approach to GOT will be designed primarily to indicate that US now seriously doubts whether either enosis or partition would prove to be peaceful or practical solutions and that US now believes that either independence within the Commonwealth or independence outside Commonwealth coupled in either case with a treaty preventing enosis are worthy serious consideration. Within context Deptel 2220 we have in mind developing these further views along following lines:

Any change in status Cyprus must be accomplished gradually if there is to be a peaceful solution. It would not appear practical in present tense situation and in view Cypriots' relative inexperience in

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–957. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Jones and Wood. Also sent to Athens, Ankara, Paris Topol, and Nicosia.

[2] In telegram 2324, April 9, the Embassy reported that the failure of the United States to respond to the recent Turkish démarche on Cyprus "could be misinterpreted by Turks as evidencing some degree USG acquiescence in whatever tactics Turkey may decide employ in Cyprus issue." (*Ibid.*) The démarche was made on April 8 by Birgi to Frederick B. Lyon, at Ankara. According to Lyon, Birgi noted that there was "increased tension" among the Turkish people over Cyprus and that the government might not be able to prevent "disturbances". Birgi also indicated that his government felt compelled to issue a statement concerning Greek "insincerity and unfairness". (Telegram 2308, from Ankara, April 8; *ibid.*, 747C.00/4–857)

[3] See Document 238.

[4] Warren was in the United States for consultation.

[5] See Document 238.

[6] *Ibid.*

governing themselves, to pass directly to some form self-determination without providing for predetermined period of self-government, such a period would afford Cypriots opportunity to assume increased measure of responsibility for their own affairs and might also permit present tensions to cool.

Because self-government would appear best prelude to any final solution, it follows that representatives of Island's communities should negotiate with HMG on mutually acceptable form self-government, since responsibility for achieving successful self-government will rest largely with Cypriots. The choice of these representatives should be left to members of Cypriot communities.

It seems unlikely Cypriots will agree on self-government as interim solution unless they have fairly clear conception eventual status Island. Concurrently, therefore, with these negotiations between HMG and representatives Cypriot communities, future status Cyprus might appropriately be explored within NATO framework. These explorations might possibly lead to a treaty whereby within a fixed term of years there would be a plebiscite to determine future status Cyprus. NATO negotiations should be secret and insofar as possible, seriatim.

Obviously eventual status Cyprus can only be finally settled by agreement between parties directly concerned. However, reestablishment good relations between GOT and GOG is matter of primary concern not only to both Governments, but to all Free World. At the present time, either enosis or partition would appear to be counterproductive to reestablishment good relations. Enosis would in the foreseeable future seriously exacerbate Turk-Greek relations. Partition would appear do the same. It would also pose grave and perhaps permanent political and economic problems on Cyprus. Both Turk and Greek communities are fairly evenly distributed throughout Island. It would seem almost impossible divide Cyprus equitably, would certainly require major population transfer and would leave in its wake bitterness and resentments among entire Cypriot population.

A solution promising more hope for improved Turk-Greek relations might be that of offering Cypriots, after fixed period self-government, choice between independence within British Commonwealth and independence outside Commonwealth. In either case there would be a treaty signed by interested and friendly nations, as well as Government of Cyprus as then constituted, whereby Cyprus would be independent and would not become part of any other nation without full consent of the parties most intimately concerned. (FYI UK, Greece, Turkey and Cypriots. End FYI)

Any solution should recognize British sovereignty over bases on Cyprus needed for Free World defense.

GOT would be informed that foregoing views are advanced within context of frequently stated desire of both GOT and USG to have frank exchange of views. The further views of GOT would be welcomed.

After soliciting HMG's views on foregoing approach, Embassy London should also suggest HMG seriously consider bringing Cypriot leaders to London for negotiations on self-government. Release of Makarios was certainly difficult step. If he now remains too long in Athens, situation may become increasingly rigid and opportunity provided by his release may be lost.

Athens: Ambassador Allen may wish urge on Makarios that having been released, he should indicate willingness promptly go to London for negotiations.

Comment addressee posts requested soonest without consultation except in London (and Athens only as stated in preceding paragraph).

Herter

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242. Editorial Note

In telegram 5734 from London, April 18, the Embassy informed the Department that the British Foreign Office had no objection to Ambassador Warren presenting to the Turkish Government the views contained in telegram 7312, *supra*. The Foreign Office added, however, that instead of telling Turkey that the United States had "discussed" these views with the United Kingdom, that the Turks be told that the United States had "informed" the British about them. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–1857)

On April 18, the Embassy at Athens informed the Department that it fully agreed with the line presented in telegram 7312. The Embassy added that a distinction should be made between the "eventual status of Cyprus" and "self-determination". (Telegram 3502 from Athens, April 18; *ibid.*)

In telegram 2424 from Ankara, April 20, the Embassy, in its interim reply to telegram 7312 to London, noted that "unless there is some drastic change in political atmosphere, it is no more possible that Turks would sit down at same negotiation table with Makarios than that Pope should sit with devil." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/4–2057)

On April 18, the Office of the United States Permanent Representative to NATO informed the Department that it agreed with the Department's position as outlined in telegram 7312 to London, repeated as Topol 1960. The Office added, however, that it was important to recognize Turkish concern for the protection of the rights of the Turkish minority, especially during any period of independence. (Polto 2511 from Paris, April 18; *ibid.*, 747C.00/4–1857)

In telegram 399 from Nicosia, April 18, the Consulate noted that both the solution and the procedure described in telegram 7312 to London were contrary to what seemed to be some of the basic tenets of the Greeks and the Turks. Although the Consulate noted that renunciation of enosis by the Greek Cypriots was unlikely, it was not impossible that Cypriot acceptance could not be obtained, "provided, of course, leads from Athens and Ankara did not prevent" it. (*Ibid.*)

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243. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State [1]

Ankara, April 24, 1957—3 p.m.

2445. Re Istanbul telegram 910 to Department. [2] I saw Prime Minister Menderes, Birgi and Esenbel together evening April 23 for almost hour and half conversation. I conveyed orally precisely sense Deptels 2416 [3] and 2469. [4] I stressed that my remarks were not a USG proposal or plan but rather observations for study and future consultation with idea they might lead finally solution Cyprus problem.

The Prime Minister remarked when I finished that his government would study my presentation (of which they made minute,

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–2457. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Athens, London, Paris, Rome, Belgrade, Nicosia, Istanbul, Izmir, and Iskenderrun.

[2] Telegram 910, April 23, noted that Warren was trying to arrange an appointment to see Menderes. (*Ibid.*, 123 Warren, Fletcher)

[3] Printed as telegram 7312, Document 241.

[4] Telegram 2469, April 20, instructed the Embassy to transmit orally the substance of telegram 2416 to the Turkish Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–1857) This was intended as a reply to the Turkish aide-mémoire of April 4 (see Document 238).

careful notes) point by point and he would give me Turkish observations very soon.

My presentation was received completely dead-pan.

When I reached point about independence, Birgi completed two sentences for me before I could do so. First instance, he anticipated word "independence". Second time he supplied "within British Commonwealth". This makes me think my remarks were not surprise for them.

I tried lay groundwork for later consultations and appeals, repeating Department's idea Turks statesmanship, restraint, and need for calm atmosphere to work out solution. Prime Minister then emphasized there limit on restraint beyond which cannot go. That limit has been reached. He stated Greeks are making categorical, dogmatic claims publicly which are freezing Greek position, satisfying Greek public opinion. Prime Minister said must now face up political requirements here in Turkey.

On conclusion my remarks, Prime Minister asked me how much of my remarks he could pass on to parliamentary groups and how much use in parliamentary debate. I replied I had not foreseen his query and so did not have the answer. I ventured the opinion, however, that Washington would not want its ideas disclosed to parliamentary groups or used in Assembly debate.

I said I felt that would violate very purpose USA efforts and prevent USA and Turkey make headway this problem.

Prime Minister then stressed he has delayed for fifteen days answering parliamentary inquiry, that his preliminary remarks will no longer hold situation, that he must make suitable reply Assembly. In his reply he must clarify the views, intentions and policy his government order to protect Turkish position in light Greek buildup.

I believe Prime Minister doubtless will discuss my presentation with his confidants in government but discussions with parliamentary groups and parliamentary debate are still of great importance to USG.

Will Department inform Embassy urgently what can be said to Prime Minister regarding use of my remarks in Assembly and in parliamentary group discussions?

Warren

244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, April 25, 1957—4:48 p.m.

2509. In response to Menderes' request (Ankara 2445 [2]) you may inform him orally and confidentially that we feel whatever merit our proposals may have would probably be jeopardized by public discussions at this time. We are motivated by strong desire make progress promptly in Cyprus explorations and continue believe best hope is through quiet diplomacy. You should emphasize that in present situation we had not intended to inform GOG until there had been time for discussion with GOT. We can understand situation Menderes faces vis-à-vis Turkish public interest this question, but hope he will agree that main consideration at this juncture is to move towards solution of question.

FYI Ankara. . . . If in your considered judgment there is likelihood that GOT will in any event, reveal publicly that US has made substantive suggestions, you should inform Athens immediately. End FYI.

FYI Athens. We would prefer not inform Greeks of contents Deptel 3730 [3] to Athens until Turk response has been received. If however Ankara indicates may divulge substance US views and if in Embassy's opinion situation would then require that GOG be informed, you may take action on basis Deptel 3730. End FYI.

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–2457. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Holmes and Wood. Also sent to Athens; repeated to London, Paris Topol, and Nicosia; and pouched to Rome, Ottawa, Bonn, and Valetta.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Printed as telegram 7312, Document 241.

245. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, April 26, 1957—5 p.m.

3596. Paris for USRO. Rome for McSweeney. Reference: Deptel 3836. [2] During meeting at my home this morning Makarios proposed that U.S. assume UN-sponsored trusteeship over Cyprus during interim period prior to self-determination. I immediately pointed out that this would not be feasible for several reasons. We would be shouldering responsibilities which those directly concerned should carry. Moreover, U.S. is already accused of speaking against colonialism because U.S. wishes to supplant existing imperialist overlords. He said if people of Cyprus requested US trusteeship, no one could accuse U.S. of imperialism. On contrary, this would be first time any great power had assumed governmental responsibilities at request of population and would consequently be opposite of imperialism. I asked if he had any evidence that Turkish as well as Greek Cypriots would like it. He said he thought they would. He added that our recently assumed responsibilities in Middle East made it imperative for us to take bold steps to help solve Cyprus problem.

I asked how British Government could justify recalling all its officials from Cyprus and seeing them replaced by Americans. He acknowledged the difficulties but pointed out that British had shifted its responsibilities to U.S. elsewhere, including the shift in Greece itself in 1947. Since U.S. had to support free-world, he thought we should exercise our responsibilities directly.

Comment: It is difficult to believe that Makarios advanced this proposal with serious belief it might be accepted. I am inclined to regard it as tactic designed to show he has come forth with something, however far-fetched, and that ball is now in our or someone else's court.

Other subjects discussed will be reported in separate telegrams. [3]

Allen

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–2657. Secret. Repeated to London, Rome, and Paris Topol.

[2] See footnote 2, *infra*.

[3] See *infra*. In telegram 3597 from Athens, April 26, Allen noted that his meeting with Makarios had been arranged by Averoff, who suggested that the conversation take place at his house. Allen added that rather than give the meeting a "conspiratorial aspect", he suggested that the meeting take place at his home. The Ambassador reported that he and the Archbishop had agreed to try to keep the meeting from becoming public. If it did become known, Allen concluded, he was prepared to say that "several sources" had suggested that the meeting might be a useful one and that he had agreed in order to obtain a better understanding of the Cyprus problem. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–2657)

246. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, April 26, 1957—5 p.m.

3595. Paris for USRO; Rome for McSweeney. Department's 3836. [2] During talk with Makarios I did not mention subject of his return to Cyprus and he did not bring it up. I did press him earnestly, however, to bring about end of terrorist threat on island as most important next step towards solution. I pointed out that neither British nor Turks would be ready to negotiate as long as he had armed organization in being which could be called into action at any time. I thought he could justify taking bold measures against terrorism on the grounds that his release from exile was beginning of new phase of Cyprus question, and urged him to present himself to world as man of peace, which befitted his clerical garb.

Makarios seemed impressed. He agreed that from international aspect, he should do so. Intense emotion of Greeks in Cyprus and Greece presented difficulties for him internally but he declared he would do everything he could.

I asked whether Grivas could be persuaded to leave Cyprus. He said Grivas would not leave while many of his followers were in prison under long sentences. I said British would probably grant amnesty in natural course of events when they were convinced by experience that return to terrorism was unlikely. He agreed, but said he would not persuade Grivas to leave unless Grivas had fairly definite assurance regarding amnesty, since otherwise his followers would feel betrayed. I said I would try to find out whether there were any possibilities regarding amnesty.

Comment: Makarios did not add condition which Averoff had mentioned, regarding his own return to Cyprus. If British are able to

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–2657. Secret. Repeated to London, Ankara, Nicosia, Rome, and Paris Topol.

[2] In telegram 3836, April 25, the Department of State noted that the United States should not take steps to facilitate the return of Makarios to Cyprus in view of "extreme Turk sensibilities." The Department added that it believed that the Archbishop would arrive in Cyprus via London soon enough, and meanwhile the Turks "needed time to cool". The Department instructed the Embassy that when it was appropriate it might wish to indicate to Makarios that he should travel to London to "establish contact there." The Department added, for the information of the Embassy, that the U.S. position was that both partition and enosis seemed impractical. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/4–2457)

say anything re amnesty which would give Makarios basis for acting, I believe he would try to persuade Grivas to leave.[3]

Allen

[3] On May 3, in reply to this telegram, the Department informed the Embassy that it agreed with Allen's suggestion that Makarios should present himself as a "man of peace". The Department added that it believed that a renunciation of violence was an "essential prerequisite" to further progress on the Cyprus issue. The Department suggested to the Embassy that it might wish to inform the Greek Government that prospects for progress on self-government for Cyprus might depend on Grivas' departure from the island. (Telegram 3941 to Athens, May 3; *ibid.*, 747C.00/4–2657)

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247. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, April 26, 1957—5 p.m.

3594. Rome for McSweeney. During talk with Makarios today I urged him to make statement favorable towards Turks of Cyprus. He said Turkish Cypriots had been almost as violent as Turks in Ankara in condemning Greece for welcoming him to Athens. Nevertheless, he asserted he would try his best to placate Turks of Cyprus. I expressed view that best way to defeat partition would be for Cypriot Turks to show they were opposed. He expressed confidence they would do so after period of self-government. I asked if he planned to make counter proposals to Radcliffe constitution. He said he had plans which he would bring forward at appropriate moment.

When I urged him to visit London, he said he planned to go but not at present because under existing atmosphere he would be castigated in London as terrorist. I said he could remove this danger by convincing evidence that he is man of peace.

Comment: I doubt he can be persuaded to visit London as long as he is being strongly attacked in Turkish and some British circles. He is aware that his visit might incite further adverse Turkish reaction.

Allen

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–2657. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris Topol, Ankara, Nicosia, and Rome.

248. Editorial Note

On April 27, Ambassador Warren reported that Foreign Office Secretary General Esenbel had presented him with a long aide-mémoire on Cyprus. The Ambassador noted that he was more concerned about the Cyprus situation now than at any time since his arrival in Ankara. (Telegram 2487, April 29; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–2957) The full text of the aide-mémoire was transmitted in despatch 678, April 29. (*Ibid.*)

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249. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State [1]

Bonn, May 3, 1957—10 a.m.

Secto 12. Paris for USRO. Following afternoon NAC session Averoff visited me for half an hour to discuss Cyprus. . . .

He said Greek Government is now contemplating two possible solutions of Cyprus problem. First would be creation of independent state and he expressed his deep conviction that Greece would accept guaranteed independence. He also said Greece would hold elections, placing issue squarely up to electorate which would leave no doubt as to Greek willingness to go through with such solution. Second solution he cited was possible creation of trusteeship. He referred to Makarios proposal to Allen re United States trusteeship. He realized this not feasible and suggested that some NATO country such as Norway might be asked to accept it. He said United Kingdom would be in position to keep its bases on Cyprus and could call on United Nations to arrange such trusteeship.

Commenting on second solution Secretary said Greek Government should turn such a proposal over to someone like Spaak to present and not present it as a Greek proposal. Secretary said heretofore trusteeships have been established with view to eventual self-government and independence and presumably trusteeship over Cyprus would have to be established on different basis. Averoff said that Greek Government could never agree to permanent trusteeship and could not exclude forever right of Cypriots to determine their

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–BO/5–357. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, London, Nicosia, and Paris Topol. Dulles was in Bonn to attend the Ministerial meeting of the NAC held May 2 and 3.

future. He thought it might be possible to express trusteeship in terms of a minimum period of 20 years or so. Averoff said in any case he preferred first solution, i.e., independence and was obviously seeking United States support for this solution. Secretary remarked Turks are opposed to independence because they fear it will lead to ultimate enosis. Secretary did not commit himself to either solution but suggested Averoff pursue question of trusteeship through third party. Secretary felt that any solution acceptable to Greece and Turkey would also be acceptable to United Kingdom. Averoff asked that his views re solution Cyprus be closely held since, he said, only Prime Minister and King in Greece have knowledge of these views.

Dulles

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250. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the British Ambassador (Caccia) and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, July 25, 1957 [1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus

The Ambassador called to leave with the Secretary the attached "oral communication" concerning a United Kingdom plan on the Cyprus problem. [2] . . .

In leaving this document, the Ambassador made the following supplemental remarks. The Cyprus problem had now entered a critical stage and it was of the utmost importance that efforts be undertaken speedily to arrive at a compromise solution. The present United Kingdom approach was prompted by the belief that it was necessary first to arrive at an agreement on the ultimate status of the island; within that framework the internal problems of self-rule

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–2557. Secret. Drafted by Jones.

[2] The "oral communication," dated July 24, not printed, proposed a plan in which Great Britain would invite representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments to a conference in London in September. According to the plan, the United States and Secretary General Spaak would be invited as observers. The conference would have no fixed agenda and might discuss "without prejudice every solution so far mooted." The "only fixed requirement[s]" the British plan proposed, on which any solution must be based, were: essential military facilities under British control; protection of the island from Communist infiltration; and ensuring peace of the island. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/7–2457)

could then be negotiated with the Cypriots. In the past, the problem of self-rule had been approached first; these efforts had failed, in part because of Greek Government support of the Greek Cypriots; there was, therefore, more hope for effective self-rule negotiations with the Cypriots if the Greek Government first became a party to an agreement on the ultimate status. The Ambassador emphasized the importance of United States influence and expressed the hope that we would use this not only to get the parties together for the proposed meeting but to have them approach the meeting with a reasonable spirit of compromise. This was particularly important in the case of the Greeks, who undoubtedly would not attend without United States encouragement. No public announcement concerning the meeting was intended and the proposed discussions with the Greek and the Turkish Governments would be on a confidential basis. It was the United Kingdom's hope that the time between now and the meeting in September could be used to consider carefully with the United States the various possible solutions. In that connection he expressed the hope that these discussions might be held in London. He also pointed out that after the Suez experience the "essential military facilities" mentioned in the document would now be quite small and should present no problem.

The Secretary said the United Kingdom plan would be studied by the Department. He asked if there was any reason to hope that the Greeks would attend, recalled the past Greek attitude toward such a meeting, and observed that it probably would be very difficult for the United States to prevail upon Greece to participate without assurances of support that we were not in a position to give because of the interests of our Turkish ally in this same problem. The Secretary also noted the importance of there being no public announcement about this plan and took under advisement the suggestion that the proposed United States–United Kingdom discussions be held in London.

251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, July 30, 1957—1:24 p.m.

Tosec 7. Re Secto 2 [2] and Deptel 856 to London. [3]

1. Departmental assessment British proposal and suggested U.S. response follow.

2. British plan in principle is consistent with U.S. desire see parties primarily interested take initiative in arriving at compromise solution. While we should join with others in influencing Greeks and Turks to attend, we do not think U.S. should participate as observer. It would involve us too deeply in Cyprus dispute and might serve to detract from role we would like Spaak to play in bringing parties together. Interim discussions before meeting should afford us long needed opportunity for frank discussions with UK concerning their intentions with respect to Cyprus.

3. Spaak should be encouraged support meeting and participate as observer. Might also be useful for him participate in interim U.S.-UK discussions, thus making London logical place such talks.

4. UK intentions with respect to meeting and to Cyprus problems generally require clarification.

(a) If meeting is largely tactical move in connection with next UNGA, UK may soon feel impelled either to leak or publicly announce meeting prematurely. This would prejudice chances of acceptance and/or success.

(b) Nature UK commitments, if any, to Turkey may influence meeting. UK freedom of action on Cyprus issue has been limited by her apparent commitment to Turkey on partition made at time of parliamentary debate on Radcliffe proposal. It would be useful to know if in approaching conference "with entirely open mind" UK will be uncommitted to Turkey.

(c) British Ambassador's assertion essential military facilities under British sovereignty will be small and present no problem suggests sharp curtailment UK military expenditures on Cyprus. Such eventuality requires assessment in terms of future base facilities to West and of impact on viability island's economy.

(d) We need to know UK intentions with respect to self-rule and whether, under any type of ultimate status, UK willing to

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–3057. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Jones. Also sent to Paris, Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia and pouched to USUN. Dulles was in London to attend a meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 2.

[2] Secto 2, July 29, requested a background briefing memorandum for possible side talks with British officials regarding Cyprus. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/7–2957)

[3] Telegram 856, July 27, transmitted the full text of a British proposal for a conference on Cyprus; see footnote 2, *supra*.

assume financial burden and political risks of transitional period of self-government under UK rule.

5. Turks will probably accept invitation to London meeting. They have encouraged UK to call such meeting and presumably believe that UK views will be more in harmony with Turk than Greek views. Because of forthcoming Turkish elections, it is doubtful if Turkish Government will be able to recede at meeting from its present uncompromising position favoring partition. Turks may therefore attempt impose conditions for acceptance.

6. Greeks will undoubtedly reject invitation unless strong influences are brought to bear.

(a) They will regard this as tactical UK move to forestall UNGA discussion or at least keep it in low key. Greeks regard UNGA as one of their most important leverages on this issue and may resort to various tactics to assure full airing Cyprus problem at UNGA. These tactics may include imposing conditions for acceptance and/or leaking UK plan to press in order marshal opinion to their side.

(b) They had bad time at London tripartite conference 1955 and have repeatedly said they would not participate in another meeting where they are outvoted two to one. While success of meeting will depend on willingness all parties to compromise rather than on voting alignment, Greeks deeply distrust UK and aware fact Turk elections limit Turk Government's capacity for compromise.

(c) Proposed meeting will put Greek Government in very difficult position vis-à-vis Makarios. Doubtful if Greek Government could participate effectively without support of and active consultations with Makarios during course of meeting. This may also lead Greeks to impose conditions for acceptance.

(d) U.S. participation as observer would undoubtedly make it easier for Greeks to accept.

7. Within context of foregoing, Department is now considering following course of action with respect UK note:

(a) Support idea of meeting attended by UK, Greece, and Turkey with Spaak as observer.

(b) Inform UK we believe we can exert influence more effectively by not participating as observer and that we are prepared to work closely with them before and during meeting.

FYI only. Should it become clear that sine qua non of holding conference is attendance of U.S. as observer, we may wish reconsider this point. End FYI.

(c) Undertake to use our influence together with that of Spaak to get Greece and Turkey to attend without prior commitments. Join with Spaak in pointing out to Greece dangers Soviet bloc involvement in Cyprus through UNGA and in urging Greece to play Cyprus in low key at next UNGA.

(d) Welcome frank discussions in London with UK (in which Spaak might also participate). Attempt to get clearer picture of UK ultimate intentions with respect to Cyprus and of UK relationships with Turks.

(e) Urge upon all parties importance of avoiding premature leaks and of minimizing publicity.

8. Comments of addressee posts desired by August 2.

9. Secretary's attention invited particularly to paragraphs 2 and 7(b).

Herter

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252. Editorial Note

The Embassy in London replied to Tosec 7 (*supra*) in telegram 886, August 2. Regarding parts a, b, c, and d of paragraph 4 of Tosec 7, the Embassy: 1) noted that the British proposal was a tactical maneuver connected with the General Assembly; 2) noted that Macmillan and Lloyd had assured Dulles that the British would not "tint" the conference with a commitment to Turkey; 3) reported that the British regarded military facilities on Cyprus as a way to protect the right flank of NATO, coordinate with Baghdad Pact planning, stabilize the area, and keep Cyprus in the free world; and 4) noted that, regarding British intentions, the Foreign Office indicated that it would approach the conference with an "open but not empty mind". Regarding the question of United States participation in the conference, the Embassy reported that the Foreign Office would be pleased if the United States were to attend, but that it appreciated United States reluctance. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–257)

In Polto 314 from Paris, August 2, the Office of the United States Permanent Representative to NATO noted that it would ideally like to see the conference postponed as it would "almost certainly" aggravate an already bad situation. Instead it suggested that the British, with assistance from the United States and Spaak, should continue to press forward with secret bilateral talks with the Greeks and the Turks. (*Ibid.*)

In telegram 283 from Ankara, August 1, the Embassy noted, regarding paragraph 6 (a) of Tosec 7, that it believed the advantages to be gained from United States attendance at the proposed conference as an observer outweighed the disadvantages. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–157)

In telegram 350 from Athens, July 31, the Embassy noted that the United States should not commit itself so firmly at this stage to

support the British proposal for a tripartite meeting that "we will be obliged either to press Greeks to point where our potential effectiveness vis-à-vis GOG is seriously prejudiced or on the other hand to back away from our support and thus lead British to accuse us of letting them down." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/7–3157)

In telegram 24 from Nicosia, August 1, the Consulate General commented that the United States should participate in the conference with Spaak as an observer. (*Ibid.*, 747.00/8–157)

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253. Memorandum of Discussion at the 333d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 1, 1957 [1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–7.]

8. U.S. Policy toward Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute (Supplement to NSC 5718 [2])

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of the statement of policy toward settlement of the Cyprus dispute (Supplement to NSC 5718). (A copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, together with part of his note on Greece.)

Mr. Cutler noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the Supplement to NSC 5718.

The President asked whether this was not an unusual type of paper for the National Security Council to consider. It appeared to him that the courses of action in the Cyprus Supplement consisted mostly of things the Department of State should do. Mr. Cutler said the Cyprus Supplement had been prepared primarily for the information of the Council. The Planning Board had felt it was difficult to talk about Greece without any mention of Cyprus.

Mr. Cutler then pointed out that there was a difference of opinion in the Planning Board on paragraph 12 of the Supplement, relating to U.S. participation in arrangements guaranteeing the interim or eventual status of Cyprus. Secretary Bowie said that it was conceivable that a guarantee arrangement might be concluded some time in the future, especially if the United States would participate.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on August 2.

[2] Document 256. NSC 5718 is not printed, but see Document 307.

State was not asking that the NSC now approve U.S. participation in a guarantee, but had suggested paragraph 12 of the Supplement in order to alert the Council to the problem. He said State would be prepared to amend the wording of the paragraph so that the phrase "be prepared to give serious consideration to participating" would replace the phrase "be prepared to participate".

The National Security Council: [3]

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in the Supplement to NSC 5718, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported at the meeting.

b. Noted the suggestion by the Department of State that the last sentence of paragraph 12 of the Supplement to NSC 5718 be amended by revising the phrase "be prepared to participate" to read "be prepared to give serious consideration to participating".

c. Noted the President's statement that the statement of policy contained in the Supplement to NSC 5718, as amended above, should be referred to the Secretary of State for his use in the conduct of future U.S. foreign relations with respect to the Cyprus dispute.

Note: The Supplement to NSC 5718, as amended by b above, subsequently referred to the Secretary of State pursuant to the President's action in c above.

[Here follow items 9–10.]

S. Everett Gleason

[3] Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 1763. (Department of State, NSC Records of Action: Lot 66 D 95)

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254. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, August 1, 1957—7 p.m.

867. Following is excerpt pertaining Cyprus from memorandum of conversation prepared by Secretary of meeting with Prime Minister, Selwyn Lloyd and Ambassador evening July 31.

"Cyprus. Lloyd referred to his plan for a conference of UK-Greece-Turkey with Spaak and the US as observers. I said I did not

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–157. Secret; Niact. Limited Distribution.

see how we could wisely act as observers. We had no status, no responsibility and no authority. This was different from Spaak, who as Secretary General of NATO had a responsibility to deal with quarrels between NATO countries. I said we might urge the Greeks to attend but only if we were absolutely convinced that there was no side deal between the UK and the Turks and no private understanding expressed or implied. Both Macmillan and Lloyd assured me with the greatest solemnity that they would go into the conference with a completely open mind and without a commitment of any sort to the Turks. I said under these circumstances we would probably indicate to the Greeks our view that they ought to attend particularly if Spaak was going to be there as apparently he would be. Lloyd asked whether they could tell the Greeks that we had been invited. I said if he thought that served their purpose I saw no objection to it. I said that as Lloyd had suggested earlier in the day [2] we might be willing to have present at the Embassy someone who is particularly familiar with Cyprus matters so that the Embassy would be in a position to take an intelligent interest in what was going on, and there could possibly be consultations outside of the conference if this seemed appropriate.

"Macmillan and Lloyd expressed regret but without any evidence of surprise that we would not actually be in the conference and said they would appreciate our help otherwise. I expressed skepticism of the possibility under the best of circumstances of getting the Greeks to attend. Lloyd reaffirmed that their only purpose was really to get a solution and they had an open mind as to any solution."

Today Selwyn Lloyd sent note to Secretary [3] urgently raising following problem: UK plans formally to propose conference to Greece and Turkey as soon as possible not later than afternoon August 2 or morning August 3, since longer delay increases risk news may reach Greek government from other quarter and Athens may reject proposal out of hand. Selwyn Lloyd stated that if this representation is to succeed, "it is vital that the United States Ambassador in Athens should be able to indicate to the Greeks, without delay, that the United States Government are in favor of the British proposal . . . " [4] He added that an indication US planning make arrangements keep closely informed of proceedings of conference would also be helpful. He concluded with pleas that such instructions be sent American Ambassador on August 2 if practicable. In view tenor of conversation quoted above and in line sug-

[2] According to Dulles' appointment calendar, the Secretary met with Lloyd at the Foreign Office at 10:30 a.m. No record of that conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Lloyd's note to Dulles, dated August 1, was attached to a note from Robert A. McKinnon of the Executive Secretariat to Monteagle Stearns of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, on August 5. A notation on the note by Wood indicates that notice of receipt was given orally to Charles Wiggin of the British Embassy. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–557)

[4] Ellipsis in the source text.

gested course of action para 7(a) Deptel Tosec 7,[5] Embassy recommends that Department instruct US Ambassadors Athens Ankara to state our general support proposed conference, say proposal appears be serious attempt by UK reach settlement problem, recommend careful consideration proposal and emphasize need for secrecy.[6]

Embassy suggests final decision whether US participate in conference be meanwhile deferred, presumably pending Secretary's return.

Secretary has seen this telegram and agrees to above recommendations.

Please repeat this message as desired.

Whitney

[5] Document 251.

[6] During an August 6 meeting among Dulles, Rountree, and Minister of the British Embassy Coulson, the Secretary noted that he doubted whether it would be useful or advisable for the United States to attend the proposed conference. Dulles added that his reservations stemmed from the fact that the United States had no authority or responsibility and no new ideas to propose on the Cyprus matter. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–657)

Dulles later instructed the Embassies at Athens, Ankara, and London to inform the governments concerned that if all the parties agreed, the United States would send an observer "without prior commitment for or against any particular proposal." (Telegram 465 to Athens, August 7; *ibid.*, 747C.00/8–757)

In an August 10 message to Dulles, Lloyd expressed his appreciation to the Secretary for this decision. The text of Lloyd's message was transmitted in circular telegram 129, August 12. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–1257)

255. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece[1]

Washington, August 2, 1957—6:24 p.m.

415. Re Deptel 856 to London,[2] Tosec 7,[3] London 867.[4] *For Athens and Ankara:* Inform soonest government to which you are accredited:

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–257. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jones, Wood, and Timmons. Also sent to Ankara and Paris Topol and repeated to London and Nicosia.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 251.

[3] Document 251.

[4] *Supra.*

1. USG has been informed by UK of proposed meeting to be attended by UK, Greece and Turkey with Spaak as observer to discuss Cyprus problem. UK has stated intention enter such discussion on basis open mind and without fixed agenda.

2. We regard this as desirable move towards arriving at compromise solution of this problem.

3. US hopes government to which you accredited will consider favorably UK proposal and accept invitation without prior conditions.

4. We believe best hope for solution Cyprus problem lies in quiet diplomacy and consequently urge that all parties impose strictest secrecy on their actions with respect this meeting, including fact meeting is being held.

If asked, you should explain that although especially as NATO members we are deeply concerned by Cyprus question, we do not now see how we can appropriately act as observer in question in which we are not a party. It seems to us advantageous that Spaak, who as SYG of NATO has a responsibility to deal with problems between NATO countries, will participate.

FYI Before making above approach we suggest you verify with your British colleague that British approach has been made and is substantially similar to "oral communication" made to us (Deptel 856 to London). Further instructions will follow based on response you receive from GOG or GOT. End FYI.

For USRO: As soon as Athens and Ankara confirm foregoing approach has been made, you may inform Spaak privately of terms of approach. [5]

Herter

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[5] In telegram 394, August 3, Allen informed the Department that he had conveyed to Averoff the pertinent sections of this telegram adding appropriate comment and emphasizing his opinion that the British proposal provided an excellent opportunity for Greece to achieve a clarification of Turkey's position and a Greek refusal would place Greece in a defensive position before world opinion. Among his comments, Averoff noted that Karamanlis agreed in general with this position, but the Foreign Minister cautioned that these were preliminary reactions. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–357) The same day Warren responded in telegram 299 that he had conveyed the points contained in this telegram and that the Turkish Foreign Office promised to transmit the substance to the Prime Minister. (*Ibid.*)

256. National Security Council Report [1]

Supplement to NSC 5718 *Washington, August 5, 1957.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 333rd Council meeting on August 1, 1957 (NSC Action No. 1763):

[Here follows NSC Action No. 1763; for text, see footnote 3, Document 253.]

The President has this date approved the above actions. Accordingly, the enclosed revised page 2 of the Supplement to NSC 5718, incorporating the amendment referred to in b above, is transmitted herewith for insertion in all copies, with the request that the superseded page be destroyed by burning, in accordance with security regulations.

In accordance with c above, the Supplement to NSC 5718 is being referred to the Secretary of State for his use in the conduct of future U.S. foreign relations with respect to the Cyprus dispute.

S. Everett Gleason
Acting Executive Secretary

[Enclosure]

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS DISPUTE

Objectives

1. Support concept of the attainment by the Cypriots of a government of their own choice in a manner that will protect the legitimate interests of our allies and of all groups on the island.

2. Pursue policies designed to preserve NATO unity.

3. Support efforts to retain continued access to NATO members and continued denial to the Soviet Bloc of the strategically important bases on Cyprus.

4. Avoid involving the United States in a settlement that will require significant U.S. economic or military support.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5718 Memoranda. Secret. NSC 5718 is not printed, but see Document 307.

Policy Guidance

5. Keep the primary responsibility for working out a peaceful solution in the hands of the Cypriots and the three countries primarily concerned. Be prepared to support a peaceful and practical compromise solution acceptable to all interested parties.

6. Support NATO efforts to resolve the problem. Be prepared to use our influence in support of a reasonable solution developed within the framework of NATO good offices.

7. Encourage some form of direct negotiations among the British, Greek, and Turkish Governments.

8. Encourage direct negotiations between the United Kingdom and representatives of the Cypriot communities toward self-government.

9. Encourage interested parties to enlist the support of the Cyprus and Greek Orthodox Churches to any mutually acceptable settlement.

10. Encourage interested parties to attempt to solve the problem through quiet diplomacy rather than in the UN forums.

11. Encourage the British to remain as ruling power pending agreement on the ultimate status of the island.

12. Preserve U.S. Government maneuverability by not freezing our position for the present in favor of any specific formula. If necessary to bring about a solution acceptable to the interested parties, on terms which will strengthen NATO interests in the Mediterranean, be prepared to give serious consideration to participating in arrangements guaranteeing the interim or eventual status of Cyprus.

257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

Washington, August 29, 1957—6:16 p.m.

748. Re Athens Embtel 420; [2] Ankara Embtel 341. [3] We concur with Athens and Ankara that GOG and GOT should be encouraged negotiate directly. If our advice sought we suggest that quiet Turk-Greek diplomatic negotiations and not Karamanlis–Menderes meeting be encouraged at this time.

FYI. Our present thinking question of high level meeting is colored by fact that in view possible London Conference and imminent Turkish elections quiet diplomatic negotiations between two countries likely at present be more fruitful than meeting at PM level. If such diplomatic negotiations (which could be expected to take up a number of weeks at minimum) were to show an area of common Greek-Turk agreement regarding Cyprus solution then a Karamanlis–Menderes meeting to put finishing touches on such an understanding and commence new era Greek-Turkish relations might well pay off. On other hand if Menderes and Karamanlis face each other without adequate advance preparations and feel constrained take firm public position at this point primarily for domestic reasons, meeting might be seriously counterproductive.

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–657. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Ankara, repeated to London and Paris, and pouched to Nicosia.

[2] Telegram 420 from Athens, August 6, transmitted the highlights of a meeting between Allen and Averoff that morning. According to the Ambassador, the Greek Foreign Minister noted that Greece was prepared to make a "bold new approach" to the Turks—including the prospect of a trip to Ankara by Karamanlis and Averoff. (*Ibid.*)

[3] On August 8, the Embassy at Ankara informed the Department that a Karamanlis–Averoff visit to Ankara would have a "salutary" effect even if no substantive progress resulted on the Cyprus problem. (Telegram 341 from Ankara, August 8; *ibid.*, 747C.00/8–857)

258. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, August 29, 1957—7:19 p.m.

1707. Deptel 1379; [2] London tel 1247. [3] Secretary has approved idea informal secret talks with UK re Cyprus on following basis and British Embassy here so informed:

A. We welcome invitation to exchange further views on Cyprus question on an informal and secret basis.

B. We regard such discussions as exploratory only and a continuation of regular diplomatic exchanges we and British have conducted on this problem.

C. We hope there will be no suggestion that talks procedurally constitute a development sufficiently formal as to raise apprehensions, should their secrecy be violated, that we and British are undertaking to reach a substantive solution to exclusion of Greeks and Turks on a matter involving their interests.

D. That Barbour will attend for United States, assisted as appropriate by a Departmental officer cognizant latest Dept. views.

You authorized inform Foreign Office Barbour prepared participate in talks within context foregoing. [4] Ascertain time British wish start talks and information on British representation.

Instructions follow for Barbour's use in talks.

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–1957. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wood. Also sent to Paris Topol and repeated to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

[2] In telegram 1379 to London, August 17, the Department informed the Embassy that Wiggin had informed the Department that Great Britain was interested in beginning secret talks with the United States on Cyprus whether or not the Greeks agreed to attend the proposed London Conference. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–1757)

[3] In telegram 1247 from London, August 19, the Embassy reported, that the latest British move to begin secret talks with the United States represented determination to advance a solution on Cyprus. The Embassy added that the United States should welcome an opportunity for discussion but that discussions should be viewed as a continuation of regular diplomatic discussions rather than constituting any new procedure. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–1957)

[4] On August 30, Caccia delivered the following message from Macmillan to Dulles:

"I am very glad to hear that you have agreed to informal, secret and exploratory talks with us about Cyprus. You know how much I believe that we must try to work together on this as on other matters and talk with frankness and confidence.

"But this is, of course, a matter of the greatest delicacy for us. I know that you understand that secrecy is vital, but I should be grateful if you would ensure that knowledge of our conversations is kept to the smallest possible circle as it will be on our side." (*Ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Dulles Correspondence 1955–1959)

259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, September 5, 1957—5:17 p.m.

1860. For Barbour. Ref London 1556. [2] Following for your guidance in bilateral talks with UK authorized in Deptel 1707. [3]

I. Background

Latest Greek reply to UK (Deptel 1743 London [4]) and continued uncertainty over date Turkish elections (Ankara 395 [5] and 562 [6]) make holding London tripartite meeting doubtful. Its being held in immediate future or prior to UNGA now virtually out of question. London US–UK talks may, therefore, be in somewhat different context from that originally anticipated and UK may now emphasize problem of UNGA tactics. We nonetheless welcome these talks in hope that they will establish more adequate exchanges with British on Cyprus problem. In our desire to establish such communications, we should however avoid in fact or in appearance substantive understandings to exclusion of Greeks and Turks on matter involving their interests. These talks must therefore be kept on strictly informal and secret basis.

II. Probable British Objectives at Talks

A. Ascertain nature of current US thinking on Cyprus.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–3157. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Jones. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Paris Topol, and Nicosia.

[2] Telegram 1556, August 31, reported that bilateral talks with the British would begin, if the United States agreed, toward the end of the week. Permanent Under Secretary Hoyer Millar or Deputy Under Secretary Hayter would probably represent the British. (*Ibid.*)

[3] *Supra.*

[4] Telegram 1743, August 30, transmitted the summary of a Greek aide-mémoire presented to the British Ambassador in Athens by Averoff on August 27. Among other things, the aide-mémoire rejected Britain's proposals for a conference to discuss Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–2957)

[5] Telegram 395, August 16, reported that Esenbel had informed Warren that Turkey could not send representatives to a conference on Cyprus until after the Turkish national elections scheduled for October 15. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–1657)

[6] Telegram 562, August 30, reported that despite the intention of the Prime Minister to hold elections around mid-October, Democratic Party leaders might have, for one reason or another, decided to hold elections at the normal time in May 1958, or even in 1959. (*Ibid.*, 782.00/8–3057)

B. Test out on US current trend of British thinking, including defense plans and ideas on three-power condominium (Depcirctel 129[7]).

C. Seek understanding with US on tactics at UNGA.

III. US Tactics at Talks

Within context of the broad criteria set forth in Deptel 1707, you should be governed by following considerations:

A. Endeavor to ascertain British intentions with respect to Cyprus. This should include defense plans (including type of installations, location of enclaves, and projected rate of military expenditures), plans for retention or divestment of governing responsibility, timing of such divestment if intended, and interim plans pending formal and final divestment. You should establish assumption that any divestment will be an orderly one and associated with an understanding among interested parties concerning interim arrangement for or ultimate status of Cyprus.

B. Explore question of interim arrangements versus ultimate status. Tempers of interested parties leave serious doubt that agreement on ultimate status now possible. Moreover, dispute has assumed such character that any interim arrangements, including self-government, may have to be settled in international forum. In view UK difficulties in providing forum at proposed London tripartite meeting, it may be desirable to emphasize again role that Spaak can plan in this direction. Arrangements might be made whereby techniques used in settlement Trieste dispute might be brought to Spaak's attention.

C. US not prepared to espouse any particular solution either as to interim arrangements or ultimate status, but believes it useful to consider criteria against which any proposed solution should be tested. Those provided in HMG oral communication (Deptel 856 London[8]) provide useful point of departure: i.e., (a) retention of essential military facilities under British sovereignty; (b) protection of island from Communist infiltration; (c) establishment peace and tranquility in island as a whole. We believe that: (1) these criteria might be further explored and refined in course of talks; (2) compro-

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[7] Circular telegram 129, August 12, sent to London, Athens, Ankara, Paris, and Nicosia, transmitted the text of a memorandum from Lloyd to Dulles and a proposed British reply to the Greek Government regarding the latter's reply to the British proposal for a conference on Cyprus. Lloyd's memorandum to the Secretary expressed Britain's appreciation for the prospects of a U.S. observer at the proposed conference, speculated on Greece's motives in rejecting Britain's proposals, expressed regret at Greek conditions for attending the conference, indicated the possibilities of some compromise on Cyprus, and noted the importance of bringing Greece to the conference table. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–1257)

[8] See footnote 3, Document 251.

mise assuring preservation of NATO unity should be another criterion; (3) account should be taken of viability of Cypriot economy under any future set up and desirability of avoiding international financial burden; (4) means should be considered for enlisting support and cooperation of orthodox churches in arriving at solution.

D. While we are interested in UK thinking, we feel that it is still premature to define UNGA tactics and also feel that any negotiation concerning either our tactics or position at UNGA should be avoided. We continue to believe solution of the Cyprus problem is to be found through quiet diplomacy rather than through public forums and that our UNGA tactics should be directed to those ends. This will require US to maintain maximum tactical flexibility. Generally speaking we should endeavor to avoid discussions and forestall resolution that would prejudice prospect for future negotiations or provide basis for increased Soviet Bloc or Afro-Asian bloc involvement in Cyprus. In view absence any significant progress toward solution since last UNGA resolution, we recognize it may be difficult to forestall resolution calling for specific solution either in direction of interim arrangements or ultimate status.

IV. Liaison with Spaak

You should suggest that UK and USG both undertake to inform Spaak of talks and to keep him currently informed. After British agreement obtained, Perkins should see Spaak and so inform him. You should of course mention in appropriate terms need for secrecy. Perkins may also inform Spaak of Barbour's terms of reference (Deptel 1707 to London) and substance of parts I and III of this cable.

V. Reporting and Guidance

Detailed guidance will be provided as required, on basis full reports which should be made of each session. You may find it useful to refer to Cyprus supplement to NSC 5718/1[9] which contains major policy guidance on Cyprus problem generally. Dep Director GTI[10] arriving London September 8.

Dulles

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[9] Printed as an Enclosure to Document 256.

[10] Murat Williams arrived on September 8 to assist in the secret bilateral talks on Cyprus.

260. Editorial Note

Between September 10 and 18, representatives of the United States, led by Walworth Barbour, and representatives of the United Kingdom, led by Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, held secret and informal discussions in London on the Cyprus problem. British officials expressed their willingness to withdraw from Cyprus provided that Britain maintain sovereignty over certain military facilities on the island. Various proposals were also examined for both an interim and a long-term solution to the problem of the status of Cyprus. Both a NATO trusteeship and guaranteed independence were given serious consideration. The British representatives believed, however, that the best solution to the problem might be a condominium in which the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey would share responsibility for that part of the island not retained for British military installations. According to the tentative plan, Cyprus would be administered by a governor selected by the three governments concerned. Self-government would be based on a constitution. The United States representatives, on instructions from the Department of State, agreed that the British proposal had merit and was worth pursuing. British and American representatives agreed that as a next step the British might suggest their proposal to NATO Secretary General Spaak. (The agreed minute of the discussions was transmitted in telegram 1969 from London, September 19; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1957) A brief summary of the conversations is also in a memorandum from Jones to Rountree, September 16; *ibid.*, 747C.00/9–1657)

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261. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, September 16, 1957—6:57 p.m.

2154. London 1778, 1812, 1846, 1856.[2] For Barbour. Your prompt and full reports on London talks appreciated. Ideas of

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1357. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Paris Topol, and Nicosia.

[2] Telegram 1778, September 11, transmitted the highlights of the first session of talks on Cyprus between the United States and the United Kingdom. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/9–1157) Telegram 1812, September 12, conveyed the results of the second session of

condominium and alternative NATO roles particularly interesting. We agree on desirability concluding bilateral talks before UNGA opens and suggest this be done along following lines.

A. Inform British we find condominium concept an interesting one and we would like see this idea developed more fully. If this concept should be pursued we agree with Barbour's suggestion Spaak might better put it to Greeks and Turks as his own idea. We would inform Spaak British discussed idea with us, that we found it of interest as another approach to a possible solution to Cyprus problem that is worthy further development, that we have asked to be kept informed as it is developed, and that we would be particularly interested learning Spaak's reaction to it.

B. Endeavor develop further British thinking on details of condominium: (1) At first sight condominium appears to be interim arrangement. Do British in fact envisage its continuing indefinitely? How will time element be defined to Greeks and Turks? (2) Are British aware Turks have mentioned condominium off and on over past several years and might not apparent British adoption Turk idea militate against its acceptance by Greeks? FYI. It appears likely British have in fact already discussed this with Turks. End FYI. In any event we would hope for time being British would discourage Turks from publicly supporting condominium. (3) How would condominium's sponsor reassure Greeks they would not be outvoted by UK and Turks within condominium. FYI. In event UK Labor Party comes into power condominium might offer more opportunities for ultimate solution favorable to Greece. Greeks might not therefore reject condominium out of hand. End FYI. (4) Ascertain more precisely NATO role and relationship in establishing condominium, adjudicating disputes, and providing for military defense. Believe suggestion that differences between co-domini be settled by arrangement involving NATO countries other than UK, Greece, and Turkey requires early study particularly as to organizational framework within NATO for handling such disputes. (5) How would condominium be negotiated? It occurs to us Spaak might take lead in negotiations of Trieste-type.[3] Account should be taken of role Cypriot groups would play in negotiations and how, if at all, church and/or ethnarchy might be identified with agreement in order fore-

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talks. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/9–1257) Telegrams 1846 and 1856, September 13, transmitted the highlights of the third and fourth sessions of the talks. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/9–1357)

[3] Presumably a reference to the secret talks held in London by the American negotiator Llewellyn Thompson, and the British negotiator, Geoffrey Harrison, first with Yugoslav representatives, February–May 1954, and then with Italian representatives, June–August 1954. The talks led to a resolution of the Trieste dispute in October 1954. For documentation on these talks, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pages 365 ff. and 439 ff.

stall continuation enosis campaign and consequent continued exacerbation Greek-Turkish community relations.

C. Follow up on Barbour's expression of "interest in exploring some other kind NATO relationship to Cyprus" (para 2 London 1812).

D. In any further discussions of independence, take into account USG reservations on this solution reflected in NSC supplement on Cyprus [4] and fact that since arrival in US, [5] Makarios has publicly coupled independence and enosis as acceptable solution Cyprus problem. Enosis and independence as ultimate solutions likely to be equally unacceptable to Turks, for present at least. Condominium or some other type of interim arrangement (also perhaps involving NATO) might provide useful cooling off period that would enable Greeks and Turks to get together in time on ultimate status that might include a Greek quid pro quo acceptable to Turks in return for ultimate enosis. While not ruling out independence, we believe enosis on this basis offers more hope for long term area stability than independence. We doubt Cypriots equipped for immediate independence, guaranteed or otherwise, and fear chaos would result. Immediate independence under some sort of tutelage partakes character of self-government and might better be considered in that context.

E. Indicate to British we would like "details to be provided and forwarded" (para 5 London 1778) on future UK base requirements to include comparative figures showing present and future estimates of British military expenditures in Cyprus and how British believe gap could be met without reduction of present standard of living on island. We would welcome any British staff studies supporting their thinking on future viability of island and possible lines for sharing financial and other responsibilities among co-domini.

F. Endeavor obtain a fuller British estimate Communist capabilities and present Communist tactics on Cyprus.

G. Inform British our UNGA position under active study here and we in contact with their delegation in New York.

H. Obtain agreement with British on separate approaches to Spaak following conclusion meeting. Williams authorized proceed Paris to assist Perkins in connection such talks with Spaak as might be agreed. Instructions will follow for Perkins.

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[4] Document 256.

[5] On September 12, Makarios arrived in the United States to campaign for the independence of Cyprus and to collaborate with the Greek Delegation to the Twelfth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, which opened on September 17. Makarios was received in New York City by both Mayor Robert Wagner and Governor Harriman. The Archbishop appeared on NBC's "Meet the Press" and addressed the National Press Club in Washington. Makarios left the United States in December.

Express gratification over this opportunity to have had such useful exchange views with British and leave door open to resumption as occasion warrants at later date.

Murphy

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262. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State [1]

Washington, September 14, 1957.

THE QUESTION OF CYPRUS

The Problem

On July 12, 1957, Greece submitted for the fourth time "Question of Cyprus" for inclusion in the provisional agenda of the 12th session of the General Assembly. The Greek item has two parts: (a) "Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus" (the same formulation as in the Greek proposals in 1954, 1955 and 1956); and (b) "Violation of human rights and atrocities by the British colonial administration against the Cypriots".

United States Position

1. To the extent feasible in light of other considerations influencing the order of items in the Political Committee, the United States should support and encourage efforts seeking to ensure that the Cyprus item will not be considered before the Turkish elections scheduled for October 27.

2. (a) The United States should emphasize its conviction that the only way to solve the Cyprus question is through quiet diplomacy among those parties concerned—Greece, the UK and Turkey. It should state its belief that there are various possible solutions which would protect the interests of the parties and peoples involved.

(b) The United States should seek to exercise a moderating influence on the parties involved. In particular, it should urge the parties not to press any resolution which would prejudge the future

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1457. Secret. Drafted by Shaw, Sisco, and Brown and attached to a brief covering memorandum from Wilcox to Dulles.

status of Cyprus or which would in other ways make more difficult the renewal of negotiations and undermine the prospects for peaceful settlement. The United States may also encourage others, such as India, to exercise a moderating influence on the parties.

(c) The United States should not take the lead on this item, except where such action may be necessary to insure the success of a compromise resolution acceptable to the parties directly concerned and consequently to the United States.

3. In keeping with the above and subject to review by the Department of any specific proposal, the United States should:

(a) In general, support any resolution acceptable to all of the parties (Greece, the UK, Turkey).

(b) In particular, support a resolution along the line of the one adopted at the 11th General Assembly on the grounds that it would give the parties maximum latitude for arranging direct negotiations but would not prejudge the ultimate solution of the Cyprus problem.

(c) Oppose resolutions of the type noted in paragraph 3(b) above, e.g., a resolution condemning the UK administration of Cyprus or a resolution condemning the Greeks for inciting terrorism on Cyprus, on the grounds that a solution can only be reached through an agreement between the parties involved and that such resolutions would only make an agreement more difficult to attain.

(d) Oppose any resolution providing for establishment of a good offices committee or a similar body to deal directly with the problem of Cyprus.

(e) Consult the Department concerning the position to be taken on other resolutions which might be presented.

Comment

In 1954 the General Assembly, by a vote of 49 (US, Greece, UK, Turkey)–0–11, adopted a resolution according to which it decided not to consider the item further. In 1955 the Assembly refused to inscribe the Greek item on Cyprus by a vote of 28–22–10, the US opposing inscription. This action reflected the conviction that "quiet diplomacy" offered a better prospect for the successful conclusion of the then current negotiations between the UK and Greece than General Assembly discussion. In 1956 both the United Kingdom and Greece submitted items on Cyprus, and both were included in the agenda without objection or formal vote. The Greek proposal called for self-determination for Cyprus and the British proposal was entitled "Support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus". On February 27, 1957, the General Assembly adopted an Indian compromise resolution which "expressed the earnest desire that a peaceful,

democratic and just solution will be found, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end". The United States supported this resolution.

While the situation on Cyprus and Anglo-Greek relations have improved somewhat, there have been no further direct negotiations. Greece took the position that the 11th GA resolution required negotiations between the British and the Cypriots, while the United Kingdom contended that the resolution was intended to cover not only such negotiations but also negotiations among the three governments concerned, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

However, some progress has been made. The British Government has released Archbishop Makarios from his exile in the Seychelles Islands, and violence on Cyprus has largely subsided. The Secretary General of NATO, Paul Henri Spaak, offered his good offices to the three governments concerned but has so far been unsuccessful in bringing about a resumption of negotiations under the aegis of NATO.

Meantime there has been a helpful modification of the British position. The United Kingdom has expressed a willingness to surrender its sovereignty over Cyprus if a mutually acceptable solution can be reached and has reduced its minimum conditions to (1) essential military facilities to remain under British sovereignty, (2) protection of Cyprus from Communist infiltration, and (3) establishment of peace and tranquillity on the island as a whole. Greece now appears willing to consider "guaranteed independence" or dominion status for Cyprus. Turkey continues to favor partition but might shift its position in the absence of British support.

In August the United Kingdom through diplomatic channels proposed a tripartite conference including the three governments, with the United States and M. Spaak to attend in the capacity of observers. The British proposal contemplates a conference on the ultimate status of the island. There would be no fixed agenda. Spaak immediately agreed to attend as an observer, and later the United States reluctantly concurred. Turkey reacted favorably but indicated it could not attend the conference until after the Turkish elections which are scheduled for October 27. Greece rejected the British proposal but qualified its answer in such a way as to permit reconsideration of its position. Moreover, at British initiative arrangements have been made for secret informal talks in London between the United Kingdom and the United States.

The United States continues to believe that the best prospect for a satisfactory solution lies in quiet diplomacy involving direct negotiations among the parties. Debate of the item in the General Assembly would probably not be helpful and could exacerbate the

existing situation. Consequently, the United States should seek to exercise a moderating influence on any debate in the General Assembly in the hope of facilitating a return to direct negotiations and should encourage others, such as India, to do likewise. It is clear that Greece is determined to press the question of Cyprus in the General Assembly in the hope that discussion there will strengthen its own position in any future negotiations.

Discussion of the Cyprus question prior to or concurrently with the Turkish elections would only serve to make the Turkish position at the Assembly more inflexible and to inflame popular passions in Turkey. It would therefore be desirable to delay substantive discussion of the issue until after the Turkish elections.

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263. Editorial Note

On September 13, 5 days before the opening of the Twelfth General Assembly, Greece noted, in an explanatory memorandum, that no progress had been made on the Cyprus issue since February 26, 1957, the date of the last Assembly resolution on the subject.

On September 13, in a discussion among Ambassador Caccia, Rountree, and Harold Beeley of the British Embassy, Secretary Dulles acknowledged that it would be helpful to avoid the language of the Greek item for inscription and added that he would consider the matter to see what the United States might do under the circumstances. (Memorandum of conversation by Rountree, September 13, 1957; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1357)

On September 17 at 10:25 a.m., Eisenhower telephoned Dulles. According to the transcript of the conversation, the following exchange regarding Cyprus occurred:

"The Sec. said the Greek-Turkey thing is in a mess. The Pres. said the Greeks are demanding unless we take their side, they will be tough. The Sec. said we probably won't favor putting it on the UN Agenda because if it comes up, it will be a shambles, but we need more definite commitments from the British. They dragged the Turks in and got them excited so the issue is considered to be Greek-Turkish and not Greek-British. The Pres. said Cyprus never belonged to Greece." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

On September 18, at 10:15 a.m. Dulles called Lloyd. According to the transcript of the conversation:

"The Secretary said we had to give an answer on Cyprus. He said the Norwegians were prepared to consolidate this Greek proposal into an innocuous single item and wondered if this was OK with Selwyn Lloyd. The Norwegians had checked with us to be sure that we were all lined up together.

"Selwyn Lloyd apparently inquired about lunch and they agreed the Secretary would come to Mr. Lloyd's suite at 1:30 today." (*Ibid.*, Telephone Conversations—General)

In Delga 13, September 18, the United States Delegation at the United Nations informed the Department of State:

"This morning we informed Norwegians and UK we could support move by former to revise title to read: 'The Cyprus question'. Just before general committee meeting Lodge informed Averoff (Greece) who said he was 'disappointed but not surprised'. We also informed other members General Committee we could support this move. After item changed by vote 11–0–4 (UK, USSR, Czech, France), Lloyd (UK) expressed satisfaction to Lodge at ease with which this accomplished." (Department of State, Central Files, 320.5747C/9–1857)

On September 20, the General Assembly decided to place the Cyprus issue on its agenda and referred it to the First Committee.

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264. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, September 17, 1957—5 p.m.

Secto 1. In conversation with Secretary, Averoff spoke hopefully of clarification in Cyprus situation (without specifically citing guaranteed independence), but impaired danger of communal violence on Cyprus if no progress at UN. Said he wished postpone debate until after Turk elections.

Secretary strongly urged that GOG change its item as proposed July 12 since it appeared unduly provocative and might arouse passions making solution more difficult. He pointed out this was not

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1757. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, Paris Topol, and Nicosia. Dulles was in New York to attend the opening of the Twelfth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

time to attack British who we convinced, were anxious to settle reasonably.

. . . . . .

Rountree pointed out GOG item as now constituted would probably produce counter item from British and cause bitter debate.

Dulles

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265. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, October 7, 1957—8:38 p.m.

2592. Embtel 2180. [2] Embassy may inform HMG along following lines that after considering our talks with them in London and after further consideration of condominium proposal, we feel it would be unwise seek persuade Spaak to advocate a particular solution before exploratory talks on his part.

Firstly, we are not sufficiently convinced of the merits of any of them to do so. We believe that condominium plan as outlined to us presents serious problems of which the greatest would be question of where ultimate authority lies in event dispute between co-domini or crisis on Island. Even assuming that Governor had unusual ability, he would need either strong support from co-domini or general acceptance by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots of his administration. Former would be unlikely since it should be assumed Greece and Turkey, as co-domini, likely be in disagreement; latter would take time and great skill. Our London talks have shown other suggested solutions also present difficulties.

We do not wish to rule out these solutions and are mindful HMG's comments on them but believe that there is a greater

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–157. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wood and signed by Dulles. Repeated Paris Topol, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia and pouched to USUN.

[2] In telegram 2180, October 1, the Embassy informed the Department that the British had decided to postpone their approach to Spaak regarding the condominium plan until the United States had further time to study the proposal. The Embassy expressed the hope that the Department could facilitate study of the plan and requested any ideas that the Department might have about "interim information", which might be conveyed to Spaak. (*Ibid.*)

likelihood of progress if we concentrate more attention on devising an acceptable procedure for the transmission of views between the parties.

This leads to our second reason for not wishing urge a particular solution on Spaak. We continue believe Spaak can play useful mediatory role as NATO SYG. However, Spaak has already attempted persuade parties of merits of a particular solution (guaranteed independence) without success. Also, most solutions thus far proposed are considered as having originated with one of parties and thus less likely be acceptable to others. Acceptable solution more likely be blend of present proposals. We believe Spaak might more usefully adopt general method of collecting views of U.K., Greece, and Turkey in separate talks without championing any particular solution and seek gradually find basis for common understanding on an interim arrangement. This would take time but we believe time is necessary element any progress this question. We would like to speak to Spaak about the London talks if no serious objection is perceived as soon as possible and also give our views along the foregoing lines. We would, of course, fully inform HMG of this discussion.

We think this would be more in line with HMG's idea of negotiations without agenda and hence less apt to frighten off Greeks or Turks. However, we are frankly not sanguine about the possible success of a London meeting of the three powers which could not avoid publicity and are thus more inclined favor secret separate talks in Paris, where all three countries well represented.

We intend explore this promptly with Spaak because we would hope that after careful preparation such talks could be started soon.

In general we believe Cyprus question less tense than last year but that nevertheless on international plane agreement on a final solution unlikely now. We feel it more realistic expect that months of serious effort will be needed to reach international understanding on some interim arrangement. For this reason we urge HMG consider taking series small but concrete steps on Cyprus itself to give Cypriots greater participation their own affairs. Preferably there should be no advance publicity or discussions which usually bring automatic critical response. This would help relieve local tensions on Island while secret international talks in progress. These might include some elements Radcliffe proposals but without so designating them.

FYI Embassy may also wish reexamine Jernegan letter to Foster of March 15, 1955[3] with view to raising points therein with HMG if

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

Embassy considers useful. Extra copies being furnished all addressees. End FYI.

Dulles

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266. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 22, 1957 [1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus Problem [2]

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador to the United States
Lord Samuel Hood, British Minister
Mr. Roger Jackling, Head of Chancery
Mr. Denis Laskey, Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary
Mr. W. Morris, First Secretary of Embassy

Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Mr. John Hay Whitney, Ambassador to Great Britain
Mr. Lane Timmons, Director, European Regional Affairs
Mr. William N. Dale, Officer in Charge, United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs

Mr. Lloyd noted that General Harding's resignation as Governor of Cyprus has been announced and then pointed out that the Greeks have become more obdurate since the Cyprus resolution adopted by the Labor Party Conference. [3] Mr. Lloyd did not think that much could be done now until after the Turkish elections. [4] He said that the British had hoped that, if they could get the parties concerned around a table, eventually they would come to agree on some compromise which everyone could accept. In this context they had developed the tridominium concept, not expecting that it would be accepted to begin with but that it might be useful as an eventual

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[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Dale.

[2] Macmillan was in Washington for 3 days of discussions with U.S. officials.

[3] On October 4, the Labour Party Conference expressed its intent to resolve the Cyprus problem by granting the island self-determination. The Colonial Office announced on October 22 that Sir Hugh Foot would succeed Harding.

[4] Turkish elections were held on October 27. Menderes' Democratic Party won 421 seats in the Grand National Assembly; the Republican People's Party won 173 seats; the Freedom Party, 4 seats; and the Republican National Party, 4 seats.

compromise. He noted that at first the US officials appeared to like the idea but that now we seemed to feel it has disadvantages.

The Secretary replied that we were not so much concerned over the disadvantages of the plan as with its practicability. He did not think that the Greeks could accept it because it would give the Turks a legal status on Cyprus.

The Foreign Secretary said that the British would be in a state of suspended animation regarding the Cyprus problem until after the Turkish elections. He noted that there would be a thirty-day gap between these elections and the date when the Cyprus item is scheduled for UN debate in December, during which time he hoped fruitful discussions might take place. He believed that the Greeks will probably start a campaign about November first to get Britain's friends to bring pressure to bear on the UK in preparation for the UN debate. Mr. Lloyd observed that the present situation on the island is precarious and that terrorism could start again at any moment. He stated that the British could no longer, in terms of money or manpower, afford to keep the same number of troops on Cyprus as Harding had had to suppress terrorism and that a reduction will take place phased over the next three to four years.

Mr. Elbrick said that Mr. Spaak will probably have something to say on the Cyprus question when he comes later this week.

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267. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, November 25, 1957—9:51 p.m.

1727. Forthcoming debate on Cyprus in UNGA, urgent British desire to lessen burdens of Cyprus status quo and expected interest in Cyprus during Paris NATO ministerial meeting, all underline importance of continuing our attempt in quiet diplomacy to assist parties concerned in their efforts to get together and solve controversy.

In frequent discussions during past year, British and Greeks have shown flexibility in respective positions. UK has privately expressed willingness under reasonable conditions to accept even

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1957. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Williams and approved by Howe. Also sent to London and repeated to Ankara, Paris Topol, and Nicosia.

solution which will mean end of UK sovereignty of island outside modest base area (London 1969 [2]). Both GOG Foreign Minister and Cyprus Ethnarch have repeatedly indicated they can accept solution short of enosis (London 3106 [3] and Athens 1050 [4]).

For many reasons including especially Turkish elections, there have been relatively few discussions in recent months with leaders of Turkish Government on Cyprus problem. All public statements reveal Turkey holding rigidly to partition of island between Greece and Turkey as only acceptable alternative (other than Turkish annexation) to status quo.

It is clear to Department that Turkey considers its readiness to accept partition as evidence of its willingness to make concessions. Yet it is equally clear that outright partition as solution presents such difficulties (Deptel 2416 [5]) that those who sincerely desire solution must carefully study variants thereof or other possibilities. In light of mutual desire for free world harmony and NATO solidarity, we believe Turkish Government will recognize need for Turkish concessions as well as concessions by all other interested parties to achieve lasting solution to this problem and thus contribute to peace in eastern Mediterranean.

Accordingly Department desires Embassy Ankara to take advantage of appropriate opportunities to impress upon Turkish Government at high level importance which we attach to solution of Cyprus question. With prospects poor for either enosis or outright partition and with need great for some solution, those who wish to solve problem must consider seriously other interim or long-term solutions in spirit that recognizes overriding importance of NATO solidarity. Most careful examination of problem bilaterally and multilaterally is called for and we trust that Turks will welcome opportunity to exchange views with those concerned and those who for sake of common interests are seeking to assist in solutions.

In approach to Turks Embassy should also say US Government particularly welcomes Spaak's interest in problem and reports of direct Turk-Greek talks. While not necessarily associating ourselves with any specific proposals that Spaak or the Greeks may make, we welcome and encourage any bilateral or multilateral exchange of views of this type that might lead to compromise proposal. NATO summit meeting in Paris [6] will doubtless offer opportunity for private talks between high level Greeks and Turks.

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[2] Dated September 19. (*Ibid.*)
[3] Dated November 15. (*Ibid.*)
[4] Dated October 8. (*Ibid.*)
[5] Printed as telegram 7312 to London, Document 241.
[6] Reference is to the Heads of Government Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at Paris, December 16–19.

If you deem it appropriate you may remark that Greek interpretation of British Labor Party resolution [7] has had profound effect in Greece, where there is growing conviction that GOG may accept nothing short of enosis since Greeks believe Labor Party victory in 1960 or before will mean enosis. Department will appreciate Ankara's estimate of impact if any of Labor Party's resolution in Turkey. Specifically may Turks be led to accept compromise (other than outright partition which they consider to be such) in anticipation of eventual change in UK policy favorable to Greece?

FYI. In your discussions with Turks we recognize that any direct attack on Turkish advocacy of partition might not be useful. However, you should bear in mind that Department has grave misgivings regarding both partition and enosis. If you have reason to believe Turks may suspect our approach motivated by Pesmazoglu (Ankara 1444 [8]) you should emphasize timing of these instructions determined by other impelling factors, e.g., end of Turkish electoral campaign, Spaak's activities and NATO Ministerial meeting. End FYI. [9]

London: Inform Foreign Office that we are instructing Embassy Ankara to make this approach to Turkish Government, and express gratification UK resuming Cyprus discussion with Turks (London 3235 [10]).

Dulles

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[7] Reference is to the statement adopted by the Labour Party at its 56th annual conference at Brighton, September 30–October 4. The part of the statement dealing with Cyprus reads:

"Cyprus should be given the right of self-determination and after a set period may opt for Greece: but it is fully possible that the Cypriots, once the right of self-determination has been conceded, may decide to stay within the Commonwealth." (Transmitted in telegram 2328 from London, October 9; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–957)

[8] Telegram 1444, November 19, reported the substance of a conversation between the Greek Ambassador to Turkey, Pesmazolu, and Warren during which the Greek Ambassador stressed his determination to find a solution to the Cyprus dispute. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/11–1957)

[9] Throughout October and November, Spaak continued his discussions with the Greeks and the British in an effort to find a framework for a Cyprus settlement that might prove acceptable to the Turks. Among Spaak's proposals were a formula for a settlement that guaranteed independence for Cyprus; a NATO base on the island occupied by British forces; and an international statute preserving the rights of minorities. (Polto 1333 from Paris, November 18; *ibid.*, 747C.00/11–1857)

[10] Telegram 3235, November 21, transmitted a summary of instructions being sent to the British Ambassador in Ankara with respect to exploring the Cyprus situation with the Turks. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/11–2157)

On December 2, Warren informed the Department that he had conveyed the substance of this telegram to President Bayar. Commenting on the conversation, the Ambassador noted that it seemed that the Turks were pressing forward with their ideas on partition and could not retreat. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–257)

268. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 2, 1957 [1]

SUBJECT

Cyprus: Greek Plans for UNGA

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Evangelos Averoff, Greek Foreign Minister
Mr. George V. Melas, Greek Ambassador

The Secretary
Mr. William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary, IO
Mr. Murat W. Williams, Deputy Director, GTI

The Greek Foreign Minister opened his discussion with the Secretary today by extensive remarks on the Middle East designed apparently to show that the Greeks were good allies in a crisis, ...

Mr. Averoff then turned to the one subject upon which, he said, all others depend—Cyprus. He felt the situation in recent months was both better and worse. It was better because the British attitude had clearly improved and the British had now shown themselves ready to accept a "quite logical solution to the problem". The situation was worse because there seemed to be a new "intransigence" on the part of Turkey and there were prospects of a resumption of fighting in Cyprus itself.

Mr. Averoff emphasized that the Greek people now realized that *not* the United Kingdom but Turkey stood in the way of a solution of the Cyprus problem. He remarked that the British Ambassador in Athens had even said that he, the Ambassador, had started to become popular. Averoff said that there had been a period of calm on Cyprus which had developed particularly "because we have fed the people with hopes". Now, with hopes still unrealized, the Cypriots might become discouraged. Moreover, the Turks on Cyprus were armed. "If fighting starts", he said, "between Greeks and and Turkish Cypriots, I must forecast that Greek-Turkish relations will be broken. I will not do it myself. I will resign first, but the street will do it."

The Foreign Minister added that the Greek Government had mobilized "all our imaginations to find a solution". Tension goes on, where will it lead? What can we do?

Turning to the UNGA, the Foreign Minister remarked that he had made a proposal to the British. While he was under strong

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of a Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Williams.

pressure to push for a resolution in favor of self-determination, he would try to break the least possible number of windows. He had suggested, therefore, that the British make a declaration at the UNGA (1) indicating that they would cancel the deportation of Makarios, (2) saying that the Government of Cyprus would start negotiations with the representatives of the people of Cyprus—both Greeks and Turks—regarding the future of the island. If the British would make such a declaration he would agree to a resolution which took note of the substance of this and would not press for his own resolution on self-determination. (*Note:* In a later talk with Mr. Rountree,[2] Mr. Averoff made it plain that the resolution itself need include only the second portion of the proposed declaration.)

The Foreign Minister reported that the British in New York appeared sympathetic towards this proposal and had referred it to London. He was hopeful that this might lead to a satisfactory arrangement at the General Assembly.

. . . . . .

In concluding his presentation, he said that be wished to request of the Secretary that the United States agree not to block his resolution on self-determination if the United Kingdom did not accept his compromise proposal. He added that he was convinced that one day the British Government would apply self-determination to Cyprus—if not under the Conservative Party, certainly under the Labor Party. "How," he asked, "can other countries impede what the British will one day apply?"

In response to the Foreign Minister, the Secretary started to comment first on what Mr. Averoff had to say about the Middle East. Averoff stopped him, saying he was more interested in what the Secretary would say about Cyprus. The Secretary then referred to the British Labor Party's statement on Cyprus to which Averoff had alluded. The Secretary noted that one must not base one's hopes too much upon what a party out of power might say, since parties are known to change their minds when they assume power and responsibility. He then observed that Mr. Averoff had omitted any mention of Mr. Spaak's name in his talk. Mr. Averoff replied that he would, of course, be glad to talk of Mr. Spaak if the Secretary wished. The Secretary then mentioned the overriding importance of a solution from the NATO standpoint, and said that he hoped that a solution could be reached in quiet diplomacy such as Mr. Spaak had undertaken. Accordingly we would not wish to see anything happen in the UN which might hurt the efforts in quiet diplomacy. The

[2] A memorandum of this conversation is *ibid.*, Central File 747C.00/12–257.

Secretary added that we did not think a United Nations resolution would resolve the problem. In respect to Mr. Averoff's specific question as to whether we would support a resolution on self-determination, he said that we could not commit ourselves in advance to support a resolution which we have not seen. However, it seemed that the most desirable result would be for the Greeks to work out something with the British. Meanwhile, we would have to reserve our position. The Secretary further noted that Averoff had told him, when they last met in September, [3] that the Greeks would do nothing to generate animosity in Cyprus. The Greek Foreign Minister took leave of the Secretary saying that he would continue his discussion in greater detail with Mr. Rountree. [4]

[3] See Document 264.

[4] Rountree's discussion with Averoff on December 2 is recorded in a memorandum of conversation drafted by Williams. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–257)

In Gadel 100 to New York, December 3, the Department instructed its delegation to "encourage UK to work out something directly with Greeks", but noted that it did not wish to take the lead on this matter. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/11–2857)

269. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, December 9, 1957—9 p.m.

Delga 571. Re Cyprus. Averoff approached Lodge after Committee I adjourned. He urged in strongest terms that US remain neutral and abstain from voting on Greek self-determination resolution. [2] . . .

When Lodge asked whether there was any possibility of Greeks and British agreeing on resolution, Averoff replied affirmatively, but emphasized Greece could never accept any resolution stipulating parties to dispute since this would give Turkey veto power over any solution.

Recommendation: On basis of what Averoff told me and what I know of situation, I strongly recommend I be authorized to take neutral position on Greek resolution should it be pressed to

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–957. Secret; Priority.

[2] The Greek draft resolution stipulated that the General Assembly would express the desire that the people of Cyprus be given an opportunity to determine their own future.

vote. . . . Of course recognize that it would be preferable if Greek resolution never came to vote, and compromise resolution acceptable all three emerged. Given Greek state of mind this year, this seems unlikely.[3]

Lodge

[3] In telegram 1683, December 10, Penfield reported that Karamanlis had expressed great concern that the U.S. position on the Greek resolution would be "unfavorable". Penfield strongly urged the Department to avoid a U.S. vote against Greece. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–1057)

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270. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, December 9, 1957.

SUBJECT

Field Marshal Montgomery's Letter to the President About Cyprus

Field Marshal Montgomery has written a personal letter (Tab A [2]) to the President expressing concern over the danger to the Free World of a continuation of the Cyprus dispute and urging the President to "bang together the heads of Karamanlis and Menderes" in order to effect a compromise solution.

Discussion:

There is a striking similarity between Field Marshal Montgomery's letter and Field Marshal Sir John Harding's final assessment of the problem in Cyprus. The British Embassy has informed us that Harding has concluded that someone must turn to the Greeks and Turks and "bang their heads together." Harding, like Montgomery, stated that the United States must do this. (Tab B [3])

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–957. Secret. Drafted by Williams, Jones, and Laingen.

[2] Not found attached. A copy of Montgomery's letter to Eisenhower, dated November 1957, is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memos.

[3] Tab B, which according to a notation on the source text was an extract from Williams' memorandum of conversation with Wiggin, dated November 27, was not found attached. A copy of the memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Central File 747C.00/11-2757.

Field Marshal Montgomery speaks of the need for concessions on both sides, including Greek recognition of Turkish interests and Turkish recognition of the principle that Cyprus must be a "single state" with majority rule subject to safeguards. Montgomery thus apparently shares Harding's views that Cyprus must not be partitioned. Our own view has also been to discourage partition. We have also discouraged the Greek desire for enosis. We have not espoused any of the various compromise solutions that have been put forward.

We believe that the best way to bring Greece and Turkey closer together on the Cyprus problem is through the efforts of Mr. Spaak. The December NATO Meeting in Paris provides an excellent opportunity to urge Karamanlis and Menderes to undertake a frank exchange of views. Spaak will seek to do this. We should also do all we can to help effect bilateral exchanges on the Cyprus dispute at Paris, between the parties concerned and between each of them and ourselves.

The British are unlikely to undertake any new departure in Cyprus until after Sir Hugh Foot, the new Governor, has had a chance to review the problem in Cyprus and make recommendations. This will probably take at least six weeks. As soon as this is done, we would hope that we may resume the secret informal talks with the British which Mr. Barbour conducted in London in September and try to agree on possible lines of action by which we could further assist Mr. Spaak in his efforts and encourage the Greeks and Turks to make necessary concessions.

Recommendations:

That you suggest to the President that he tell Field Marshal Montgomery:

1. That we have already, as Montgomery suggests, urged the Greek Government to use all its influence to keep EOKA from further violence at this time. We have also made representations to Averoff on the need for moderation in the UNGA debate on Cyprus.

2. That we are now concentrating our efforts regarding the Cyprus problem on appropriate support to Mr. Spaak's activities.

3. That at the NATO Meeting in Paris we will encourage Greeks and Turks to begin to talk to each other to try to narrow their differences. When the President sees Menderes and Karamanlis in Paris individually, he may wish to encourage such talks.

4. That after the new British Governor has made his report, we would like to go over with the British possible lines of action with a view to seeing in what ways we can further support Mr. Spaak's efforts and encourage the Greeks and Turks to make concessions.

We are prepared to draft a suggested reply to Montgomery along the above lines. [4]

[4] There is no indication on the source text that Dulles approved the memorandum.

271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, December 10, 1957—7:11 p.m.

1891. Your 1600, [2] Athens 1661 [3] and Nicosia 142. [4] US policy on Cyprus has not changed and you should go ahead with representation to GOT as set forth Deptel 1727. [5] As stated in these instructions we welcome and encourage any bilateral or multilateral exchange of views that might lead to compromise proposal. We trust that Turks will welcome opportunity to exchange views with those concerned and those who for sake of common interests are seeking to assist in finding solution.

Re paras A, B and C reftel, [6] US is not supporting any of various compromise solutions which have been put forward. We are carefully preserving our freedom of action in manner which will

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–1057. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Williams, Laingen, and Jones. Repeated to London, Paris, Athens, and Nicosia.

[2] In telegram 1600, December 6, the Embassy informed the Department that it was concerned that the United States position on the Cyprus question was shifting. The Embassy was particularly disturbed by the possibility that the United States was becoming too closely involved in the problem and too closely identified with a particular position. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–657)

[3] In telegram 1661, December 7, Penfield noted that a solution to the Cyprus problem had to be found as soon as possible. He concluded: "Should excessive demonstrations of these three dangerous national characteristics happen to occur simultaneously or as chain reaction it is hard to see how we could avoid disastrous results to NATO and our ME position." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–757)

[4] In telegram 142, December 9, the U.S. Consul at Nicosia, commenting on the telegrams cited in footnotes 2 and 3 above, noted: " . . . I have tended disregard more extreme statements Greek Cypriot politicians and others who claim they have nothing lose but chains in bringing on 'heroic holocaust' heralded by recent EOKA leaflets and private statements that 10,000 lives not too high price for freedom. But it seems perilous ignore statements ethnarchy and EOKA indicating unwillingness accept further delay." (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/12–957)

[5] Document 267.

[6] Reference is to three paragraphs of telegram 1600, which contained references to three telegrams that included various proposals for resolving the Cyprus problem. One of these was telegram 1727, *ibid.*

permit us to exert our influence most effectively on all interested parties of Cyprus dispute.

In event Zorlu asserts "USG too active in Cyprus matter" you should say that as member NATO and close friend of parties involved, US is deeply concerned over continued failure parties to recognize larger issues at stake and to make compromises essential to solution of Cyprus controversy. US has been urging and will continue to urge interested parties to get together and arrive at compromise solution. There is too much at stake for us to do otherwise.

We generally agree with various points made by Embassy in reftel except following:

A. Now that elections are over we fail to see why GOT feels it must go "full steam ahead on partition." If Greece does likewise in pursuit its aims we see only gravest consequences ahead. Only hope lies in gradual retreat by both Greek and Turks from intransigent positions they have taken.

B. We do not agree "that status Cyprus can remain unchanged if no solution found." If we are to avoid further deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations and in NATO defenses in area it is imperative that some early interim or permanent arrangements be found that will take us out of present impasse. Events of last 18 months clearly indicate how untenable is status quo. British themselves recognize this.

We trust you will be able to make representations to Menderes and Zorlu along lines Deptel 1727 before their departure for Paris. [7]

Dulles

[7] Presumably a reference to the NATO Heads of Government meeting in Paris, December 16–18.

272. Letter From President Eisenhower to Field Marshal Montgomery [1]

Washington, December 11, 1957.

Your recent letter on Cyprus [2] was very much appreciated here. Foster and I share your concern about the bad effect this controversy

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Confidential Files. Secret.
[2] See Document 270.

is having on the North Atlantic Alliance. I agree that some way has to be found to bring the Greeks and Turks closer together.

I have already tried to persuade both the Greeks and the Turks to restrain themselves in the debates of the United Nations General Assembly because, as you say, bitter debate there would make a solution more difficult and could further interfere with the working of our Alliance. I also have urged the Greek Government to keep E.O.K.A. from further violence.

You probably know that the United States is supporting Mr. Spaak's efforts to find some common ground between the Turkish and Greek positions in the hope that these efforts may contribute to some solution. During the NATO Meeting in Paris we will encourage the Greeks and the Turks to talk to each other directly.

After the new Governor has had a chance to look over conditions on the Island and make his report to London, I think it might be worthwhile for us to go over with the British Government possible lines of action to see if there are ways in which we can further support Mr. Spaak's effort and encourage the Greeks and Turks to make the sort of concessions of which you speak.

As I am sure you know I am ready to do whatever is right to do to bring an end to this quarrel.

I look forward to seeing you in a few days.

With warm regard, [3]

[3] The source text is not signed. On December 15, Montgomery responded to Eisenhower's letter:

"I have just got your letter in answer to mine about Cyprus. I am so very glad to know that you agree.

"I shall not see you again while you are in Paris; I have to go over to England tomorrow afternoon for certain commitments in connection with Christmas charities. I must be content with the glimpse of you at the airport yesterday; it was good to shake your hand again."

The source text is handwritten. (Eisenhower Library, White House Confidential Files)

273. Editorial Note

On December 12, during discussion at the Secretary's Staff meeting, the subject of the Cyprus issue at the United Nations was raised. According to the notes of the meeting:

"Mr. Walmsley reported that Ambassador Lodge last night moved for adjournment of the vote on the Cyprus resolution, which

had been expected to pass in Committee by a small majority. Certain amendments were expected and there was also the alternative of introducing a new resolution which would eliminate the reference to self-determination and which would indicate that some progress had been made since the last resolution. Mr. Walmsley expected the Greek resolution would be amended before it was adopted. If it came to a vote in its present form, the US would have to abstain. (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

Later that day by a vote of 33 to 20 with 25 abstentions, among them the United States, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on Cyprus. (U.N. Doc. A/3794) The approved text of the resolution, which noted the importance of having the principle of self-determination applied in the case of Cyprus, was based on a Greek subamendment to a four-power amendment to the operative part of the original Greek draft resolution. The operative part of the amended resolution reads:

"Expresses its earnest hope that further negotiations and discussions will be undertaken in spirit cooperation with view have right self-determination applied in case of people of Cyprus."

Two days later, however, at the plenary session of the Assembly, the amended resolution failed to attain the two-thirds majority required for final approval. The vote was 31 for, 24 against, with 24 abstentions, among them the United States.

274. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador's Residence, Paris, December 18, 1957, 9:30 a.m. [1]

USDel/MC/22

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Constantin Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece
Mr. Averoff-Tossitza, Foreign Minister of Greece
Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Mr. Karamanlis said that he wanted to invite the President's attention to the problem of Cyprus. It was having very unfortunate repercussions in the Balkan Pact and in NATO. The solution was simple—Cyprus should either be independent or Greek. In either circumstance, it would be with the United Nations and a member of NATO; Greece was prepared to give guarantees concerning the Turkish minority.

The President commented that all problems become difficult when emotions are involved. He knew that Cyprus was not an easy problem for Greece. Mr. Karamanlis declared that Greece had a moral obligation to support the Greeks on Cyprus.

The President said he thought the UK was now more flexible on this problem and would support any arrangement that Greece and Turkey agreed on. Mr. Averoff wondered whether the UK was sincere in this and the President stated his strong conviction, based on his long friendship with Prime Minister Macmillan, that the UK was indeed sincere.

The President said he would be very happy to see Mr. Karamanlis and Mr. Menderes get together on Cyprus, to see if within an atmosphere of flexibility they could agree on something.

Mr. Karamanlis said that for 2½ years he had endured a series of provocations connected with Cyprus. He referred to the riots in Istanbul and Izmir and to "unfriendly" British moves. An anti-Western feeling was being built up in Greece because of Cyprus. Whereas only 10 per cent of the Greek population is Communist, a Popular Front had now been established. Mr. Karamanlis said that despite all this, he continued to steer a pro-West policy but he was constantly being attacked because the West was against Greece on

[1] Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, 56–59. Drafted by Rockwell. Eisenhower was in Paris to attend the NATO Heads of Government meeting, December 16–19.

Cyprus. "You all vote against us in the United Nations," he said. . . .

The President asked whether Turkey or Greece couldn't sit down with a third, neutral, person to work out an agreement. Mr. Karamanlis reiterated that the solution was a simple one. He added that if a neutral person became involved, it should be the President.

Mr. Averoff, in discussing the Turkish minority, said that Greece had in mind that a committee of neutrals would fix the status of the minority. This status would then be put under the guarantee of the United Nations, which would have a Commissioner on Cyprus for this purpose.

The President inquired whether Cyprus, if independent, could survive economically. Mr. Averoff said it could.

The President asked whether the Greeks had proposed their solution directly to the Turks. Mr. Karamanlis said there had been no direct contact but that the Turks were aware of the Greek position. Turkey is opposed to the union of Cyprus with Greece, he added. A UN guarantee against this should prevent such union. . . .

The President commented that the geography of the situation worries the Turks. Mr. Karamanlis replied that there would be no security problem if Cyprus were independent or controlled by Greece, a small power. Cyprus under UK control was more dangerous to Turkey because the UK is a big power and some day might not be friendly to Turkey.

The President stressed his concern over the damage being done to NATO by the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus. He thought Cyprus should not be allowed to prevent Greece and Turkey from being allies in NATO. He noted that Cyprus had even caused the destruction of the American Library in Athens, despite our vote in the UN, which we understood had pleased the Greeks. Mr. Karamanlis said he was sorry about this. He believed the Communists might have done it.

. . . . . .

The President said that the Turkish Prime Minister was coming to see him shortly and that he would suggest to Mr. Menderes that Turkey should be as flexible as possible and that Greece and Turkey might meet to discuss Cyprus.

Mr. Karamanlis said that Turkey desired partition of Cyprus but that this was not a logical or practical idea, since 82 per cent of the population is Greek. The Turks are too intransigent, he thought.

The President said that he would be willing to do personally anything he thought would help. Mr. Averoff said that the US is the only country that can persuade Turkey to be "reasonable". The

President made clear that we had not espoused any particular Cyprus solution. We did not believe we should use pressure on either side. We would urge flexibility and the possible use of a neutral party. Mr. Karamanlis said that he was grateful that the US had made clear that it is not against Greece.

The President said that the US was trying to keep strong the alliance against Communism. We are trying to promote agreements among the many friends we have in cases where these friends are in dispute. We often think it is better to abstain in votes on these problems and thus maintain our influence and ability to play a useful role.

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275. Memorandum of a Conversation, Hotel Bristol, Paris, December 19, 1957, 3:15 p.m.[1]

USDel/MC/34

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary
Mr. Rockwell

Greece
Prime Minister Constantin Karamanlis
Foreign Minister Evanghelos Averoff-Tossitza
Mr. George Melas, Greek Ambassador in Washington

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Prime Minister Karamanlis said that something had to be done to solve the Cyprus problem. Because of it Greece was in conflict with its allies and because of it it was hard for the Greek Government to oppose the Communists at home. The US must intervene decisively. The Greek solution would meet the interests of Greece, Turkey, the UK and the Cypriot population. Greece was willing to give guarantees regarding the latter.

The Secretary inquired whether Greece was working with Mr. Spaak. Mr. Karamanlis said that he had talked with Mr. Spaak

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 953. Secret.

yesterday and that Mr. Spaak agreed that partition was no solution. He favored a solution on the basis of independence. . . .

Mr. Averoff said that the US was the only power which could bring about a solution. Mr. Spaak had said that the UK was willing to accept independence for Cyprus, but not Turkey. That was why Greece was asking for US help in connection with the problem of the Turkish attitude.

Mr. Karamanlis was sure that next year a majority of the UN would vote for independence for Cyprus. He said that he was in severe trouble at home over Cyprus, facing eight opposition parties, the Communists, Makarios, and the Cypriots. . . .

The Secretary said he could understand why Greece felt it had to bring the Cyprus matter before the UN. We did not think the UN could solve it, and it was for this reason that we were not sympathetic to the UN approach, not because of our views on the merits of the Greek position. Emotional forces made a solution difficult. The Secretary told Mr. Karamanlis that he admired how he had conducted himself in the face of domestic political pressures. We recognized him as a real friend of the US, and we were trying to be a real friend of Greece. This did not mean, however, that we would do what we thought was wrong—to coerce another friendly country. We did not use our aid programs in this way. Furthermore, we had no mandate to settle the Cyprus problem, not that we were asking for one. We would like to help, but we could only do so through appeal to reason on both sides. The Secretary thought that if all the parties would put down what they wanted and why they wanted it, the "whys" could be reconciled.

The Secretary said that Mr. Spaak had a mandate of sorts to reconcile differences between NATO members. We were prepared to encourage him.

Ambassador Melas stated that just a display of interest with Turkey would be helpful. The Secretary replied that the President spoke with Prime Minister Menderes yesterday about Cyprus and that he, the Secretary, was going to see Mr. Menderes that very afternoon after his appointment with Mr. Karamanlis.

The Prime Minister said that Cyprus was the last part of Europe under colonial rule. This was intolerable.

Mr. Averoff said the Secretary should tell Mr. Menderes that partition is something rejected by everybody but Turkey. He should be made to be less sticky on this. Greece, for example, had proposed three or four possible approaches. Greece badly wanted the re-establishment of good relations with Turkey in order to be able better to withstand the pressure of the Slavs on the East Mediterranean.

Greece

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH GREECE [1]

276. National Intelligence Estimate [2]

NIE 32–55 *Washington, January 18, 1955.*

THE OUTLOOK FOR GREECE [3]

The Problem

To estimate the current situation and probable developments in Greece over the next three or four years.

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[1] For previous documentation on US policy toward Greece, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 780 ff.

[2] Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of Cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided many political and some economic sections of NIEs.

[3] According to a note on the cover sheet:

"The following organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 18 January 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

In a memorandum of January 28, Armstrong forwarded a summary of NIE 32–55 to Secretary Dulles. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 781.00/1–2855)

Conclusions

1. Greece has seldom enjoyed real political and economic stability and remains handicapped by its poverty of natural resources and by the volatility of a political system in which foreign influences still play an important part. Since World War II, however, Greece has with US and UK assistance crushed the Communist effort to seize power through force, repaired the tremendous damage brought about by the war, and made a start toward building up the economy. Moreover, since the installation of Premier Papagos in 1952, the Greek Government has had a degree of popular support and political effectiveness unusual since World War I. (paras. 9–11)

2. So long as Papagos retains active leadership, we believe that the present Greek Rally government will remain in power at least up to the 1956 elections. Although some deterioration of the Rally's cohesiveness and prestige has recently taken place, probably presaging an increase in political intrigue, and some decline in the government's strength and effectiveness, it is unlikely that sufficient Rally deputies will defect to overturn Papagos' now comfortable majority. On the basis of present indications, if Papagos is still active and on the political scene, the Rally will probably win the 1956 elections, though as compared with its showing in 1952 it will inevitably suffer some loss of electoral strength. (paras. 21, 23)

3. If Papagos, who is now 72, should die or become incapacitated, the Rally would soon fall apart, and the centrist Liberal Party would replace it as the strongest political grouping. Since even the Liberals would lack a parliamentary majority in their own right and would probably be unable to gain one in new elections, the eventual outcome would probably be a series of unstable coalition governments, marked by political fragmentation and an increase both in Palace influence and in Communist opportunities for political maneuver. Under such circumstances, there might be an attempt at dictatorship by the secret military society, IDEA, although this would depend to a large degree on IDEA's estimate of the US reaction. (para. 22)

4. The Greek economy will probably remain fairly stable over the next three or four years despite a decline in US aid; some modest improvements in production and in Greece's foreign exchange position may take place. In the longer term it is improbable that a politically acceptable standard of living can be maintained without some form of economic assistance unless there is a reduction in Greece's contribution to its defense budget. (paras. 29, 30)

5. Regardless of internal political developments, Greece's strongly pro-Western orientation is unlikely to change over the next few years. The US in particular is likely to retain its present predominant

influence in Greece, although Greek responsiveness to US advice may decline somewhat as a result of the progressive reduction of US aid and the US position on enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece). (paras. 43–45)

6. The British are seeking to restore their influence in Greek internal affairs. While they share the basic US interest in maintaining a stable, non-Communist Greece, they also desire to protect their special interests and influences. They desire a Greek Government more amenable to their influence than the present one and have been particularly irritated by Papagos' advocacy of enosis. (para. 17)

7. Although the enosis issue is likely to be a continuing irritant in Greek relations with the UK, Turkey, and the US, it is unlikely that Greece's alliances with these powers will be strained by this or any other issue. Greek relations with its non-Satellite neighbors will probably continue to improve slowly, though underlying suspicions and conflicts of interest will remain. (paras. 46, 47)

8. The development of Greek military capabilities is progressing satisfactorily with continuing US training and material assistance, and the Balkan Alliance military planning has made satisfactory progress.[4] However, growing Greek reluctance to maintain present levels of military expenditures is likely to make the maintenance of a military establishment meeting NATO and US requirements depend increasingly on assistance for meeting military expenses. (paras. 34, 35)

[Here follows the remainder of the Estimate.]

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[4] On August 9, the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia signed the Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance at Bled, Yugoslavia. The agreement, which supplemented a February 25, 1953, Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration, was often referred to as the Treaty of Bled, the Balkan Pact, or Balkan Alliance, and sought primarily to guarantee the territorial integrity and political independence of the member states. The accord entered into force upon final ratification by the three parties on May 15, 1955. For text, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, p. 197.

277. Draft Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs (Nolting) [1]

Washington, February 14, 1955.

SUBJECT

Aid to Greece

Last spring it was decided to increase Greece's economic aid for FY 1955 from $15 to $25 million in order to maintain Greek ground forces at 105,000. USCINCEUR recommended strongly that the Greek ground forces be kept at a minimum of 100,000 while the Greek Government indicated clearly that, if Greece received only $15 million in economic aid, it would be compelled to reduce the ground forces to 70,000.

It is now proposed to reduce Greek economic aid to $15 million for FY 1956, and if this is done the same problem will recur. As explained below the Greek Government could obtain no popular or political support for an increase in its defense budget to compensate for decreased United States aid. Therefore the almost certain result of decreased economic assistance would be a decrease in the Greek armed forces. If the Greek ground forces are reduced 30,000 below the NATO minimum, other NATO members may be influenced to make corresponding reductions in their own forces.

Greece is one of the countries which has not reduced its defense expenditures. It has continued to devote about 40 percent of its budget to defense despite strong internal pressures. These pressures have their origin in the fact that Greece has a per capita income of only $158 compared to an average of $600–800 for the NATO countries of Western Europe. United States economic assistance has shown the Greeks how to make substantial increases in their standard of living, and they have made economic development a national objective. They understand that expenditure for investment in development projects is necessary for improved levels of living, and no

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.5–MSP/2–2455. Secret. This memorandum, drafted by Wood, was not sent. A memorandum for the files by Baxter, February 24, attached to the source text, notes that Allen had made the following comments on the proposed memorandum:

"I believe our role in this is to point out that reduction in aid to Greece will require reduction of the Greek army to 70,000. It is for the military (and particularly NATO) to determine how that will affect the general defense picture. I do not wish to take on the burden in NEA of justifying the size of the Greek army. If those primarily concerned with defense want to keep it at 100,000, let them fight for the money. Otherwise, let the army drop to 70,000."

Greek Government could successfully withstand the demand for further progress. The communists have gauged this situation accurately and for some time they have taken the line that America seeks only to increase the Greek defense burden at the expense of any improvement in the civilian standard of living.

For these reasons the Greek Government and our own observers were convinced last spring that it would have been politically impossible to increase the defense budget at the expense of the economic development program. Since then the Greek Government has been weakened by Cabinet changes, the Cyprus question and the municipal elections of November 1954, when communist-supported mayors were elected in five of the country's six leading towns. Our Embassy believes these election results were largely caused by popular dissatisfaction with the Government's lack of significant progress in improving the standard of living. Thus the stable and friendly Papagos Government would risk almost certain political suicide if it attempted to increase defense expenditures in FY 1956.

Another factor which cannot be ignored in deciding on our level of economic aid for Greece in FY 1956 is the adverse effect which the Cyprus question has had on Greek-American relations. American prestige has declined in Greek eyes, and if we now decide to cut Greek aid, the friendly and cooperative relations which we have had with Greece may be expected to suffer.

Thus a cut in Greek aid of $10 million, which is a comparatively small share of our over-all aid program, would probably lead to a substantial reduction in Greek armed forces and might well reduce our influence in this strategically placed country at a time when Greece can play an important role in strengthening the Balkan alliance and the connections between that alliance and NATO.

278. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Greek Ambassador (Melas) and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, April 6, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Greek Ambassador's Views on the Middle East; Yugoslav Cooperation with the West; and Cyprus

The Greek Ambassador called today at his request to exchange views on several topics of interest to his Government, the first two of which are treated at greater length in the attached memorandum which he left with the Secretary. [2]

1) *Middle East*—Ambassador Melas advanced the view that the desirable objective of an all-inclusive defense pact arrangement for the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East area had been somewhat dimmed by the precipitate conclusion of the Turkish-Iraqi Pact [3] and the ensuing heavy-handed Turkish approach to the Arab states, particularly Syria and Egypt. His talks with Arab chiefs of mission had convinced him that all the Arab states wished eventually to cooperate with the West but that they felt they must be dealt with as a unified group and not picked off individually with bilateral agreements which would arouse suspicions among their sister states. He believed that time should be given them to prepare for such cooperation and that it would be very helpful if, during this period, some limited defense assistance could be extended to them. Within six months, during which Arab defense capabilities might be built up to some extent and serious attempts made to implement international agreements relative to Israel, it might be possible to bring the Arab states into some defensive agreement with the West, either through the extension of the North Atlantic Treaty or perhaps by means of a more limited Mediterranean pact. (*Comments:* The Ambassador's reference to a "Mediterranean Pact" reflects the Greek desire, which has been informally expressed ever since the MEDO proposals of 1951, [4] to participate in any defense arrangement in the

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[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Baxter on April 8.

[2] Not printed. Dated April 6, the memorandum presented in detail the Greek Government's views on certain Middle Eastern developments and Yugoslavia's relations within the Balkan Pact and with the West.

[3] The Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq, signed in Baghdad on February 24, 1955 (generally referred to as the Baghdad Pact), was adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5, by Pakistan on September 23, and by Iran on November 3. For text, see 233 UNTS 199.

[4] In October 1951, the United States, France, Britain, and Turkey proposed that Egypt participate in a Middle East Defense Organization plan (MEDO). Egypt and the other Arab states rejected the proposal.

Middle East. The acerb hostile references to Turkey in the attached memorandum may not have originated in instructions from the Greek Foreign Office; however, they are consistent with the bitter attitude toward Turkey which Ambassador Melas has revealed in other conversations with Department officials.)

2) *Yugoslavia*—The Ambassador wished to assure the Secretary that, despite rumors, mostly originating from Ankara, of a Yugoslav drift away from the West toward Moscow, sources in the Greek Government confirm the fact that Yugoslavia remains firmly in the Western camp. Top-level military contacts have convinced the Greek Government that the Yugoslav Government is pursuing a policy of strengthening the military aspects of the Balkan Pact and of maintaining association with the West for mutual defense.

3) *Cyprus*—The Ambassador introduced the subject of Cyprus and rehearsed the many arguments in support of the Greek position which he has frequently expressed at all levels in the Department. In concluding, he referred to that portion of the Secretary's messages to Papagos of November 16 and December 11, 1954, which stated that the United States Government "would explore otherwise methods of reducing the tensions created by this question." [5] The Ambassador ventured to suggest that, as four months had passed with no indication of any change in the British policy towards Cyprus, it might be considered an appropriate time for the United States to approach its good friend, the United Kingdom, to offer friendly advice.

The Secretary thanked Ambassador Melas for the clear and frank expression of his views and made the following comments:

1) *Middle East*—It would be a mistake, the Secretary thought, to exaggerate the part played by the United States in current Middle East developments. He had originally enunciated the Northern Tier concept in 1953, when his tour of the Middle East convinced him that countries on the border of the Soviet Union who had long been subject to Russian pressures would be more inclined to work out some arrangement of defensive strength based on anti-communism than states to the south, which were preoccupied with other problems. It would also be more feasible for the United States to extend defense assistance to an anti-communist grouping of northern states. The Secretary indicated that developments were now taking a somewhat different course from the one he had first envisaged. He had not anticipated such an early adherence by the United Kingdom. As to other states of the area, we are not exerting any pressure to accelerate their joining the pact; on the other hand, of course, we would not try to prevent their adhering if they wished to do so in

[5] For texts, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 727 and 738.

their own interests. However, it might be well if further developments should come more slowly. The adherence of one or two states bordering on Israel would raise difficult questions. For example, the furnishing of military assistance to them would in turn lead Israel to feel that it must be strengthened militarily. The result might be a small arms race in the area.

2) *Yugoslavia*—The Secretary said he was happy to have the encouraging views of the Ambassador on Yugoslavia. He himself thought there was no probability of Yugoslavia swinging back into the Soviet orbit. It is in the enviable and politically astute position of simultaneously being wooed by the Soviets and enjoying all the advantages of cooperating with the West.

3) *Cyprus*—The Secretary remarked that a new Prime Minister had just come into power in London. It is well known that Churchill was determined not to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire, and during the time that he was in the saddle all British decisions in that direction, such as those relating to the Sudan and the Suez Canal, were taken with the utmost reluctance. British policy on many questions may be modified or reexamined under a new Prime Minister. Of course, Eden will be very occupied for some time in taking over the reins of the Government and in preparing for elections; he will need the benefit of a little breathing spell for this process.

After leaving the Secretary's office, Mr. Baxter expressed the hope that the Greek Government, during any such "breathing spell," would take no steps which might freeze its position and deny it maneuverability. He wondered whether the story in last Sunday's *New York Times*, reporting Papagos as saying that the Cyprus case "would be submitted *soon* to the United Nations," implied the intention of the Greek Government to bring this matter to the Security Council. The Ambassador protested that there was no plan to seek Security Council action on Cyprus, but his Government would be forced to present it again at the next General Assembly. Mr. Baxter said he knew Ambassador Cannon had been advising Prime Minister Papagos not to commit the Greek Government irrevocably to any specific course of action. Official Greek statements that Greece "would pursue the Cyprus question by all appropriate means" should certainly be sufficiently forthright to meet political necessities in Greece. Such a flexible position would permit the Greek Government to take advantage of any changed circumstances which may develop during the next few months.

279. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador's Residence, Paris, May 10, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Additional United States Aid to Greece

PARTICIPANTS

Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos
Mr. Georges Exintaris
The Secretary of State
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr.

The Greek Foreign Minister came to see the Secretary at the former's request and took up the following subjects:

1) He said that he was worried over the apparent fact that Austria was to be neutralized. The Secretary clarified this by saying that, whereas Austria intended to declare its neutrality, there was no question of it being neutralized in the sense of being deprived of the means of self-defense. In fact, the Soviets had agreed to the deletion in the treaty of the articles which imposed a ceiling on the size of Austrian post-treaty army and armaments.

2) He then turned to the main subject of his meeting with the Secretary, additional US aid to compensate for the effects of the recent earthquake. [2] The Foreign Minister discussed the damage and the courageous effort which Prime Minister Papagos had already taken to help the sufferers. He emphasized over and over again that it is not possible for the Greek Government to take care of this situation alone. The budget will be exhausted. Without help there will be much less chance of maintaining in Greece stable internal conditions and carry on with the success of the Greek construction projects such as the oil refinery, hydroelectric plant, and better communications, all of which have given Greece much courage. In order to conserve what has been done the Prime Minister of Greece is obliged to ask for US aid. This has already been taken up with the US Embassy at Athens. The Prime Minister has sent his personal greetings to the Secretary and asked the Foreign Minister to explain the very difficult position of his government. If some additional aid is not forthcoming, it may be necessary to reduce the military expenditures. The Foreign Minister pointed out that any weakening

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 881.49/5–1055. Confidential. Drafted by Young. Secretary Dulles was in Paris to attend the Ministerial meeting of the NAC, May 9–11.

[2] Between April 19 and May 14, a series of earthquakes hit the port city of Volos in northern Greece. Documentation on US interest in providing assistance and relief is *ibid.*, Central File 881.00.

of the Greek army would have unfortunate repercussions on the morale of the people, which in turn would hurt the army because the people are its supporters. Mr. Stephanopoulos then mentioned the return of the Venizelos party on the left. The Greeks regard the future with a certain anxiety lest elections go badly. While the people are actually anti-Communist, they are nevertheless watching the future closely. The Foreign Minister said he did not wish to give the impression that the Greek people would bargain with its liberty and friendship from one side to the other. He merely wished to point out that the situation could be exploited by people who wished to weaken or abolish the army. Greece as a free country is a bastion and must have a stable government holding the confidence of the people. Accordingly, the Foreign Minister appealed to the Secretary to study the request which had been already submitted officially to the United States.

The Secretary stated that he had not seen this request but that he would certainly study it with much sympathy.

As for US aid to Greece, the Greeks have talked to Clair Francis who was quite encouraging about the possibility of using agricultural surpluses. The Greeks also talked to General Gruenther and wished the Secretary and General to discuss this situation. [3]

Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos and Mr. Exintaris emphasized that the provision of aid should be handled in such a way to have the maximum psychological and moral effect. It should be done all at once and the announcement of aid should be done in one package for psychological effects because the Greeks are very impressionable.

3) Finally, the Foreign Minister raised the question of Cyprus. He thought the British Liberal Party had adopted a reasonable position and hoped that the United States could use its influence with the British. The Foreign Minister and the Secretary noted that while the Liberal Party might represent a large section of British opinion, it had no votes. The Secretary said the US had not intervened directly with the United Kingdom on this matter. Exintaris stated that the recent conversation between Eden and Papagos had gone very badly which had made Papagos, a military personality, very irritated with the British. The Greek Government would hope that the United States could help to arrive at a solution. The Secretary said it would be better to wait until after the British elections.

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[3] In a June 15 memorandum to Francis, Scott noted that discussions had begun in Athens to provide Greece with $15 million in addition to the $16.5 million already programmed for fiscal year 1956. Half of the additional aid was to be provided through Mutual Security funds and half through the sale of agricultural commodities. (*Ibid.*, 881.00/5–2455)

280. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Secretary of State [1]

Athens, May 20, 1955—noon.

2458. Reference: Department telegram 2470, April 1. [2] I believe time has come give urgent consideration to inviting Marshal Papagos visit United States near future. In addition internal political factors mentioned previous telegrams recent international developments make it highly important that we dramatize through Papagos visit United States-Greek solidarity and latter's relation to Western strength in this area. Fact that news regarding suspension of Tymbakion airbase [3] coincided with speculation over forthcoming Soviet visit Belgrade [4] and related talk about neutralism has left unfortunate impression in some circles here regarding United States' intentions Greece.

Appreciate and agree with view that it may be difficult disassociate Papagos visit entirely from aid question, but believe this should not be considered as overriding factor. Decision regarding special aid for Volos disaster (Embassy telegram 2386, May 11 [5]) prior to visit would tend minimize aid aspect. In any event, we must face fact that United States aid to Greece next fiscal year will represent drastic reduction and will be compared by Greeks unfavorably with United States aid program in such neighboring countries as Italy and Turkey. Properly exploited Papagos visit could offset to some extent almost inevitable adverse repercussions.

As we seem to be entering period during which we may begin to reap some positive fruits from our policy of strength, it would seem prudent to bear in mind need to avoid weakening existing position and to give appropriate recognition to those who have made a significant contribution thereto. Greece is symbol United States post-war decision stand firm against Soviet Communist expansionism and has been a practical bulwark in that endeavor since 1947. I can imagine no better time than at present to call attention to this fact than by Presidential invitation to Marshal Papagos to visit United States to discuss matters of mutual concern between our two

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.5–MSP/5–2055. Confidential.

[2] Telegram 2470 informed the Embassy at Athens that although "sympathetic consideration" had been given to the idea of inviting Papagos, the Department could not extend an invitation at this time. (*Ibid.*, 033.8111/4–155)

[3] In May the United States decided not to proceed with the construction of a proposed airbase at Tymbakion on Crete. Documentation on the airbase issue and Greek reaction to the cancellation is *ibid.*, 711.56381.

[4] Reference is to Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade, May 27–June 2.

[5] Telegram 2386 transmitted Cannon's recommendations on U.S. assistance for earthquake relief. (Department of State, Central Files, 411.8141/5–1155)

countries. Appreciate that your schedule and that of President may make mid-September earliest possible date for actual Papagos visit. However, announcement in days immediately ahead that invitation has been received will serve constructive purposes outlined this message.

Cannon

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281. Editorial Note

Between June 20 and 28, Ambassador Cannon consulted with officials of the Departments of State and the Navy in Washington regarding the situation in Greece. Among the subjects raised were naval assistance to Greece (memorandum of conversation by Wood, June 28, 1955; Department of State, Central Files, 781.5621/6–2855), negotiations for immunities for American personnel in Greece, and the question of extraterritoriality provisions of the military facilities agreement (memorandum from Cannon to Allen, June 27, 1955; *ibid.*, 033.8111/6–2755).

On June 27, in a conversation with Secretary Dulles, Cannon recommended that Papagos be invited to the United States. Cannon noted, among other things, that the visit should be arranged "safely" before the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly or well after to avoid "emphasis" on the Cyprus question. Dulles replied that he thought a visit might be arranged. (Memorandum of conversation by Cannon, June 27, 1955; *ibid.*)

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282. Letter From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) [1]

Washington, July 15, 1955.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The question of the privileges and immunities of United States military personnel in Greece has become

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.5/7–1555. Confidential. Drafted by Wood on July 13.

an acute political problem in Athens. The issue is increasingly embarrassing to a government friendly to the United States, and threatens the excellent relations between the United States and one of its staunchest allies. The State Department, therefore, strongly suggests that we should agree to negotiate promptly on the problem with the Greek Government.

Present arrangements are based on the United States-Greek AMAG agreement of 1947 [2] which was negotiated at a time when Greece's existence as a free nation was threatened by the Guerrilla War. Under this and subsequent arrangements our military personnel enjoy virtual "extra-territoriality" and are completely immune from both civil and criminal jurisdiction in the Greek courts. Such immunity far exceeds that granted to the United States by other NATO members. As Greece has recovered her strength and pride, popular resentment against the extraordinary immunities granted to alien military personnel stationed in Greece has increased.

For over a year our Embassy in Athens was successful in dissuading the Greek Government from raising the question formally. However, the Greek Government is losing its ability to withstand popular criticism on this question. During the past six months, Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos has repeatedly raised the question with Ambassador Cannon in the course of official conversations. Finally, on June 14, the Greek Parliamentary Opposition demanded a statement from Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos on the status of the question. In reply, the Foreign Minister made it clear that his Government considered it necessary to revise the present arrangements and was already in contact with our representatives.

Thus, the Greek Government has not only officially raised the question with us, but has publicly gone on record with its position that a revision must be negotiated.

Ambassador Cannon feels that the longer we wait on this question the more difficult our bargaining position will become. At present the Greek Government is considered willing to negotiate an agreement by which United States military personnel would receive privileges and immunities at least as favorable as those we enjoy in other NATO countries.

It is essential, of course, that friendly and harmonious relations be maintained with allied countries where our forces are stationed. Greece in particular has been one of our most loyal friends. If you agree that it is in the interests of the United States Government to negotiate promptly with the Greek Government on this subject it

[2] For text of the agreement, see Charles I. Bevans, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776–1949*, vol. 8, p. 403.

would be appreciated if your Department would advise us of its views on the question.[3]

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Hoover, Jr.[4]

[3] In a September 29 reply to Hoover's letter, Gordon Gray, on behalf of the Department of Defense, agreed to delete all reference to extraterritorial rights in the existing arrangements with Greece. Gray noted, however, that the Department of Defense could not agree with the Department of State's suggestion regarding criminal jurisdiction: that the Greek Government be offered Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement "supplemented by Greek agreement to waive its primary jurisdiction in favor of the United States except in cases which may be of particular importance to the Greek Government." (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56381/9–2955)

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

283. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, August 17, 1955.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: Greece Moving Toward Political Stalemate

Greece has been without effective political direction since Prime Minister Papagos became seriously ill nearly six months ago. The two Vice Premiers, the Minister of War Canelopoulos and of Foreign Affairs Stephanopoulos, have been competing, though . . . for the leadership of the Greek Rally, the conservative coalition now in power. The Ministerial Council—the body which expresses collective governmental authority—apparently has had no real meetings for the past three or four months, although actions are being taken in its name. Its members are resentful of one another. Each of the Ministers acts independently of any central direction. Other factions within the Government are also jockeying for a position of power.

At the same time, a secret military group appears to be influencing part of the government from behind the scenes, and has come to dominate some branches of the administration. This para-governmental group, known as Sacred Bond of Greek Officers (IDEA), is

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.00/8–1755. Confidential. Transmitted through the Executive Secretariat.

now in control of the Army, Air, and probably the Navy, guards the ailing Prime Minister, influences the Cabinet, and seeks to guide the Palace. The opposition parties are publicly committed to disbanding IDEA if or when they come to power.

Indications are that the Palace is uncertain how to evaluate the political outlook in Greece and is undecided on what to do if Papagos withdraws or dies. Papagos's departure is likely to take place before new elections are due in November 1956. Yet, while the political leadership of the party in power has lost its vitality, the political opposition of the center—the Liberal Party under Papandreou and the Liberal Democratic Union under Venizelos—appears at present unable to capture the initiative.

The current relaxed international atmosphere in Greece has given the left wing parties an impetus, and provided the stimulus for an upsurge in Communist political activity. The Communist-controlled United Democratic Left (EDA) has become more articulate and outspoken in pressing for a "Democratic or Patriotic Front."

WPA

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284. Letter From the Counselor of the Embassy in Greece (Thurston) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter) [1]

Athens, September 12, 1955.

DEAR BILL: These are busy days for all of us, but I am stimulated by your letter of September 2 [2] to try my hand at an informal evaluation of the present Greek internal political situation. I had planned to do so at the time of the King's departure for Belgrade [3] but for reasons I am sure you understand have not up till this time been able to get around to it.

In response to the specific point raised in your letter, that is, the plans of Karamanlis, the Embassy . . . has been following this subject very closely both with Karamanlis himself as well as with persons in the Royal circles sympathetic to the aspirations of Kara-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.00/9–1255. Secret; Official–Informal.

[2] Not found in Department files.

[3] King Paul and Queen Frederika of Greece visited Yugoslavia, September 8–14, at the invitation of President Tito.

manlis. Just before his departure on leave the Ambassador had a long talk with Karamanlis, the purport of which was reflected in the intelligence reports you mentioned.

I agree with you that ideally it would be a tidier situation all around if Karamanlis would continue to serve in a transitional government should such a government have to be set up. However, Karamanlis himself feels very strongly that staying on would adversely affect the possibility of his becoming prime minister and we have to take his judgment seriously in arriving at our own conclusions as to the better course. If he sullies himself politically by serving in what may likely be the unpopular swan song period of the Rally as we know it, his qualities of leadership and professional competence may be lost for an indefinite period. A lot will depend of course on the actual march of events and the extent to which a crisis situation might develop in Greece in the weeks ahead as a result of various internal and external pressures now at work.

If we are lucky, the question you raise may not be acute until later in the year. Just before the King's departure for Yugoslavia there was a momentary flurry in Royal and political circles, the gist of which seemed to be the apparent decision of the King to persuade Papagos to resign and to appoint Stephanopoulos as his successor in an interim government. At the same time the Marshal, or at least his family, embarked on a small counter-campaign. This involved an indirect approach to me in which some persuasive arguments were used to make a strong case for the Marshal to remain in the prime ministership as long as possible. . . . There is a good deal to be said for this point of view, and certainly in the present atmosphere the formation of a new government bringing with it the possibility of early elections is a prospect I do not view with enthusiasm. In the end the Marshal managed to get a good medical certificate from a French doctor and the King and Queen went off to Yugoslavia with the stated purpose of not coming back to Athens until the end of October. Some critics in high places have told me that the King and Queen were acting like spoiled children in insisting on carrying out their plans for a long vacation in Austria, but the King's absence might actually have a beneficial effect in that it will tend to reduce to a minimum speculation about imminent political changes.

All this of course took place before the recent blow up in Greco-Turkish relations and the rather sad conclusion of the London

Conference from the Greek point of view.[4] Other than what we have said at some length in recent cables on this subject I would only like to add here that these recent events make it absolutely impossible to predict whether the present Government will stay put for a few more months or whether the King will change his plans and come back to Athens. Otherwise it would have been a pretty safe bet that no important changes would occur here until November.

Not directly related to the foregoing but certainly worth consideration in the present overall Greek picture is the attached memorandum of a conversation I had with Papandreou, the Liberal Party leader.[5] Although it covers a number of topics, I should especially like to allude to his statements about the fear of the Greeks that we are abandoning them, a fear which at this time seems primarily to stem from the fact that there has not been from the United States either officially or otherwise a public condemnation of the atrocities in Turkey against the Greeks. The Greeks expect an awful lot under the best circumstances but knowing so well our traditional humanitarian reaction to persecution of minorities, they simply cannot understand why we seem to take so lightly the recent outbreaks against the Greek minority in Turkey.

I do hope we can get a favorable response to our recent suggestion on how to handle the Presidential invitation to the Marshal. I hope that you are pushing this wholeheartedly.

All of us here look forward to your paying us a visit before the end of the year both because we would like to see you again and also because a visit now or in the near future would be very useful.

Sincerely yours,

Ray

[4] On August 29, a tripartite conference of representatives of the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey convened in London to discuss problems of the Eastern Mediterranean. The conference was suspended on September 7 pending Greek and Turkish consideration of British proposals for granting self-government to Cyprus. On September 6, a series of violent anti-Greek riots broke out in Istanbul and Izmir resulting in extensive damage and destruction of Greek-owned shops and Orthodox churches. The rioting was reportedly in response to a number of anti-Turkish incidents in Salonika on September 5.

[5] Not printed.

285. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, September 22, 1955.

SUBJECT

Comments of King Paul and Mr. Constantine Karamanlis Regarding the Greek Political Crisis

1. . . . This information is forwarded for your personal consideration and will not be further disseminated by my Organization. It is related to . . . King Paul's message to you and is in amplification of Mr. Thurston's telegram No. 703 to the Department. [2]

2. In discussing the Greek political crisis, King Paul and Queen Frederika stressed their fear that any Prime Minister succeeding Prime Minister Papagos would have to adopt a more neutralist policy unless the United States takes appropriate steps to correct the swing in Greek public opinion. Neither the Royal Couple nor the Cabinet felt that the recent letter of the Secretary of State to Prime Minister Papagos meets this need. [3]

3. The King stated that he had been told by Minister of Foreign Affairs Stephanopoulos that if efforts at inscription of the Cyprus question failed at the United Nations, he would advise the Secretary of State of his intention to resign as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Stephanopoulos stated to the King that he was committed to a pro-Western policy which he could not carry out in the future once the Greek public reacts to an unfavorable vote in the United Nations. King Paul indicated that it was his belief that Mr. Stephanopoulos means what he says.

4. King Paul has twice indicated his determination to call on Mr. Karamanlis to form a new government. This may be done immediately after the inscription issue is settled, or in the event of Prime Minister Papagos' death or resignation. King Paul has postponed his Austrian vacation until the inscription issue is decided.

5. King Paul views the appointment of Mr. Stephanopoulos as Prime Minister as being "out of the question." At the same time he is fearful of the neutralist line which might be taken by any

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.00/9–2255. Top Secret. According to a note attached to the source text, Dulles' memorandum was read by Hoover, Allen, Baxter, Jernegan, and Barnes.

[2] In telegram 703 from Athens, September 17, Thurston reported that the King and Queen had urged the United States to support the inscription of the Cyprus item at the U.N. General Assembly. The royal couple indicated that unless this were done the Prime Minister succeeding Papagos might be forced to take a neutralist or even anti-NATO line in order to maintain popular support. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/9–1755)

[3] See footnote 3, Document 129.

opposition leader. The King anticipates strong criticism when he calls Mr. Karamanlis out but feels that the Greek people and the Army will be behind him.

6. With regard to Prime Minister Papagos' health, the King stated that he had been told by the Prime Minister's personal physician on 16 September that the Prime Minister had taken a bad turn in the last few days and that the situation was serious.

7. . . . feels that Mr. Karamanlis is maintaining objectivity, calmness and good judgment. He also believes that Mr. Karamanlis, if he takes over following the failure of the Cyprus inscription, will undoubtedly have a very difficult adjustment period, particularly since the appointment of Panagiotis Pipinellis as Minister of Foreign Affairs will be attacked as appeasement on the Cyprus question. Mr. Karamanlis continues to hope that the United States can help Greece find means for shelving the Cyprus issue "with honor" so that he can address himself to internal economic problems. Publicly, he will announce that Greece's Cyprus policy will continue and that only the methods in carrying out the policy will be changed.

8. Both King Paul and Mr. Karamanlis believe that Karamanlis will probably assume the leadership of a provisional government no later than the first week in November.

Allen Dulles

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286. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, September 29, 1955—3 p.m.

833. Deterioration Greek-Turk relations, failure Cyprus UN appeal, and bitter popular reaction to stand NATO allies, in combination prolonged illness Prime Minister Papagos has provoked domestic political crisis. Crisis expected be brought to head following return tonight of Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos and early changes government leadership seem likely. . . . King now convinced necessity providing solution to replace incapacitated Papagos to achieve active government direction and intends press Rally

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.00/9–2955. Confidential. Pouched to Salonika.

leaders persuade Papagos to resign. Concurrently, opposition parties applying pressure on King to force early governmental change.

Rally factions have reportedly been discussing idea "provisional" government which would carry country through until elections next year, when pitch popular passions might have abated. Figures mentioned most frequently as possible head such government are Karamanlis, Rhodopoulos (Parliamentary President) and Stephanopoulos. Opposition parties, however, have now indicated that they would consider "provisional" government violation constitution and have demanded as only possible solution present crisis formation "service" government to vote new electoral law, dissolve Parliament, and call immediate elections.

Opposition maneuvers spearheaded by Liberal Democratic Union leader Venizelos' threat day before yesterday that if any other solution imposed he would resign and ask LDU deputies to follow suit in order force by-elections. Democratic Party has made parallel announcement. Liberal and EPEK parties (who originally proposed mass resignation opposition deputies some months ago) have indicated agreement Venizelos proposal. Communist-front EDA, which has consistently advocated this course, called Venizelos' proposal "gratifying". At same time, LDU and Democratic Party are reportedly engaged in negotiations for electoral cooperation on platform to include repeal Greek-U.S. base agreement, general amnesty, and abolition loyalty certificates.

Venizelos scheduled give speech Salonika this Sunday and according some reports, may announce resignations LDU deputies that occasion. On other hand, he has set no specific time limit for solution and unless he takes initiative before mid-November he will have lost opportunity force by-elections (constitution permits by-elections in last year Parliament only in event more than one-quarter Parliamentary seats become vacant). There seems little question that any elections held this time would result strong Leftist gains. This will be important factor in King's decision on solution crisis. [2]

Cannon

[2] In telegram 844, September 30, Cannon reported that in a conversation with King Paul on September 29, he learned that the King intended to force the resignation of Papagos within the next few days. The Ambassador noted that the King would have preferred to appoint Karamanlis, but all indications pointed to Stephanopoulos as Papagos' successor. (*Ibid.*, 781.00/9–3055)

287. Editorial Note

At the 260th meeting of the National Security Council on October 6, General Cabell raised Greece in his review of developments affecting United States security:

"General Cabell then commented on the death of Prime Minister Papagos. He predicted that this event would bring to a head the political crisis which had been shaping up in Greece for over a year. He also predicted the probable end of the period of relative political stability which Greece had enjoyed under the dead Prime Minister." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

That same day, the Embassy at Athens reported that the death of Papagos on October 4, the resignation of the Rally government, and the King's "bold and unexpected" designation of Karamanlis to form a new government had brought about an "immediate crisis" within the Rally Party and between the Rally and the opposition parties. The Embassy noted that Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos, appointed Acting Prime Minister hours before Papagos' death, would attempt to seek a vote of confidence from the Rally. According to the Embassy, the King believed Karamanlis to be a "more suitable" leader. (Telegram 905 from Athens, October 6; Department of State, Central Files, 781.13/10–655)

The Karamanlis government, formed on October 6, was, like its predecessor, composed entirely of Greek Rally members. Karamanlis became Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and Spyros Theotokis replaced Stephanopoulos as Foreign Minister.

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288. Telegram From the Army Attaché in Greece (Strange) to the Department of the Army [1]

Athens, October 13, 1955—6:30 p.m.

MID 754, 131630Z October (Army message).

1. Because new Karamanlis Government has just received vote of confidence which provides it assurance to tackle unsettled prob-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.21/10–1355. Secret; Noforn. Sent also to the Department of State, which is the source text. Repeated to the Army Attaché at Ankara, USNMR at Paris for SACEUR, USDOCOSOUTH, USDOCOSOUTHEAST, and the Army Attaché at Belgrade. The information addressees were instructed to pass the telegram to appropriate U.S. Embassies.

lems in Greece,[2] here follows detailed account of timely discussion today between new Prime Minister and General J. Lawton Collins. Also present were Admiral Spanides, Acting Chief of NDGS, Lt. General Pallis, Greek MA in Washington and representative to NATO standing group, and USARMA.

2. PM Karamanlis referred to traditional concept of balance of power among Balkan nations. He then said:

(A) While Greek authorities realize U.S. international relations are complex, Greek people are seriously disturbed when they see disproportionate U.S. aid supplied to their neighbors, Yugoslavia and especially Turkey. Many Greeks regard with trepidation the important role Turkey seems to have in western military and political plans.

(B) Many people believe their past performance as firm adherent to their western alliances warrant greater recognition in increased military aid vis-à-vis their neighbors.

(C) They conclude that perhaps U.S. does not recognize strategic importance and reliability of Greece.

In reply General Collins:

(A) Explained that he was no longer directly connected with U.S. military aid program.

(B) Reviewed decision and circumstances prompting initiation of U.S. aid to Yugoslavia. One basic condition for aid continuation is Yugoslav contribution to western defense, which means effective military cooperation with her western neighbors, Italy and Greece. To Greece this is of great importance because Yugoslav cooperation enables her to base her defense on the very strong strategically important struma position in northern Greece.

(C) With reference to the inference to Turkey as a possible military threat to Greece, he emphasized that war between Turkey and Greece is unthinkable under any conditions present or future. While NATO countries have jointly agreed to come to the defense of any member nation no matter what quarter attack may come from, without or within NATO, the present threat to peace is Russia. Purpose of NATO is to build common defense so strong that Russia would have no temptation to attack.

(D) U.S. military aid to NATO countries is intended to enable those countries to equip armed forces in accordance with NATO requirements for common defense. He then gave brief explanation of difference in defense problems in strategic areas of Greece and Turkey.

(E) He disagreed with any idea that U.S. did not recognize importance of Greece to free world. Best proof was during Communist guerrilla war in Greece when U.S. supplied large amounts of aid to Greece at critical time. Continued interest shown by subsequent

[2] In telegram 966, October 13, the Embassy reported, among other things, that Karamanlis had received an "impressive" vote of confidence winning 200 of the 279 votes of deputies present in Parliament. (*Ibid.*)

aid program extending to present. He believes Greece can always count on U.S. support and interest where needed.

4. PM changed theme to say:

(A) Greek people solidly feel recent disorders in Turkey were "slap in face" to entire nation. As indicated by U.S. press apparently American people do not appreciate depth of this feeling.

(B) Provocations on 6 September against Greek officers serving in Izmir were really insult to NATO because these Greek officers were NATO officers. NATO authorities should recognize as such and take appropriate action.

(C) Greece badly needed assistance of her allies to persuade Turks take proper steps restore Greek-Turkish relations to proper plane.

5. General Collins reply:

(A) He understood, and believes U.S. did understand as well, depth of Greek feeling this subject. He could only express his personal regret at such tragic events.

(B) He emphasized his trip had no relation to present relations between Greece and Turkey, that his trip had been planned long prior to events of 6 September.

(C) As military man could not comment on political aspects. Even though making trip as U.S. official, he could not completely disassociate himself with his NATO position and therefore expressed strong hope that Greece would resume full participation in NATO affairs at early date.

6. In lighter view, PM then referred to political opposition newspapers attacks on himself as "quisling" for not adopting neutralist foreign policy for Greece and for not withdrawing completely from NATO. He said he believed either course was wrong, Greece must adhere to its alliances, but he must take feeling of the people into consideration.

. . . . . .

289. Telegram From the Office of the Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State [1]

Paris, October 22, 1955—5 p.m.

Polto 618. Re Athens 1016 [2] repeated Paris 83. Foreign Minister Theotokis spent hour and half with me this morning. It was clear that his main objective was to lay before U.S. Greek requirements for additional economic assistance, preparatory to making similar request when he sees the Secretary. He did not touch on specifics of Greek difficulties with Turkey until end of conversation and then only in response to queries from me.

Theotokis, after mentioning that Ambassador Cannon had suggested he call on me, led off with summary of current political situation. Gist his remarks was that, with elections scheduled next year (he was not responsive to my query regarding date), government is faced with prospect of going before electorate amongst whom neutralist sentiments are growing with Communist encouragement, and who are increasingly questioning need to maintain armed forces at present level which takes 30 percent of Greek budget. Added to this is public feeling that United States has "let Greece down" and abandoned its democratic principles in United Nations vote on Cyprus.

To combat these tendencies present government, who are being called "westerneers" by large segment of public, urgently need additional economic aid from United States. There is an unfavorable balance of payments situation, but Theotokis thought this manageable. The main need for assistance is in connection with (a) budget

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/10–2255. Secret. Repeated to Athens and Ankara.

[2] In telegram 1016, October 20, the Embassy suggested that it would be "most useful" in strengthening the Greek Government if Dulles would agree to meet with Theotokis in Paris. (*Ibid.*, 110.11–DU/10–2055) Dulles, who was in Paris en route to the Foreign Ministers meeting in Geneva, October 27–November 16, met with Theotokis on October 24. The following record of the conversation was transmitted to the Department:

"During talk October 24 with Greek Foreign Minister, I assured him that we would take no precipitate action on any Turkish request for special economic aid. He apparently feared that we had under contemplation large scale aid in response to pleas he understood Turks had made to us. At present time favorable response by us would be interpreted, according to him, in Greece, as inordinate sympathy for Turks. He indicated, however, that if some additional aid to Turkey in future were tied to Turkish reimbursement Greek claims for September riots, would kill two birds with one stone. I assured him we would take no action without regard to Greek sensibilities and in referring to substantial number impending elections among our friends, mentioned we have one coming up ourselves." (Secto 25 from Paris, October 25; *ibid.*, 782.5–MSP/10–2555)

deficit of about 10 percent and (b) economic development program. This necessary to curb inflation, with its inevitable effects at the polls, and give public hope for future improvement in standard of living. All this calls for an increase, according to Theotokis figures, in United States economic aid from present level of about $40 million to $61 million, including certain amount of surplus agricultural commodities. Moreover swift action is essential if desired political effects are to be achieved. Finally, Theotokis stated he was specifically instructed by Prime Minister Karamanlis to say that aid must be in form of grant not loan.

In addition to economic aid, Theotokis made plea for OSP contracts to permit ammunition factory to continue operations, existing orders being near completion.

I told Theotokis I would report his remarks to appropriate quarters but presumed he aware this organization had no supervisory functions respecting country aid programs. Re OSP explained difficulties facing this program as ammunition build up nears completion and need arises to put production facilities on standby basis.

In discussing political prospects, Theotokis referred to need for "normal international relations", as well as economic aid. In response my query what this involved, he said resolution of Cyprus problem and difficulties with Turkey. I ventured opinion former not likely be brought about prior to election. He seemed to agree but responded gulf between British and Greek positions "deep but not very wide". So far as difficulties with Turkey are concerned it was plain his main preoccupation was with 2 ceremonies in Izmir (see earlier telegram [3]) and he implied that if Turks carried them out "moral rehabilitation" Greece would be complete. Re compensation Theotokis was much less clear. He agreed problem compensating 5 Greek officers Izmir on way solution but he was vague as to other claims. Called Turkish offer $300,000 (his figure) for orthodox churches Istanbul ridiculously small.

Though text Topol 448 [4] not available before meeting, I urged on Theotokis necessity for moderation in present situation and told him that Greeks, through their apparent unwillingness accept Turkish efforts make amends were losing much of sympathy which NATO partners had originally felt for them. Theotokis did not

[3] In Polto 617, October 22, Perkins forwarded information regarding Turkish ceremonies planned for Greek Army officers whose homes were attacked during the anti-Greek rioting at Izmir on September 6. (*Ibid.*, 740.5/10–2255)

[4] In Topol 448, to Paris, October 21, the Department noted that it hoped that the meeting with the Greeks would provide an opportunity to emphasize the Department's concern over the current situation "with its disruptive effect on NATO" and its belief that it was now time for them to begin to resume their "full participation" in NATO activities. (*Ibid.*, 740.5/10–2155)

appear impressed and responded rather emotionally by reference to Turkish failure live up to "gentleman's agreement" to carry out 2 Izmir ceremonies reported separately. Said inter alia would be out of question for him to attend Balkan pact Ministerial meeting, which must be held before end of year, unless satisfaction obtained this point.

Perkins

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290. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, November 9, 1955—5 p.m.

1211. Paris USRO for Gray. When we learned yesterday from Prime Minister that Foreign Ministry was about to deliver to Embassy formal note raising question of privileges and immunities enjoyed by American personnel in Greece, it was decided to make available immediately to Karamanlis the statement contained Deptel 1041 [2] (see paragraph 2a Embtel 1136 [3]).

Prime Minister undertook discuss matter with Foreign Minister before taking any action. Although Karamanlis not conversant with technical aspects question, we gathered from his remarks that he had understood that prospective negotiations would embrace entire scope AMAG agreement of 1947.

Today other Embassy officers and I have discussed matter with Foreign Minister and Grivas, Chief U.S. Section, and we found that they had strong views that prospective negotiations should include all American personnel. We endeavored, I believe, with some success to dispel their misconceptions in this regard, emphasizing that by so widening the question they were introducing complications and delays which would not be in the interest of either government. We stressed that if what they desired was quick progress on the most important sector of the problem, then the best way to proceed would be along the lines indicated in the statement contained Deptel 1041.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56381/11–955. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris.

[2] Dated October 9. (*Ibid.*, 711.56381/10–955)

[3] Dated November 2. (*Ibid.*, 781.00/11–255)

Deptel 1041 expressed hope that instructions to negotiate would be transmitted in one week. That was one month ago. Developments reported herein make it painfully clear that unless we can get ourselves into a formal negotiating posture in this matter within the next few days, we may have to face up to great pressure for a revision of status American personnel here far broader and more damaging than that envisaged in Deptel 1041.

Cannon

291. Staff Study Prepared by an Operations Coordinating Board Working Group [1]

Washington, November 16, 1955.

ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN GREECE (PURSUANT TO NSC ACTION 1290–D) AND RECOMMENDED ACTION [2]

I. Nature of Security Threat

1. Since the liberation of Greece in 1944, the principal security threat in the country has been the Communist Party (KKE), which twice (December 1944 and December 1947) launched attempts to

[1] Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Greece. Top Secret.

The working group that prepared the study included representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, CIA, ICA, and USIA.

[2] On December 21, 1954, the NSC charged the OCB with the task of formulating a concept for U.S. aid in the development of forces adequate to provide internal security in countries vulnerable to Communist subversion. (NSC Action No. 1290–d; *ibid.*, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 95) In a circular telegram sent to 20 posts, including Athens, on March 23, 1955, the Department requested the respective Chiefs of Mission to whom the telegram was sent to have "the country team, including representatives from FOA, MAAG (or service attachés), . . . prepare a report on the possibilities and requirements for U.S. assistance in increasing the effectiveness of the regular armed forces to deal with communist subversion and insurrections." (Circular telegram 559, March 23, 1955; *ibid.*, Central Files, 700.5/3–2355) According to a memorandum of December 8, 1955, by the OCB Secretariat Staff, attached to the source text, the OCB noted the paper on Greece at its August 24 Board meeting; concurred in its analysis and recommendations at its meeting of November 16; agreed that implementation of recommendations should be carried out in the same manner as the implementation of courses of action in Outline Plans of Operations; and noted that the International Cooperation Administration will assume "over-all" leadership in the implementation of the program. An overall report on the 1290–d program was concurred in by the Board on November 23 for transmittal to the NSC. On December 8, the National Security Council discussed the report.

seize power by force. The first attempt ended in three months—the second continued until October 1949, when the KKE declared a "change in its political line" and "a tactic of withdrawal in the face of the enemy's colossal superiority." Since the latter date the KKE has steadily lost strength and significance; it does not at present constitute an immediate political or insurrectionist threat to Greek security. This defeat was the result of resolute action by the Greek Government, supported by American and British aid, and of the withdrawal of Yugoslav support for the guerrillas. However, in spite of substantial successes achieved by Greek security forces in uncovering and breaking up clandestine KKE organizations during the past five years, the Party does continue to present a considerable security threat in terms of its current capability for subversive activity and its potential for sabotage and guerrilla warfare.

2. Illegal since 1947, the KKE now has clandestine membership estimated at 30,000 in Greece. There are another 20,000–25,000 KKE members abroad, most of them former Greek guerrillas who, with their families, are now refugees in the Soviet Bloc countries of Western Europe. On the basis of returns in the last three Parliamentary elections it is estimated that the KKE also has a reasonably dependable bloc of 200,000 sympathizers, constituting about 10% of the electorate.

3. The KKE is a broadly based party. In addition to the valuable educated element composed of minor government officials, journalists, and teachers, a substantial proportion of its membership consists of industrial workers, peasants, and agricultural workers. Recruitment and indoctrination is believed to be concentrated at present among Greeks abroad and an estimated 25,000 political prisoners and ex-prisoners inside Greece. Its recruitment of youth has been impeded by proscription of its youth fronts (EPON in 1947 and EDRE in 1952).

4. The geographic distribution of KKE membership is of strategic significance. Its industrial component is located primarily in Piraeus, other major port areas, and in northern Greece. Rural strength is also largely concentrated in the sensitive northern area adjoining the Bulgarian border, around Salonika, Kavalla, and Drama.

5. Inside Greece the KKE organization has been largely disrupted since 1950, but contact is maintained among some elements through clandestine channels. Political leadership and exploitation of KKE clandestine assets is the responsibility of the KKE central committee and secretariat in Bucharest which broadcasts instructions over the Free Greece radio, infiltrates agents through Bulgaria and Western nations, and provides most of the funds for internal party work. The party is active among colonies of Greeks throughout the

world, and its sympathizers (estimated at 30,000) assist in its infiltration and finance operations.

6. As of January 1955 over 3,500 Greeks of an estimated 50,000–80,000 resident in the Soviet bloc had been repatriated. So far their resettlement and rehabilitation has been largely unsuccessful. In spite of joint American-Greek security screening, the group presumably contains undetected trained agents, and the growing dissatisfaction within the group makes it likely that many others will be susceptible of recruitment by the KKE in the future. Funds are currently inadequate to support the government program for handling these 3,500 repatriates and other pressing matters such as the Volos earthquake disaster have diverted attention from the development of a well thought-out program for the refugee group as a whole. It is anticipated that the security threat to the sensitive northern areas of Greece, where the majority of the repatriates are now living will increase significantly if a substantial proportion of the group still in the satellites is repatriated.

7. In the satellite area the KKE conducts training schools for espionage, sabotage and political organization. Of about five hundred agents known to have graduated from these schools, about 150 have so far been dispatched clandestinely to Greece to engage in espionage or to conduct political and psychological warfare and rebuild the party cadres. In addition, practically all male youth who were evacuated to the Iron Curtain countries during the guerrilla war have received intensive indoctrination and some degree of paramilitary training, including sabotage and infiltration techniques.

8. The majority of Party members and sympathizers who take part in overt political activity are affiliated with the United Democratic Left party (EDA), which was created in 1950 at the instigation of the KKE. Others are affiliated with the Democratic Party of the Working People (DKEL). In the labor field the KKE works primarily through the United Syndicalist Movement of Greece (ESKE) which controls about 20% of Greek labor.

9. The EDA has worked overtly to win supporters for the Communist cause and to obtain a strong position in the political life of Greece by legal means. It succeeded in sending deputies to the Parliament until 1952, when the proportional representation system was changed to the plurality system. The vote of the party and its sympathizers remains fairly constant at about ten percent of the total, as evidenced by several by-elections held since 1952, and by the increase in the vote for non-Communist opposition candidates supported by the EDA during the municipal elections of November 1954. The failure of the EDA to attract a wider popular following is indicative of the resistance of the majority of the Greek people to overt Communist influence.

10. Rather than attempting to seize power now the KKE appears to be pursuing a short-range program to neutralize Greece as an element of Western military strength and as a base for operations against the Soviet orbit. Toward this end its members and agents are endeavoring to undermine the faith of the Greek people in the Rally government, to create economic and political instability, and to exacerbate differences and frictions between Greece and its allies.

[Here follow sections II–IV.]

V. Political Factors Bearing on Internal Security Programs and Feasibility of U.S. Assistance

45. The Rally has a large Parliamentary majority and governs more effectively than any other Government since World War II. However, it is not an organized political party but a group of political elements held together chiefly by the prestige of Prime Minister Papagos. [3] He is not well, and there is no indication that he will return to vigorous health. Moreover, defections from the Rally have occurred, and while they have not affected its present control of Parliament, they do indicate some deterioration in the cohesiveness of the group. If Marshal Papagos should disappear from the scene, this would lead to jockeying for position by the various leaders, both in the present Rally and in the opposition, and a consequent period of political uncertainty.

46. Stabilizing influences in such a situation would be the King and Queen, who could, if necessary, appoint a caretaker government, and the possibility that the Rally may be preserved by several of the capable and experienced younger ministers who are dedicated to the Rally program. The military clique, IDEA, which reportedly favors the younger ministers, would undoubtedly use its influence against the formation of a government in which communists had a dangerous degree of power.

47. Greece has been consistently pro-Western in its orientation, and joined NATO in 1952 under the left of center Prime Minister Plastiras. Under the Rally Government it has continued to cooperate loyally and enthusiastically in NATO. It has maintained heavy military expenditures, which put considerable strain on the Greek budget, in order to work toward the achievement of its force goals. This has been done at the expense of development plans, which in a country with such a low standard of living has meant real sacrifices by the people. This policy, though increasingly criticized, has been

[3] Since preparation of this country analysis, Marshal Papagos has died. A Rally Government of a caretaker nature is in office until elections in the Spring of 1956. [Footnote in the source text.]

acceptable partly because of national pride in Greece's place in NATO and partly because Greece expects continuing U.S. assistance.

48. The Greek Government would probably be willing to accept technical assistance to improve its internal security forces, provided this did not entail diverting aid from the armed forces. While the Government recognizes the necessity for outside help in meeting NATO commitments and in developing the Greek economy, it believes that it has, on its own, done a good job of countering subversive activities. The people share their Government's satisfaction with its record in this respect; they are, however, far from satisfied with the rate of economic development. Consequently any effort to divert aid from the armed forces to provide assistance to internal security forces rather than to the economic program would be politically unacceptable.

49. Moreover, assistance given Greek internal security forces at the expense of aid to the armed forces would have widespread and undesirable repercussions in NATO. Greek armed forces, while small, would play an essential role in a general war. A reduction of military and economic aid would diminish Greece's ability to meet its NATO commitments and would seriously affect allied military strategy in Southeast Europe. Moreover, substantial U.S. support of internal security forces in Greece would undoubtedly lead to renewed requests for similar support from other NATO countries.

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292. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Gray) [1]

Washington, November 25, 1955.

DEAR MR. GRAY: Your letter of September 29, 1955 [2] addressed to the Secretary on the subject of modification of United States base arrangements in Greece has received careful consideration in the Department of State, and it is hoped that it will be possible to send a mutually acceptable instruction to our Embassy at Athens with a

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56381/9–2955. Secret. Drafted on November 14 by Ben Dixon, Acting Political-Military Adviser to the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, and by Chalmers Wood.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 282.

minimum of delay. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Hoover feel that every effort should be made to reach promptly a mutually satisfactory agreement along the lines which follow.

There is no doubt that we should seek to retain the maximum measure of United States jurisdiction in criminal cases involving members of the United States forces in Greece which is concomitant with our over-all interests. It is also agreed that the provision regarding the status of our forces under the present Military Facilities Agreement with Greece is causing serious difficulties to the friendly Greek Government and should be renegotiated. The basic remaining question to be determined is the maximum amount of criminal jurisdiction that can be retained. What is this maximum? Present agreements between the United States and Greece can be abrogated by Greece. The question of "extraterritoriality" for United States forces has become a major cause of difficulty in our relations with Greece at a time when these relations have already been strained over the Cyprus question.[3] It is not only exploited by the communist press, but is a sore point with people of every political hue. The present friendly Karamanlis government is in effect a "caretaker" government which has announced elections for the early spring. It is anxious to subdue the anti-American emotions in Greece, and to begin rebuilding Greek-Turkish relations. It deserves our full support. In negotiating changes in our Base Agreement, the Karamanlis government must accomplish tangible results or seriously jeopardize its popular support. On November 9 the Embassy reported that the Greek Government had made it clear that it desired to start negotiations very soon (Embassy telegram 1211[4]). Karamanlis has also indicated that if prompt agreement on a revision were not reached, he might have to make a public declaration and perhaps introduce a bill into the Greek Parliament.

In order to determine, then, what is the maximum measure of criminal jurisdiction that may be retained, it is our conviction that our Embassy at Athens should be instructed to carry on its negotiations on the following basis. First, the Embassy would seek agreement along the lines you propose: the elimination of all reference to "extraterritorial" rights, the application of NATO Status of Forces Agreement arrangements for matters arising under civil jurisdiction (i.e. return of civil jurisdiction to Greece) and the retention of United States jurisdiction in criminal cases which under the NATO formula

[3] On November 23, in a memorandum to Murphy requesting approval of the letter to Gray, George Allen presented the Department's position on the question of extraterritoriality and the renegotiation of the US-Greek Military Facilities Agreement, signed in Athens on October 13, 1953. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56381/11–2355) For text of the agreement, see 4 UST (pt. 2) 2868.

[4] Document 290.

would fall under Greek jurisdiction. It would be further agreed that if the Greek authorities so requested, and if the United States authorities agreed, a criminal case could be tried in a Greek court. Our Embassy in Athens would be instructed to seek agreement on this basis through firm and vigorous negotiation.

However, if after every proper effort had been made, agreement with the Greek Government could not be reached, the Embassy would then seek permission to start the second phase of the negotiations. In this phase the Embassy would offer to put criminal jurisdiction on the same general basis as our agreements with other NATO countries, i.e. Greece would retain primary criminal jurisdiction, but would waive such jurisdiction except in cases of particular importance.

We believe that this method of negotiation would be the best and most practical way of determining the maximum amount of jurisdiction which the United States can retain in criminal cases.

The proposed instruction which has been prepared in the Department of State does not place members of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in Greece on the same status as members of the Embassy staff. This is chiefly due to the relatively large size of the Advisory Group as compared to the Embassy. As of October 1, 1955 there were a total of 174 Americans on the Embassy staff compared to 261 officers and enlisted men on the staff of the Advisory Group, of whom 154 were enlisted men. There would be no objection to placing all the members of the Advisory Group on the same status as the Embassy when the number of officers and enlisted men has been considerably reduced. This is provided for in the proposed instruction. This is done in other countries where the Advisory Groups are relatively small. For the present the principal officers of the Advisory Group should be given diplomatic status, and the remaining personnel should be on the same status as other military personnel in Greece.

We are anxious to remove this source of irritation between the United States and Greece, on which our Embassy has urged renegotiation for over sixteen months, as rapidly as possible. We therefore hope that agreement can promptly be reached between appropriate officers of the Department of Defense and the Department of State to send instructions based on the method outlined above. We also believe that the two Departments must reach an understanding in advance of sending out the instructions to the effect that if agreement with the Greek Government can not be reached, the two Departments will promptly authorize Embassy Athens to proceed with the second set of proposals. I believe that an effort to maintain the first position as the only basis for negotiation might well cause the Greek Government to insist on strict adherence to the Status of

Forces Agreement of NATO SOF. In view of the approaching Greek elections, instructions along the above lines should, if possible, be sent forward to Athens within the next week.

I recommend that the two Departments should promptly reach agreement on the basis outlined above.

Sincerely yours,

Robert D. Murphy [5]

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

293. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, December 13, 1955—6 p.m.

1502. Paris USRO for Gray. For Deputy Under Secretary Murphy. Reference Embtel 1422. [2] Tziras of Foreign Ministry (now acting as Chef du Cabinet to Karamanlis) asked me to call this morning and said that Prime Minister had asked him take up with me as matter of urgency present status immunities question.

Prime Minister has learned that opposition leaders intend raise matter in Parliament December 17 and to press him with questions regarding promised negotiations (Embtels 1211 [3] and 1216 [4]). In absence any indication from Embassy that instructions received or plausible explanation for delay Prime Minister utterly at loss how to deal with anticipated questions. Unless he can say something concrete, he greatly fears that his political opponents will start agitation for unilateral Greek action such as denunciation of Greek-US agreement of 1953 on military facilities.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56381/12–1355. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Paris.

[2] In telegram 1422 from Athens, December 6, Thurston informed the Department that in a conversation with Karamanlis, the Prime Minister had expressed his concern about the immunities issue. According to the Embassy, although Karamanlis' announcement about U.S.-Greek negotiations assuaged both the press and the opposition, "it will take only one serious traffic accident involving U.S. personnel to reactivate unwelcome clamor. This would hurt both U.S. and Karamanlis." (*Ibid.*, 711.56381/12–655)

[3] Document 290.

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

Over 2 months have passed since receipt Department's message authorizing announcement US will shortly begin formal negotiations and saying "hope transmit instructions negotiate in one week". Luckily it did not become essential to announce our willingness negotiate until one month ago (November 9). Now we have pushed our own and Prime Minister's luck to brink. We owe it to Prime Minister to extricate him for posture he assumed in good faith by giving him definite way out by Friday December 16. Moreover, we risk destroying progress we have been making with sincere help of Karamanlis towards reestablishment US-Greek relationship. If we stumble on this one, it can hurt us both seriously.

Thurston

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294. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Greek Ambassador (Melas) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen), Department of State, Washington, January 23, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Greek Elections and Cyprus

The Greek Ambassador said he was alarmed by the unity which the opposition parties and groups were showing and feared that they might be able to defeat Prime Minister Karamanlis. He implied that this unity was the result of high feelings in Greece over the Cyprus question and that these feelings in turn were caused by the way in which that question had been handled. He said he felt strongly that something positive must be accomplished on the Cyprus question before the elections if Mr. Karamanlis' victory was to be assured. Mr. Allen said that we had already pushed the British government and that he was confident that at the Eden–Eisenhower meetings [2] we would urge the British to make progress on the Cyprus question. Mr. Allen also said it would be unfortunate if the Greek Govern-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.00/1–2356. Secret. Drafted by Wood on January 24.

[2] Prime Minister Eden visited Washington January 30–February 1 for discussions with the President and Department of State officials. Cyprus was apparently not discussed.

ment allowed Archbishop Makarios to determine Greek foreign policy.

. . . . . .

He also read from the Makarios minutes of the Makarios–Harding meeting of January 13.[3] According to these minutes, Archbishop Makarios was willing to accept the phrase in the formula referring to "strategic considerations", but not the phrase "treaty obligations". Archbishop Makarios had repeatedly asked Governor Harding if the treaties referred to (NATO and Jordan) were not primarily strategic. Harding had almost conceded that they were. Makarios had then suggested that the phrase "strategic considerations" would cover the whole thing.

Ambassador Melas said the phrase "treaty obligations" was fundamentally unacceptable.

Mr. Wood suggested that if Makarios and Harding were able to agree that the two phrases really meant the same thing and one was acceptable to Makarios, he should then be able to agree to the other. The Turkish interest was also reemphasized.

Ambassador Melas then pleaded that something be done before the elections as he was very fearful of the outcome.

[3] See Document 157.

295. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, May 26, 1956.

SUBJECT

Conversations with Prime Minister Karamanlis on 7 and 10 May 1956

1. The views outlined below were expressed on 7 and 10 May 1956 by Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis of Greece . . . .

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.00/5–2656. Secret. In a memorandum of June 6 to Eric Oulashin of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Roger Kirk of the Executive Secretariat indicated that copies of Dulles' letter were being forwarded to the Secretary and Howard Furnas, Intelligence Staff Officer.

2. Reviewing the difficulties which had beset his government since its inception, with the deportation of Archbishop Makarios and public statements by the Turks about armed action over Cyprus confronting him almost before he had had time to form a cabinet, the Prime Minister repeated an earlier statement that Greece is being taken for granted by her allies. He stated once more the intention of the Greek government to proceed to the United Nations General Assembly over the Cyprus issue. He said that in view of Turkey's need for American economic aid, he hoped the United States could exert some influence on Turkey favorable to a Cyprus solution.

3. Turning to the proposal for an economic aid program which his government had just submitted to Ambassador Cannon for transmittal to Washington,[2] Mr. Karamanlis said it was essential that he be able to proceed successfully with a vigorous domestic program to offset the harassment and failures his government had experienced in foreign affairs. He felt that if his government is to survive he must achieve some progress quickly during the next few months and before Cyprus is raised at the General Assembly. Since the government's principal support comes from the agricultural classes, he is especially anxious to make progress in a financial aid program for agriculture. The tobacco workers and other workers of Northern Greece are complaining about the government's failure to accept the rumored Soviet offer to purchase the entire tobacco crop; Mr. Karamanlis plans to resist these pressures, perhaps with a public statement making it clear that the Soviets already have a deficit of $1,500,000 in their current trade balance with Greece.

. . . . . .

Allen W. Dulles

[2] In a May 2 letter to Ambassador Cannon, Karamanlis presented the Greek Government's case for economic aid in 1956 and 1957. The Prime Minister noted that in addition to a $60 million aid level for ordinary foreign exchange and budgetary deficits, Greece was in need of special assistance of $68 million for the support of additional agriculture and economic development programs. After consideration of Karamanlis' proposals by the Embassy and the country team, Cannon forwarded them to Washington in despatch 950, May 15. (*Ibid.*, 781.5–MSP/5–1556)

296. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, June 11, 1956—3 p.m.

3408. Reference Deptel 3558 May 31. [2] Greek-Sov Bloc trade relations have evolved during recent years, not without difficulties, into "normal" exchange of largely primary products, governed by trade and clearing agreements. During recent months indications from overt and covert sources all point to likelihood that Sovs preparing offer Greece "economic assistance". Sov Embassy extremely active (Embdesp 973, May 21 [3]). Sovs returning this year to Salonika Fair on large scale. Inspired press articles (enclosure number two, Embdesp 885, April 25 [4]) and cautious official comment to Embassy officers indicate Sov economic campaign in Greece may also include "reconstruction assistance".

Available evidence does not permit precise forecast nature and timing any offer economic assistance. Visit Greek parliamentarians to Moscow, perhaps this summer, could provide opportunity. Also, Sovs might await developments on Cyprus issue, this summer and fall.

Recent internal economic developments tend weaken GOG capacity to resist Sov offer. Cessation of OSP will create serious labor problem, and possible political repercussions. Bauxite and tobacco production in excess of free world requirements make them natural targets as means of payment for Sov capital goods. GOG especially vulnerable on tobacco since increased purchases by Sovs could obviate need for planned subsidization program. Citrus fruits, and potentially cotton, also in this picture.

Internal economic situation would be greatly aggravated by any decline in level business activity in Western Europe, which largely responsible for Greece's relative "prosperity" at present, or if greater competition encountered from Turkey, because of devaluation of lira or Turkish introduction tobacco export subsidies.

Further buildup of Greek-US relations, politically, militarily, and economically is basic . . . . Our plan furnish GOG two submarines fits this concept, as did recent negot 20.1 million dollar Public Law

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.81/6–1156. Secret.

[2] Telegram 3558, May 31, requested that the Embassy evaluate the possibility of a Soviet offer of assistance to Greece, which Karamanlis would have difficulty rejecting, and to suggest measures for countering such an offer. (*Ibid.*, 611.81/5–3156)

[3] Despatch 973 transmitted information about intensified Soviet efforts to cultivate relations with Greece. (*Ibid.*, 661.81/5–2156)

[4] Enclosure B to despatch 885 was an article by a Greek "left winger" on financing the economic development of Greece. (*Ibid.*, 481.609/4–2556)

480 agreement,[5] and counterpart release program continuing budget support at 100 million drachmae average per month until end of 1956. However PriMin's June 6 statement on investment program, characterized privately to Embassy officer by Deputy PriMin as rehash of last December's budget message, underlines paucity of effective tools which PriMin has to work with to provide political and economic fillip to his govt's program, even though statement received fairly good press.

A tangible economic development program, which Greek people will believe leads toward a higher standard of living, is essential. . . . GOG decisions on several such projects are upcoming, such as the Porter Hotel, the Kennicot asbestos development, and the Westinghouse bid to construct the Ptolemais steam power plant aided by Eximbank financing (Embtel 3390, June 9[6]).

However, cardinal feature Karamalis economic program as presented us (Embdesp 950, May 15[7]) is accent on agricultural improvement. Greek farmers are chronically underemployed and yet they are backbone of electorate which keeps conservative govts in power here. We are conscious that cooperation with Karamanlis on agricultural program involves some problems for us, but such cooperation essential if we are to bolster Karamanlis capability resist Soviets offers.

Specific proposals in country team message which follows.[8]

Cannon

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[5] The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 was designed to facilitate the sale of surplus American agricultural products in foreign countries. For text of P.L. 480, see 68 Stat. 454.

[6] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 881.2614/6–956)

[7] See footnote 2, *supra*.

[8] Telegram 3420 from Athens, June 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 781.5–MSP/6–1256)

297. National Intelligence Estimate [1]

NIE 32–56

Washington, June 26, 1956.

THE OUTLOOK FOR GREECE [2]

The Problem

To estimate the present situation and probable developments in Greece over the next three or four years, with particular reference to Greece's probable role as a member of the Western alliance.

Conclusions

1. The next three or four years will probably see an increase in internal controversy and political maneuvering, in which leftist and neutralist elements will almost certainly gain strength. A return to a pattern of unstable multiparty coalition governments would provide the strengthened left with further opportunities for developing influence and popular support, particularly if new strains developed with the Western powers or economic conditions deteriorated. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a Communist or Communist-oriented government will come to power in Greece during this period. (Paras. 24, 27–29)

2. Despite serious setbacks on the Cyprus issue, we believe the chances are better than even that the present Karamanlis government will be able to ride out opposition criticism between now and the next meeting of the UN General Assembly in November. Karamanlis' chances for survival over a longer period will depend on his ability to show progress toward an understanding on Cyprus. (Para. 25)

3. Given a continuation of US aid at approximately present levels and sustained demand for Greece's major export products, the Greek economy will probably remain relatively stable over the next few years. Its average annual rate of growth even with the continuation of present US aid will probably not exceed three percent, an

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[1] Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret.

[2] According to a note on the cover sheet:

"The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 26 June 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

increase insufficient to accomplish much toward raising the extremely low standard of living or relieving endemic unemployment and underemployment. There appears to be little likelihood that any Greek government will be able to carry out a program of economic development large enough to cause significant improvements in employment or in Greek living conditions during the period of this estimate. (Paras. 38–40)

4. Given a continuation of the Bloc's present tactics of conciliation, some expansion of Greece's economic dealings and other relations with the Bloc will take place, though not to the extent of making Greece economically dependent on the Bloc or of compromising Greece's NATO status. (Paras. 42, 64)

5. Military facilities on Greek territory will probably remain available to the US and NATO. Present US military influence may decline as a result of the Cyprus and Turkish issues, although such loss would be counterbalanced to a large extent by Greece's military interest in NATO and by its dependence on the US for military assistance. If fears of Communist aggression continue to recede, military expenditures are likely to be reduced somewhat within the next few years. (Paras. 40, 48–49)

6. Greece will probably retain its basic pro-US and pro-Western orientation, at least for the period of this estimate. Nevertheless, the absence of a Cyprus settlement will impose serious strains on the relations between Greece and its allies, particularly the UK and Turkey. Moreover, even if an understanding on the Cyprus issue is achieved, Greece will probably pursue a more independent policy toward the US and UK. (Paras. 57–58, 63)

7. We believe that there is about an even chance that some formula for the solution of the Cyprus problem will be agreed upon within the next year or two. Achievement of a Cyprus settlement, however, will at best be a difficult and delicate process which could easily be set back by insufficient flexibility on the part of the principals concerned or new flareups of popular feeling. (Paras. 60–61)

[Here follow the Discussion section of the Estimate, paragraphs 8–65, and Annexes A, Greek Political Parties and Groupings, and B, Development of the Cyprus Question.]

298. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 2, 1956.

SUBJECT

Further Economic Support for Karamanlis Government

Background

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The Karamanlis Government has requested US economic aid for FY 1957 totaling $128.2 million (compared to about $33 million extended in FY 1956). Karamanlis believes that this level of assistance is essential for Greek political and economic stability and for maintenance of its defense establishment.

The U.S.S.R. is increasingly active in the political and cultural field in Greece, and there are signs that it may offer economic assistance.

Discussion

. . . . . .

Karamanlis could increase his domestic political strength and his ability to resist Soviet wooing if he could make conspicuous moves in economic development. . . . His Government has recently announced an expanded investment program, but realization of projects thereunder will be restricted by financial limitations.

US economic assistance could take the form of ICA aid or of surplus agricultural commodities under PL 480; it could also include the partial financing of development projects by the Export-Import Bank. The proposed US aid program for Greece in FY 1957 includes:

a. Defense support aid of $25 million, subject to Congressional action;

b. PL 480 Agreements tentatively totaling about $35 million.

In addition, the Export-Import Bank has told Westinghouse that if it secures the contract the bank will grant a $7.2 million credit to cover the foreign exchange cost of the steam electric power station

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 881.00/7–256. Secret. Drafted by Laingen and Lincoln on June 29.

in the Ptolemais lignite development project. Bidding is now between Westinghouse and a Swiss competitor.

Except for the last possibility, US economic aid to Greece is not readily visible to the average Greek. More tangible participation by the US in development projects of direct benefit to the Greek people, especially to the rural population . . . is desirable.

The Greek Government announced on June 19 that it will invite bids for the construction of a nitrogen fertilizer factory, a part of the development plans for the Ptolemais lignite deposits (Tab B [2]). Foreign exchange cost of the plant is estimated at $20 million. It will produce about 70,000 tons of nitrogen annually, supply farmers with needed fertilizer in quantity and provide nitric acid and other chemicals to Greek industries. It is anticipated that the plant would save about $17 million annually in foreign exchange. The Pittsburgh film, Koppers, Inc., has surveyed the project and considers it feasible.

Recommendation

That the Export-Import Bank be asked to give sympathetic consideration to financing the foreign exchange cost of this nitrogen fertilizer factory. [3]

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[2] Despatch 1073 from Athens, June 21, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 102.798/6–2156) In a June 28 letter to Rountree, Cannon expressed concern over expanding Greek economic relations with Soviet bloc countries. In an effort to offset the possibility that Greece might sell its surplus of low-grade tobacco to the Soviets in exchange for agricultural machinery or industrial goods, Cannon mentioned the nitrogen fertilizer plant. The Ambassador noted: "I think that our financing of a nitrogen fertilizer plant is almost 'tailor-made' for our purposes. This project would fit perfectly the interests of the United States, by establishing another concrete and visible economic link between us and the people of Greece." (*Ibid.*, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 64 F 5, 500–USOM Rf. 320 Greek-Soviet)

Tab A, not found attached, is a memorandum of June 4 from Murphy to Rountree. (*Ibid.*, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 59 D 36, Karamanlis Visit 1956)

[3] Hoover approved the recommendation on July 5.

299. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) and the Ambassador to Greece (Cannon) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) [1]

Washington, August 21, 1956.

SUBJECT

Greece: Extraterritoriality

Background

You will recall at our last meeting on this subject that we agreed to send a suggested draft to Embassy Athens. This was done on July 25, 1956 (Deptel 303—Tab A [2]). On August 1 the Chargé (Ray Thurston) replied (Embtel 393—Tab B [3]) that after an exploratory talk with the Foreign Minister he was convinced that the Greek Government would not agree to the suggested draft since it was very similar to one which had been previously rejected. Thurston then submitted a draft of his own which met some of Defense's earlier objections and which he thought the Greek Foreign Minister might accept.

A telegram of August 6 from the Embassy (No. 455—Tab C [4]) and a letter of August 7 from Ray Thurston to Ambassador Cannon (Tab D [5]) indicate that the Karamanlis Government is under heavier and heavier pressure on this question. It is Ambassador Cannon's considered view that if agreement is reached soon, we can count on Greek good will in the interpretation of the agreement, but that each week's delay means an abatement of that good will since the Government is under heavy pressure from public opinion which will continue to move steadily against us so long as the question remains unsettled.

The question has now been an open source of US-Greek friction for two and a half years and it has been under negotiation for seven months. It is our judgment that the Department should now take the position that for the good of US-Greek relations it should not be allowed to drag on any longer. In reaching this conclusion it is recognized, as was pointed out at some length in Deptel 303 (Tab A), that amendment of the existing agreement along the lines desired by the Greek Government could possibly have an unfavorable effect

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56381/8–2156. Secret. Drafted by Wood.

[2] Telegram 303 to Athens, July 25, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 711.56381/7–1156)

[3] Telegram 393 from Athens, August 1, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 711.56381/8–156)

[4] Telegram 455 from Athens, August 6, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 747C.00/8–656)

[5] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 59 D 36, Extraterritoriality 1956)

on our current SOF negotiations with Germany, where we are endeavoring to reach a waiver agreement based on the Netherlands formula. Our Embassy in Athens points out (Tab B) that the Greek Government could hardly be expected to be persuaded by our problem in Germany to take political risks of its own in trying to sell an unpopular agreement to the Greek public.

Negotiations have reached the point where over-insistence on exact wording may cause serious Greek resentment and cause the Greek Government to interpret any agreement so narrowly as to be contrary to our interests.

Mr. Allen Dulles shares our view that it is in the interests of our relations with Greece to reach agreement rapidly and ranking officers of the Agency have discussed the matter with Mr. Gray.

We should like to propose that we seek firm and prompt agreement with Defense to instruct Embassy Athens along the following lines:

Recommendation

The Embassy would be empowered to make three proposals to the Greek Government, each proposal to be put forward without any reference to the following proposal:

1. The Thurston draft (Embtel 393—Tab B) as amended by Defense with the approval of State. Although Thurston's last telegram has been in for three weeks and we have requested Defense's comments, there have so far been none. However it can be assumed that they will want to propose some changes in the Thurston draft.
2. If the Thurston draft as amended by Defense proves completely unacceptable to the Greek Government, the Embassy would then propose Thurston's draft without amendment.
3. Finally, if neither of these proposals is acceptable, the Embassy would propose that the privileges and immunities of our forces in Greece be governed by the NATO Status of Forces Agreement already in force. In present circumstances it is believed that the Greek Government would be willing to interpret this agreement in a way which would be at least as favorable to our interests as would be the case if it were possible to reach agreement on the proposals now under consideration. These proposals constitute agreements supplementary to the existing NATO SOF, but if narrowly interpreted would probably give less protection than NATO SOF alone interpreted in a friendly manner.

300. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, October 31, 1956—10 a.m.

1463. I have now had two "full-dress" meetings on aid with Karamanlis and principal ministers concerned. It is clear that perhaps because firm decisions have been delayed Greeks have allowed themselves to believe that their requests, including some $68 million additional aid over next three years, were being given favorable consideration. I felt strongly that the sooner they were disillusioned the better from long term viewpoint. In recent meetings, therefore, I have been firmly negative.

My October 26 speech to Propeller Club was widely commented upon in Greek press and generally interpreted as "firm". [2] (I was, for instance, seriously asked by a Government minister whether my statement that "the UN can not impose" a Cyprus solution, meant that the US had decided to oppose inscription).

Disappointing British reaction to current Greek position indicates that far from assuming any early improvement in Cyprus situation, we must rather anticipate a worsening unless British can be persuaded at least to go slow on unilateral moves.

It is inevitable that above developments are and will continue to be great shock to Greeks, genuinely shake their faith in US and encourage neutralist trend which already alarms many competent political observers here, and have other unpredictable but certainly not favorable political repercussions. I therefore believe it of utmost importance, now that we are giving the Greeks a major dose of realistic disillusionment, to make such gestures as we can to demonstrate our sympathetic interest.

By separate telegrams [3] I am recommending certain action on aid program as well as action on Cyprus problem. Earnestly hope Department will be able to approve these recommendations prompt-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.5–MSP/10–3156. Secret. George V. Allen presented his credentials as Ambassador to Greece on October 12. Cavendish Cannon, who had been appointed Ambassador to Morocco on July 21, left Greece on July 28.

[2] On October 26, Allen delivered a speech at the Propellor Club in Athens. The address, entitled "The Eastern Mediterranean," was criticized by the Prime Minister and the press for its reported lack of sensitivity to the Greek position on Cyprus. The text of the speech, press reaction, and the comments of the Embassy were transmitted in despatch 304 from Athens, October 31. (*Ibid.*, 123 Allen, George V.)

[3] In telegram 1647, November 8, Allen forwarded his views on aid to Greece. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 781.5–MSP/11–856) The telegram that transmitted recommendations on the Cyprus problem is not further identified.

ly. In addition I feel that special effort should be made to give Karamanlis some special mark of attention while he is in US.[4]

Allen

[4] On October 22, Karamanlis announced that he would head the Greek Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York in November. On October 26, the Department informed the Embassy in Athens that Ambassador Melas had made a strong request for a meeting between Karamanlis and the President. The Department had informed the Greek Ambassador that although Eisenhower planned to be away from Washington for several weeks following the election, if he should return while Karamanlis was in the United States, the matter of a meeting would be reconsidered. (Telegram 1497 to Athens, October 26; Department of State, Central Files, 781.13/10–2656)

301. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 15, 1956, 11:30 a.m.–12:10 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Greece: Military Aid

PARTICIPANTS

Constantine Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece
George V. Melas, Greek Ambassador
Phedon Cavalierato, Counselor, Greek Embassy
General Gerogianopoulos, NATO Standing Group
Robert Murphy, G
William M. Rountree, NEA
Mr. Gordon Gray, Defense
Mr. McGuire, Defense
Captain Wagner, Defense
Mr. Willis, Treasury
Mr. Barnes, U/MSA
Owen T. Jones, GTI
Murat W. Williams, GTI
Chalmers B. Wood, GTI

The Prime Minister's theme was that within the overall problem of common defense, Greece's importance was not adequately recognized. Its importance was based on two facts: first, that Greeks are good fighters, who faced total destruction in 1940 in preference to abandoning their allies, and, second, the country's geographical position. Greece's long northern frontier reaching to Turkey was as vulnerable to invasion from Bulgaria, the Prime Minister claimed, as

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.5–MSP/11–1556. Secret. Drafted by Wood on November 26. Karamanlis arrived in New York on November 10 to head the Greek Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

it was when Greece joined NATO. If war occurred, the connection with Turkey could be severed, the Straits bypassed and Greece forced to fight deep within its own territory.

Greece needs a division of tanks and sufficient antitank equipment to correct this situation, the Prime Minister emphasized.

In reply to questions from Mr. Murphy, the Prime Minister stated 1) that Greece was poor in antitank weapons and had only obsolete light tanks; 2) that there had been some joint Greek-Turkish planning within the Balkan Pact (The Prime Minister played this down.); 3) that the Greek request was based on the findings of SHAPE and SACEUR.

As to the Greek Navy, the Prime Minister said that the Greeks, with their naval tradition, felt they were unprotected from the sea since they knew their Navy had only a few obsolete units. SHAPE found that modernization was needed.

If the above requests (tanks, antitank equipment and naval units) are fully met, the added cost of "training, maintenance and material" for such additional equipment would cost, the Prime Minister estimated, $13 million per year. The present Greek military budget cannot be increased. Greece now spends more than it can afford. If new equipment arrives, Greece will need additional military aid for "training, maintenance and material."

Mr. Murphy acknowledged the heavy burden of the Greek defense effort, said that the United States had made a substantial contribution to this effort and that, subject to the views of Congress, it would appear to be in the American interest to continue this contribution.

Mr. Gordon Gray indicated that subject to Congressional approval and certain other factors, the defensive strength of Greece might well be considerably augmented. Some recoilless rifles had been provided in past programs. Ambassador Melas had made us aware of the Greek desires. However, Mr. Gray added, there were no plans for additional financial aid of the type requested.

302. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 15, 1956, 12–12:50 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Economic Aid

PARTICIPANTS

Constantine Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece
George V. Melas, Greek Ambassador
Phedon Cavalierato, Counselor, Greek Embassy
Mr. A.D. Sismanides, Foreign Trade Administration
Secretary Hoover
Robert Murphy, G
William M. Rountree, NEA
Mr. Seager, ICA
Mr. Willis, Treasury
Mr. Barnes, U/MSA
Owen T. Jones, GTI
Murat W. Williams, GTI
Chalmers B. Wood, GTI

The Prime Minister opened by sketching the recent improvements in the Greek economy and indicating the remarkable stability which Greece had achieved: stable cost index, stable currency, greatly increased bank deposits reflecting public confidence and a reduction of interest rates from as high as 30% to 16%, greater availability of capital, balanced budget ("really balanced"), and good prospects for investment. "The economy of the country is now good and the Government seeks to consolidate these gains on a more permanent basis."

The Prime Minister spoke first of Greece's current needs and then of long range needs.

As to current needs he said that the US had usually taken into account the Greek balance of payments deficit which for the current Greek fiscal year (ending December 31, 1956) was $73 million. Greece could absorb $62 million in surplus commodities and the remaining $11 million should be in global PA's. The Prime Minister also requested the release of 400 million drachmae before the end of the current Greek fiscal year (before December 31, 1956). He also emphasized that Greek crops were poorer than had been expected five months ago when it was thought Greece would receive $60 million in aid. He hoped any additional amount would not be in surplus commodities. It was important for the Greek Government to have the American decision soon since a new Greek budget had to be prepared for January 1, 1957.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 881.00/11–1556. Confidential. Drafted by Wood on November 19. The times given for this conversation and the one *supra* are as on the source text.

Turning to the long range program Prime Minister Karamanlis said that although the Greek economy was now stable, it could be easily upset. The chief need was to improve the agricultural economy, since 63% of the population were farmers who were the backbone of Greece. Most of them were very poor since the arable land was only 20% (*sic*) of the area of Greece. The Government's long range agricultural improvement program had two main parts: 1) improved farm production (agricultural machinery, etc.) and 2) improved food processing (canning, etc.). This Greek program would cost $60 million including a fertilizer plant. In making plans for it the Greek Government needed assurances that counterpart would be released promptly as the need arose.

Mr. Murphy promised that these questions would be studied immediately and sympathetically.

The Prime Minister then presented the attached paper on Economic Aid. [2]

The Acting Secretary then made some extremely cordial closing remarks to the Prime Minister stressing his admiration for Greek courage in time of war and for Greek determination and success in the subsequent reconstruction. He also emphasized the importance of NATO, the potentialities of the Balkan Pact, and closed by underlining the usefulness of these talks.

The Prime Minister was pleased and replied with warm appreciation.

The meeting adjourned at 12:50.

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[2] The November 15 memorandum, not printed, dealt with the following subjects: the level of aid for the current fiscal year, the need for the restoration of the earthquake-damaged areas in the Aegean Islands, extra aid for agricultural expansion and development—$60 million—duration 4 years, and terms and conditions under which aid is accorded to Greece.

303. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 15, 1956[1]

SUBJECT

NATO

PARTICIPANTS

Constantine Karamanlis
Prime Minister of Greece
George V. Melas
Greek Ambassador
Phendon Cavalierato
Counselor, Greek Embassy

Robert Murphy, G
William M. Rountree, NEA
C. Burke Elbrick, EUR
B. E. L. Timmons, EUR/RA
Owen T. Jones, GTI
Murat W. Williams, GTI
Chalmers B. Wood, GTI

Mr. Murphy stressed that our attitude towards NATO was unchanged and that recent events, especially in Hungary,[2] had underlined the continuing need for NATO.

The Prime Minister agreed on the need for NATO, but said that it had been shaken by recent events. He emphasized the need for strengthening NATO and suggested three general needs for improvement: 1) The need to widen NATO's duties to include political and economic questions, so that the members would come to have the solidarity of a family with common peacetime interests as well as the need of common defense in time of danger. 2) Cyprus is a weakness. "We are in one alliance, but we don't have the ability or perhaps the courage to tackle this question between three members."[3] Three members have a public dispute which can't be settled. This is bad for NATO's reputation. 3) The recent Anglo-French action in Egypt[4] is disruptive for NATO. Many members of NATO disapproved of these actions. If some procedure can't be found for settling these disagreements, the US should take the lead and attempt to "discipline" some of the members by "persuasion". The US is in a good position to do this since its prestige was never higher.

Mr. Murphy agreed that something needed to be done, but indicated the difficulties especially if the United States appeared to try and force other members. He hoped that the report of the Three

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/11–1556. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Wood on November 20.

[2] Reference is to the Hungarian rebellion during the fall of 1956.

[3] Karamanlis discussed Cyprus with Holmes and Thurston on October 5; see Document 200.

[4] Reference is to the Anglo-French air bombardment of Egyptian installations in the fall of 1956.

Wise Men [5] would contain some suggestions. He pointed out that the members were democracies which did not take lightly to dictation. He suggested that formal debates in the North Atlantic Council would not be apt to settle differences and suggested that the United States could be more useful by informally offering its good offices.

The Prime Minister said he was not attempting to make specific suggestions but commented that any democracy which joined an alliance must surrender some of its sovereignty. Democracy must not be allowed to drift into license.

[5] Reference is to the committee of three appointed by the Intergovernmental Conference for the Common Market and EURATOM in late October 1956.

304. Memorandum From the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Hollister) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, December 12, 1956.

SUBJECT

Greek Economic Aid [2]

I have been apprised by Mr. Seager of the general nature of the talks on November 15, 1956, as these bore on the question of economic assistance to Greece, and have a copy of the note presented by Prime Minister Karamanlis. [3]

I am unable, however, to respond as affirmatively as I should like to your request that on political grounds $10 million be made available to Greece in the form of "global PA's" rather than in the form of surplus agricultural commodities, because certain collateral problems have arisen in our consideration of this proposal, namely:

1. The Department of Defense advises that the Greek military establishment is short of certain supplies, particularly POL, because of the inability of the Greek Government to provide them and has requested that we consider financing these necessary supplies with Defense Support funds. If, in spite of the other problems mentioned

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.5-MSP/12-1256. Secret.

[2] On November 29, Hoover forwarded a memorandum to Hollister that expressed the hope that ICA could make the remaining $10 million in Department of Defense aid allocated for Greece available through global PA's rather than in the form of surplus agricultural commodities. (*Ibid.*, 881.00/11-2956)

[3] See footnote 2, *supra*.

below, it is decided to issue global PA's to Greece for some $10 million, it is possible that we could use the occasion of such issuance to obtain satisfactory assurances from the Greek Government that it would indeed provide the necessary supplies, including POL, to the Greek armed forces.

2. It is quite clear that Greece will need, before the end of this fiscal year, surplus agricultural commodities even in excess of the $10 million in question. If we issue global PA's for $10 million as you suggest, the question will then arise as to the financing of needed surplus agricultural commodities. We could, of course:

a. Ask the Greeks to finance these imports, but in this event they might just as well finance the commodities for which they are asking global PA's;

b. Provide them under Title I, PL 480. This in turn raises two questions, first, whether this may be done legitimately in view of the normal marketing requirement of PL 480, and, secondly, the very limited authority remaining under the existing legislation. While the amount of existing commitments against PL 480, Title I, is not clear, it appears that authority remains for less than $100 million of commodities at CCC costs, which are the governing values. The latest request from Greece, together with the wheat imports that otherwise would be financed from Section 402, would require about $45 million of this remaining authority (about $26 million at market prices). Since there are a number of other urgent requirements for Title I programs, for example, Korea, Turkey, Pakistan, The Philippines, Peru, Burma, and Indonesia, which greatly exceed the amount of the remaining authority, I do not believe that ICA could urge, or for that matter the Department of State or the Department of Agriculture would be willing to support, the commitment of such large proportion of the remaining authority for Greece.

c. Increase the Defense Support program to Greece by $10 million, thus providing for the issuance of $10 million of global PA's plus $25 million of financing on surplus agricultural commodities. Here, again, we face a dilemma because of the number of high priority competing demands for our reserve funds.

While I recognize the political desirability of responding to the Greek request as soon as possible, it seems to be clear that we cannot at the moment take the action which you hoped could be taken, i.e. to make available to Greece $10 million in non-agricultural PA's, unless you consider the matter of such high political significance as to require an increase in the Greek Defense Support

program from $25 million to $35 million. I would appreciate advice to this effect if that is the case.[4]

John B. Hollister

[4] In a December 31 memorandum to Murphy, Rountree referred to Hoover's memo of November 29 and Hollister's reply of December 12. According to Rountree the "virtual exhaustion" of resources under P.L. 480 had recently become apparent and had forced the Department to change its position on the use of Defense support assistance for Greece. Rountree added that Allen had been informed of the situation and until he replied there was little reason to continue discussions in Washington. (*Ibid.*, 781.5–MSP/12–3156)

305. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, December 13, 1956—3 p.m.

2147. Former Prime Minister Constantine Tsaldaris called at my office today at his request, to urge US support for information of coalition government in Greece. . . . for any Cyprus solution to enjoy national support, it should be accepted by all parties.

I referred to his strong criticism of US policy, during time of Ambassador Peurifoy, when he had alleged that US had interfered in internal Greek affairs, and commented that he seemed now to be urging US interference. Tsaldaris said US mistake had been to build up one individual, Papagos. He did not want US to say who should be Prime Minister but merely to indicate that US thought coalition government was desirable in principle.

Venezelos has been seeking occasion to see me during past ten days and Grand Chamberlain of Court asked me yesterday, allegedly speaking entirely on his own, whether I had seen Venezelos. He expressed considerable pleasure when I said I had agreed to dine with Venezelos December 15.

Comment: While I have no reason to believe King's support for Karamanlis has weakened, it is evident that King is trying to improve his relations with opposition in order to avoid stigma of being King of only one party.

There are some valid arguments in favor of coalition governments. Moreover, I do not wish to give opposition leaders further

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.00/12–1356. Secret. Repeated to Paris and London.

reason to say I am refusing to see them. However, I do not think we should take any action, at least at present juncture, which could be construed as favorable or unfavorable to coalition. General impression I have given so far is that Greek politics are inscrutable but that I, as outsider, see no reason for agitation about new elections or changes of government when present chamber is only ten months old. [2]

Allen

[2] In telegram 2300 to Athens, December 17, the Department concurred with Allen's views. (*Ibid.*)

306. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, May 8, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Greece, April 28–May 2 [2]

Discussion

In spite of the short notice (the Greek Government was notified on April 26 that Ambassador Richards intended to be in Greece on April 28 on his way to Bonn), arrangements were made and the Mission was well received by the Greek Government. The Mission consulted with Prime Minister Karamanlis and other Government officials. It was evident that the Prime Minister's prime concern was in obtaining greater recognition of the role he considered Greece could play in the Middle East and in getting United States moral and economic support for this role. The Prime Minister stated that he thought the United States underestimated Greek potentialities in this respect, and having invested large amounts of money and much effort to make Greece strong, the United States had failed to utilize

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted on May 6 by Lathram.

[2] On March 12, James P. Richards left the United States for a 57-day mission to the Middle East. Richards visited 15 countries as part of an effort to explain the President's proposals on economic and military assistance to Middle Eastern countries, which he had presented to Congress in January.

the results of this investment. He indicated particularly that Greece's long history of trade with the Middle East, the numerous Greek colonies in Arab states, the influence of the Greek Orthodox Church, the association of Greek and Middle East military in a spirit of confidence, the lack of Arab fear of Greece because of the latter's lack of imperialist ambitions, and the fact that Greece could serve as a show window of the results of American friendship and aid were all factors which emphasized the potential of Greece in playing an important role in the Middle East.

The Greek Government further was quite critical of United States policy in its emphasis on Turkish influence and in promoting the Baghdad Pact. They insisted the Pact is a bad influence and expressed the hope that the American Doctrine[3] would eventually take the place of the Pact.

The Government heartily endorsed the American Doctrine and, as indicated below, was quite willing to emphasize the importance of United States aid and of cooperation with us.

Commitments

During the discussions Ambassador Richards indicated that no material aid for Greece was contemplated in connection with his Mission and the Greek Government made no request for such assistance. Therefore, no commitments were made.

Communiqué

A joint communiqué, issued on May 2,[4] stressed the danger of international communism and the necessity for cooperation in the free world. It also pointed out the necessity for improving the economies of the weaker nations and the fact that Greece, with her ten years of experience with American aid and cooperation, demonstrates the desirability of such assistance in preserving the national independence of the countries of the Middle East.

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[3] In a statement on January 5 before a joint session of Congress, President Eisenhower requested legislative authority to authorize military and economic assistance to countries in the Middle Eastern area that requested aid. The measures that the President proposed also included the employment of the armed forces of the United States "to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism." The President's message, introduced into the House of Representatives on January 5 as H.J. Res. 117 and into the Senate on January 9 as S.J. Res. 19, was approved by Congress and signed by the President on March 9. The Middle East resolution became popularly known as the American Doctrine or Eisenhower Doctrine. For texts of the initial resolution and its amended version, see *AFP: Current Documents, 1957*, pp. 783–830.

[4] For text of the joint communiqué issued in Athens on May 2, see *ibid.*, p. 848.

307. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 30, 1957.

SUBJECT

US Policy Toward Greece—NSC 5718, July 18, 1957

Background

The attached draft statement of "US Policy Toward Greece" [2] was prepared to supersede NSC 103/1, dated February 14, 1951. [3] It includes a supplement on "US Policy Toward Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute." [4] These drafts are scheduled for consideration by the National Security Council on August 1, 1957.

Discussion

Since the previous NSC policy statement on Greece, substantial progress has been made toward achieving the objectives then stated (Cyprus was not then a problem affecting US-Greek relations). Greece has become a member of NATO and the Balkan Pact. It has achieved, since 1952, unusual political stability by Greek standards. Communism is no longer an imminent threat to political stability. Greek-American relations are on a firm and friendly basis and our important base rights in Greece are secure. Greece has given clear public endorsement to the American Doctrine.

Although Greece is still a poor country, its economy has made a remarkable recovery since 1947, when it was near collapse. This has resulted from substantial US aid and Greece's own efforts. The Greek military posture has also been improved. Due largely to US aid, approved force goals have been met in terms of organization. However, there is a serious shortage of technical skills and much equipment is obsolete. Further progress is dependent on continued American aid. The cost of Greece's share in NATO's defense is beyond its present ability to pay.

Cyprus has become, since 1954, the dominant issue in Greek foreign policy, affecting nearly all aspects of our relations with Greece. It has contributed to a rigidity in Greek foreign policy and

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5718 Memoranda. Secret. Drafted by Laingen and sent through the Executive Secretariat.

[2] The draft statement, NSC 5718, dated July 18, not printed, was drafted in the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs. (*Ibid.*, NSC 5718)

[3] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. V, p. 463.

[4] See the enclosure to Document 256.

caused serious strains with its major allies. The continuation of the present political stability in Greece is in large part dependent on progress toward a peaceful settlement of this question.

American aid programs in Greece have been greatly reduced since 1952. The draft statement notes, however, that if Greece is to continue the necessary evolution in its long term economic and military strength, future United States assistance at about present levels will be needed. The statement, therefore, recommends that we continue to lend reasonable international political support to Greece and also:

(1) Support currently approved Greek force levels during FY 1958.

(2) Consider providing, in the total military aid program for Greece for the period FY 1958–60, appropriate conventional equipment and recurring maintenance costs.

(3) Consider providing appropriate advanced . . . weapons in relation to Greek capability to utilize them effectively.

(4) Be prepared beyond FY 1960 to carry most dollar costs of military maintenance replacement and modernization of the Greek armed forces.

These recommendations are made on the understanding that we make clear that Greece itself must make greater efforts to correct the deficiencies in its armed forces. It is also proposed that the United States review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Greece.

The statement also recommends that we provide economic assistance sufficient to aid Greece in maintaining the necessary military posture and in continuing a modest rate of economic growth. Any large reduction in our economic aid would almost surely cause any Greek Government to reduce its defense budget in order to maintain the politically important economic development program.

Cost estimates of these recommended programs are given in the economic and financial annexes to the paper.

The statement includes a detailed supplementary statement of "US Policy Toward Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute." It recommends that we continue to encourage those primarily concerned to work out a peaceful solution among themselves and that we preserve our maneuverability by not at present favoring any specific formula. It notes, however, that if necessary to bring about an acceptable solution, on terms which strengthen NATO interests in the area, we should be prepared to participate in arrangements guaranteeing the interim or eventual status of Cyprus. You will note that some Planning Board members took exception to this. They question whether the United States should now state that it is prepared to enter into such a guarantee arrangement. We believe it is important

that the way should be open for such participation by this country should it become necessary for a lasting settlement.

Since this NSC Statement was drafted, the UK has informed us that they propose inviting Greece and Turkey to a conference in London in early September to seek a solution to the international aspects of the Cyprus problem. They hope that we and M. Spaak will attend as observers. We believe that this British plan is generally consistent with the policy guidance stated in the NSC Statement. The degree to which we should associate ourselves with the plan, however, and whether we attend is still under consideration within the Department.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached NSC statement of "US Policy Toward Greece" and seek its adoption by the Council.

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308. National Security Council Report [1]

NSC 5718/1 *Washington, August 5, 1957.*

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

[Here follows a list of references.]

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 333rd Council meeting on August 1, 1957, adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5718, subject to the amendment thereto which is set forth in NSC Action No. 1762–b. [2]

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5718, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5718/1; directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the US Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5718 Series. Secret.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, NSC Records of Action: Lot 66 D 95)

An Economic Annex, a Military Annex, and a Financial Appendix are also enclosed for the information of the Council.[3]

The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes NSC 103/1.

S. Everett Gleason[4]
Acting Executive Secretary

[Enclosure]

STATEMENT OF US POLICY ON GREECE

General Considerations

Importance of Greece to the United States

1. Greece is important to the United States because of its strategic location, its proximity both to the Soviet Bloc and to the Near East, its membership in NATO, and its ties to Yugoslavia through the Balkan Pact. Together with its Balkan Pact neighbors, Turkey and Yugoslavia, Greece forms a land barrier to Soviet access to the Mediterranean. Also Greece has given the United States and NATO extensive base rights. Communications facilities and a USAF support group are maintained in Greece and are important links in our global network of bases.

International Political Orientation

2. Greek foreign policy is based on close ties with the United States and opposition to Soviet Communism. This has been shown by armed resistance against Communism (1947–49), active participation in the UN (Greek troops fought in Korea), and adherence to NATO (1951) and the Balkan Pact (1954). This Western orientation is based on its classic tradition and historical, personal and commercial bonds with the West.

3. As Greek economic strength and political stability have grown, national self-confidence has increased and Greece has taken a more independent and nationalist role. Greek nationalism has frequently sought, often successfully, to bring within Greece's frontiers, areas inhabited primarily by ethnic Greeks. This irredentism, behind which the Greek Orthodox Church has generally been the main driving force, has found its principal expression recently on the Cyprus problem and has led to serious inter-allied tensions. These

[3] None printed.
[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

nationalist ambitions are tempered by a deep fear of Russia and distrust of Bulgaria, and a strong awareness that the United States is the only power which will protect Greece and not take advantage of it.

Greek Relations with the United States

4. While most Greeks know that in a real crisis their country must depend on the United States, their country's economic recovery has permitted a sharp reduction in American aid and caused an increased sense of Greek independence. These developments have been healthy for Greek-American relations. Greece has been especially anxious to reduce the appearance of dependence on the United States. Thus on September 7, 1956, US-Greek status of forces agreements were revised on a basis more acceptable to Greek sensibilities.

5. Nevertheless, American prestige in Greece is far greater than that of any other foreign power. The Greeks look to the United States for leadership in world affairs and for political support, notably on the Cyprus question. Recent events in the Middle East, especially Soviet threats at the time of the Suez war, have emphasized the importance to Greece of its ties with the United States. While Greece gives general support to American efforts to resolve Middle Eastern problems and has given clear public endorsement to the American Doctrine, its attitude toward Middle East questions is influenced by its suspicions of Turkey and its fear of Turkey's entrenching itself as the chosen instrument of US policy in the area. In addition, the presence of the influential Greek community in Egypt makes Greece unwilling to oppose Egypt directly.

The Cyprus Problem and its Consequences [5]

6. Since 1954 the Greek Government has given active diplomatic support to the movement on Cyprus of Greek-speaking Cypriots demanding union of the Island with Greece (enosis). Some 80% of the Cypriots consider themselves to be of Greek ethnic origin. The Greek Government supports their claim that the principle of self-determination should be applicable to Cyprus. The Cypriot problem has become the dominant issue in Greek politics and foreign policy. It has absorbed the energies of the Greek Government, diverted attention from the problems of economic development, and caused the rigidity of Greece's foreign policy and serious strains with its major allies. The Cyprus question, by sharpening Greek-Turk dis-

[5] See Supplementary Statement of US Policy Toward Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute, distributed separately on a limited basis. [Footnote in the source text. This statement is printed as an Enclosure to Document 256.]

trust, has been a large factor in preventing the development of the Balkan Pact among Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. At present Greece regards the Alliance as potentially important for both military and economic reasons, but claims that it cannot be developed until the Turkish attitude on Cyprus changes. Meanwhile Greek-Yugoslav relations have continued reasonably close, principally in the military sphere.

Internal Strengths and Weaknesses

7. By Greek standards there has been unusual political stability under fairly strong conservative governments since 1952. The Greek Communist Party is illegal and its underground group is under effective surveillance. Communism is not now an imminent threat to political stability. On the other hand, the Cyprus question and a Soviet friendship campaign in Greece have assisted Communist efforts to legitimize the Party and have contributed to some "neutralist" tendencies in Greek public opinion and politics. The extremely difficult Cyprus problem poses the most immediate threat to Greek political stability. Progress towards a solution acceptable to the Greek Government and the Greek Orthodox Churches of Cyprus and Greece, would facilitate a continuation of rule by the conservative and moderate groups. Greek frustration over Cyprus and differences between the Greek Government and the Greek Orthodox Church over the issue, might lead to a series of less stable governments still drawn primarily from conservative and moderate groups but subject to a varying degree of leftist influence.

8. The internal security forces are reasonably capable of handling Communist subversion inside Greece. The USSR has issued a severe warning against the stationing of nuclear-capable forces in Greece which the Greek Government has rebuffed. The USSR has also started a strong cultural offensive aimed at Greece. In handling Soviet overtures Greece is concerned by the strength and proximity of the Soviets. Also there is some feeling in the Greek Government that Soviet support on the Cyprus question should not be lost. Finally, a potential security problem is the presence in the Soviet Bloc of about 50,000 Greeks who left home or were abducted during the guerrilla war. Many have probably been indoctrinated and Soviet pressure for the return of all these Greeks would pose problems. So far only about 3,500 have been allowed to return and they have caused no serious difficulties.

Economic Problems and US Aid

9. Greece is poor and has limited natural resources. Half the people live on the land but only a quarter of the land is fit for

farming. Industry is small and inefficient and largely depends on imported oil for power. Economic development has been retarded by repeated periods of warfare. Greek defense expenditures are heavy in relation to Greek resources. There is over-population in terms of the present level of development with resulting unemployment and underemployment.

10. However, the Greek economy has made a very substantial recovery since 1947 when Greece was on the verge of economic collapse. Living standards are now higher than prewar; crop and industrial production have increased 60% since 1940, while the population has increased 10%. The gross national product increased at an average of roughly 6% annually from 1951 through 1956, and per capita income about 4%. Currently the rate of increase in GNP appears to be approximately 4%. Greece has recently followed sound economic policies and has a relatively stable economy, although it has been running budgetary deficits, partly as a result of investment expenditures. In recent years, US aid, including P.L. 480, has enabled Greece both to finance a balance of payments deficit and to increase its foreign exchange reserves. Exports and earnings from services and remittances have more than doubled since devaluation in 1953.

11. Greek recovery since 1947 was made possible by a combination of substantial US aid and Greece's own efforts. From June 1947 through June 1957 expenditures for all forms of US economic aid totalled approximately $1,491 million (average FY 1948–1951, $261 million; average FY 1952–1957, $74 million). It is estimated that US economic aid expenditures for defense support and technical assistance (the only forms of economic aid capable of current estimate) should be less in FY 1958 than in FY 1957. Even with recent economic growth at a rate which compares favorably with other Western European countries, per capita income is about $240, the lowest in Free Europe except Portugal. A continuing rate of economic growth is needed for the continuance of pro-Western Greek governments. External economic aid will be necessary to maintain such a rate of economic growth so long as the United States encourages Greece to continue defense expenditures at present levels. Reduction or elimination of such aid would probably compel a corresponding reduction in Greece's defense effort.

12. Greece is a member of OEEC and has taken an interest in OEEC's work in less developed areas. It has unofficially discussed with the OEEC a five-year development program. Greece realizes the importance of associating itself with the European Free Trade Area but as a relatively underdeveloped country sees basic difficulties in doing so.

Military Problems and US Aid

13. Greece has committed its ground and air forces to NATO. Its naval forces, under national command, will be assigned NATO missions in time of war. Greece's primary NATO mission is to provide maximum forward defense against Soviet attack from the north. Greek forces would also assist in defending the Straits area and would maintain internal security. The present strength of the Greek armed forces is: Ground Forces 106,000; Air Force 15,150; Navy 15,500.

14. Department of Defense approved force objectives for Greece are 11 and 13/3 infantry divisions, 1 armored brigade, 12 air squadrons and 54 combatant vessels. These force objectives have been met in terms of organization, but technical skills are seriously lacking and much equipment is obsolete. In the case of ground forces, current active forces provide only one-third of wartime strength and there is no effective training program for the reserves necessary to meet wartime strength requirements. The Greeks are good fighters. Greek forces are capable of maintaining internal security. They could provide limited defense against a satellite attack, but even if fully mobilized could provide only a relatively brief delaying action against a joint Soviet-satellite attack. Military planning against any Communist attack is, of course, within a NATO context.

15. The cost of Greece's share in NATO's defense is beyond Greece's present ability to pay. Greece is devoting to defense about 5% to 6% of its GNP. The level of Greek defense expenditures has not risen as rapidly as GNP. Defense expenditures are about 28% of all budgetary expenditures (excluding those financed by US aid). The United States has financed, on the average, 20% of the Greek defense budget in the last three fiscal years. The US Military Aid Program provides virtually all of the dollar costs for military maintenance, replacement and modernization of the Greek armed forces. There is little likelihood that Greece will assume in the immediate future a relatively greater defense burden than she is now carrying.

16. US military aid programmed for Greece from 1947 through June 1957 approximated $1,150 million, of which an estimated $970 million was delivered by June 30, 1957. Compared with the military assistance program for FY 1957 of $51 million and deliveries of $60 million, the military assistance program for FY 1958 is currently estimated at $110 million and deliveries at $120 million.

17. Although the Greek Government has requested additional equipment which it believes vital to its defense, the United States has not yet made a commitment as to any specific future military aid program. Some consideration has been given to the deployment

of a US nuclear-capable task force in the general area, possibly in Greece.

Objectives

18. An independent and stable Greece, cooperating in Free World defense and maintaining the will and ability to resist Communist subversion and influence.

19. Access by the United States and NATO to military facilities in Greece, and Greek cooperation with NATO countries.

20. Greek armed forces capable of resisting, as part of a concerted allied defense, direct Soviet or satellite attack.

21. Improvement of Greek-Turkish relations, and Greek participation in the further development of the Balkan Pact.

22. Settlement of the Cyprus dispute.

23. Lessening of Greek irredentism.

24. A Greek economy which can support reasonable economic development and assume a larger share of the cost of the Greek defense establishment.

Major Policy Guidance

General

25. Taking account of other demands on US resources, help Greece to develop the long-term economic and military strength needed to assure its independence and resistance to Communist influence and subversion.

26. Continue to lend reasonable international political support to Greece, thus encouraging Greek recognition of the mutual benefits of association both with the United States and with the Atlantic Community.

Military and Economic Assistance

27. Continue during FY 1958 to support currently approved Greek force levels. Consider providing in the total military aid program for Greece for the period FY 1958–60 appropriate conventional equipment and recurring maintenance costs; and atomic-capable weapons systems, predicated upon her desire and ability to absorb, train with and maintain such systems as are contained in Military Assistance Programs and, if applicable, upon the granting of atomic storage rights to the United States. The United States should review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Greece and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Greek armed forces, appropriately revise Greek force levels in the light of NATO requirements.

28. Without prior commitment to the Greeks, be prepared beyond FY 1960 to carry most dollar costs of military maintenance replacement and modernization of the Greek armed forces.

29. Make clear to the Greeks that the US military assistance and defense support programs are based on the assumption that Greece itself will make efforts to correct the weaknesses and deficiencies in its armed forces.

30. Limit the number of American official personnel, including dependents, to an operational minimum in order to avoid frictions resulting from the presence of large numbers of foreigners in a small country. [6]

31. Provide economic assistance (including P.L. 480 assistance) sufficient to aid Greece in maintaining the military posture outlined in paragraph 27 and in continuing a modest rate of economic growth.

32. Continue technical assistance to improve productivity and distribution, focusing on a few long-range projects and utilizing whenever possible the facilities of established American educational institutions in Greece.

33. Encourage the Greeks to maintain sound economic policies and preserve relative economic stability.

International Relations

34. Continue to exert influence on the Greek Government to reach an accord with the United Kingdom and Turkey for an equitable settlement of the Cyprus question. [7]

35. Encourage, as appropriate, Greek initiative in the further development of the Balkan Pact.

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[6] Early this year, the following numbers of American official personnel, including dependents, were residing in Greece: Defense, 2169; State 252; USIA, 292; ICA, 70; total, 2783. [Footnote in the source text.]

[7] See Supplementary Statement of US Policy Toward Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute, distributed separately on a limited basis. [Footnote in the source text.]

309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

Washington, August 16, 1957—5:16 p.m.

586. During ceremony at White House August 9, during which President made formal presentation 4 black Angus cattle Salonika Farm School, Greek Ambassador gave President 4-page personal letter from Karamanlis concerning economic aid. [2] Letter notes that decision about to be taken in connection amount aid to be allotted Greece FY 1958 and reviews progress made to date by Greece, with support US aid, in bolstering Greek economy and military defense. Letter also notes that Government now faces task consolidating achievements made to date and in this task continued US aid vital. Describes "serious dangers" which would result if level of aid lower than FY 57. Prime Minister summarizes specific aid requests GOG as follows:

A. Aid should at least equal that of last year, that is, $50 million.

B. Aid should be used for purchase surplus commodities up to amount Greece's requirements, balance in global PA's.

C. Additional military aid in amount $13 million to meet increased military expenditures.

D. Loan—aid from Economic Development Fund over two year period amounting $25–30 million for financing nitrogen fertilizer factory and Larissa–Katerini–Salonika Highway.

Greek Ambassador subsequently saw FitzGerald at ICA and made detailed oral and written presentation same subject.

President's reply avoids discussion specific GOG requests and notes that aid legislation still under consideration Congress. Letter states that until legislation enacted no commitments can be undertaken but points out that reductions appear likely and aid to Greece will have to be determined in context needs throughout world.

Signed Presidential letter dated August 14, for delivery to Prime Minister [3] and text Prime Minister letter follow by pouch. Dept

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.5–MSP/8–1657. Official Use Only.

[2] Dated August 3. (*Ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 174, F–L 1957) In a note transmitting Karamanlis letter to Dulles, Eisenhower wrote, "It emphasizes that *they* believe that reduction in our foreign aid would be catastrophic, at least as far as they are concerned."

[3] Eisenhower's reply to Karamanlis reads:

"Your letter raises the question of future American aid to Greece. As you know, the entire program of our aid under the Mutual Security Program for Greece and the rest of the Free World is still being considered by Congress. Until the necessary legislation has been enacted we cannot, of course, undertake any commitments on this subject. I must point out, however, that the total of our aid programs for the coming

assumes that no publicity with respect to exchange messages is contemplated. Should GOG approach you seeking agreement on release you should request instructions.

Herter

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fiscal year may very well be reduced from last year. This will raise problems with respect to individual programs in many countries. I am sure that you understand that our aid to Greece will therefore have to be determined in the context of other priority needs for our aid throughout the world." (*Ibid.*) Transmitted to Athens in instruction A–44, August 17. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 781.5–MSP/8–1757)

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310. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

Athens, September 13, 1957—noon.

799. Reference: Embassy despatch No. 82. [2] In view of a discernible change in the climate of Greek Government, press and public opinion in recent months, stemming largely from a growing resentment over western and, particularly, US failure to support the Greek position on Cyprus and from the almost unanimous feeling here that US and western policy is inimical to Greece's real or fancied position, prestige and economic interests in the Middle East, I am impelled to urge caution in estimating Greek capacity and willingness to assume a greatly increased proportion of her defense expenditures. I am especially concerned at the possibility that Greece might be forced for financial reasons to reduce her military effectiveness at a time when other nations in this area friendly to the US are building up. In such an eventuality, Greece would certainly feel the loss of its prestige to be great. We would be held largely responsible and the opposition would be give a ready-made opportunity to point out once again that GOG foreign policies are ineffective. I wish to stress that the minimum practical level of US support funds which any Greek Government can live with has at least as much of a psychological and political basis as an economic one. My staff and I have repeatedly warned GOG that US economic and defense support assistance will be smaller this fiscal year and GOG is cognizant of

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.5–MSP/9–1357. Confidential.

[2] Despatch 82, July 31, transmitted the Embassy's evaluation of Military Assistance Program development. (*Ibid.*, 781.5–MSP/8–2357)

lower illustrative defense support figure $15 million and illustrative PL 480 figure $27.5 million. Recent conversations with Minister Coordination and Minister Commerce indicate GOG also believes unlikely will receive immediate and large credits under development loan fund, and thus anticipates time will be required even partially to substitute latter for present public investment program.

During each of last two Greek fiscal years, total US releases of local currency, for budget and extra-budgetary projects, were equivalent of $48 million. If $15 million defense support used for global PA's and if PL 480 finances Greek agricultural needs (estimated range $20–30 million), then 1958 Greek budget would realize maximum $28 million drachmae equivalent, after taking into account amounts withheld for US use and private enterprise financing. Failure provide defense support, or even decision to program under section 402, [3] would result in even further sharp reduction budgetary aid. Significant deterioration in Greek balance of payments this year further supports case for global PA's to finance non-agricultural imports which recently 18 percent above 1956 level.

I urge most emphatically that we prod TA $15 million of defense support in global procurement authorizations and finance Greece's agricultural commodity requirements under PL 480, having in mind that GOG is already cognizant illustrative figures of this order of magnitude. Because of this knowledge, I believe GOG will be forced recognize that such a program represents demonstrably our maximum effort in so far as providing local currency to the Greek budget is concerned, even though the result is a 30 percent cut in US budget support from present levels.

Any further cuts, such as would flow inevitably from an absence of defense support allocations to Greece or requirement to use defense support money for agricultural commodity imports, would so magnify GOG problem of choosing between reduced military expenditures, reduced public investment, or reduced private consumption as to eliminate almost any possibility of finding a solution which would be politically and psychologically acceptable and economically sound.

Furthermore, GOG and the Greek people will find it difficult enough to understand and accept a 30 percent cut in US budget support, and almost any Greek Government would find it almost impossible to explain publicly "aid" reductions of a greater magnitude. I believe it is critically important that we take all the above factors into consideration in developing a 1957–58 budget support program which, together with our military end item and military

[3] Section 402 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1954 concerned the earmarking of funds. For full text of the act, see 68 Stat. 833.

consumables program, will minimize tendency to attribute ulterior political motivations to almost any economic policy.

Allen

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311. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 26, 1957 [1]

SUBJECT

(1) Greece and the Eisenhower Doctrine; (2) Greece and the Common Market; (3) A level of US aid to Greece.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Gregory Kassimatis—Minister without Portfolio, Greek Cabinet
Mr. George V. Melas, Greek Ambassador
The Under Secretary
Mr. Murat W. Williams, Deputy Director, GTI

. . . . . .

(2) Mr. Kassimatis next inquired as to the United States Government's views regarding the common market, a project which Greece supported. He remarked that because of the attitude of Britain and some of the Scandinavian countries, the market had not developed as Greece had hoped it would.

(Because of a digression by Ambassador Melas on the subject of our foreign aid program, the Under Secretary did not have an opportunity to comment on Mr. Kassimatis' inquiry regarding the common market.)

(3) Mr. Kassimatis then expressed the Greek Government's disappointment over the reduction of US aid to Greece. He handed the Under Secretary an Aide-Mémoire on this subject, [2] underlining the importance of United States aid for maintaining the level of Greece's armed forces.

The Under Secretary expressed his appreciation of the Greek problem and assured Mr. Kassimatis that his Aide-Mémoire would be carefully studied. He reminded the Greek Minister of our own

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[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Williams.

[2] Not found attached.

difficulties because of the reduction of foreign aid funds during the last session of Congress.

In leaving, Ambassador Melas asked Mr. Williams to bring to the Under Secretary's attention a point which he and Mr. Kassimatis had been unable to make due to lack of time. This had to do with the advantages accruing to the United States from such visits as the Greek visit to Cairo. He had been told by officers of the Department that it had been useful to have the full accounts of Nasser's attitude which had been submitted following the visit. Mr. Melas also thought it significant that Nasser had treated the Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister themselves as representatives of a country which was fully part of the West.

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312. Despatch From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State [1]

No. 308 *Athens, November 4, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Greece's Disengagement from United States Policy

In recent weeks and months the Embassy has reported to the Department a series of increasingly frequent instances wherein Greece and the United States have found themselves, primarily in the political and psychological spheres, at odds on major and minor matters of policy. For several weeks officers of the Embassy have studied these instances in their contexts and believe that they are of sufficient importance to constitute a trend which, ... for lack of a better label, may be described as a "disengagement" on the part of Greece from the essentially "American" policy which she has followed since the end of the Second World War.

This recently accelerated disengagement has become manifest in three fields: (1) in Greek domestic politics and the Greek national psychology; (2) in matters affecting the Middle East; and (3) in Greece's attitude toward Communists, Communism and the Communist Bloc of states.

It should be said at the outset that this despatch is considered to be chiefly an analysis of a trend which the Embassy considers to be of major importance to United States and Western interests in this

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.81/11–457. Confidential.

part of the world; it is not intended to be a balanced report of the entire picture of Greece and her domestic and foreign policies of the moment. Furthermore, in order to identify for the Department in the clearest and briefest manner possible the factors which constitute this now recognizable trend, no attempt has been made to provide bulky documentation to substantiate the thesis. However, few items will be mentioned in this despatch which are not already to be found in the Department's files among previous telegrams and reports submitted to Washington by the Embassy and by other United States agencies operating in Greece. Here it is our purpose to tie together all the factors of this trend primarily to identify and assess them, so that having once been recognized they may be dealt with by the Embassy and the Department.

Summary and Conclusions

Greece today remains formally and officially tied to the United States and her NATO Allies and will continue to be so tied for the foreseeable future. The United States is—and for some time to come will probably remain—the paramount foreign power in this country, as it has for the past ten years. But we are passing through a period when our influence and prestige among the Greek people and with the Greek Government are undergoing a reassessment and readjustment in a changed world situation. We can no longer be as certain as we have been in the past that we shall have Greece's support in foreign policy matters that are critical to us. In the Middle East our policies and our actions in the past few years, with very few exceptions, have been the contrary of what Greece has considered to be her own best interests. In the Cyprus issue most of all we have failed in Greek eyes to support the Greek position, and to the Greeks there is no more important problem in this decade. Toward the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc Greece's attitude has undergone an accelerated process of softening in the past year and a half and she less frequently asks for or accepts our advice in her dealings with the Bloc. She feels that we have ignored what she considers to be her special position in the Middle East and that we have supported more strongly her ancient enemy, Turkey, instead. The other reasons for this drift toward divergence and disengagement are manifold; some are of a minor and transitory nature, but others are deep, permanent, even normal and natural, and will be difficult to correct. Unless they are corrected, however, there is a distinct possibility that Greece will find herself ultimately in the neutral bloc or in a "non-bloc" alignment where, we have reason to fear, a growing number of Greeks today already feel themselves psychologically.

[Here follow sections entitled: "Domestic Scene"; "Greece, the US and the Middle East"; and "Attitude Toward the Communist Bloc".]

The General Perspective

By the nature of its subject this despatch has had to paint a rather dark picture of the current state of Greek-American relations. While it treats admittedly of only one side of the whole story it is a side which, until recent weeks, had been of very small significance and which was not an important factor in our relations with Greece. The trend toward disengagement—or, as Liberal Leader George Papandreou has phrased it, "psychological dis-association"—of Greece from American policy has recently become a fact, recognized and deplored by the Embassy as well as by responsible figures in public life in Greece. We are certain from remarks made by the Prime Minister to the Ambassador that no one deplores this drift more than Constantine Karamanlis, himself, who assures us that regardless of the prominence of the present trend Greece will remain loyal to her NATO commitments. Similar sentiments have been expressed to us privately by other high Government personages and by members of the Opposition as well. Unfortunately the latter will undoubtedly proceed as usual in the current session of Parliament to berate the Government publicly for being "American lackeys". Politics in Greece is like that. The unfortunate thing about this whole matter is that no one in public life, with the exception of the King, has expressed any strong feelings of late that Greece must resist a drift away from her NATO ties and toward a softening attitude on Communism.

On the economic side, the Embassy feels that there do not exist the same grounds for concern as on the political. Greece's volume of trade is 90 percent with the Free World and cannot be easily or abruptly changed. The economic ministers of the present Government are realistically aware of Greece's continuing dependence on the West as a market for her exports and as a source for the investment capital which she needs. Also realistically (and privately) they are willing to face up to a gradual tapering off of American economic aid, knowing that less aid is in itself a measure of Greece's growing economic prosperity, as its capacity to absorb US surpluses decreases. Their sense of duty to their country will, however, require them to protest loudly at any mention of decreased assistance.

. . . . . .

Indeed a similar report could be compiled containing counter-indications to many of the factors treated in this despatch. Never-

theless, it is hoped that the Department will give careful and thoughtful study to the contents of the present despatch, which represents the serious and well considered view of the Embassy that we have reached a new stage in Greek-American relations in which many of our decade-old assumptions and rules-of-thumb are no longer valid. During the current process of Greek readjustment every move on our part which affects Greece assumes a double importance.

For the Ambassador:
JK Penfield
Counselor of Embassy

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313. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter) [1]

Washington, November 29, 1957.

SUBJECT

Operations Plan for Greece

Background:

There is attached a paper entitled "Operations Plan for Greece," designed to implement NSC 5718/1 on Greece, approved by the NSC on August 5, 1957. [2] The Operations Plan is to be considered by the OCB at its meeting on December 4, 1957.

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Discussion:

The Operations Plan is primarily concerned with the manner in which we should seek to achieve our continuing important objectives with respect to Greece in the face of strengthened Greek self-confidence growing out of increased economic strength and political

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[1] Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Greece. Secret. Drafted by Laingen on November 26.

[2] The attached draft, dated November 19, is not printed. (*Ibid.*, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 60 D 39, Greece 1957 NSC–OCB) The approved Operations Plan for Greece is printed as Document 315.

stability on the one hand and reductions in our aid programs in Greece on the other. We seek, as noted in paragraph 8, to channel this increased self-confidence into greater support by the Greek Government and people for NATO and Greece's Western alliances. Paragraph 9 points out that the Cyprus question is the greatest obstacle at the present time to achievement of this goal. This paragraph also notes how Cyprus has endangered virtually all policies requiring Greek-Turk, Greek-US and Greek-NATO cooperation. Without specific reference to Cyprus (because of the Presidential action noted above), we therefore stress in paragraph 24 the importance of strengthening the conviction of the Greek leaders and public that Greek interests lie with NATO and the West.

Another of our policy objectives which has been thwarted by the Cyprus dispute is the development of the Balkan Pact among Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. The Board Assistants, noting developments since NSC action on the policy paper, including continued Greek-Turk differences over Cyprus and renewed uncertainty as to the future of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, expressed reservations as to the desirability of emphasis on its further development at this time. Caution in US initiative is therefore suggested in paragraphs 8 and 26.

Considerable discussion took place in meetings of the working group and the Board Assistants on the implications for US aid programs in Greece of objective Number 7: "A Greek economy which can support reasonable economic development and assume a larger share of the cost of the Greek defense established [*establishment*]." The basic policy paper for Greece pointed out the political importance in Greece of continued economic growth deriving from economic development projects and stated that external economic aid would be necessary to achieve this so long as we encourage Greece to continue defense expenditures at their present increasing levels. We believe that the language of the policy guidance in paragraphs 13 and 14 is a good general statement of this problem and the outlook for our aid programs in Greece. Paragraph 13 points out that economic assistance in its several forms should be continued to help Greece maintain an appropriate defense position as well as a modest rate of economic growth. Paragraph 14 notes the political problems in Greece growing out of heavy defense expenditures but expresses our consistent policy that Greece should be encouraged to assume a larger share of its total defense costs as its gross national product increases. The possibility that the continuing review of Greek force levels may provide a way out of this political dilemma is also discussed. Paragraphs 38 and 40 state specific courses of action on this problem.

Recommendation:

That you seek approval by the Board of the attached Operations Plan.

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314. Editorial Note

On December 4, at the OCB luncheon meeting, the subject of the Operations Plan for Greece was raised. Murat Williams and L. Bruce Laingen were present for the discussion. According to the preliminary notes of the meeting, the following exchange occurred:

"Mr. Herter opened discussion by saying that he had never seen a country and people so completely centered on any one problem as is Greece and the Greeks on the Cyprus issue.

"Mr. George Allen, ICA, agreed and said that the Cyprus problem colors Greek attitudes towards everybody and everything. He reviewed the positions of England, Greece and Turkey toward the Cyprus question and said it now seemed impossible to avoid an acrimonious UN debate on the subject. He said that independence is a solution best characterized as mutually unsatisfactory to all concerned, but perhaps it will prove to be the only feasible one. Governor Herter wondered whether the Cyprus question might cause Greece to pull out of NATO. Mr. Allen said this was unlikely since both the government and the opposition are violently anti-Communist. The government is resisting Communist support for the Greek position on Cyprus. He noted, however, that a continued inability to solve the problem would strengthen extremist groups which even now question whether Greece benefits from membership in NATO because NATO has not taken a position favorable to Greece on the Cyprus issue.

"Mr. Allen Dulles said that the cheapest and best way to provide dollars to Greece without expense to the Treasury would be to encourage tourism, especially in the undeveloped but extremely attractive islands. Mr. Allen agreed, noting that significant hotel expansion is being carried out in Athens, and that the projected Balkan highway would be of great help also. It was agreed to add a paragraph to the Operations Plan indicating our interest in promoting tourism in Greece.

. . . . . .

"Mr. Williams said Greece is now self-sufficient in rice and exports cotton. Mr. Allen noted that a proposed P.L. 480 program involving vegetable oils could not be carried out because of the large Greek olive oil exports.

"The Operations Plan was approved with minor revisions for transmission to the Embassy and appropriate agencies in Washington." (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430)

315. Operations Coordinating Board Report [1]

Washington, December 11, 1957.

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR GREECE

Objectives and Special Operating Guidance

A. National Policy Objectives (Approved August 5, 1957):

1. An independent and stable Greece, cooperating in Free World defense and maintaining the will and ability to resist Communist subversion and influence.

2. Access by the United States and NATO to military facilities in Greece, and Greek cooperation with NATO countries.

3. Greek armed forces capable of resisting, as part of a concerted allied defense, direct Soviet or satellite attack.

4. Improvement of Greek-Turkish relations, and Greek participation in the further development of the Balkan Pact among Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

5. Settlement of the Cyprus dispute.

6. Lessening of Greek irredentism.

7. A Greek economy which can support reasonable economic development and assume a larger share of the cost of the Greek defense establishment.

B. Special Operating Guidance:

8. *International Role of Greece.* The growth of Greek national self-confidence should be encouraged in the direction of making Greece a stronger ally. Irredentist tendencies, . . . should be discouraged. The community of Greek and Western interests should be highlighted and the necessity stressed for settling, or at least avoiding intensification of, issues causing interallied tensions. Greek participation in

[1] Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Greece. Secret. In a memorandum attached to the source text, Elmer B. Staats noted that the OCB had revised and concurred in the plan at its December 4 board meeting and that the plan superseded the "Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Greece and Recommended Action", Document 291.

international and regional organizations and projects furthering Western interests should be encouraged. While Greece should be encouraged to keep the Balkan Pact in existence, caution should be observed in view of strained Greek relations with Turkey over Cyprus, and uncertainty as to the future of Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union.

9. *Impact of Cyprus on Greek Foreign Policy.* The Cyprus question has permeated virtually all aspects of Greek politics and foreign policy. It has seriously harmed Greek-Turk relations, frustrated virtually all policies requiring Greek-Turk cooperation, such as in the Balkan Pact, and has even impaired Greek support for its ties with NATO and its Western allies. This factor should be kept carefully in mind in estimating the degree to which Greece identifies its interests with those of the West and the cooperation which can be expected from Greece in furthering Free World objectives in the area. The long term importance to Greece of good relations with Turkey as a close neighbor and the need for Greek-Turk consultations in facilitating a Cyprus settlement should continue to be emphasized in discussions with the Greek Government.

10. *Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute.* In encouraging the Greek Government to reach an understanding on the Cyprus question with the United Kingdom and Turkey, the US should continue to emphasize the necessity that Greece assume its full share of responsibility, that both interim and long-term solutions should be sought, and that while the US is prepared to assist the parties concerned procedurally, it does not intend to assume direct responsibility for any particular solution. In any efforts to assist the parties, the US while recognizing the primarily international interests of the three countries, should not ignore the primarily local interests of the Cypriots. The US is prepared to assist NATO in any reasonable attempts to assume a mediatory role.

11. *Relations with Political Parties.* At the present time the Karamanlis Government provides greater assurance for the promotion of US interests in Greece than any probable alternative and should, therefore, receive our continued support. However, the US should not be overtly identified with any political party or figure and should retain friendly relations as feasible with all responsible leaders. Efforts should be made through these contacts to counteract local Communist influence.

12. *Aspirations for Area Leadership.* While looking to the US for world leadership, Greece considers that it is capable of playing a larger role in the Near East. Greece is jealous of the role envisaged by Turkey for itself in this area. The Greek desire to play a larger role in the Near East was in part responsible for the decision of the present government to give public support to the American Doctrine

after its announcement. However, it should be recognized that Greek sensitivities regarding the Arab states can be a restraint in the degree of open support which Greece can be expected to continue to give the American Doctrine. These sensitivities grow out of such factors as the Cyprus question, the Orthodox Church and Greek communities in such places as Alexandria. For example, the Greek colony in Egypt enables Egypt, if it wishes, to exert pressure on Greece. Greek views on an increased role in the area, therefore, should be entertained sympathetically, but caution should be observed in encouraging Greek initiative.

13. *Economic and Technical Assistance.* Economic assistance, including Defense Support, PL 480, and the possible financing of sound loan projects under the Development Loan Fund, should continue as necessary in order to make possible the maintenance of an appropriate Greek defense position as well as to continue a modest rate of economic growth. Technical assistance emphasis should continue in the fields of agricultural and industrial productivity and marketing. The Greek Government should also continue to be encouraged to formulate a sound, long-range, economic development program.

14. *Military Assistance.* The US is reviewing the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Greece and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Greek armed forces, of appropriately revising Greek force levels in the light of NATO requirements. This subject is currently being considered in the NATO annual review process. Nevertheless Greece should be encouraged to continue to increase its share of the total military budget gradually, looking toward a greater degree of military self-sufficiency, especially as the country's gross national product grows. It must be recognized, however, that no Greek Government is likely to reduce significantly its economic development program in order to increase defense expenditures. Further, it should be noted that Greek opposition leaders have announced their intention to press for a reduction in Greek military spending.

15. NATO military guidance and US military judgments eventually may alter the size and composition of the Greek armed forces somewhat in favor of a smaller and more efficient force. Whether or not these force levels are reduced, US efforts should be directed toward improving their effectiveness. It should be made clear in this connection that the US military assistance program is based on the assumption that the Greeks will try to correct their own military weaknesses and deficiencies. Critical comments on these points may be required from time to time, but US officials should miss no opportunity to commend Greek officials on progress towards improving the effectiveness of their armed forces.

16. . . .

17. *Internal Security.* Currently there is no serious Communist threat to Greek internal security. For the past five years there has been political stability and reasonable economic growth. Although the Government is firmly anti-Communist, the Communist-front EDA, in the elections of February 1956, won a degree of political respectability by combining in an electoral coalition with the normally moderate Center parties and won 18 seats in Parliament. In addition, the fellow-traveling DKEL, in the electoral coalition, won 20 seats and several nominally independent Deputies frequently follow the EDA line. The likelihood of the emergence of a similar coalition in the next elections should not be ruled out. Such a development, if it occurs, would be likely to produce a further increase in Communist respectability and influence.

18. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE), which has been illegal since 1947, has been following a policy of active participation in non-Communist and even non-leftist groups in the achievement of its aims. Greek security agencies have noted a significant decline in the fear of communism among the population and a general relaxation of vigilance even by public authorities.

19. As a result of this relaxation and "in the interest of economy", the Gendarmérie was reduced, in August 1956, from 15,670 to 13,300 and the City Police was reduced from 6,252 to 5,127. The Gendarmérie has an authorized peacetime force of 21,986 which could be increased to 23,356 in the event of international strife or hostilities. The City Police has an authorized strength of 8,573. These Greek security forces are moderately efficient, but there is room for improvement along the lines envisaged by the police training program.

20. In addition to these forces, there is a para-military force (TEA) of 83,530 men, loosely organized into 104 national defense battalions under the supervision of the Greek National Army. It has the mission of providing security to the local rural population and of contributing raw intelligence. One third of the battalions are located close to the northern borders, another third are near army concentrations in rear areas and the remainder are scattered throughout communications zones and in the islands.

. . . . . .

C. Selected US Arrangements [2] *With or Pertaining to Greece:*

22. *US Involvements Which May Imply Military Security Guarantees.*

a. *NATO.* In accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States is committed to regard an armed attack

[2] See State Department publication *Treaties in Force* for additional arrangements. [Footnote in the source text.]

against Greece as an attack against itself and to take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security" of Greece.

b. *Middle East Resolution*. The United States by a Joint Resolution on the Middle East, signed by the President on March 9, 1957, announced its determination to assist Middle Eastern nations to maintain their independence. The resolution declared that the US is prepared to commit its military force, on the determination of the President, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism whenever a victim requests such aid.

23. *Other Arrangements.*

a. *Military and Economic Assistance*. The basic agreement concerning all US aid to Greece is that signed on June 20, 1947. Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, further agreements were signed on February 7, 1952 to bring Greece under MDAP.

b. *Joint Use of Facilities*. A US-Greek Agreement was signed in Athens on October 12, 1953 providing for the improvement and use of certain air and naval facilities in Greece, in implementation of Article 3 of the NATO Treaty.

c. *Status of Forces*. The basic military assistance agreement of June 20, 1947 provided complete immunity for personnel of the military mission. This immunity was extended to other US military personnel by subsequent agreements. Status was modified by the Status of Forces Agreement of September 7, 1956, based upon the Netherlands formula; however, JUSMAG retains its earlier privilege.

d. *Atomic Energy*. Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy was signed August 4, 1955. The US agreed to exchange atomic information and to lease to the Government of Greece 6 kilograms of uranium enriched up to twenty percent U–235 for use in research reactors. Greece has expressed interest in an atomic power bilateral agreement and was given a draft copy in May 1957. The US currently is considering a $350,000 grant for a one megawatt "swimming pool" type research reactor, to be located in a suburb of Athens and operated by the University of Athens. It is expected that this reactor will be in operation by Spring 1958.

e. *Voice of America Facilities*. A ten year agreement for continued operation of Salonika Relay Base and Rhodes USCGS *Courier* broadcasting station concluded with Greek Government November 28, 1955, also provides for shifting of facilities now on board the *Courier* to a land-based installation with the consent and cooperation of the Greek authorities. However, this proviso is inoperative due to Greek refusal, growing out of sensitivities regarding the Arab states, to permit a land-based installation intended for use in broadcasting to the Near and Middle East.

[Here follows Section II entitled "Current and Projected Programs and Courses of Action".]

Turkey

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH TURKEY: QUESTIONS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE [1]

316. Editorial Note

On January 5, 1955, at the 230th meeting of the National Security Council, during a discussion of national security policy, President Eisenhower, in response to Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey's comments on the need to progressively reduce United States economic aid on a worldwide basis, raised the question of Turkey. According to the memorandum of discussion, the President made the following comments:

"The President, turning to Secretary Humphrey, said that the reai criterion with respect to the level of US economic assistance was the security advantage which the United States obtained. He pointed out that US economic assistance to Turkey was the best possible way to buttress our security interests in the Near Eastern area. Moreover, it was much better and cheaper to assist the Turks to build up their own armed forces than to create additional US divisions." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

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[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 865 ff.

317. Memorandum From the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Scott) to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, January 5, 1955.

SUBJECT

Views on Turkey's Deteriorating Economic Situation

Embassy and FOA Ankara have forwarded their comments on the report on Turkey's economic situation which was prepared by Heuser, a Federal Reserve official on loan to FOA. [2] The report has confirmed our officials' feeling that the economic situation has deteriorated and will probably continue to deteriorate in coming months.

In light of the report's conclusions on the advantages of using devaluation as a stabilization tool and of US objectives in Turkey, our officials suggest three possible alternative approaches. The first is to recognize Turkey's determination to proceed with its development at the highest rate possible and assist with such means as we have at our disposal. This would probably require some increase in US aid and would certainly require frank discussion and acceptance by the Turks of economic policies designed to permit the best use of aid to the most advantage. The second is to influence the Turks to adopt economic policies more consistent with the presently scheduled aid. This would imply reducing the rate of economic growth admittedly below the level necessary adequately to support and maintain Turkey's defense effort in a period in which NATO force goals are to be achieved.

The third alternative is to have a direct and frank expression of the official US view that unless Turkey adopts and implements a policy of greater internal stability and external solvency, the US has no choice but to reexamine its support of Turkish efforts in military and economic build-up. In considering this third alternative, the US would have to keep in mind our commitments to Turkish defense build-up, our acceptance of NATO force goals, unilateral Turkish commitments to the US, our encouragement of Turkey to assume

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/1–555. Secret. A note on the source text in an unidentified hand indicates that the Secretary saw the memorandum.

[2] Transmitted in telegram 692, January 3. (*Ibid.*, 882.00/1–355) The Heuser report has not been found.

leadership in the Balkans and the Near East, and of efforts made by Turkey to become independent of aid. [3]

WKS

[3] A joint State–Treasury–Defense–FOA message to Ankara, January 12, noted: "Believe our military and other objectives coincide Turks objective strengthen economy and attain sound economic development at maximum rate. Turks should understand attempt force development through inflationary means retards overall expansion production, diverts resources to uneconomic and less essential uses and tends defeat purpose. Although certain projects may be completed damage to overall and balanced development occurs, private investment discouraged, capital formation reduced, hampering controls instituted and economy distorted. Mistaken policies and efforts obtain through accumulation commercial arrears and inflation more resources than otherwise available may appear yield temporary gain, but Turkey is now at stage of real damage to economy." (Telegram 772; *ibid.*, 782.5–MSP/1–555)

318. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, February 21, 1955.

SUBJECT

NSC 5510—US Policy on Turkey [2]—Item No. 3, NSC Meeting February 24, 1955

Discussion:

This is the first revision of the NSC statement of policy toward Turkey since prior to its adherence to NATO. Among other matters, it discusses and makes recommendations concerning: (1) the role Turkey is playing in developing Middle East defense arrangements; (2) the desirability of and the US commitment for building up the strength of the Turkish armed forces; and (3) current Turkish economic difficulties.

With respect to economic difficulties, Turkey is developing many segments of its economy at once, and at a faster rate than it can finance without inflation. Prices have advanced by at least 20

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5510 Memoranda. Top Secret. Drafted by Lincoln and transmitted through the Executive Secretariat.

[2] NSC 5510, February 14, was drafted in the Department of State. For text of the draft, see *ibid.*

percent in the past year, and Turkey has accumulated over $150 million of arrears in payments due to foreign suppliers. Turkey recognizes that it is in difficulties and has asked the US for a $300 million loan. It is our opinion (see paragraph 22 [3]) that Turkey can put its own house in order without loans of this nature.

Menderes, the Turkish Prime Minister, discussed Turkish military and economic matters in the US, particularly with Mr. Stassen, in June 1954. Menderes asked that the US increase the amount of military end items to be delivered to Turkey so that in four years the Turkish armed forces would be at a modified United States TO & E; this was estimated to require $200 million aid per year for the four years.

Menderes was told that the US intends to continue to base its military aid to Turkey toward meeting the requirements of the NATO approved force goals and, subject to certain caveats, the US was prepared in FY 1955 to meet one-fourth of the requirements to bring Turkish armed forces to NATO standards (a modified United States TO & E).

The Department of Defense believes it was not adequately consulted when the US made the commitment to Turkey as to military aid, and the Joint Chiefs go so far in their opposition as to question whether this Government made any commitment at all. The issue is posed in paragraph 20. [4] The left side, supported by State,

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[3] The approved version of paragraph 22, NSC 5510/1, February 28, 1955, differed only from the draft paragraph in that in subparagraph 22a. the phrase "rely primarily upon Turkey's taking" was substituted for the phrase "rely primarily upon encouraging Turkey to take". See Document 320.

[4] Paragraph 20 reads as follows:

"20. With respect to the commitment made by the US to Turkey for FY 1955:*

"*First Alternative* (Proposed by the State, FOA and ODM Members and the CIA Adviser)

"a. Determine by April 1, 1955, as part of the review of military assistance programs called for by NSC 5434/1, how best to fulfill such commitment.

"*Second Alternative* (Proposed by the Defense and Treasury Members and the JCS and Budget Advisers)

"a. Determine by April 1, 1955, as part of the review of military assistance programs called for by NSC 5434/1, the nature of such commitment and the extent to which the US can fulfill it, taking into consideration:

"(1) Whether necessary mutual security funds and equipment can be made available without seriously affecting other country programs.

"(2) The ability of the Turkish armed forces to absorb the increased military assistance.

"(3) The necessity for not seriously harming the Turkish economy.

"b. Further action on such four-year program should be subject to a reassessment based on the combined US–UK–Turkey military staff talks and on the USRO (Holcombe) study now in preparation."

The asterisk footnote in paragraph 20 reads: "See para. 8 above and the aide-mémoire of June 4, 1954, attached as an Annex." In the source text alternative paragraphs "a" were typed in two columns.

proposes that we find out how much money we do have and then determine how best to carry out an existing, but not precisely delineated, commitment. The right side, advanced by the military, in effect proposes that we determine how much money is available and, regardless of the probable inadequacy of the amount, do nothing more about it. The considerations listed on the right side are obviously incomplete as they do not take into account political effects in Turkey and elsewhere in the Near East.

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319. Memorandum of Discussion at the 238th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 24, 1955 [1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and item 1.]

2. *US Policy on Turkey* (NSC 36/2; NSC 109; NSC 5510; [2] Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 21, 1955) [3]

In the course of his briefing of the Council on the reference report (NSC 5510), Mr. Cutler read most of the General Considerations and Courses of Action contained in the report. He emphasized to the Council that Turkey presented the United States with two major interrelated problems, one military and the other economic. He then indicated the reasons for the difference in point of view regarding paragraph 20, [4] which dealt with the nature of the commitment made by the United States Government to Turkey for assistance in Fiscal Year 1955. The short alternative form of paragraph 20, which had been proposed by State and certain other agencies, called for a determination by April 1, 1955, of "how best to fulfill such a commitment". The second alternative, on the right-hand side of the page, proposed by Defense and other agencies, called for a determination of "the extent to which the US can fulfill

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on February 15.

[2] For text of NSC 36/2, "Construction of Airfields and Stockpiling of Aviation Gasoline in Turkey", see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, p. 884. NSC 109 is printed *ibid.*, 1951, vol. V, p. 1148. Regarding NSC 5510, see footnote 2, *supra*.

[3] The memorandum forwarded a memorandum from Radford to the Secretary of Defense transmitting JSC comments on NSC 5510; see footnote 11 below.

[4] See footnote 4, *supra*.

it [the commitment],[5] taking into consideration" the availability of funds, the ability of the Turkish armed forces to absorb increased military assistance, and the necessity of avoiding serious harm to the Turkish economy.

At the conclusion of his briefing, Mr. Cutler invited the comments of the Acting Secretary of State.

Secretary Hoover replied that the State Department felt, in view of the aide-mémoire of June 1954,[6] that the United States had made a definite commitment to the Turkish Government, even if that commitment were qualified in some respects. No corresponding commitments had been made by Turkey in response to the US commitment. Accordingly, it appeared to the State Department to be a question of the US honoring what, at least in Turkish eyes, amounted to a firm commitment. For that reason, said Secretary Hoover, he supported the first alternative.

The President quickly stated that it was hard for him to believe that the United States could have made a commitment to Turkey in such very precise form without the President's explicit agreement thereto (implying that he had not given such explicit agreement). . . .

In response to the President's questions, Mr. Cutler quoted certain sentences from the aide-mémoire which cast light on the nature of the alleged US commitment. The President replied that regardless of the aide-mémoire, one would have to presuppose that in all these deals between the United States and allies which it was assisting, consideration was given to how much assistance an allied country could profitably absorb. It therefore seemed indicated to him that a fresh look should be taken at the whole problem of assistance to Turkey. If this revealed that the Turks could make profitable use of more money, the President said he would be for giving it to them; but he was afraid that the gift of further money might harm rather than help an important ally.

Admiral Radford said that he strongly shared the President's feeling on the subject. Of course, we wanted to be strong in the general area of Turkey. Moreover, we wanted to do all we could to build up the strength of the Turkish armed forces. But his own recent visit to Turkey, in November 1954, had shown him a number of serious difficulties. When he had gone to Turkey the previous November, neither he nor any of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been made aware of the commitment which the United States had made

[5] Brackets in the source text.

[6] The June 4, 1954, aide-mémoire dealing with US assistance to Turkey was transmitted in airgram 245, June 8, 1954. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.5–MSP/6–854), For a summary of the aide-mémoire, see telegram 1351 in *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, p. 949.

to Turkey in June 1954. Admiral Radford then proceeded to illustrate the serious lack in the Turkish armed forces of career soldiers, sailors and airmen with sufficient technical skill to make profitable use of many of the modern weapons for which the Turkish Government was making requests on the United States. He added that the FOA authorities in Turkey and the United States Ambassador to Ankara likewise shared his own feeling that the Turks were trying to move ahead too rapidly in building up the strength of and in modernizing their armed forces.

Mr. Cutler asked General Porter (who was representing Governor Stassen in the latter's absence) whether he could throw any light on the problem of the commitment the United States had made to Turkey. General Porter replied that since he had discussed this matter at length with Governor Stassen before his departure to the Far East, he believed he could throw some light on the problem.

General Porter proceeded to describe the circumstances of the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister to Washington,[7] and the background of the aide-mémoire of June 1954. While he admitted that Governor Stassen had been obliged to "cut some corners", and had not discussed the program of military assistance to Turkey with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he had at least discussed the commitment with the Secretary of Defense. General Porter concluded his statement by commenting that Governor Stassen felt that the United States had made a firm commitment to the Turkish Prime Minister.

The President found this perplexing, and repeated that on the occasion of the Prime Minister's personal call on him,[8] . . . . he had talked in generalities, which was why he believed that our commitment to the Turks was only a qualified commitment. . . .

Secretary Humphrey commented that it seemed a plain fact to him that we had "got ahead of ourselves", and even so, the Turks were looking for further assistance. It seemed to Secretary Humphrey rather idle to debate the technical question as to whether we had made a commitment to the Turks, and if so, what kind. Turkey presented the United States with a colossal financial and economic problem. Secretary Humphrey again insisted that the United States had "out-promised" itself.

Secretary Wilson said that it was his view that all of us favored steps to strengthen the position of Turkey. If they would go ahead on their part to take these steps, we should do what was necessary on our side.

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[7] Prime Minister Menderes visited Washington in early June 1954.

[8] For Eisenhower's account of this meeting on June 2, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, p. 944.

The President asked with some impatience whether the time hadn't come for Britain and France to step in and help us with such problems as Turkey. Both these countries were eager to export manufactured goods, and desperately needed markets.

Admiral Radford expressed the judgment that our current program for assistance to Turkey contained about as much as the Turks could successfully absorb unless they were radically to improve their own capabilities.

General Porter expressed the view that NSC 5510 did not quite present in a fair light the program for the modernization of the Turkish military establishment. As estimated in this paper, the costs of such a program seemed to him too high. Accordingly, he proposed that the Council agree that the United States did have a commitment to Turkey, and thereafter "work it out" on the basis of Turkey's ability to absorb this military assistance.

The President said he agreed in general with General Porter's suggestion, and Mr. Cutler offered language to revise paragraph 20 accordingly. As he was doing so, the President said that when you got down to the bottom of it, what Mr. Cutler was saying was that the commitment should be of such a nature that its implementation would be useful to both Turkey and the United States. Accordingly, he felt that the problem should be urgently studied by a new high-level commission which should promptly go to Turkey and carry out this mission on the spot.

Admiral Radford pointed out that there were already several survey teams in Turkey. Secretary Wilson added the opinion that we could readily spend our money in Turkey if we could only be sure that the Turks were up to using the money effectively. Secretary Humphrey took issue with Secretary Wilson, and insisted that the Turks were not only ahead of themselves in the military sphere, but in the economic sphere as well.

Secretary Hoover offered certain revisions to Mr. Cutler's proposed language for paragraph 20, which the Council agreed to accept.

The President then spoke briefly from his own knowledge of the background of Turkish military development since 1952, when he himself had last been in Turkey. He drew the conclusion that the Turks were not yet in shape to take a large amount of new US military equipment. Therefore, thought the President, it would be better for them to use money for training and men to make effective use of new equipment. If we presented this problem in the right way, the President was confident that the Turks would agree to our solution.

Secretary Hoover said all he wanted to add was a sense of urgency. We have got to get together and settle this matter with the Turks promptly. It has dragged on much too long.

After the Council had agreed on language dealing with the military problem in paragraph 20, Mr. Cutler invited the members of the Council to turn to what he described as the "sad part" of NSC 5510—namely, the problem presented by Turkey's financial and economic condition. This, he said, was set forth most clearly in paragraph 11,[9] which he read to the Council.

The President interrupted to point out that this appeared to be a situation in which we could be of real help by using our great agricultural surpluses, such as wheat. The President was insistent that this point be followed up. General Porter assured the President that the United States was already sending in wheat in exchange for Turkish chrome. General Porter was backed up by Dr. Elliott (sitting for Dr. Flemming), who provided figures on the exchanges of wheat and chrome.

Mr. Cutler then went on to read the Courses of Action dealing with the problems of Turkey's economy. He pointed out that there was no difference of view in the paper on the economic courses of action, with the exception of paragraph 21, reading as follows:

"As an exception pursuant to NSC 5501, para. 55–b, be prepared to purchase from Turkey strategic minerals for long-term strategic stockpile in order to assist Turkey to meet its minimum essential civilian and military requirements."

The Treasury and Budget members of the Planning Board favored deletion of this course of action. The Joint Chiefs, on the other hand, had indicated that they favored retention of the paragraph as written.

Dr. Flemming, who had by now joined the meeting, said that it was his understanding that the Treasury Department was now ready to withdraw its objection to this proposed course of action. He went on to describe briefly the US stockpile position with respect to chrome ore, noting that there was plenty of room in the stockpile for adding more chrome, and pointing out that if the current price of $48 were raised to $55, marginal producers in Turkey might be brought into operations again.

The President said that he failed to see why it was necessary for the United States to keep raising the price it would pay to stockpile chrome ore from Turkey. This problem, along with the others, should be put in the hands of Ambassador Warren as part of the

[9] Paragraph 11 of NSC 5510 was identical to paragraph 11 approved in NSC 5510/1 (*infra*).

new survey and as part of a package deal between the United States and Turkey.

Dr. Flemming again pointed out that the Council should realize that our stockpile position on chrome was not very good. The President replied that that might well be the case, but that it offered no excuse for us to jump what we were willing to pay for chrome from $48 to $55. Secretary Wilson agreed with the President, and said that if we needed it so badly we could buy chrome elsewhere than in Turkey. If we raised the price that we were willing to pay Turkey for her chrome, we might unwittingly add to Turkey's embarrassing inflationary situation.

Secretary Humphrey expressed agreement with Secretary Wilson, and pointed out that there was no use in the United States "bailing out" the Turks each successive time that they got themselves into trouble. What we needed to do was to go over to Turkey now and deal with the whole situation.

While the President said that he agreed with this statement of Secretary Humphrey, the latter should remember, or try to recall, the prevailing climate of opinion when we had made our promises to assist the building up of Turkey's economy and military position. We were "scared to death" at that time and only too glad to welcome Turkey as a military ally.

Secretary Humphrey said that he understood this, but that we could not reorganize everything that was wrong with Turkey in a minute. The thing to do was to try to cool the Turks off. They were so steamed up in their hopes for economic advancement and modern military strength. Secretary Wilson queried whether we wanted to do too much toward "cooling the Turks off". After all, there were relatively few nations who, like the Turks, were really steamed up on our side of the struggle against the Soviet bloc.

Dr. Flemming assured the President that the US stockpile proposal, as set forth in paragraph 21, could be made part of a US package proposal to Turkey, as the President had earlier suggested.

The Council indicated approval for the inclusion of paragraph 21, although the Director of the Budget warned that US stockpile transactions should be handled on the basis of the items of materials that the United States needed, and not solely on the basis of countries which the United States desired to assist by purchases for the US stockpile.

Mr. Cutler suggested that Mr. Dodge, as head of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, might wish to add some comments on the economic aspects of NSC 5510.

Mr. Dodge said that he only wished to say that it was impossible to overemphasize the seriousness of Turkey's internal and external financial and economic position. The Germans had found

themselves obliged to shut off all credit to Turkish buyers last August. Three months later they had offered to reopen credits, and they were now flooded with orders from Turkish businessmen. Mr. Dodge said it was also essential to remember that in their agreements with us the Turks had made a commitment to put their own financial house in order, and that thus far they had notoriously failed to do so. If they do not carry out this promise, Mr. Dodge warned, additional US assistance would amount to pouring money down a hole. The situation was very much like the situation in Japan, with which Mr. Dodge had been faced earlier in his career.

General Porter admitted that the Turkish economy was in dire straits, but said perhaps it might be considered a "ray of light and hope" that the Turks have asked the OEEC to send its people into Turkey to make a study of Turkey's economic problem. At least the Turks had got around to admitting that they did have an economic and financial problem.

As Mr. Cutler was suggesting language to revise paragraph 22 in the light of the previous discussion, the President said that he hoped that Ambassador Warren could be told to start work at once toward a solution of these problems. Admiral Radford suggested that one or two high-level people, not merely to compose a survey team but who were of a policy-making rank, should be sent to assist Ambassador Warren. Expressing agreement with this view, Secretary Humphrey said he would like to find "another Joe Dodge" for Turkey.

At the conclusion of the discussion, the President and Admiral Radford both warned the members of the Council not to overlook the fact, in their criticism of Turkey's economic condition, that the Turks were among the few people who had openly manifested the will to fight.

The National Security Council: [10]

a. Discussed the statement of policy on the subject contained in the reference report (NSC 5510) in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 21. [11]

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[10] Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 1338. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

[11] On February 18, Radford, on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, transmitted by Gleason to the NSC on February 21, forwarded the JCS comments on NSC 5510. Radford noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were "in general agreement" with the NSC paper's evaluation of the political and strategic importance of Turkey to the United States and with NSC 5510's proposed objectives and courses of action. In regard to the differing views contained in subparagraph 20a, Radford indicated that the JCS recommended the adoption of the second alternative proposed in the right hand column. With regard to paragraph 21, Radford noted that the JCS recommended the retention of this paragraph unless it was decided that the proposal was incompatible with the US stockpile program.

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5510, subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Paragraph 18, 1st line:* Change "review" to "reviews".
(2) *Paragraph 20–a:* Revise to read as follows:

"a. Determine by April 1, 1955, as part of the review of military assistance programs called for by NSC 5434/1, [12] the nature of such commitment and action with respect thereto in the common interests of both countries, taking into consideration:
"(1) The amount of mutual security funds and equipment that can be made available without seriously affecting other country programs.
"(2) The extent of the ability of the Turkish armed forces to absorb the increased military assistance.
"(3) The necessity for not seriously harming the Turkish economy."

(3) *Paragraph 21:* Delete the brackets and the footnote relating thereto; change "strategic minerals" to read "chrome"; and change "in order" to read "as part of a program".
(4) *Paragraph 22–a:* Change "encouraging Turkey to take" to read "Turkey's taking".

c. Agreed that, after completion of the review of basic data which is now in the process of being gathered and evaluated, the Department of State should arrange for a high-level mission to Turkey, including other appropriate agencies, to coordinate the development of and to negotiate an over-all solution to Turkey's military and economic problems.

Note: NSC 5510, as amended and adopted, approved by the President, subsequently circulated as NSC 5510/1, and transmitted to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President. The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation.

S. Everett Gleason

Subject to the foregoing comments, the JCS recommended that the Secretary of Defense agree to the adoption of NSC 5510 as a statement of US policy on Turkey. For text of the JCS memorandum, see *ibid.*, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5510.

[12] NSC 5434/1, "Procedure for Periodic Review of Military Assistance Programs, approved by the President on October 16, 1954, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. I, Part 1, p. 786.

320. National Security Council Report [1]

NSC 5510/1 *Washington, February 28, 1955.*

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 238th Council meeting on February 24, 1955, [2] adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5510, subject to the amendments thereto which are set forth in NSC Action No. 1338–b. [3]

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5510, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5510/1, directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the US Government, and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes NSC 36/2 and NSC 109. [4]

James S. Lay, Jr. [5]

[Enclosure]

STATEMENT OF POLICY ON TURKEY

General Considerations

1. Turkey is of particular political and strategic importance to the United States because:

a. It has a world outlook closely corresponding to that of the US and is thus a natural ally.

b. It is the most stable and anti-Soviet country in the Eastern Mediterranean and Near Eastern area, thus making possible multiple security agreements of great value.

c. It is located astride the water passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. It also commands the most direct land route from the USSR to the Suez. Turkey borders the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, and lies within striking distance of important targets within

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5510 Series. Top Secret.

[2] See *supra*.

[3] See footnote 10, *supra*.

[4] Neither printed, but see footnote 2, *supra*.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Communist borders. It has granted the US important military facility rights.

d. Its armed forces are strong, patriotic, well-disciplined, and determined to resist infringement of Turkish rights or territory.

2. Turkey is a target for Soviet ambitions. In 1945 the USSR presented claims to two eastern provinces of Turkey (Kars and Ardahan) and in 1946 proposed a new regime for the Straits to be established only by Turkey and other Black Sea powers, with joint defense of the waterways by Turkey and the USSR. Turkey consistently and firmly rejected these claims. Although Soviet aggressive demands have recently been toned down, there is no reason to suppose that Soviet objectives have changed. However, a direct attack upon Turkey by armed forces of the USSR, or its satellite Bulgaria, is unlikely unless the USSR is prepared to risk general war.

3. Turkey is consistently endeavoring to broaden and strengthen its ties with Western Europe and the United States, and has made great progress. It has taken a firm stand in the UN against Soviet acts of aggression and obstruction and is participating in other international organizations (NATO, Council of Europe, OEEC, EPU) in cooperation with the US and Western European countries. Turkey is extremely sensitive to its national security problem and alert to the need for collective defense. In 1939 Turkey, the U.K., and France signed a Treaty of Mutual Assistance [6] which, at Turkish insistence, was recently reaffirmed by the U.K. and France. Turkey, with US support, pushed its candidacy for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which it entered on February 18, 1952.

4. On February 28, 1953, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, confirming the close economic and diplomatic collaboration which had been developing between the three countries and providing for contingent military planning. [7] On August 9, 1954, after consultation by the Turks and Greeks with the North Atlantic Council, this agreement was supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance [8] which provides that aggression against one would be considered aggression against all, and that in such an event the Governments would take the measures they deemed necessary, including the use of armed force, to counter aggression. Although Yugoslavia is committed only in the event of an attack on Turkey or Greece, it has committed itself to consult

[6] The Treaty of Mutual Assistance was concluded on October 19, 1939, at Ankara and ratified on November 16, 1939. For text of the treaty, see *Cmd.* 6165.

[7] On February 28, 1953, the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia signed the Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration in Ankara. For text of the treaty, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, p. 271.

[8] On August 9, 1954, at a meeting of the Ankara Pact Foreign Ministers in Bled, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia signed the Treaty of Military Alliance known also as the Treaty of Bled. For text, see *ibid.*, 1954, p. 197.

with Turkey and Greece in case of an attack on another NATO country. Despite the lack of a formal link of Yugoslavia with the NATO system, for all practical purposes a good defensive system for the Southeastern European area is being added to the NATO defense system. There has been some discussion of Italy's eventual participation in the Turkish-Greek-Yugoslav Alliance. The basis has therefore been laid from which a continuous Western defense system from Northern Europe to Asia Minor might ultimately develop.

5. On April 2, 1954, Turkey and Pakistan signed an agreement providing for continuing consultation on mutual security problems.[9] This agreement, overtly originating in the region but given impetus by US encouragement, provides for accession by other states in the area. It may, therefore, eventually serve substantially the same purposes as were envisaged in the still-born Middle East Defense Organization sponsored by the UK, France, and the US and strongly supported by Turkey.[10] In that event, Turkey will become of even more importance as a link between formal collective security arrangements of the Western world and the Middle East. Turkey has in fact been playing a leading role in seeking Middle East defense arrangements, particularly expansion of the agreement with Pakistan. A recent step looking toward the development of a northern tier was a statement by Turkey and Iraq on January 13 [*12*], 1955, of their intention to negotiate a security alliance.[11]

6. Turkey is undergoing one of the most successful social, political and intellectual revolutions of modern times. Turkey desires to become a fully modern state based on western cultural ideas and has been developing democratic forms of government and institutions. From an inefficient, tyrannical and theocratic state, it has reached a point where, in some respects, it can well serve as an example of peaceful evolution for other underdeveloped areas.

7. From FY 1947 through FY 1954 the US expended $704.3 million in military aid to Turkey; from April 1, 1948 through FY 1954 the US expended $262 million in economic and technical assistance to Turkey. With this aid Turkey has undertaken major programs to modernize its military establishment and to develop its economy. Expenditure estimates for the FY 1955 aid program total about $348 million ($258 million military aid; $90.3 million economic and technical assistance).

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[9] This agreement, known as the Turco-Pakistani Agreement for Friendly Cooperation, was signed in Karachi. For text, see *ibid.*, p. 185.

[10] In October 1951, the United States, France, Britain, and Turkey proposed that Egypt participate in a Middle East Defense Organization plan (MEDO).

[11] For text of the Turco-Iraqi communiqué, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, p. 286.

8. Although the Turkish armed forces have made great progress, present plans for building up Turkey's armed forces in accordance with US interests will require continued substantial US assistance over a period of years. During FYs 1950–54 the US allocated one billion dollars for expenditure in those and following years on a program to build up the Turkish Army, Navy and Air Force. In June 1954 the Prime Minister of Turkey submitted a proposal to the Director of FOA for the partial conversion of the Turkish Army by 1958 to modified US Tables of Organization and Equipment along lines desired by NATO planners and the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey. The cost of this partial conversion, estimated by the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey at approximately $800 million, would be additional to the billion dollar program referred to above. By an aide-mémoire dated June 4, 1954,[12] the US Government indicated to the Prime Minister that the US was prepared, subject to certain caveats, for FY 1955 to "increase the presently approved military assistance program by an amount to meet one-fourth of the unfunded US screened requirements of the Turkish armed forces to achieve NATO goals," but there has been no common agreement between the countries as to the amount and rate of this increase. Nevertheless, the Turks consider that the US Government has made a firm commitment and, based chiefly upon the US-Turkish conversations, have in mind as implicit in the commitment the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey $800 million four-year program. While the qualitative improvement of the Turkish Army along these lines would seem to be desirable from a strictly military point of view, implementation of such a program is open to question at the moment because of the lack of available US funds when global military assistance commitments are taken into account, and because of the impact of such a program on Turkish economy and the questionable ability of the Turkish armed forces to convert to greater mechanization so rapidly.

9. Based on current estimates, the *maximum* new money which can be made available for the Fiscal Years 1955 and 1956 would be something less than $300 million, and may be substantially lower, as compared with the over $600 million which would be required if the material called for by the $800 million augmentation plan were to be delivered by the end of FY 1958. The Department of Defense estimates that the funds required for the Turkish augmentation program can be found only at the expense of other military or economic assistance programs under already-approved policies, or by supplemental appropriations.

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[12] Attached as an Annex. [Footnote in the source text. The annex is not printed.]

10. If, however, the proposed augmented program were completed (assuming the US provides the necessary military maintenance dollar costs, which are estimated at $80–100 million per year), the continuing annual cost of maintaining Turkey's converted forces ($610 million)[13] would be, commencing about CY 1959, about double the total Turkish defense budget of CY 1953 ($366 million).[13] Expenditures of this magnitude by Turkey from her own resources beginning in CY 1959 are unlikely. Consequently, there would be required a considerably higher level of US economic assistance than the $70 million currently programmed. It is estimated that total US aid, military and economic, might run as high as $200 million per year. In connection with the ability of the Turkish armed forces rapidly to absorb an augmented program, there are indications that the Turks will have increasing difficulty in maintaining equipment because of inadequate numbers of trained technical personnel and insufficient warehousing and maintenance facilities, as well as the general low level of experience in logistics management. Correction of these deficiencies will require considerable effort.

11. The Turks have attempted to carry out an economic revolution comparable to their social and political revolution, but their eagerness to modernize the country, combined with their unhesitating acceptance of military force goals suggested for them by NATO and the United States, has brought serious economic difficulties. In the early post-war years considerable economic progress was made and productivity increased substantially, in large part as a result of US aid and a succession of good crop years. However, Turkey has increasingly lived beyond its means; with the result that in the last two years foreign exchange resources have been exhausted, a burdensome external debt has been accumulated, and inflation has developed internally. Imports have been stimulated by foreign firms seeking markets, by importers' hopes for quick profits spurred by the rising price level, and under the assumption that there would be a continuing US support of the Turkish economy. By and large, exports are no longer competitive in world markets, domestic private capital can no longer be successfully channeled into the most productive uses, and foreign investors are now unwilling to risk much long-term capital in Turkey, even though the Government has passed legislation highly favorable to private enterprise and foreign capital. In the last six months Turkey's situation has been aggravated still further by a serious crop failure which has compelled Turkey, recently an exporter of wheat, to import cereals. At the same time,

[13] These figures represent Turkish lira expenditures converted into dollars at the official rate of 2.8 to $1. The current free market rate is about 6.8 to $1. [Footnote in the source text.]

European suppliers are becoming less anxious to extend further commercial credits. Thus, the time appears to be approaching when Turkish imports may decline as suppliers cease to ship until paid in cash.

12. The restoration of economic stability in Turkey and the maintenance of a sound economic development program will require either curtailment of the total rate of investment or the level of military expenditures, or both, unless the gap is met by additional aid from abroad.[14] Most, if not all, of the adjustment needed to restore stability at the present level of US military and economic aid and the present level of Turkish defense spending could be obtained through fiscal and financial measures which would reduce investment and curtail credit but still allow a reasonable rate of economic progress. The problem is that the Turkish Government, while it has made some gestures in the direction of controlling inflationary pressures, has been reluctant to recognize the seriousness of the situation and to accept reasonable limitations on the rate of economic development. The Turkish Government has already turned to the United States in an attempt to obtain additional aid, and Turkish officials have taken the position that the US is committed to extend Turkey a $300 million loan. The US has made no such commitment. In this situation we must expect continued difficulty in persuading the Turkish Government to take the necessary actions. In view of Turkey's special position as a staunch ally which has consistently withstood Soviet threats, the US must consider carefully the effect of pressures and actions that would offend Turkish pride and adversely affect this basic US-Turkish relationship.

Objectives

13. a. Continuance of Turkey's independence, territorial integrity, identification with the free world, and will and ability to resist Communist invasion or subversion.

b. Turkish armed forces capable of repelling attack by a Soviet satellite or of providing maximum practical resistance to direct Soviet attack as part of a concerted allied defense.

c. Access by the United States and its allies to Turkish resources and military facilities necessary for the preservation and further strengthening of the free world.

d. Continued Turkish cooperation in NATO and in strengthening free world regional security arrangements in the Balkans and

[14] New crises could be expected to develop even with increased aid unless the Turkish Government applied more restraint than it has been willing to apply up to this time in the field of credit and investment. [Footnote in the source text.]

furthering the development of such arrangements in the Middle and Near East.

e. Improved relations between Turkey and the Arab States.

f. Achievement of a stable Turkish economy which, with maximum Turkish efforts, can support an increasingly greater share of its defense expenditures, while maintaining investment outlays at realistic levels.

Courses of Action

14. Encourage such continued development of democratic ideas and institutions in Turkey as would help to insure Turkey's identification of interest with the western European and other free nations of the world.

15. Cooperate with Turkey as a full and equal member of the western European alliance of free peoples.

16. Encourage Turkey to participate in appropriate regional security agreements, so as to bring selected neighboring states into regional defense pacts aimed at resisting communist penetration of the area. Such agreements should provide for (a) integrated Southeastern European defense, (b) extension of security planning to include not only Pakistan, but also other selected states to the south and east of Turkey whose participation would be important to the defense of the Middle East and South Asia.

17. Continue a program of substantial military aid to Turkey which, when coupled with maximum Turkish effort, will serve the following military objectives:

a. To implement existing military facilities agreements and assure the availability of Turkish facilities to the US and its allies in case of hostilities.

b. In accordance with NATO-approved goals as accepted by the US, to achieve and maintain Turkish forces in a state of combat readiness, in order to be able to repel an attack by a Soviet satellite or to provide maximum practical resistance to direct Soviet attack as part of a concerted allied defense.

18. Reassess, in connection with the semi-annual reviews of military assistance programs called for by NSC 5434/1:

a. Financial and force level implications for Turkey arising from its growing network of security arrangements.

b. The resulting effect on US support for Turkey.

19. Expedite, in so far as practicable, deliveries under the FY 1950–1954 military assistance program in accordance with the US commitment to Turkey.

20. With respect to the commitment made by the US to Turkey for FY 1955: [15]

a. Determine by April 1, 1955, as part of the review of military assistance programs called for by NSC 5434/1, the nature of such commitment and action with respect thereto in the common interests of both countries, taking into consideration:

(1) The amount of mutual security funds and equipment that can be made available without seriously affecting other country programs.

(2) The extent of the ability of the Turkish armed forces to absorb the increased military assistance.

(3) The necessity for not seriously harming the Turkish economy.

b. Further action on such four-year program should be subject to a reassessment based on the combined US–UK–Turkey military staff talks and on the USRO (Holcombe) study now in preparation. [16]

21. As an exception pursuant to NSC 5501, para. 55–b, be prepared to purchase from Turkey chrome for long-term strategic stockpile as part of a program to assist Turkey to meet its minimum essential civilian and military requirements.

22. a. In dealing with the impending economic crisis, rely primarily upon Turkey's taking the necessary fiscal and financial measures, and in particular to limit the rate of its economic development to that consistent with a viable economy.

b. Pending the completion of the studies now underway, continue to provide economic and technical assistance at approximately existing levels, but do not agree under present circumstances to extend a long-term loan to Turkey.

c. Upon determination of the extent of US military assistance pursuant to para. 20 above and upon adoption by Turkey of the necessary fiscal and financial measures (subpara. a above), provide economic assistance based on the amount required to permit Turkey to fulfill its military program as approved by the US, while still allowing Turkey to carry out a reasonable economic development program.

23. Continue to encourage Turkey to improve the climate for investment in Turkey of both foreign and domestic private capital.

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[15] See paragraph 8 above and the aide-mémoire of June 4, 1954, attached as an Annex. [Footnote in the source text.]

[16] Reference is to a report prepared by a team headed by John L. Holcombe of the Department of Defense and including European representatives of US agencies, dealing with Turkish defense requirements and capabilities. Dated May 22, the report has not been found.

24. Extend appropriate encouragement to Turkey in its efforts to exert such influence in the Arab world as might eventually have a stabilizing influence on the Arab States.

[Here follow Annex A, a copy of the Aide-Mémoire of June 4, 1954; a Financial Appendix; and a Staff Study comprising two parts: Part I, "The Strategic Importance of Turkey," and Part II, "Economic Problems and Prospects."]

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321. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) [1]

Washington, March 15, 1955.

SUBJECT

Economic Situation in Turkey

As you know, we have for some time been concerned over the deteriorating economic situation in Turkey which, if allowed to continue, will, we believe, jeopardize the economic stability which is so necessary to the attainment of investment and defense goals in Turkey.

In an effort, therefore, to assist the Turkish Government in improving its economic and financial position, this Government readily acceded to a proposal by Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Zorlu that a Turkish-United States Economic Consultative Group be constituted in Turkey to survey the situation as a basis for determination of future policy. Simultaneously an Interagency Committee on Turkish Economic Problems, composed of representatives from the Departments of Defense, Treasury, and State and FOA, was established in Washington to develop policy guidance for the US representatives on the Ankara committee. [2] In accordance with instructions from Washington, Turkish officials were informed that it was anticipated that the US-Turkish consultations would proceed

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/3–155. Secret. Drafted by Snyder on March 11. An identical memorandum was sent to Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of Defense. None of the tabs was found attached to the source text and none is printed.

[2] In accordance with a decision made by Hoover on January 12, an Interagency Committee on Turkish Economic Problems was established in Washington to formulate policy guidance for the Joint Turkish-US Consultative Group, which recently had been established in Ankara.

within the context of the availability of present resources and that no increase in the level of US assistance was contemplated (Tab A).[3]

Turkish Prime Minister Menderes reacted violently when he was informed of this US limitation on the discussions, stating that, given this premise, they could result only in a suggestion to retrench on investments and/or defense, neither of which he would consider. The Prime Minister subsequently agreed, however, that the proposed consultations were necessary and, despite continued bitterness over the "imperious approach", the Turks have decided to begin the formal discussions (Tab B).[4]

Mr. Hoover has requested that I send you the foregoing information as well as a copy of a memorandum of March 2, 1955 (Tab C),[5] transmitting to him a report of the work of the Washington Interagency Committee (Tab D).

Robert Murphy[6]

[3] Telegram 959 to Ankara, February 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/2–755)

[4] Telegram 986 from Ankara, March 1, reported Menderes' reaction to the US limitation. (*Ibid.*, 882.00/3–155)

[5] Tab C was a memorandum from Waugh to Hoover, March 2. (*Ibid.*)

[6] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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322. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State[1]

Ankara, April 1, 1955—4 p.m.

1173. Re Embtel 1170, April 1.[2] There is so much sleight-of-hand going on in Mid-East at present, it is hard to keep the eye on the ball. Frankly, I feel our Turkish friends have demonstrated they have rather clearer eye-sight than some of the rest of us. I cannot avoid feeling we are letting them down badly—and against our own interest. "Northern Tier" is our concept, and in my mind, a sound one—not likely to add great material strength to free world military

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/4–155. Secret; Priority.

[2] In telegram 1170, the Embassy in Ankara reported the substance of a meeting with Nuri Birgi to discuss developments in the Middle East. Birgi, who had called on Menderes' instructions, indicated that the Prime Minister believed that the "weight of maneuvers and attacks" against the Northern Tier defense concept was coming not only from the Arabs, but from the French and the Israelis. The attacks, Birgi continued, "are really getting to be too much for Turco-Iraqis shoulders alone." (*Ibid.*)

capabilities in the near future, but contributing (as one can judge by Moscow's violent opposition) an immediately powerful deterrent. I fear that such assurances as were given the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington (Embtel [*Deptel*] 1230, March 30[3]) seriously undercuts the position we have encouraged the Turks to take by our support of the Turco-Pakistani and Turco-Iraqi pacts;[4] and that it may prolong the life of a Syrian Government hostile to us, encourage the Egyptians in a neutralist, if not actively anti-western course, and long delay the construction of a Middle East barricade deterring Soviet designs. I hope the desk will give prompt consideration to the Prime Minister's observations reported in reference telegram and give me a positive reply for him.[5]

Warren

[3] In telegram 1230, March 29, the Department informed the Egyptian Ambassador that the United States was not trying to prevent an Egyptian pact with the Syrians and the Saudis, although it indicated that the American people would favor a Turco-Iraqi pact directed against a "communist menace", rather than a Syrian-Saudi-Egyptian pact, which might have "other objectives". The Department also suggested that Nasser might wish to consider a defense arrangement that might include Turkey and Iraq. Warren was also informed that the United States favored the preservation of the status quo regarding the adherence of additional Arab States to the Turco-Iraqi pact. (*Ibid.*, 682.87/3–3055)

[4] On April 2, 1954, Pakistan and Turkey concluded an Agreement for Friendly Cooperation; for text, see *AFP: Basic Documents, 1950–1955*, p. 1253. On February 24, 1955, Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan concluded a Pact of Mutual Cooperation. For text of the accord, see *ibid.*, p. 1257.

[5] In telegram 1252, April 2, the Department asked Warren to assure the Turkish Government that the United States "strongly supports" the Turco-Iraqi Pact, but that it continued to doubt the desirability of applying pressure on Iran to join the pact. Nor did the Department feel that the time was right for US adherence to the pact. (Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/4–155)

323. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State[1]

Ankara, April 21, 1955—4 a.m.

1289. I took leave last night of Prime Minister Menderes, in one of grimmest interviews in my career. I felt it desirable to reiterate Department's cautions on prospects any increased aid or loans, and

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/4–2155. Secret. Repeated to Paris Topol.

mentioned we entertained some serious misgivings as to some of Turk's assumptions and estimates, and as to economic policies involving danger of uncontrolled inflation. This led to outburst which, while in general tone "more in sorrow than in anger," was characterized by bitterness and by an intensity of conviction and determination beyond description. Following are highlights, which I shall try to fill in on my return: [2]

1. Common interests and attitudes of Turkey and United States and resultant friendship must and would go on "forever," and would survive even refusal of aid.

2. Military aid was not in question. [3] This is invaluable. Even if Turkey had money, she could not procure indispensable material being provided. For this, he could only say profound thanks. At same time, he trusted Turkish armament served common purpose.

3. However, in economic field, United States was alone in being unwilling to extend credit to Turkey. Even "poor" Yugoslavia, Austria and Greece were doing so, in addition to stronger powers like England, Germany and France.

4. He had heard nothing but criticism and cries of inflation from Americans since he had been in office. In 1952 when Turkey had sought some special help in insignificant sum of $12 million, Draper, afraid to come himself, had sent Paul Porter to give him disaster line. Porter had predicted financial collapse within a year and no help had been forthcoming.

5. There is, in fact, Menderes said, no significant inflation in Turkey and no danger of any. Indeed, if Turkey had had bumper crop last year instead of failure, he would not be seeking help now and be in present position listening to our doubts.

6. What did we want him to do? What did we want him to change? Did we want him to stop productive projects, already 98 percent paid for, for lack of the remaining 2 percent? He could not do so. He would find the 2 percent somewhere. Did we expect him to turn down foreign offers of investment which would improve the productive capacity of the country and the standard of living of the people? He was not prepared to do so. Why should he take two

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[2] Warren was returning to the Department for consultation.

[3] On April 21, at the 245th meeting of the NSC, Robert Anderson raised the question of Turkey during a discussion of military assistance programs:

"With respect to Turkey, Secretary Anderson indicated that the Department of Defense was in a position to make available $180 million worth of military assistance to Turkey for FY 1955 to meet our commitment to that country. On the other hand, he believed that these funds should not actually be made available to the Turks until receipt of the views of the high-level mission to Turkey, which would attempt to reach conclusions as to the capacity of the Turkish economy to absorb this amount of US assistance without disastrous repercussions." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

years to do things terribly needed in Turkey, which could and should be done in one?

7. The logical conclusion of our approach would be that since we cannot change his policy, we would have to change the government. Did we want Turkey to become another Syria? He feared we had no realization of the importance of Turkey vis-à-vis the Soviet Union of the essentiality of continued political stability in this critical spot.

8. He was beginning to feel that it would be better just to drop the whole matter. Turkey could get along and would confound our predictions. He was sure our refusal to help Turkey in her time of need would long remain to trouble our conscience.

Message Unsigned

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324. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 18, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Interdepartmental Meeting on Turkish Economic Problem

PARTICIPANTS

Treasury:
Mr. Andrew N. Overby—Assistant Secretary
Mr. C. Dillon Glendinning—Deputy Director, Office of International Finance

Defense:
Mr. H. Struve Hensel—Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs
Mr. Charles A. Sullivan—Chief of Policy Division

FOA:
Mr. D.A. FitzGerald—Deputy Director for Operations
Mr. Cedric Seager—Director of NEA Division
General William E. Riley [2]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/5–1855. Confidential. Drafted by Brewster on May 23.

[2] Deputy Director for Management, Foreign Operations Administration.

State:
NEA—Mr. George V. Allen, Chairman
NEA—Mr. William O. Baxter
NEA—Mr. Francis F. Lincoln
NEA—Mr. H. Daniel Brewster
FN—Mr. John Parke Young
Miss Matilda Milne[3]

Mr. Allen opened the meeting stating that Mr. Hoover had expected to attend this meeting on the Turkish problem but, unfortunately, had had to leave for the West Coast a few hours earlier. He explained that Mr. Zorlu had arrived in Washington Tuesday afternoon and would be available Thursday, Friday, and Saturday morning for meetings with representatives of the Department of State and other agencies. He then called on Mr. Young to make a brief summary presentation of the conclusions of the Inter-Agency Committee on Turkish Economic Problems.

Mr. Young referred to a secret document, prepared by the Committee, on "US Aid to Turkey", dated May 17, 1955,[4] which had been circulated to all those present and called attention especially to the summary, the conclusions on Page 2 of the document, as well as the measures needed to achieve economic and financial stability, noting specifically the points covered on Page 6. The general areas in which reforms were needed, he pointed out, were: (1) qualitative and quantitative control by the Central Bank over credit; (2) bringing the over-all budget into approximate balance, including expenditures for State enterprises; (3) measures to expand the export of Turkish products and to improve "the competitive position of Turkish exports on the world market" (This point, he explained, was a subtle way of referring to devaluation.); and (4) eventual elimination of control of imports and foreign exchange.

Mr. Young then explained that he had discussed the aforementioned points informally with International Monetary Fund representatives who agreed with them. He had also learned that the I.M.F. expects to send a mission of experts to Turkey on June 2, and Mr. Merle Cochran, who will head the mission, will arrive in Turkey on June 16 for a stay of ten days or so.

In opening the discussion, Mr. Overby stated that the problem before the group as he saw it was to determine what defense forces we want the Turks to maintain and how much we are willing to pay for them. Also, can that amount be found in the Defense Depart-

[3] Chief, Exchange Rates, International Financial Division, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs.

[4] In January 1955, a US Interagency Committee on Turkish Economic Problems, composed of representatives of the Departments of State, the Treasury, and Defense held its first meeting. The report is not further identified.

ment budget? This was a problem he considered primarily a Defense Department responsibility. He did not think the Turks would, for political reasons, be prepared to cut back their development program. . . . In response to a question from Mr. Allen, he stated that he did not believe a loan in any traditional sense was a good or wise, or even a desirable, solution. The Turkish defense problem will go on for years and it would be a disservice to give them a loan. He wished to emphasize particularly that we do not want to bail out Turkey's short-term European creditors. Any aid we give should be closely associated with Turkey's defense effort. He indicated that after we decide how much aid we will give them for defense, the Turks will have to negotiate whatever extensions are necessary with their European creditors.

Mr. Allen pointed out that the Department's interest in extending extraordinary aid to Turkey was based on the Turkish military posture as the eastern anchor of NATO and a pivotal country in Middle East defense arrangements. It was Mr. Allen's understanding that a reduction in the numbers of the Turkish Army would not greatly reduce their defense budget and would not extricate them from their present serious troubles. Mr. Hensel picked up this theme and noted that 1954 actual figures (shown on Table 1 of Mr. Young's paper) indicated that total defense expenditures ran 912 million Turkish liras, whereas the total amount devoted to investment (in the economy, not limited to government expenditures) was 2,236 million liras. He, for one, was most anxious to wait for the Holcombe Study with its analysis of what the Turkish economy could support. He, in principle, did not believe the US could go on indefinitely supporting forces beyond the means of the country. As concerns the expenditures associated with the proposed additional 800 million dollars end-item program referred to in the Young report, he noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had never given that "commitment" its entire blessing, and there was considerable doubt in the Defense Department as to whether Turkey could effectively operate a "modernized" army equipped with this additional material.

When Mr. Allen asked whether the US Government had recommended devaluation to any other countries in so many words, it was pointed out that this step had been taken in a few cases such as Korea, but that usually such advice was given in a veiled way by pointing out that the country was "over-importing and under-exporting". Mr. Young warned against the US having to take the blame publicly for devaluation, especially in the light of the strong Turkish Government stand on this issue.

Mr. FitzGerald said that his answer to the question of where the money to aid Turkey is to come from, is that he does not know unless Congress is asked for a supplemental appropriation. Mr.

Overby said he felt such a request would be unwise. Mr. FitzGerald then pointed to the very real short-term problems, such as payment for oil imports, and the slow-down in certain manufacturing and processing industries due to a lack of imported raw materials. Mr. Baxter, at this point, stated that Socony, he had just heard, had been given oral assurances that a confirmed letter of credit would be opened by the end of May for June shipments. Mr. FitzGerald then stated that on the longer pull he was fairly pessimistic about the adequacy of the estimates of both the Embassy and the Young Committee unless there were substantial cuts in the defense and investment programs. He considered the price tag for economic aid to carry on both programs at present levels might be between 800 million and a billion dollars over five years.

A brief discussion took place about the excellent results achieved in Greece following a sharp devaluation preceded by an effective economic stabilization program. Broad aspects of devaluation, investment and hoarding were also touched upon.

Mr. Hensel then reiterated that none of the conditional commitment made last June for one-quarter of the 800 million dollars in hardware had as yet been met, and that in the 1.4 billion military aid program for Fiscal Year 1956 there was no additional money earmarked for Turkey. It was always possible to find money within the program for the most pressing military problems, but this always had to be done at the expense of other country programs. Mr. Overby stated that it was really a question of the priority to be given Turkey. He then asked if the Turks had been informed that a $300 million loan was not in the cards. Mr. Allen replied "no" . . . .

Mr. Allen then asked whether the US Government was trying to get the Turks to cut their investment program because such a cut will be beneficial or because we are trying to find an excuse to refuse aid. Mr. Hensel replied we could find the money if it would help but without a stable economy, more aid would just be swallowed in the whirlpool. Mr. Hensel continued that Turkish force goals are illusory if the Turkish economy is not able to support the defense establishment planned. It would be in an unsound military position unless supported for the most part by the country's own resources. At this point Mr. Baxter noted that in the cases of both Greece and Turkey it had always been the US Government's understanding that we expected to have to supply end item aid and spare parts over a considerable period of time to maintain the desired level of forces.

Mr. Hensel also commented that Turks have seen this economic crisis coming on for some time and he felt that it was quite proper for the Department of State to be frank with the Turks. At that point Mr. Hensel raised the question of an adjustment in the

exchange rate and placing US personnel abroad on a gold payment basis. This problem, if raised by Mr. Allen, he thought might be an indirect hint to Mr. Zorlu of a need for devaluation. In response to a question as to what the Embassy's views were on this problem, Miss Milne said that latest information was that the Embassy, MAAG and USOM/T did not feel the Turkish Government should be approached on this question at present, but that it should be settled only as a part of an across-the-board exchange rate change.

Mr. Allen then raised the question as to what tactics should be followed in case Mr. Zorlu agreed to our "conditions" concerning a modification of the investment program, a tightening up of credit, balancing of the over-all budget, control of imports, and possibly even devaluation. Should we, in response to his request for a loan on this basis, meet a request for perhaps $80 million to meet the immediate crisis? Mr. Hensel believed that if the Turkish Government was prepared to meet the conditions, and adequate assurances could be given to the US Government concerning their sincerity, we should say that we would use our best efforts to obtain additional aid for them. We would have to so space this aid that it would depend on Turkish performance. . . . Mr. Hensel stated that he would help if we can get the right commitments.

At this point, discussion took place about the "high-level mission to Turkey" and Mr. Hensel and Mr. Overby both questioned the desirability of such a mission. Mr. Overby believed that the decision on this matter had to be made in Washington and that the Turks know what to do as far as economic measures are concerned and will do it when they have learned that they will get only X amount of money and no more from the US He again stressed that the US should make it clear that we will give no aid to bail them out with their European creditors. The group agreed that any financial stabilization program must include a provision that the Turks must fund their current short-term debts. In response to a question from Mr. Allen as to whether any additional aid should be handled through the present machinery in Ankara or by a special group, it was the consensus that the present team in Ankara, strengthened by the necessary additional technicians, could best do the work.

Mr. Allen then asked what his line should be with the oil companies if they threatened to discontinue oil shipments to Turkey. It was generally felt that State should take a firm line on this problem and inform the oil companies, if they inquire, that it was entirely their decision to make as to whether oil should be shipped to Turkey beyond what the Turks could pay for, and that their decision should be based on purely commercial reasons. Mr. Hensel agreed.

Mr. Allen proposed that very much the same group meet with Mr. Zorlu at one of the meetings scheduled before Mr. Zorlu's departure. It was considered best to have Mr. Allen and State representatives meet with Mr. Zorlu at a first meeting and that the remainder of the committee would be on call for a further meeting if Mr. Allen considered it desirable.

In a brief discussion as to the desirability of requesting Congress for additional aid to Turkey, it was considered that it would be undesirable because the presentation on the aid legislation is now well under way . . . . Mr. FitzGerald and Mr. Overby considered that aid in grant form was preferable to a "hard" loan. There was then some discussion of the possibility of some form of "soft loan".

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325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey[1]

Washington, May 21, 1955—2:21 p.m.

1509. Assistant Secretary Allen and other Department representatives held first meeting with Zorlu and Esenbel May 19.[2]

Zorlu made clear his main purpose in coming United States at this time was to discuss loan and he prepared to stay as long as necessary. He repeated well known Turkish arguments previously presented in Ankara Consultative Group meetings and Turkish memorandum. Turks fully aware their economic plight and do not want to find themselves in same situation again. He convinced that if requested aid extended Turkey could bring its economic situation into balance within few years. He believed problem simple one, i.e. United States must make decision in principle as to whether or not it prepared help Turkey.

Allen stated record clearly showed years of United States assistance to Turkey. Normal military and economic aid will continue and United States policy toward Turkey unchanged. As for loan request, careful study being given by all interested Washington agencies to Turkish memorandum and report developed by United States members Ankara Group. Holcombe report still missing element but

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.10/5–2155. Confidential. Drafted by Brewster, Baxter, and Snyder and signed by Allen for the Secretary of State.

[2] The full record of the meeting is in a memorandum of conversation by Brewster, May 19. (*Ibid.*, 882.00/5–1955)

expected next week. United States Government position, Allen explained, still same as outlined to Esenbel April 27 (Deptel 1396).[3] United States not convinced Turkey has yet taken measures aimed at stabilization its economy and controlling inflation and therefore believes present economic difficulties are not of temporary nature susceptible correction by large cash loan. In any event United States Executive not prepared support extraordinary loan request before Congress.

As difference of opinion existed whether measures already taken by Turkey adequate prevent serious recurring financial difficulties, Allen suggested meeting following morning for discussion specific issues with working level representatives all interested United States agencies.

Zorlu agreed and concluded with plea for serious consideration political aspects of question as purely budgetary approach could jeopardize Turkey's future.

At meeting May 20[4] with Defense FOA and Treasury representatives present Allen informed Zorlu he wished make clear no hope for United States loan magnitude $300 million. If any loan forthcoming it would be much smaller, but any extension credit would depend entirely on United States evaluation Turkish plans for creation proper climate of economic stability. He reiterated deep concern over inflationary trends in Turkey and over-ambitious long-range investment projects.

Zorlu repeated theme immediate remedy was $300 million after which further study could be given Turkish projections and future plans. Smaller loan would only be half measure. Said he recognized there is inflation in Turkey and Turks prepared to take corrective steps, but receipt of loan basic.

In reply specific question re subsequent lifting credit restrictions initiated last July, Zorlu attributed relaxation to wheat failure which created immediate imbalance of 300 million Turkish liras. Moreover, credit restrictions created bankruptcy threat many businesses. Zorlu added application 13% GNP to investment did not appear abnormal.

State representatives expressed appreciation Turkish potential but commented inflation core of present problem and high prices and costs making Turk exports noncompetitive. Zorlu countered price issue not primary in intra-European trade. In response Treasury query Zorlu gave assurances United States loan would not be used pay European debts.

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[3] Dated April 28. (*Ibid.*, 882.00/4–2855)

[4] A record of the May 20 meeting is *ibid.*, 882.00/5–2055.

Zorlu and Allen then left meeting to see Secretary and Hoover.[5] Secretary opened and closed discussion with warm expression appreciation excellent work of Turks at Bandung. Re Turkish economic situation he said both Turkey and United States want to see sound Turkish economy on which to base strong Turkish army. However $300 million loan far exceeded any amount that might be considered. If any additional aid proved feasible amount would be far less. Secretary stressed that prerequisite to any additional aid would be United States satisfaction that present difficulties not of recurring nature. Zorlu assured Secretary "Draconian" measures would be taken to meet emergency.[6]

Dulles

[5] According to Dulles' Appointment Book, the Secretary met with Zorlu, Allen, and Hoover in the latter's office from 12:36 to 12:50 p.m. (Princeton University) No memorandum of conversation of the meeting has been found.

[6] In a May 19 memorandum for the record, Hoover reported on his conversation that afternoon with Robert Anderson, regarding the talks with Zorlu. According to Hoover, Anderson had discussed the question of Turkish aid with Wilson, Hensel, and Radford and all had agreed that a "firm approach" to Zorlu was required. All reportedly agreed that an "eventual showdown" was unavoidable and believed that it would be better if it occurred now than in the future when the situation might have deteriorated further. (Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/5–1955)

326. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 21, 1955[1]

SUBJECT

Turkish Loan Request

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Zorlu, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey
Mr. Esenbel, Turkish Foreign Office
Mr. Allen, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. Baxter, Director, GTI

Mr. Zorlu asked to see Mr. Allen for a private discussion without the presence of a large working group.

Mr. Zorlu opened the conversation by expressing the strong hope that we would avoid any inter-relation between consideration

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/5–2155. Confidential. Drafted by Baxter on May 24.

of Turkey's loan request and the forthcoming mission to Turkey of the International Monetary Fund. The IMF group would go out in June; it would spend several weeks in Turkey; then it would prepare a report. This whole process might take several months, and the situation in Turkey called for immediate action, as the next few weeks were crucial. Furthermore, the IMF visit was a routine annual affair and should be kept separate from the need for extraordinary assistance. Mr. Zorlu felt that we were not making much progress and wondered just what procedure Mr. Allen would suggest for reaching a quick decision.

Mr. Allen regretted the necessity to agree with Mr. Zorlu that we weren't making much progress. There appeared to be a fundamental difference of opinion between the Turkish Government and the United States Government as to the nature of the present economic crisis in Turkey and the methods by which it might be improved. As Mr. Zorlu had heard personally from the Secretary the day before, the figure of $300 million was far in excess of anything which the United States could do, and, if extraordinary assistance in a lesser amount should prove feasible, it would have to be coupled with additional measures taken by the Turkish Government to insure that the present situation would not recur year after year.

Mr. Zorlu said he thought there should be some way to get out of the vicious circle of talks on the technical level. He believed that many of the technicians were too theoretical and tried to follow text-books without knowing the realities of European trade or of the particularities of Turkish economy. They all made a great issue of inflation, without understanding that there was no inflation in the usual sense of the word in Turkey, where 85 percent of the population had very little cash income and where importers' goods represented only 5 percent of the outlay of the average Turkish peasant. The technicians also talked as if Turkey were expanding its investment program, whereas it was in fact only finishing projects already started and had no intention of starting new ones. He believed too much emphasis had been given to our differences of opinion instead of to the large areas of agreement. The Turkish Government realized that it must try to get a balanced budget and was working to that end; it was also carrying out necessary credit policies and intended to slow down the rate of development in the future. Details on all of these matters could be worked out satisfactorily, he felt sure, but the first important thing to do was to establish the amount of the loan which the United States could make and then discuss how matters could be worked out. If the United States felt it could not extend a loan of $300 million, it certainly must have some figure in mind which it was prepared to make available. If the Turkish Government could know what

amount the United States had in mind, it could then decide what measures it must take.

Mr. Allen said that, if Mr. Zorlu wanted to know the answer as to what amount the United States could make available at this time and in the present circumstances, he must answer frankly that the answer was none. Mr. Allen explained that, though he had done most of the talking with Zorlu, he thought he had reflected accurately the view of other agencies—which is that any extraordinary aid we might find available would have to be accompanied by extraordinary measures instituted by the Turkish Government to get its economy on a sounder basis.

At this point Mr. Zorlu said that, if this was the answer, he would have to tell his Government that the United States would not help Turkey in its time of need.

Mr. Allen said that, though it was Mr. Zorlu's privilege to report to his Government in any fashion he saw fit, he believed Mr. Zorlu would be making a mistake if he gave the impression that the United States was not interested in the future of Turkey or in helping Turkey as much as it could. The United States attaches great importance to the close and friendly relations between our two countries and is eager, as is Turkey, for Turkey to be strengthened in every way to play a major role in the area and in the defense of the free world. However, there is an honest difference of opinion as to how that strength may be achieved. We are not convinced that the remedy proposed by the Turkish Government is the one which will achieve the desired results, and, as the Turkish Government is asking United States assistance, it is unfortunately up to the Turkish Government to convince us that its policies are those which in our opinion will overcome the present economic difficulties and not allow them to become a chronic element in Turkish economic life.

Mr. Zorlu stated vehemently that the aid problem had always been kept separate from the broader and more important relationships between the two countries. No matter what the United States decision might be on the loan request, it would not be permitted to jeopardize cordial United States-Turkish relations, nor would Turkey reduce its defense effort, which it maintained for its own security as well as for the contribution it could make to NATO and the free world. He believed, however, that the United States would not be acting in its own best interests if it made a decision which would weaken a country so important to the free world and to United States objectives as is Turkey.

Mr. Allen asked if he were correct in inferring that the Turkish Government felt that its present economic difficulties were in large measure due to bad luck, specifically the crop failure of a year ago. When Mr. Zorlu indicated the essential accuracy of this statement,

Mr. Allen said that he feared the United States view was that Turkey could have taken steps which would have prepared it to be in a stronger position to meet such natural disasters, and that measures had not yet been taken which would prevent the present difficulties from recurring. Therefore, to answer Mr. Zorlu's question as to what size of loan might be feasible, he must state frankly that, in the circumstances, he could see no source for any funds.

In referring several times to measures which the Turkish Government would take to improve the economic situation, Mr. Zorlu had taken the position that those could not be decided upon or usefully discussed until the size of the United States loan was known; otherwise, the Turkish Government would not have the basis on which to determine what steps should be taken and how drastic they should be. However, Mr. Esenbel had indicated that Mr. Zorlu would be willing to discuss those measures with a small group of high American officials, but, of course, because of their delicate nature, he could not be expected to talk them over with a large working group. It was, therefore, agreed at the close of the conversation that a meeting would be arranged early next week at which Mr. Zorlu could discuss such questions with Mr. Allen, Mr. Hensel, Mr. Overby, and Dr. FitzGerald. Mr. Allen pointed out that Mr. Hensel might not wish to say too much at that time, as his views would necessarily be dependent on the Holcombe report, which will not be received in Washington until the latter part of next week.

Throughout the conversation Mr. Zorlu frequently referred to the fact that FOA funds and credits from the Exim Bank, by being tied to specific projects, had the effect of pushing Turkey toward further development. Such sources of assistance were not required in the present situation. What the Turkish Government really needed was a cash loan (fonds de manoeuvre) with which to establish a stable import program. [2]

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[2] In telegram 1522, May 26, the Department transmitted a report on Allen's meeting with Zorlu to the Embassy in Ankara. (*Ibid.*, 882.10/5–2655)

327. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) [1]

Washington, May 25, 1955. [2]

The vague uneasiness which yesterday's meeting [3] raised in my mind was greatly increased by a call from Esenbel late last night. He said he wanted to see you urgently today (without Zorlu) preferably in the morning to discuss with you the "impressions" created by yesterday's discussions. It was fairly evident that he had had a stormy postmortem session with Zorlu and that he hoped, by seeing you, to prevent an impasse—as he had tried to do yesterday when he pointed out that we should give serious consideration to the list of measures planned by the Turkish Government and which we had not heard of before. . . .

. . . . . .

Yesterday in talking to Erkin [4] the Secretary was unstinting in his praise of Turkey; its brave stand on defense in a perilous advanced position was an inspiration to the rest of the world. When we go to the Hill on defense matters, the Secretary said, Turkey is our No. 1 exhibit. Probably Turkey has been foolish and over-ambitious in offering to carry a much larger defense burden than it should support, but in general we and Nato have eagerly accepted their proffers and shouted "stout fellow." And Turkey might say, with some justification, that its efforts in another direction have made a start on Middle East defense arrangements—where the combined efforts of the US, the UK, and France failed miserably. Turkey is looked upon as our chosen vessel. If it falls flat on its face

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.82/5–555.

[2] A notation on the source text indicates that the memorandum was dated May 5. Baxter's own notation indicates that the memorandum was written on "Wednesday morning". Other indications in the source text, however, particularly Baxter's reference to Dulles' meeting with outgoing Turkish Ambassador Feridun Erkin, suggest that the memorandum was written on Wednesday, May 25.

[3] On May 24, representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury met with Zorlu to discuss the economic situation in Turkey. During the meeting, Zorlu presented a list of proposed economic measures that the Turkish Government was prepared to implement. A record of the interagency meeting of May 24 and Zorlu's list are in Department of State, Central File 882.00/5–2455. In telegram 1529 to Ankara, May 27, the Department transmitted a report on the May 24 meeting. (*Ibid.*, 882.10/5–2755)

[4] Erkin made a farewell call prior to assuming his new post at Madrid. (Memorandum of conversation, May 24; *ibid.*, 782.00/5–2455)

(and it makes no difference whether the US is "letting Turkey go bankrupt" or whether Turkey is going bankrupt because of its own bad management), other countries, particularly those of the Middle East, will wonder just how much US support is worth. . . .

. . . . . .

I think we should face up to the fact that Turkey is going to cost us considerably more for the next few years than we had thought. Instead of trying to decide on the magnitude of an "accommodation," should we not agree internally that our regular aid be increased and then, by sitting down with the Turkish and figuring out their requirements for the next two or three months, say, and then for the next six months or so, get them to institute the drastic measures we think necessary in direct connection with the release of funds for specific obligations. (I'm getting fuzzy here, but I think some of our qualified people in Treasury, the Department and FOA could spell out a program.)

Sorry for the early morning aberration, but this problem has been keeping me awake of nights. It's one that has to be solved, not by-passed, and I can't yet see the way through it.

WOB

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328. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State [1]

Ankara, June 7, 1955—noon.

1519. Last Sunday night Istanbul when I was arranging with Prime Minister for release four American airmen still under charges of desecration of Turkish flag on Turkish Independence Day at Izmir, I inquired concerning the progress of Zorlu's conversations in Washington. I had not then seen the Department's memoranda of conversations of May 18, 19, 20 and 21. [2] The Prime Minister was depressed.

He said that there was no positive reaction from any of the American officials to the suggestions Zorlu advanced for putting the

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/6–755. Secret.

[2] See Documents 325 and 326. The reference to a conversation of May 18 is not clear as Document 325 indicates that the first meeting was on May 19.

Turkish financial and economic house in order. I ventured that the study of the Holcombe report was not yet completed in Washington and that in my opinion the American position on what might be done with Turkey at this time could not be expected to be firmed up until that analysis was finished and related to other studies that have been under way during the past several months. The Prime Minister rejoined that meanwhile the situation on Turkey is deteriorating rapidly both financially and politically.

We then discussed the petroleum situation. The Prime Minister said he was following it closely and realized that unless he is able to do something positive in meeting the petroleum companies requirements for firm letters of credit before any further petroleum shipments are made supplies in the country will be exhausted by June 30. He had hoped to borrow $11,000,000 from the International Monetary Fund to tide him over this emergency but there had been delays in working this out with the IMFT and he feels that even if the loan were available it would be too little and too late to meet the country's requirements following harvest and transport during the season that is already under way.

The Prime Minister was also depressed about the political situation. He said that Kalim Gulek, Secretary General of the RPP, was that very day, last Sunday, addressing a meeting of some 3,000 persons in Izmir, alleging that the Menderes Government is incompetent to manage the country's economic affairs and has already brought the economy to the brink of disaster. Given the fact that this government still has three years to go before a general election, the Prime Minister says the country and its friends now face the risk of having to work with a government whose people become upset in a national sense, there is no telling what may happen. He said he is taking to the countryside immediately to answer these attacks but he believes the effects of these inter changes of polemics will do nobody good unless it is the Soviet.

I then inquired, since I had not yet seen the memoranda above mentioned, whether the Prime Minister considered recalling Zorlu and having Gork request the American Government to send a high level team immediately to Turkey to inquire into the situation here and to try to work out recommendations on how best to meet the situation. It may be recalled that this proposal was being considered favorably when I left Washington early May. The Prime Minister said he is prepared to do anything to ease the situation and I inferred that such a request would be forthcoming.

I recommend that if such a request is made it be entertained seriously. In my opinion no good purpose will be served if the opposing Turkish political parties wrangle throughout the countryside this summer over the responsibilities of their current economic

and financial crisis. Inevitably the United States will be drawn into the picture by adverse press comment. The only effective way to control this, in my opinion, is to have the Americans visit take place, with an understanding from both principal political parties that now is not the time for recriminations. I believe it possible to get such an understanding from the opposition party although relationships between the government and the opposition have deteriorated within the last two weeks, largely on account of some personal animus between the leaders.

Meanwhile Max Thornburg, who saw the Prime Minister after I did Sunday, was instructed to get on with his studies.[3] He had an intimation that the Prime Minister is convinced he should set up a special commission for economic and financial control and management and I gather he may want Thornburg either to head it or be the Secretary General. The indication to Thornburg was that if such an organization were undertaken it would probably have to continue for several years until the country's economy was on its feet and until there was an integration of planning and coordination with respect to the public and private sectors in the Turkish economy.

Warren

[3] On July 15, Max Thornburg, a private American industrial consultant, completed his report on the economic situation in Turkey, which had been requested by the Government of Turkey. (Transmitted in despatch 126, September 29; Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/9–2955) In telegram 169, August 8, the Embassy in Ankara reported that Menderes had called Thornburg in to discuss the report and disputed Thornburg's findings and recommendations. (*Ibid.*, 882.00/8–855) Thornburg's report concluded that no American loan could be obtained until Turkey strengthened its economic administration.

329. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 8, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Turkish Loan Request

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Zorlu, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey
Mr. Esenbel, Turkish Foreign Office
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
Mr. George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs
Mr. William O. Baxter, Director, GTI

After introductory amenities Mr. Allen referred to the useful discussions held with Mr. Zorlu during the past few weeks and assured him that the Turkish economic situation and the views of the Turkish Government had been given most serious and sympathetic consideration in all branches of this Government. The question had been taken up yesterday by the highest level officers of State, Defense, Treasury and FOA, and the decision made by them had only this morning been cleared with the President. The final position of the United States Government was set forth in a letter which Mr. Allen read aloud and then handed to Mr. Zorlu (copy attached). [2]

Mr. Zorlu asked if he was correct in understanding that the Turkish request for a loan was rejected. Mr. Allen confirmed this fact. After most careful examination of the Turkish situation, he said, the United States could not recommend to the Congress a course of action that would involve Turkey in further international financial commitments that in our opinion would not be remedial in nature nor prevent the present situation from recurring in the near future. He wished to stress to Mr. Zorlu that we were most sympathetic with regard to the present difficulties and with the Turkish wish to develop industrial potentials and improve the stand-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/6–855. Confidential. Drafted by Baxter on June 13.

[2] Dated June 8, from Allen to Zorlu, not printed. The letter indicated that the United States was prepared to increase its economic aid to Turkey from $70 million to $100 million. It also noted that this assistance would be extended "in the confident expectation that the Turkish Government will take every remedial step in its power, along lines which have been brought out during our discussions." Regarding the loan requested by the Turkish Government, the letter noted that the United States believed that "the incurring of additional financial obligations by the Turkish Government at this time would not be a remedial measure likely to prevent a recurrence of economic and financial difficulties."

ard of living of the Turkish people. However, there was an honest difference of opinion between our two Governments as to how such an aim could be achieved. It was the view of the Turkish Government that a large cash loan was required, whereas the United States Government felt that this would only postpone the remedial measures which the Turkish Government must take to get its economy on a sound footing.

Mr. Zorlu said he wished to express the thanks of the Turkish Government for this offer of additional grant aid. It was a substantial amount which would be of assistance in the coming months. He was touched by this proof of United States friendship for his country. However, while he and his Government were thankful, they could not be "happy," as this was not the reply he had hoped to get. He believed that the magnitude of the problem and the great potentialities for strength in Turkey called for a large loan at this time. He summarized many of the arguments he had advanced in previous discussions, pointing out that Turkey had requested a loan rather than additional aid in the belief that it would be easier for the United States and that it would be an indication of Turkey's intention of standing on its own feet. He also made clear that Turkey had never tried to bargain or to threaten that it would cut back its defense effort if the loan were not forthcoming. "Turkey will keep its twenty-five divisions," he stated flatly, and expressed the opinion that they were worth something to the United States. He felt he must point out, however, that this decision will come as a great shock to his Government.

Both Mr. Zorlu and Mr. Esenbel then urged that the FOA loan guarantee provision be exercised at once in connection with Turkey's current obligations to the American oil companies. Such a suggested solution had been discussed with the oil companies in Ankara and had been forwarded by the FOA Mission to Washington, where it was turned down. It was pointed out to Mr. Esenbel that the loan guarantee provision had been written into FOA legislation by the Congress with the aim of encouraging new investment abroad and not with the idea of "bailing out" debts to existing American enterprises. Furthermore, it was not FOA policy to finance oil purchases or to guarantee loans for oil. Mr. Zorlu said that one exception he knew had been made in the case of Greece. Mr. Allen promised that this question would be taken under consideration.

After leaving Mr. Murphy's office there was an opportunity for a brief exchange with Mr. Hoover who reaffirmed our sympathetic interest and our willingness at all times to discuss frankly with the Turkish Government our views on action, most of which he believed would have to be measures taken by the Turkish Government, to work out of the present difficulties into a firm economic position.

330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, July 2, 1955—5:13 p.m.

13. In calls on Under Secretary Hoover and Assistant Secretary Allen [2] Ambassador Gork has endeavored to reopen talks on economic aid as if conversations held with Zorlu had merely been suspended temporarily without any definite conclusion having been reached regarding $300,000,000 loan request. He has been informed in clearest terms that request for loan was very definitely refused and that we are not aware of any basis for reopening any talks regarding extraordinary aid until such time as measures discussed with Zorlu to correct basic causes for Turkey's economic difficulties have been put into effect and have shown results. . . .

Mr. Hoover emphasized that Turkey would have to tailor its economic development program to fit its capabilities without relying on unjustifiable expectations of foreign aid. If Turks still expected to obtain large loan from US, they were entirely unrealistic. He said he thought $30,000,000 of additional aid found for Turkey last month should permit Turkey to use its foreign exchange resources to meet, for example, its pressing petroleum requirements.

Ambassador Gork was reminded that in current aid proposals before Congress, per capita provision for economic aid to Turkey would be about $3.50, for Paks about $1.00, and for India about $.30. This was indication of importance we attach to Turkish economic development.

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Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.10/7–255. Confidential. Drafted by Allen, who also signed for the Secretary.

[2] On June 28, the new Turkish Ambassador, Haydar Gork, paid a courtesy call on Allen. The record of the meeting is *ibid.*, 882.00/6–2855.

331. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ankara, September 14, 1955 [1]

Meeting in Ankara with Prime Minister Menderes, Ambassador Warren, General Riley, Melih Esenbel, Görk, Zorlu

I. After an exchange of pleasantries, in an appropriate way, there was an opportunity for the Secretary to advise the Prime Minister that the request for a $300 million loan had been definitely refused and that no such loan was either possible or in contemplation. The reason why this was so was explained by pointing out the extreme burdens which the US had assumed; a somewhat unbalanced budget situation with loss of reserves; tax reduction resulting in decreased revenues and from a financial point of view balancing its expenditures with its demands with its income to protect its own economic situation even to the point of the most careful scrutiny of the most minor items, down to every million dollars or less. Mr. Hollister then explained that we were obligated to accomplish 64 countries in varying degrees and that he was under the strictest obligation to consider proper distribution of his funds among the countries so that every minor item required the most careful consideration.

The Secretary then continued to explain that although the $300 million loan was impossible, both now and for the foreseeable future, that we were very proud of our association with Turkey; we regarded them as one of our most important partners in the preservation of the free world, and that we had every intention of supporting them to the limit of our ability, both militarily and economically, in about the area of past years' performance. However, such support would be undoubtedly declining as time went on and as our necessities and burdens became greater; that we thought it was only fair with a good partner to be perfectly frank with each other so that our partnership might endure on a firm and free basis, each knowing what to expect of the other and not to be deceived into impossible positions. It was further explained that all nations in the world are now facing the most difficult problem of balancing their military expenditures which they could afford with what their economy could support and that this was just as true of the US with

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.10/9–2455. Secret. Humphrey and Hollister were in Turkey to attend the 10th annual meeting of the Boards of Governors of the IBRD and IMF held in Istanbul. According to a note to Hoover of September 24 attached to the source text, Hollister indicated that the memorandum had been dictated on a return flight from Ankara. The language, particularly the use of pronouns, suggests that Humphrey and Hollister may have dictated the memorandum to Riley or another official who then transcribed it.

its tremendous obligations as it was with Turkey. While we did not feel that our aid must terminate suddenly, nevertheless the time was approaching when all partners would have to be more nearly self-sufficient and balanced in their own economies. He explained that we were willing and anxious to proceed as rapidly as possible with determination of aid and in exact amounts and, to that end, we suggested information which we desired the Turkish Government to give to us to help us formulate our views; that there would be military matters discussed with the military; and economic information requested by the Ambassador, and as soon as the information from these various sources and particularly from them was available to us for study and consideration, we would look forward to meeting with them in Washington with all concerned to get the matter reduced to final figures. But that for the present and for today, all we can do is to reassure them of our intense support in their affairs; of how proud we were to be associated with them; and request that they proceed to help us reach a conclusion so that we both might have a definite basis for making plans for the immediate future. The Prime Minister responded with very complimentary comments of appreciation for past performances and hope for the future. There could be no possible misunderstanding that $300 million was not in the offing and that we were to resume conclusion of our mutual affairs in the area of previous performance.

Mr. Hollister stated that in the distribution of the funds available for the foreign aid program, the public relations was an important matter and that the events of the past few days in Turkey had raised some very serious questions, when a few hours of destruction might bring about loss equivalent to a whole year's aid program.[2] It was obvious that our country must see the whole picture in a new light before reaching any definite conclusions.

The Prime Minister stated that he regretted exceedingly the recent happenings and that it was his belief that the riots were largely the result of Communist activities and that the Government expected to take all necessary measures.

II. Just prior to lunch with the President,[3] in the presence of our Ambassador, Mr. Hollister and General Riley, and the Deputy Secretary General of the Foreign Office, and part of the time the Prime Minister, the President stated pleasantly but bluntly that he was greatly disturbed and his country had been seriously embarrassed by the manner in which their request for the $300 million loan had

[2] On September 6 and 7, a series of violent anti-Greek and anti-minority rioting erupted in Istanbul and Izmir. The riots, primarily anti-Greek in character, resulted in widespread damage and destruction to Greek churches, shops, and other establishments.

[3] Celal Bayar.

been handled and refused; that as a past banker, the method of handling the refusal of a loan was of prime importance to him. He referred specifically to the AP release on the subject from Washington and the embarrassment which its publication had caused him and his Government. . . . The Secretary told the President that we had had a long and fruitful discussion with the Prime Minister, during which we had gone into full details with respect to the $300 million loan and all of the reasons why it was not possible to grant it. He explained that if in the handling of the matter there had been some embarrassment to him or his government, he had our humble apology and our assurance that it would not be repeated, but as to the merits of the case, there was no doubt in our minds that the matter was closed and would not be reopened and we requested the Prime Minister to explain the matter fully to the President and ask that he give him time to do so. As others are waiting for luncheon, there was no time to get into this at the moment. The Prime Minister agreed to do this and you may rest assured he will do this. We then proceeded to lunch and had a very agreeable time. The President was very affable. There were 16 top officials (12 Turks and our party of 4) present. After luncheon the Secretary asked the President for another five minutes of serious discussion. It was immediately granted, and he, Mr. Hollister and an interpreter stepped into another office with the President.

The Secretary again explained to the President his regret that any embarrassment had been caused and he assured him of our great pride in association with him; that our desire to cooperate in every way within our powers, but everything we had said about the reasons why increased aid could not be granted was reinforced and we again requested that he very carefully consider the reasons we had so meticulously given to the Prime Minister, which we asked him again to allow the Prime Minister to explain at length to the President. The meeting ended with relations in a cordial vein.

Additional Information on Conversation with the Acting Prime Minister Zorlu and Ambassador Warren at the President's Palace today

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The Prime Minister said he thought it would be a good idea in any case for the President to receive the Secretary and Mr. Hollister; to take over the luncheon which the Prime Minister had arranged; and to take advantage of the occasion to say to the Secretary anything that was on his mind relating to relationships between the two countries in the fields of finance and economics. The President then replied under the circumstances he would be very pleased to

extend an invitation but that he intended not to hold his fire and to say everything that was on his mind. The President's blunt, and at the same time agreeable, approach to the Secretary on meeting him before the luncheon, was the carrying out of the President's intentions.

In conversation after lunch the President stated that it was his belief that higher authorities in Washington did not appreciate Turkey's position, and that they were being misled by reports that did not take into account the broader views of the relations between the two countries and Turkey's strategic position in the world. The Secretary assured the President that he was misinformed on this subject and absolutely wrong and that President Eisenhower and the highest authorities in Washington, all were fully aware of real conditions and they were not misled, and that the loan was impossible because of definite conditions affecting the US and its obligations. It was well understood by everyone in Washington as the Prime Minister would explain in detail to the President. The Secretary further explained that he and Mr. Hollister would cover the whole subject with President Eisenhower when they saw him within the next few days.

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332. Memorandum of Discussion at the 264th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 3, 1955 [1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1 and 2, a briefing by Allen Dulles on significant world developments affecting United States security and a discussion of United States policy toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China.]

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on November 4.

3. US Policy on Turkey (NSC 5510/1; Progress Report, dated September 7, 1955, by OCB on NSC 5510/1) [2]

Mr. Anderson briefed the Council on the reference Progress Report, stressing the two main problems: the military assistance program and the Turkish financial and economic situation. At the conclusion of his briefing (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting), Mr. Anderson said that he understood Secretary Robertson wished to say a few words on the subject.

Secretary Robertson briefly outlined the present status of the funding of the program of military assistance to Turkey covering the Fiscal Years 1950 through 1956. He pointed out that the funding for FY 1957 was now under study. He thereafter read a letter which had been prepared for Secretary Humphrey just prior to the latter's departure for the recent Istanbul Conference.

Secretary Hoover said that in view of the fact that the National Security Council was well aware of the difficulties confronting our program of assistance to Turkey in the past, he would confine his comments to the present situation. The State Department felt that the Turks had very good reason to believe that the United States had actually promised them a great deal more than the $200 million already provided. Accordingly, the State Department foresaw an excellent chance that the Turks would come to a parting of the ways with the United States if we do not shortly reach a firm agreement with them on the nature and extent of the US commitment to provide military and economic assistance to Turkey. Their economic situation, continued Secretary Hoover, was extremely serious. The United States must therefore face up to what we are going to do with Turkey within the next three weeks. This $64-question had been posed. Secretary Hoover recommended that the Administration take a well-thought-out position in this matter and inform the Turks of this position within the time period he had mentioned.

Dr. Flemming inquired about the course of action in the US policy toward Turkey (NSC 5510/1), which permitted the United States to purchase Turkish chrome for the long-term US stockpile. He also noted that the President had been interested in a more vigorous program of barter to the end of assisting the Turkish economy. There was nothing in the Progress Report on either of these matters, and Dr. Flemming asked if any member of the Council could provide any information about them. He believed that the ODM could do something in this field if the Council so desired.

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[2] NSC 5510/1 is printed as Document 320. The Progress Report is in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Turkey 1955.

Secretary Hoover said that he had talked with the Turks about the availability of chrome and other materials. The fact of the matter, however, was that the Turks had about reached the limits of their chrome production unless the United States was prepared to provide large capital support to enable the Turks to open additional mines. Such a move might cost the United States $25 million in cash. Moreover, the Turks don't seem very enthusiastic over this prospect, and we have not been able to extract very accurate information on the subject from them.

Dr. Flemming said that, in short, he was to understand that the responsibility for the failure to take these courses of action rested on the Turks rather than on the United States. Secretary Hoover replied in the affirmative, but nevertheless asked Dr. Flemming to give him a memorandum on how much elbow-room the ODM would have to purchase Turkish chrome and other materials for the long-term stockpile.

Mr. Hughes, referring to Secretary Hoover's earlier statement, inquired where the Turks could go if they came to a parting of the ways with the United States. Secretary Hoover replied that he did not think they would "go" anywhere, but that they could cease to be satisfactory allies.

Admiral Radford commented that it was well within the realm of possibility that the Turks would withdraw from NATO and embrace neutralism. Such moves would greatly embarrass US policy. Admiral Radford went on to point out that we ourselves were largely responsible for the elevated force goals which the Turks had adopted. Our responsibilities for these force levels stemmed from the fact that our program of military assistance to friendly nations had begun in 1950 on an emergency basis. Accordingly, the Turks now have us over the barrel, and Admiral Radford confessed that he did not know how we were going to wiggle off the hook.

Mr. Rockefeller expressed strong support for the observations of Secretary Hoover and Admiral Radford. He said he believed that the United States was in danger of being accused by its allies and friends of rushing in with all kinds of promises when critical situations arose, and then of leaving its friends in the lurch when the crisis subsided. He believed that we must give some thought to our posture and reputation. We may have to work out something in the way of aid agreements, which did not recommend itself to us as sound from the strict economic point of view.

Secretary Robertson stressed that the Defense Department felt that it would be a grave mistake not to keep the Turks tied to us. If they prove to be willing to undertake the necessary economic reforms, we should design a realistic program which would call for another $100 million over and above what we have already given

them, to meet the commitments we have made to Turkey. Secretary Robertson warned, however, that this move could not be made if it was proposed to limit the over-all figure for US military assistance world-wide to $500 million.

The Vice President said that although the United States could not afford to overlook costs, it must keep firmly in mind its major objectives with respect to such allies as the Turks. He presumed that the State Department shared this view. The Turks were certainly among our best allies and could not be permitted to become disenchanted. The Vice President said that he further assumed that the new committee being set up at the Assistant Secretary level under OCB would take a hard-headed look at the Turkish problem, but that the committee would in the end realize that it must make a deal with the Turks.

Secretary Hoover confirmed the Vice President's conviction that an acceptable deal with Turkey must be arranged. Dr. Flemming wondered whether it was not desirable for the Planning Board to review our present Turkish policy (NSC 5510/1). Secretary Hoover replied that for the present, at any rate, our policy was sufficiently broad, but if Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray and other members of the new OCB committee found it desirable for the Council to review the Turkish policy, this should be done.

Admiral Radford said that he wanted to reenforce the statements which Secretary Robertson had made. The United States simply could not gracefully get out of the commitments for military aid which it had earlier made to friendly countries all over the world.

Secretary Hoover expressed thorough agreement with Admiral Radford's statement, and went on to point out that for every dollar of US hardware given to an allied country the United States had to pay another for the support of the soldier who uses the military hardware. He explained that he meant that US economic support had to be given to enable the economies of many of our allied states to support the military establishments which we desired them to maintain. This was more or less true everywhere, and particularly so in the case of Turkey.

Mr. Hughes said that while this might be so, we should take into consideration the reforms which the Turks must undertake to carry out if our assistance to them was to be meaningful. While of course we wanted the Turks as friends, we wanted them to be permanent and not temporary friends.

Mr. Anderson pointed out that Turkey was but one of a number of countries where we had problems with respect to our military assistance programs. He indicated that the Council would

presently be presented with a review of the whole extent of our military assistance programs world-wide.

Dr. Flemming pointed out that, particularly in view of the serious deterioration in the Middle East, this was no time for the United States to have to answer charges of bad faith from our friends.

The Vice President expressed agreement with Dr. Flemming, but also said that he felt that Mr. Hughes had made a good point. In short, the United States could not agree to demands upon it which, if fulfilled, would end up by doing the Turks more harm than good. The United States was going to be obliged to make a deal that "we can sell them on." Secretary Hoover pointed out that the difficulty was compounded by the fact that if we try to build up Turkish forces amounting to 20 divisions, this move would require US economic assistance which will cost as much again as the figure for the military aid. He could see no solution except an effort to try to reduce the proposed force levels for Turkey.

Admiral Radford pointed out the difficulty of such a move, in view of the fact that it was the United States itself that had pushed the Turks into accepting the presently agreed military force levels. Moreover, the same thing was true in the case of Korea, Formosa, and Indochina. We would have to have very good reasons indeed to explain why we have changed our minds and have now come to feel that these countries no longer need as large military forces as we had initially urged on them.

Mr. Rockefeller felt that the best solution might be to cut our military aid program to Turkey and increase our economic assistance.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board, in the light of supplementary statements by the Acting Secretaries of State and Defense.

b. Noted that an interdepartmental committee at the Assistant Secretary level is developing a US position for early negotiations with Turkey on the Turkish military and economic situation and US aid programs related thereto.

[Here follow items 4–6, the Arab-Israeli situation, the situation in Brazil, and the status of National Security Programs.]

S. Everett Gleason

333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, November 17, 1955—4:58 p.m.

878. Your 819. [2] In prospective talks with President your presentation should be along following lines which is reiteration US position:

1. US welcomes Turkish desire discuss their economic problems at highest levels with appropriate US officials Ankara. Such consultation is consistent with wholehearted cooperation our countries have had recent years in building free world strength against communist menace.

2. US gravely concerned over recent economic deterioration; believes difficulties are largely of internal origin centering around large monetary expenditures of government, state enterprises, and private sector which are beyond Turkish real resources. Seems to us difficulties are accentuated by magnitude bank credits, and specifically, scale of development program seems constitute heavier burden than Turkish economy can stand combined with defense efforts. We fear present difficulties are likely get worse rather than better unless stabilization program energetically undertaken.

3. Patiently explain disastrous consequences inflation.

4. Turkey has said it intends undertake economic stabilization program and at Turkish request US submitted statement on general nature measures necessary entitled "Measures to Relieve etc." However Turkish measures taken so far do not appear adequate meet situation. Due to its significance in economic situation total budget for coming year will be special interest as indication Turkish intention this field. Ambassador should indicate US would appreciate statement by Turkish Government results thus far achieved toward economic and financial stability. Also desire detailed foreign exchange budget quarterly basis.

5. US believes stabilization program essential to solution economic difficulties and realization Turkish objectives. Allen letter June 8 [3] to Zorlu said "future economic assistance will be based upon effectiveness measures to be taken by Turkish Government to bring about economic and financial stability, and upon appropriations of

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/11–1555. Confidential. Drafted by Young, who also signed for the Acting Secretary. Repeated to Istanbul.

[2] Telegram 819, November 15, reported on Warren's meeting with Zorlu on November 14 concerning Turkey's economic situation. The discussion touched upon methods the Turkish Government might undertake to study and correct their economic and financial problems before approaching the United States for aid. (*Ibid.*)

[3] See footnote 2, Document 329.

US Congress for foreign aid, subject of course, to requirements for assistance of other nations."

6. US Government is prepared keep Turkish economic situation under constant review. [4]

Hoover

[4] On November 29, Prime Minister Menderes submitted his resignation as a result of strong opposition to his government's economic policies. President Bayar requested that Menderes form a new cabinet, which was announced on December 9. In telegram 981 to Ankara, December 9, the Department informed the Embassy that until the new Cabinet's attitude and program toward the economy was known it would be inadvisable to attempt to determine a firm US line of action. The Department added that in the absence of new developments other than the appointment of the new Cabinet, it would be inadvisable for the Embassy to approach the Turkish Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/12–355)

334. Memorandum of a Conversation, American Embassy, Ankara, January 13, 1956, 10 a.m. [1]

PARTICIPANTS

The Ambassador
Mr. E. Perkins McGuire
Mr. John H. Haskell
Mr. Foy D. Kohler
General William E. Riley
General L. R. Dewey
Mr. John Holcombe
Mr. Gardner Patterson
Mr. G. Lewis Jones
Colonel Clayman
Mr. John Goodyear

SUBJECT

Briefing on Turkey

Mr. McGuire opened the briefing by referring to the original statement of Mr. Harold E. Stassen which had been the basis for the commitment in the Aide-Mémoire of June 4, 1954, handed to Prime Minister Menderes on the occasion of the latter's visit to Washing-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5–MSP/1–2456. Secret. On January 24 this memorandum of conversation and the record of a previous briefing on January 12 were sent to Baxter by Kohler. According to Kohler, the minutes of the meetings were not cleared with McGuire, but seemed to reflect the "flavor" of the conversations. (*Ibid.*)

ton. He emphasized the importance of the time factor in programming, and specified that if we completed a program of a certain magnitude in six years instead of five, the country concerned sometimes made a case that the original five year program had not been completed. He continued that in his opinion the United States had, in the Aide-Mémoire referred to above, made a definite commitment in terms of material for one-fourth of the four year program for Turkey involving a buildup of military forces to United States approved NATO force goals.

The Ambassador then gave the background of Prime Minister Menderes' visit to Washington in June 1954. He said that only a month previously, the Prime Minister's Democrat Party had been swept into power, gaining 508 of 541 seats in the Grand National Assembly. Menderes thus felt that he had a definite mandate from the people (though actually the popular vote was in no way comparable to the overwhelming majority obtained in the GNA, the Democrat Party having gained approximately 60% of the popular vote in that election as opposed to approximately 55% in the previous one). Menderes had come to Washington with the hope of assistance from the United States to build an economic base in Turkey capable of sustaining the projected Turkish military posture in four years time (without taking account of replacement, spare parts, etc.). He estimated that the military (Army) program then envisaged to bring Turkey up to NATO force goals called for an $800 million military aid program over a period of four years, with an expenditure of approximately $200 million a year. Further, the Prime Minister was seeking a $300 million economic aid loan, in addition to the economic program then envisaged for Turkey, at the rate of $75 million a year.

In Washington, the Prime Minister was told (the Ambassador continued) that there would be no four year commitment, but that the United States military authorities were sympathetic with Turkey's plans, and were therefore willing to underwrite an immediate commitment for one-fourth of the four year program. In reply to Menderes' request for economic aid, the United States Government suggested that there be a full, frank discussion of the problems involved, including the exchange rate for the lira, before there could be any consideration of a special accommodation. With some indignation, the Prime Minister said that "under no circumstances" would he discuss the exchange rate. Economic discussions thus ended on a frigid note, though when he left, the Prime Minister did have in his pocket a commitment for one-fourth of the military aid program and over $75 million economic aid for that year. Concurrently, the United States agreed to accelerate delivery of the sum of $500 million in the military aid pipeline.

Upon his return to Turkey, the Prime Minister was to undertake a stabilization program and to discuss further the matter of economic aid with the Embassy. However, he passed the summer pleasantly in Istanbul; took no action toward opening negotiations with the United States; took only a few measures toward stabilization; and was confronted with a sharp Turkish business reaction to even those he had taken. At the same time, the attitude of his principal advisor, Acting Foreign Minister Zorlu, was that Turkey should pump for $300 million in cash for purposes of "maneuver", and without strings.

Mr. McGuire interrupted to pose a few questions. Was it the Embassy's opinion, he asked, that there was an implied willingness on the part of the United States to consider the possibility of making allocations for the last three-fourths of the four year military aid program for Turkey, but no definite commitment to meet three increments? The Ambassador and Mr. Kohler said yes. Was there a commitment by Turkey, Mr. McGuire pursued, to discuss economic problems with the United States Mission? Again the answer was yes, with the comment that this commitment had not been fulfilled. The Ambassador then noted that there was a close relationship between the economic and military problems in Turkey, but that they were not as close as Mr. McGuire's questions implied. In our relations with Turkey, the Ambassador continued, we must assess the importance of the following admitted assets of the country: (1) geography; (2) manpower; (3) psychology. No one could gainsay that Turkey was extremely strategically located; or that her military manpower was superior to that of any other in this area; or that, finally, the Turks have an ingrained anti-Soviet outlook. It was necessary, he added, to make definite decisions on our military program for Turkey, and to make them soon. Military strategy would not wait five years.

Mr. McGuire said that was all very well, and one must balance advantages and necessities, but he pointed out that many officials in Washington are asking: "What good is a bankrupt ally?".

The Ambassador . . . . said that the Turkish view was: "What we have is yours", but that concurrently they felt that what the United States has (in the form of credits, matériel, etc.) should be the subject of discussion by the United States with Turkey.

There ensued an exchange about the effect of United States relations with Germany upon United States-Turkish relations. Mr. McGuire wanted to know what the attitude of the Turkish Government would be if the United States substantially stepped up its military aid program to Germany. The Ambassador replied that, in general, the Turks have a strong regard for, and a substantial reliance upon, Germany as a military mentor and provider; and that

consequently, anything which increased German military potential was attractive to the Turks, since it would be presumed that part of that potential would be directly advantageous to Turkey.

The Ambassador then referred briefly to the fact that Turkey had been honored by the visit of some 100 United States Congressmen during the past year, and that the Embassy had been very careful to give these United States officials a very thorough briefing on Turkey. He spoke of the favorable attitude toward Turkey of such congressional leaders as Senator Saltonstall, Senator Green and Congressman Judd. [2] He noted that out of the entire group there was only one dissonant voice, that of Senator Capehart, which could be explained by the fact that there are a number of Greek constituents in Indiana, who might be pressured to be emotionally interested in the Istanbul/Izmir riots of last September over Cyprus.

Mr. McGuire noted that in United States thinking, the Middle East was the number one priority in FY 1957, and asked about the relationship of a military aid program in Turkey to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Ambassador pointed out that Turkey was the only country in this area which recognized the State of Israel and which did not observe the Arab economic boycott of that country. On the other hand, he noted that Turkey was doing everything in its power to improve its relations with the Arab States, and he adverted to the Turkish role in the formulation of the United Nations Resolution of 1951, [3] and in the formulation of the Baghdad Pact. To indicate how carefully Turkey was treading in the delicate field of Arab-Israeli relations, the Ambassador referred to the fact that the Turkish Government did not even allow the Israeli Symphony Orchestra to come to Turkey last year to give a concert, or even to permit individual members of the orchestra to come to Ankara and give performances.

Mr. Kohler interrupted to say that he thought it was important to keep in mind that from the point of view of Israeli-Arab relations, a stepped-up military aid program for Turkey would not involve the complications that similar program to Iraq would involve, since the latter would presumably have to be balanced by some quid pro quo for Israel.

Discussion then ensued concerning recent Soviet overtures to Turkey. Mr. Kohler reviewed the Soviet Chargé's recent conversations with the Deputy Secretary General of the Foreign Office (Mr. Melih Esenbel). He noted that Mr. Esenbel had turned a cold

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[2] Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, Theodore F. Green of Rhode Island, and Walter H. Judd of Minnesota.

[3] Adopted by the Security Council in September 1951, this resolution affirmed the right of shipping to and from Israel to transit the Suez Canal. For text, see U.N. Doc. S/2322.

shoulder to these Soviet blandishments. Still, the Soviet approach had been strong, with a concurrent statement by Khrushchev, and a warm reception of the new Turkish Ambassador to Moscow. For the first time, Mr. Esenbel had expressed concern for the reaction of public opinion in Turkey should the Soviets choose to publicize the definite economic and financial offers which they had made. Continuing the discussion, the Ambassador noted that actually there was a certain amount of Soviet-Turkish trade going on all the time, amounting, among other things, to the transfer across the eastern border of some 100,000 head of cattle a year in exchange for Soviet POL products. . . .

Mr. McGuire brought up the subject of training Turkish military personnel. He stated that he had learned during his visit to Turkey that there were two problems involved here, (1) the problem of teaching English; (2) the problem of having technicians come back to Turkey and do what they were trained to do. He said that he had heard that all too frequently, for example, trained radar operators were assigned to kitchen police. It was agreed that this was indeed a problem, and that before technicians were brought to the United States for training, they should learn English; and that upon their return to Turkey, it should be understood that they should be indentured to the job for which they were trained.

Referring to the question of a relief brigade for Korea, the Ambassador pointed out that this question was a part of the Turkish trading position on the United States military aid program, and that the Turks might take the position that they would agree to ship a new relief brigade to Korea if the United States met certain conditions with respect to military aid.

The Ambassador continued to give Mr. McGuire the substance of the Embassy's draft Progress Report on Turkey for the period August 11, 1955–February 11, 1956 (Embassy's Despatch No. 299, January 11, 1956).[4]

Following this, Mr. McGuire brought up the specific question of the effect of fulfillment of the projected United States military aid program for Turkey upon the Turkish economy.

General Riley[5] and Mr. Patterson[6] replied that, in essence, a stepped-up military program for Turkey, within reasonable limits, would be no serious drain on the adequate Turkish manpower pool. Neither would such a military aid program be a major drain upon the output of the Turkish economy since the Turkish Army's big

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.82/1–1156)

[5] Deputy Director for Management, FOA.

[6] Gardner Patterson, Special Assistant to the Director for Economic Affairs, Ankara.

requirement was for food and clothing and these would have to be provided for the personnel whether they were in the Army or not. Mr. Patterson noted that, at present, Turkey devotes approximately one-third of its central government budget to defense expenditures, and is actually planning to increase such expenditures in the future. It would, of course, be an anti-inflationary move if these funds could be frozen and not spent on defense, but there is no reason to believe that the Turkish Government would collect the present taxes if the proceeds were to be sterilized. He noted, incidentally, that one advantage to the civilian sector of the economy of a military aid program was the fact that many of the recruits were illiterate, and returned from their military service with a capacity to read and write.

Mr. Patterson agreed with a statement by Mr. McGuire that the United States did not want "bankrupt allies", but stated that he did not believe cutting down United States military aid was a way of bringing Turkey out of bankruptcy—rather quite the contrary. He pointed out that because the Turkish Government was so intent upon fulfilling its military obligations to NATO it would probably make a serious attempt to do so whether or not the country were granted military aid, and that consequently lack of United States support for Turkey's military program would mean that the Government would squeeze its defense financial requirements from other sectors of the economy, to the overall detriment of the Turkish economic situation. On the other hand, as regards to economic aid, Mr. Patterson said, it seemed quite clear that United States should hold to a firm policy of extending only the minimum amount of aid necessary to keep Turkey's head above water unless and until Turkey were to undertake policies of living within her means and so restoring stability and solvency. Otherwise, Turkey could, and would be encouraged to, follow policies which necessitated ever-increasing amounts of foreign help.

In this general connection, brief mention was made of the use of economic aid as a foreign policy tool.

Following this, Mr. Patterson gave a briefing on the current Turkish economic situation. He pointed out that from 1949 to 1953, the gross national product of Turkey increased at a rapid rate, but that it fell off in 1954 as a result of the drought. The earlier increases of the GNP were caused by a fortunate conjunction of several factors: good weather resulting in good crops; the initial material improvements (investments) often had the most spectacular effect and by the consideration that the price of minerals during the period were high and thus increased the value of Turkish exports. United States aid was also an important contributing factor to this increase in the GNP. Possibly even more foreign assistance was

obtained from Western Europe and this too had helped increase GNP. The result of all these things was that the Turkish officials became over optimistic and undertook an overambitious investment program. Turkey attempted to do more than it had the resources to pay for. The domestic device used for supporting the rapidly expanded investment program was a tremendous increase in money supply. Since this greatly exceeded the physical resources to match it, Mr. Patterson continued, the results were (1) a price increase (which had an adverse effect, though an admittedly limited one, on the military program with respect to trainees and to costs); (2) a larger foreign trade gap; and (3) a depreciation in the value of the lira. Soon, Turkey had no reserves; it had a large exchange deficit; it suffered from a shortage of imports—and yet the Turkish Government continued to lay new cornerstones almost every other day, and to undertake a headlong investment program. As a consequence, it finds itself in urgent need of ever increasing economic help from the United States.

At Mr. McGuire's request, Mr. Patterson gave a detailed briefing on the use of counterpart in Turkey. He said that in the past couple of years, it had been used 100% for the military budget but that this year, as an anti-inflationary measure, the United States Government, by the use of its veto power over counterpart, has frozen some 30 million Turkish lira for future unspecified use. In addition, Mr. Patterson said, the United States had been parceling out economic aid piecemeal, again as an anti-inflationary measure, since it was hoped this policy would serve to convince the Turks that the United States was serious about the need for economic reforms. They had this year so far advanced only a "first slice" to Turkey, amounting to $12.5 million.

In this same connection, mention was also made of the administration of Public Law 480.

Mr. Haskell[7] posed a question concerning the Central Bank. General Riley and Mr. Patterson indicated that the Central Bank in Turkey did not perform the classic role of such an institution in other countries, but that rather it was merely an adjunct to the Finance Ministry.

. . . . . .

A discussion concerning loans brought out Mr. McGuire's view that in general he considered loans to many undeveloped countries

[7] John H. Haskell, Deputy Representative, North Atlantic and Mediterranean Area.

unwise, because it was unrealistic to believe that such countries could actually make interests payments upon them.

A discussion then ensued concerning those members of the Menderes Cabinet who seemed to be behind real Turkish economic reforms. General Riley, Mr. Patterson and Mr. Kohler, together with the Ambassador, all agreed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Economy and Commerce, and the Minister of State Enterprises (and probably also the Minister of Defense) were strongly behind a program of realistic reforms in the economic field.

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335. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State [1]

Ankara, January 17, 1956—noon.

1180. Paris for Wallner and Knight. Rome for Maffitt. Admiral William Fechteler has given me synopsis his conversation yesterday with President Bayar. Conversation began at midday and lasted one hour and fifteen minutes. In addition President and Admiral, there were present on Turkish side Acting Chief of General Staff and Deputy Chief of General Staff with President's private secretary, Chief of his Secretariat and an interpreter. Admiral Fechteler was accompanied by his Chief of Staff, Major General Frank P. Roberts. Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister formed party for luncheon where members of American country team, Lt. General Riley of ICA, Maj. General Dewey Jammat and I were additional guests. Conversation at luncheon was general.

President thanked Admiral Fechteler for taking trouble to come Turkey at his invitation and said he considered it necessary talk about critical situation in Turkey and its implications before there is a catastrophe. President said he wished discuss political, military and economic aspects of Turkish situation in that order. According to Bayar, Russians have stepped up their campaign against Turks. Thousands of leaflets printed in Lebanon in Turkish are smuggled through Syria to Turkey and distributed in principal cities especially Izmir, where, as in Istanbul, there is floating population of marginal workers running into tens of thousands people. These leaflets attack

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/1–1756. Secret. Repeated to Rome, Paris, and London.

Government of Turkey as accepting hazards from West and at same time undergoing economic privations, both result of mistaken policy by Turkish Government. Leaflets call for changes in Government and particularly removal of Prime Minister Menderes from office because of his attachment to West and his commitments beyond capacity of country to accomplish with resultant privations now experienced by Turkish people. At same time this campaign going on, which government attempting control largely through its intelligence agencies, Soviets both in Moscow and Ankara are offering Turks as neighbors in need, unlimited economic aid in goods as well as in loans to help them out of their present financial and economic straits. President had before him report of new Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Kavur, in which President of Soviet Union at time Ambassador presented his credentials last week, made offers of economic aid to Turkey, "without any strings attached". To these Russian overtures, threats and intrigues, President said, "Turkey is well alerted". This country he told Admiral, is irrevocably committed to West and particularly to United States and has given ample proof whenever opportunity has been presented to demonstrate its loyalty, but he does not minimize danger of subversion particularly with large elements of urban population now living marginal existence as result of scarcities of necessities of life which, however, do not include food.

On military side, President said United States has been dragging its feet past two years in giving Turkey equipment necessary enable its defense forces meet their NATO commitments. Promises made Prime Minister when he visited United States June 1954 of military equipment not only have not been kept, but no explanation was offered Turks as to why they were not being met. However, added President, as result of recent visit to United States of Acting Chief of Turkish General Staff Tunyjoglu,[2] and his conversations with responsible officers of Pentagon, it is believed by Turks that situation now in process of correction and that they can look forward with confidence to continuance of American military support that will enable Turkey to build and maintain its defense establishment up to standard required by its NATO responsibilities.

In economic field, however, situation now faced by Turkey is critical. Arguments that have been advanced by various American officials who have discussed Turkish economic situation are not, President's opinion, sound. He cited as instance World Bank which has refused further minor credit to Turks and at same time is party to a four hundred million dollar commitment to build a dam in Egypt. He said that there were other instances of American generosi-

[2] Presumably a reference to General Tunaboglu.

ty to countries whose political and military commitments to United States are in no sense comparable to that of Turkey and whose position in no sense is as important at this particular time as that of Turkey in Middle East. He said, as his conviction, the financial needs of Turkey arising out of Turkish determination to build economy able support their defense effort within the lifetime of present government, have not had fair hearings. In his opinion, Turkish needs have been gauged by "bookkeepers and small minded men who have kept from attention of President Eisenhower true state Turkish needs and Turkey's importance to United States". Feels situation is so critical that it is vital President be informed. Then went on to mention that communiqués will be issued simultaneously in United States and Turkey today that Clarence Randall, who made earlier visit Turkey April 1953,[3] will be coming this country again end of this month to make personal investigation of Turkish economy. He hopes as result of Randall visit Government of United States will realize dangers being faced this country as well as its needs and that two Governments may come to understanding to their mutual benefit.

Admiral said President made no specific demands on him in any way of requested action. He has impression that Bayar hopes have passed along Bayar's estimate of interlocking relations between two countries and the hope that United States may be disposed regard any exceptional aid that may be extended to Turks from political strategic point of view rather than financial and economic one.

Admiral Fechteler returning Naples today.

Warren

[3] In January 1956, the Turkish Government requested that Randall come to Turkey as an adviser on the economic situation. Randall had visited Turkey in August 1953 as the head of a private investment mission.

336. Letter From the President's Special Consultant (Randall) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Humphrey) and the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, March 6, 1956.

GENTLEMEN: At your request [2] I flew to Turkey on January twenty-eighth, returning on February eleventh, and the purpose of this letter is to present to you as succinctly as possible the present state of my thinking with regard to the economic problems of the Turkish Republic.

My colleagues, Forest Siefkin [3] and Dr. C. Edward Galbreath, [4] are preparing a factual report, which will be available very shortly. [5] The essential parts have already been communicated verbally to the staffs of the interested Departments.

Before leaving Washington we had the privilege of being intensively briefed by a wide variety of Departments and agencies that had knowledge of the Turkish problem, and enroute we had the benefit of conferences with the economic staffs of Ambassador Perkins and the Embassy in Paris, as well as with General Gruenther and his staff at NATO, and with Admiral Fechteler at Rome. I have the feeling that we were adequately prepared for our task.

Our objective was twofold: (1) to present to the officials of the Turkish Government the state of American public opinion with regard to economic aid, and (2) to persuade the Turkish Government to undertake prompt and decisive measures for the solution of their fiscal problems.

On this second point, we had an extraordinary break, caused not by anything we did but rather by the fact of our going.

While we were in Paris on our way to Turkey, Prime Minister Menderes faced up squarely to his financial problems, and announced to his people a program of financial reform containing nearly every element that we had had in mind for presenting to him. He had apparently decided that he should do this on his own, and

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/3–656. Confidential.

[2] According to a January 6 memorandum from Hoover to Dulles, Hoover and Humphrey, after learning that the Turkish Government wished to obtain an economic adviser and mentioned Randall in particular, met with Randall to urge him to accept the assignment. (*Ibid.*, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 58 D 610, The Randall Mission 1956—January)

[3] General Counsel, International Harvester Company.

[4] US Government economist on the staff of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy.

[5] A copy of the Randall Mission report is in Department of State, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 58 D 765.

not have it thought by his people that he had done it under compulsion from the United States.

The essentials of his program were as follows:

1. A balanced budget
2. Strict measures to control the further issuance of commercial credits by the Central Bank
3. The requirement that each State Enterprise operate within its own revenues, and not be dependent upon the Central Budget
4. No further increase in agricultural subsidies
5. Orderly procedures for the allocation of available foreign exchange.

In my private conferences with the Prime Minister and the President, I received the most categorical assurances that this reform program would be carried out meticulously, and my associates, in their dealings with the staffs of the various economic ministers, received the impression that everybody in Government meant business on this program. The Prime Minister repeated these assurances to us in front of his Cabinet, and at that time informed us that the following three executive decrees were being issued:

1. One to police the limiting of credit
2. One to police the individual budgets of the State Enterprises
3. One to regulate foreign exchange.

It seems to me, therefore, that consideration of the Turkish problem must now be undertaken on the hypothesis that Turkey has, in good faith, taken the initial governmental steps which the United States has long urged it to adopt.

More problems remain to be solved, but the beginning thus made is a courageous undertaking by the Prime Minister, and a direct turnabout from the laxity of the last two years.

It remains, of course, to be seen whether the Government will follow through on this program, and to that end, if you should so desire, I am prepared, with my colleagues, to return to Turkey early in May to check their progress.

I have come to the conclusion, however, in my own mind that the action presently undertaken by the Turkish Government merits a strong reciprocal vote of confidence from the United States, the details of which I shall discuss later.

Military Problem

My first impression on studying the Turkish problem was that this country was undertaking a military burden beyond its means, and that this should be reduced. The more I studied the problem, however, the more I doubted the soundness of that conclusion.

From the strategic point of view, it must be borne in mind that Turkey is of extreme importance to the United States. If we should lose Turkey, we might lose all of the Middle East. Both General Gruenther and Admiral Fechteler assured us that in terms of military cooperation, the relationship with Turkey was satisfactory. She has a good army, that is rapidly becoming well equipped.

Furthermore, her position vis-à-vis the Soviets is taken out of deep conviction, and would not change even though we should abandon aid. Speaking roughly, some 26 percent of her budget expenditure is military in character, which is about 8 percent of her Gross National Product.

Since the end of the war the number of men bearing arms has been reduced, and the present army is far more effective than it was, because of increased fire power.

NATO would strongly resist any cutback in Turkey's force assignment because to do so would take the pressure off other allies who have been far less cooperative than Turkey.

This whole military question is moot, however, in my judgment because Turkey would never consent to cut back her forces. They have fought Russia for 300 years, and I think it would be politically impossible to persuade them to reduce their military effort.

One thing, however, in the military field needs doing and doing at once. All vagueness as to what the commitment of the United States is to Turkey on the military side should be eliminated. That whole program should be brought into sharp focus, and a new arrangement negotiated, if necessary, in order that hereafter there may be no further misunderstandings on this score. I have discussed this with Gordon Gray, and I am prepared to work with him on making our commitment clear.

Immediate Need

Short-term the Turkish economy is in desperate straits. For all intents and purposes their entire gold reserve has already been pledged, and they have almost no capacity to finance the most immediate import necessities. Such industry as they have is grinding to a halt for lack of imported raw materials and spare parts, the agricultural industry lacks motor fuel and lubricants for its new equipment, and so forth. There is reason to believe that in a period of perhaps two to three years, the new reform program, coupled with the completion of some of their public ventures that have not yet brought value into the economy, might restore some sort of balance to their trade. But the country may come close to bankruptcy in the next few months. It would do us little good to have an ally that is militarily strong only on paper, if the economy should go

dead. The dangers of the internal unrest that might result are obvious.

To relieve this situation, I am altogether opposed to a soft loan. Furthermore, I do not believe the Turkish Government is going to request another loan in the near future.

They must have cash and have it now, however, and this would be my recommendation:

I propose that our staff in Turkey be forthwith given authority to obligate our Government for sufficient dollar-aid to Turkey to bring that country up for Fiscal 1956 close to the 100 million dollar total of aid which they received in Fiscal 1955. It is my understanding that these funds are available.

I propose that the time and manner of making these commitments be left to the discretion of our staff in Turkey. I was impressed with their caliber, and believe they can be trusted so to administer this fund as to bring the greatest possible benefit to the Turkish economy.

Time is running out, however, and I urge strongly that they be given this authority and be given it now.

Debt Problems

Turkey has a serious problem of short-term debt due to various European nations for capital equipment, and other items, purchased in the course of their too rapid industrial development.

These obligations are being handled on a hand-to-mouth basis without orderly planning. Turkey is pursuing a bilateral approach to these questions, trading as best it can with each nation, one at a time. This is costly to the Turkish economy. It forces them to buy in selected markets rather than buying on the best terms wherever available. They are being charged higher prices than competition would justify. I think that the only intelligent approach to that question is the familiar multilateral plan of having all the creditors around one table, and that the agency for accomplishing that would be OEEC. I recognize the apprehension felt by some of the Treasury staff that this would at once bring the United States into the picture, but I believe that that danger can be obviated, and I think that the multilateral solution is the only rational answer. Knowing the Treasury feeling, I did not urge this upon Turkey, but I do feel that I should make my viewpoint clear to you. In my opinion it is the only solution that will give all countries a new and fair start on trading with Turkey. Furthermore, we would thus greatly widen the number of countries that would have a stake in the economic survival of Turkey.

The long-term debt of Turkey is something over 900 millions of dollars. It ought to be refinanced. I would not be prepared to say that this is too much debt for the Turkish economy to bear, but the maturities need to be spread out over a longer period of time.

In our talks with the International Monetary Fund, we found that they hold the considered viewpoint that once Turkey embarks upon a monetary reform program, this international debt can be refinanced, possibly by bringing into the situation private banking capital from the United States and other countries. I was so impressed with what Messrs. Rooth,[6] Cochran and Sturc[7] said that I urged strongly to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet that they seek the early advice of the officials of that Fund with regard to their debt problem. I think that Merle Cochran should go back to Turkey just as soon as he can, and I believe that under his wise guidance a new and helpful debt program might be worked out for Turkey.

Devaluation

At no point while I was in Turkey did I let the word "devaluation" pass my lips. This was a studied effort on my part. I came to the conclusion that the logic of events almost inevitably will take Turkey to devaluation, and that it was highly important that this decisive step should be taken by the Turkish Government on its own initiative, and without compulsion from the United States. My slender stock in trade vis-à-vis Turkey is my personal relationship with the Prime Minister. I believe that we understand one another and have mutual respect for each other. I felt that all of that good will might be jeopardized if I let myself be in the position of recommending devaluation to him, because in earlier years he had publicly taken so strongly the position that he would never permit it. My colleagues, in talking with the staffs of the economic ministers, sensed that at the junior levels there is an understanding of the ultimate necessity for devaluation, and I think it would be wiser to let that pressure build up, so that devaluation comes about from inside forces rather than outside pressure.

I shall be available at any time to any of the interested agencies for further discussion of the Turkish problem, and of course to you for any further counsel that you may think I can give.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence B. Randall

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[6] Ivar Rooth, Managing Director and Chairman of the Board of Executive Directors, International Monetary Fund.

[7] Ernest Sturc, Deputy Director European Department, International Monetary Fund.

337. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, March 8, 1956—8:21 p.m.

1468. There are disturbing indications that, despite Randall's clear statements to Turkish officials of scope of his mission, Turkish Government still has lingering hope that his report and recommendations to US Government may result in some spectacular US gesture. Impression gained that Turks might expect US to produce solution their problems without their pursuing path of gradual but sound economic stabilization. Randall did not and does not intend report or recommend to US Government anything beyond his recommendations to Turkish Government. Although Turkish economic problems are serious ones they are of magnitude which, in his and our opinion, can largely be managed by Turkish Government facing up resolutely to period of belt-tightening and vigorously implementing stabilization measures to which it already publicly committed. In addition would seem wise for Turkish Government immediately act on Randall recommendation to consult IMF on financial and foreign debt problems. Delay in moving forward simultaneously on all stabilization lines can only aggravate already grave situation. This connection Randall, who was convinced of Turkish sincerity and resoluteness, fully expected that immediately following his departure Turkish officials would begin consultations with appropriate US officials as to needs and requirements of next few months. Officials in Washington disappointed at evident reluctance Turkish officials to get down to business.

As misunderstanding seems still to exist, Turkish Government should be immediately disabused of idea that US will come forward with massive aid or loan. US is prepared make available to Turkey full extent FY 1956 assistance in conjunction with successive steps in their own implementation of stabilization measures. US also prepared explore other avenues which might relieve situation, e.g., PL 480, release of counterpart, etc. Further US prepared consider possibility some additional economic assistance from ICA appropriations for FY 1956 but Turkish Government should not be under any illusions amount would be large in terms their previous loan request. FYI Possibility of need to increase current aid by $30 million has been envisaged by ICA for some time. End FYI.

Turkish Government should not lose sight of fact that US has staunchly supported Turkey politically, economically and militarily

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.8241/3–856. Confidential. Drafted by Baxter.

to significant extent over last decade. Our mutual interests and objectives dictate continuing support for Turkey of kind which will give country more solid economic base on which to continue building its strength and influence in area. This, we believe, can be accomplished only by sincerest cooperation and most earnest efforts on part of both countries to agree on programs that can be supported with resources available to Turkey including US assistance.

You are authorized to use any or all of foregoing information except figures in FYI portion in frank discussions with Prime Minister and other Turkish officials.

Hoover

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338. Letter From the President's Special Consultant (Randall) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Humphrey) and the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, April 17, 1956.

GENTLEMEN: Together with my associates, I have endeavored today to review the Turkish problem.

The purpose of this letter is to submit some specific recommendations.

In the morning we had an exploratory conference with the new Ambassador, [2] Mr. Warren, with Patterson and Scott from Ankara, and with Baxter of State.

This afternoon we met with Prochnow, Overby, FitzGerald, and Gray, and various staff members.

The situation is mixed in Turkey and not too satisfactory.

On the financial stability program, the line established by the Prime Minister in January has been reasonably well held, but no new steps have been taken. Doubt is cast upon its vitality by the resignations of Ulas and Kurdash, who had been known proponents.

The immediate and most urgent crisis has to do with the importation of petroleum products, commonly called POL. The Turks have exhausted every known means of financing those im-

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 58 D 610, The Randall Mission 1956—January. Confidential.

[2] On March 7, Fletcher Warren was appointed Ambassador to Turkey to replace Avra M. Warren, who left his post on February 17.

ports beyond the end of May, and without them their economy will certainly come to a full halt.

It is the position of the Turkish Government that the amount of aid granted pursuant to our mission to Turkey is inadequate to meet the public relations problem. People in Turkey still expect a $300 million loan, and the Prime Minister fears that his Cabinet will fall due to his failure to secure that sum of money. For this reason he has not yet announced the total of FY 1956 aid.

The International Monetary Fund is now sending a working party to Ankara in advance of its normal June date. Sturc, who leads that party, will arrive in Ankara on April 23, to be followed by Merle Cochran on May 10. It is hoped that out of that mission may come discussions of the exchange problem, but in the opinion of our country team the Turks will not voluntarily open that subject.

Out of our discussions today, there seemed to me to be consensus to support the following specific recommendations, which I now submit:

1. The American people and the Turkish people must be told promptly the full amount of American aid for FY 1956. The Turkish Government should be given a further opportunity to make that announcement itself, but if they fail to do so, we should release the facts to the press in both countries. This will serve as a partial check on the obvious belief held by many Turks that our dollar aid allotment is not yet final, and will negative [*negate*] the impression which some members of the government have promoted that what we have done is niggardly and unworthy of the relationship with a staunch ally.

2. $13 million out of the recent allotments should be made available to our country team for financing about three months of POL. We all recognize the difficulty that this creates for ICA, but we see no escape from the dilemma. We cannot let all Turkish industry be shut down for lack of fuel and lubricants, and there is no other source from which the money can come.

3. This allocation should be used, however, by the country team for the express purpose of persuading the Turks that they themselves must open with IMF the subject of the improvement of the exchange situation. We believe this can be done without making it as bald as a categorical demand for devaluation. We see no way, however, other than by the use of these funds, to insure that IMF will have the subject before it, and if this present working party should leave Turkey without discussing that subject, it might set the whole matter back for a long period of time.

4. When these steps are taken, we should stand absolutely firm, and grant no other aid whatever to Turkey until discussions for FY 1957 open. The fact that we are standing firm, and that these decisions are in fact final, should be made clear to the Turks by every means at our command.

Upon my return from the other mission, it had been tentatively agreed that I would go back to Ankara with my associates the first

week in May. This was for the purpose of checking the progress of the stabilization program.

After discussing it at length with all concerned, I have come to the conclusion that it would be inappropriate and perhaps dangerous for us to go that soon. For us to arrive there while the IMF study is on might take the whole pressure off. It would once more suggest to the Turks that some miracle might still happen.

I do think, however, that we should go back later.

I am not available in the month of June, but I shall be prepared to go at any time after the first week in July, and my associates will be prepared to go with me.

Meanwhile I will continue to follow the subject.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence B. Randall

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339. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State[1]

Ankara, April 17, 1956—4 p.m.

1732. Eyes only for George Allen. Learn through military channels plans for massive deployment US air and ground forces and special weapons in Turkey, mainly Adana area. Also that parallel instructions coming my way to get Turk consent.

This would be tough one to give Turks cold. They have been trying for two years now to get US to consult them on the Arab-Israeli conflict and related aspects our Middle East policy, with relatively little to show for their pains. They will probably cooperate in these plans as partners, but are likely to be sticky if we simply put it to them unilaterally. In view of Moscow's warning against interference some time ago, Turkish cooperation in a military venture of this magnitude involves some major risks for them, from the other side of their northern borders. Finally, would be well remember our military and economic relationships are not presently in ideal state of repair.

In any event, gentlemen who would make decision—Menderes, Koprulu, Birgi and Chief Staff Tunaboglu—are all now in Tehran

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.54/4–1756. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

and will not be back here until April 23–24. These are same gents who have been seeking to be brought into our confidence and into consultation on Arab-Israeli conflict. Consequently, I think important, as minimum preparation for hitting them with this impending request, that Loy Henderson be authorized to discuss policy and plans with them privately and frankly in Tehran in way calculated to develop their receptivity. [2]

Kohler

[2] In telegram 1728, April 18, the Department replied:

"Request for 'preparatory planning' re possible movement US forces to ME stems from purely contingent military planning by Defense and involves no repeat no use or movement of forces in area.

"Fact this Defense planning exercise being carried out should be restricted fullest possible extent in order avoid misunderstandings or leaks. Please discuss this aspect with any US military authorities who know of secret order to which you refer, and assure that matter is not discussed with Turks.

"Understand Defense issuing urgent clarifying instructions." (*Ibid.*, 782.5411/4–1856)

340. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State [1]

Ankara, April 28, 1956—3 p.m.

1793. Paris for USRO. Joint Embassy–ICA message. Reference: Deptel 1762, [2] Embtel 1781. [3]

1. Prime Minister Menderes received General Riley and me alone for one and one-quarter hours thorough discussion pertinent

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.10/4–2856. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris.

[2] Telegram 1762, April 20, informed the Embassy that the Department shared the Embassy's desire for an early devaluation of the Turkish lira and expressed concern that the Turks might refuse to discuss the matter with the IMF mission. The Department also instructed the Embassy to inform Menderes that in view of the "dire effect" on the Turkish economy of a shortage of POL products, the United States was prepared as an emergency measure to finance up to $13 million of POL imports. (*Ibid.*, 882.10/4–456)

[3] Telegram 1781, April 27, informed the Department that the Embassy planned to make its approach to Menderes on April 18. The Embassy added that it seemed "essential" to see the Prime Minister personally. (*Ibid.*, 882.10/4–1756)

contents reference telegram. Following discussion aide-mémoire left with him text of which in following telegram.[4]

2. Prime Minister expressed great appreciation US understanding his economic difficulties represented by decision finance $13 million POL through August. Said he fully appreciated this reduced pipeline aid would bring serious problems later in year. However, indicated degree of seriousness would depend on outcome harvests.

3. IMF consultations, Prime Minister said he was prepared to receive our suggestion as made with intention being helpful. However, he indicated that degree of seriousness with which he was prepared to talk over external aspects Turk stabilization problems with IMF representatives still required further study and consultation with his colleagues. In this connection he expressed some displeasure previous IMF consultations which he implied dealt only with limited strictly statistical aspects Turk problem and approached problem from completely detached point of view. He hoped IMF would this time show more "understanding" and willingness to be of positive assistance. He made clear that prompt reassurances to him as to IMF approach would help him reach favorable decision.

4. Prime Minister said that he would reflect on our conversation and study aide-mémoire left with him and get in touch with us again within a few days.

5. Discussion was friendly throughout. Prime Minister went to great lengths express appreciation for past aid, particularly military. Reaffirmed in strongest terms devotion and loyalty to mutual political, military and economic interests. Said that whatever differences of view might arise with respect to economic interests, confident these would be surmounted and overall relationship unaffected. Prime Minister talked of recent Soviet approaches, including recent specific offer of five tankers POL without foreign exchange which he had given instructions should not be accepted. While reiterating responses of allies to Soviet moves was making situation increasingly difficult for Turkish Government, he repeated that he would never yield to Soviet blandishments nor engage in deals with Moscow.

During conversation we reassured Prime Minister US goals for Turkey not different from his own; our differences related to methods and pace of economic program. Indeed morale and determination of Turkish people which he so anxious maintain in our view would be weakened by economic distress. Consequently we trust that he would appreciate our advice and suggestions offered in spirit of sincere interest in welfare and progress Turkey. Prime Minister

[4] Transmitted in telegram 1797, April 30, the aide-mémoire summarized the instructions contained in telegram 1762. (*Ibid.*, 882.10/4–3056)

seemed cordially accept this approach and repeated he would consider in that spirit.

Kohler

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341. Memorandum of Discussion at the 285th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 17, 1956 [1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–4.]

5. US Policy on Turkey (NSC 5510/1; NSC Action No. 1486–e; Progress Report, dated April 5, 1956, by OCB on NSC 5510/1) [2]

Mr. Anderson briefed the Council on the major points contained in the Progress Report on Turkey, emphasizing in particular the critical situation with respect to the Turkish economy and the study by the so-called Prochnow Committee [3] on the capacity of the Turkish economy to support the levels of the Turkish armed forces. He pointed out that upon receipt of the Prochnow Committee report on Turkey, [4] the Planning Board would undertake to review US policy on Turkey as contained in NSC 5510/1. (Copy of Mr. Anderson's brief filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

When Mr. Anderson had concluded his briefing, the President inquired whether the studies of the various nations by the Prochnow Committee were being pursued as a matter of priority. Mr. Anderson replied that the Prochnow Committee report on Turkey had been completed and was only awaiting approval by the responsible de-

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on May 18.

[2] NSC 5510/1 is printed as Document 320. NSC Action No. 1486–e, taken at the 269th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 8, 1955, dealt with military and economic assistance to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Vietnam, Formosa, and Korea. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 75, NSC Records of Action) The Progress Report is not printed. (*Ibid.*: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5510)

[3] Reference is to the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain US Aid Programs, composed of representatives of the Departments of State, the Treasury, Defense, and ICA, and chaired by Herbert Prochnow. The committee was instructed by the NSC to "examine special country situations where US-supported military programs might impose undue burdens upon the economy of the country."

[4] Dated August 3. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series)

partment heads before being circulated. Studies of the other nations would follow. The President asked whether Mr. Anderson meant to suggest that we should needle certain department heads in order to get the report on Turkey out.

Secretary Dulles stated emphatically that the whole question of our military assistance programs was now in need of a most careful and thorough review. Whatever the nature of the changes going on in the USSR, we could at least safely conclude that these changes require us to do more by way of building economic strength around the periphery of the Soviet Union, rather than to continue our present scale of effort to build military strength around this periphery. The older policy which we have continued to pursue was obviously justifiable when it was undertaken some five years ago in the light of Soviet aggressive moves against Greece, Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. Now, however, the time has come to reverse this policy. The military assistance programs which we are now envisaging will enormously strain the economies of such nations as Turkey. We will be confronted with two disagreeable alternatives. Either we will ourselves have to "pick up the tab", perhaps to the tune of $400 million a year, in support of Turkey; or else we shall have to severely cut down the size of Turkey's military establishment.

The President commented that it was to resolve such problems as these that we had created the Prochnow Committee. It was, nevertheless, a very great problem to him to determine how we could ever induce the Turks to agree to a considerably reduced military establishment. On the last occasion of a trip to Turkey it had become clear to the President that they wanted six more divisions than the nineteen which they already had and were finding it difficult to support.

Secretary Wilson said that he understood the point of view of the Secretary of State, and that in principle he favored it. In his opinion, it was no more than sound military principle to secure first your military headquarters and thereafter to proceed to secure your military outposts. Secretary Wilson said that he was beginning to have very great anxiety about military headquarters, by which term he said he meant the domestic economy of the United States. He expressed himself as very worried about the possibility of a recession, and added that a strong US economy was a fundamental bulwark of the free world.

The President again said that he had wished the Prochnow Committee to analyze in the case of a half dozen other countries, this problem which was represented by Turkey. In response to the President, Mr. Anderson read the schedule of the dates on which the

working group's reports to the Prochnow Committee were estimated to be completed.

Secretary Humphrey said that it was now time for the Council to get down to brass tacks on the problem of Turkey. He said that Messrs. Gray, Hoover, Hollister, Randall, and himself had been spending an awful lot of time in recent months on Turkey. Moreover, at this precise time former Ambassador Cochran, now of the International Monetary Fund, was in Turkey making a thorough review of Turkey's economic and financial situation. He was expected to report his findings within a few days,[5] and it was hoped that through the auspices of the International Monetary Fund the Turks could be induced to carry out some of the economic reforms which were badly needed and which we were strongly recommending.

As to cutting back on the size of the Turkish military establishment, Secretary Humphrey agreed that this would be extremely difficult. Accordingly, we were going at this objective in an indirect fashion. Turkey, moreover, was on the brink of economic disaster. Twice in recent weeks, Mr. Hollister had had to bail out the Turks at the last minute in order to keep them in oil and spare parts. At any rate, it was clear that there was no need to needle anyone on the problem of Turkey. In point of fact, until Mr. Cochran had made his report we simply could not decide what to do about the Turkish problem. Finally, said Secretary Humphrey, he wanted to point out that it was the Turks who were so anxious to build up a larger military establishment. It is not we who are pressing them on this matter. It is they who are pressing us, and we were being presented with a terrible problem in devising ways and means of inducing them to reduce their military forces.

The President replied that of course he knew this. Everyone today is clamoring for armament.

Secretary Dulles inquired whether the President would like to hear from Under Secretary Hoover on this matter. Secretary Hoover said that he actually had in hand the text of the Prochnow Committee report on Turkey, although it had not been finally approved. It emphasized two problems. The first problem was the cost to the United States of our program of economic assistance to Turkey. The second problem was the cost of our military assistance program both to the Turks and to ourselves. The Prochnow report estimated that for the years 1955 to 1960, if we give the Turks what they are

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[5] In a June 19 memorandum to Hoover, Kalijarvi referred to a brief report on Cochran's mission to Turkey, which, although not found, had been attached to the memorandum. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 782.00/6–1956) A copy of the report is *ibid.*, GTI Files: Lot 59 D 4, Economic Situation for January–March.

asking for, the sums would run into the billions. Part of these costs would fall on us; part would fall on the Turkish economy. Secretary Hoover concluded with a brief comment on the procedures of the Prochnow Committee. The Prochnow Committee accepts from our military people the force goals for Turkey which they recommend. On this basis the Committee proceeds to figure up what it would cost the Turks and what it would cost the United States to maintain such force levels in Turkey. Incidentally, Secretary Hoover added, the economic data required by the Prochnow Committee for its study of Turkey had been handed in a long time ago. It was only recently that the Pentagon had supplied the requisite military data.

The President said that he was under the impression that the Prochnow Committee had been assigned the task of determining the size and character of military forces which the Turkish economy was in a position to sustain. Mr. Anderson then read to the President the terms of reference of the Prochnow Committee, and noted that the primary job of the Committee was fact finding. In the light of these facts, it was the responsibility of the Planning Board to review the policy of the United States toward Turkey and the other countries which were under study by the Prochnow Committee.

The President observed that the Council was now talking in terms of a program for Turkey which would cost $2 billion over the next five years. It was not to be forgotten that Turkey was only one of many claimants on the United States. Secretary Humphrey said with emphasis that this was precisely the situation, and that this country simply could not afford to supply military assistance in such vast amounts.

Secretary Dulles made the observation that one of the most frightening aspects of the Soviet Union was the undoubted capacity of its leaders to make significant decisions so quickly. He asked the Council to think what the Soviets had done by way of decisions over the last year, in the fields of both internal and external policy. The Soviet Union had demonstrated a capacity for prompt decision-making that no democracy could probably ever equal. Nevertheless, in the face of this Soviet capability our Government needed to do everything it possibly could to improve its own capacity to make prompt decisions. Things get studied to death in this Government, to a point where we are unable to reach a decision until the decision is too late to be really useful. If we could get the heads of the responsible departments and agencies here together around this table, we could make decisions in a period of 24 hours on the issues that the Prochnow Committee has been studying at such length. Such decisions would undoubtedly not be so perfect as if they had been studied at great length; but what the decisions lacked in perfection they would more than make up for in timeliness. In any

case, we must reach decisions like these in a much shorter time span. We must either compel officials below us in our departments to move more rapidly, or else we, as heads of departments, must make the decisions ourselves.

Secretary Humphrey said he agreed with all that Secretary Dulles had stated, but felt compelled to point out that many of our decisions must be made on the basis of factors we cannot actually control. Turkey, for example, was on the verge of a bust-up.

The President said that he frankly doubted whether wise policy decisions could be made by simply getting together a few heads of departments and without full knowledge of the facts relating to the problem to be decided. He agreed, however, that we were probably in a position now to make a decision on the case of Turkey.

Secretary Humphrey pointed out that the Prochnow Committee report on Turkey had not yet officially been circulated. Only Secretary Hoover knew precisely its content. Despite this, however, we have long known the essential elements in the Turkish situation. The gist of the problem was how to revise Turkey's military program to a point where we and the Turks together could find resources to support the military program.

Mr. Anderson pointed out that the Planning Board would promptly review the relevant country policies as soon as it received the reports of the Prochnow Committee.

Secretary Dulles indicated that, as Secretary Humphrey had pointed out, we already know the broad answer to the Turkish problem. No one, however, has received any authority yet to recommend what we should do in response to the Turkish problem.

(At this point in the discussion of Turkey, the Council launched into a discussion of broader aspects of US military and economic assistance programs, for which discussion see Item 6.) [6]

Subsequently, getting back to the problem of Turkey, Secretary Dulles asked whether the National Security Council should request the Prochnow Committee to indicate in their forthcoming report on Turkey a military program of a size and character which the Turks could support with an acceptable degree of assistance from the United States. In response, the President said he wanted the Prochnow Committee to make such a suggestion, and indeed believed that this request was already included in the terms of reference of the Prochnow Committee. Admiral Radford warned of the difficulties inherent in the attempt to provide the study requested by Secretary Dulles. Secretary Humphrey agreed that whatever the results of these studies, we would have to provide some financial assistance to

[6] Item 6 was a "Review of Military Assistance and Supporting Programs".

Turkey for a very long period of time. Agreeing, Secretary Wilson said that we had better start out by figuring out just how much money we are willing to provide by way of assistance to Turkey. Secretary Humphrey said it seemed to him that we had to start with the military side and the military decision, and then work back to the economic and financial decision.

The National Security Council: [7]

Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board, with particular reference to the economic burden imposed upon Turkey by the current plans for Turkish armed forces.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

[7] The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1559. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 75, NSC Records of Action)

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342. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, June 20, 1956—8:19 p.m.

2129. Joint State–Defense–ICA. Active consideration being given recommendations re future Turkish aid programs formulated in Washington in collaboration with representatives Ankara Country Team following completion Turkey paper by Interdepartmental Committee on Certain US Aid Programs (Prochnow Committee). We recognize necessity reaching earliest possible decision on target figures for Turkish programs to facilitate orderly US and Turkish planning. However magnitude world-wide programs which US able support must be examined in light of 1) Congressional action present aid bill, 2) completion within next few weeks other country studies by Prochnow Committee and over-all consideration by NSC. Until situation further clarified US not in position to propose or discuss with Turk Government revisions in Turkish programs.

Generally recognized that continuation foreign aid programs at current or previously contemplated levels requires greater resources

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5–MSP/6–2056. Secret. Drafted and signed by Baxter. Repeated to Paris for USRO and CINCEUR.

than those likely to be available to US for that purpose. Therefore in any discussions with Turkish officials Ambassador and Chief Jammat should bear in mind future US aid will fall far below Turkish desires and expectations in military and economic fields. [2]

Dulles

[2] In telegram 2222, June 29, the Embassy replied indicating the "urgency" of formulating necessary guidelines in Washington, which would enable the United States to develop a new military program with the Turks. The Embassy also suggested that if the new military program was far below the level that the Turkish Government anticipated, the United States should be prepared to offer Turkey, "further evidence of our continuing interest in Turkey's security." (*Ibid.*, 782.5–MSP/6–2956)

343. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, July 10, 1956—7:02 p.m.

90. At Department's suggestion Turkish Ambassador brought Finance Under Secretary Ergin and colleagues to call on Assistant Secretary Allen July 9. [2]

Allen expressed surprise and concern at memorandum from Prime Minister urtel 57. [3] He said US officials had great confidence in IMF and believed their recommended measures essential element in progress toward economic recovery Turkey. [4] On understanding Turkish Government would proceed with the reforms developed in consultations with IMF US had extended extraordinary emergency aid $25 million in support Turkish modification exchange rate system. He made clear this sum not available as additional aid if Turkish Government did not carry out this exchange reform. In serious questions affecting monetary rates no question Turkey has

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5–MSP/7–756. Secret. Drafted by Baxter and signed by Allen for the Secretary.

[2] A more detailed record of the meeting is in a memorandum of conversation by O'Grady, July 9. (*Ibid.*, 882.10/7–956)

[3] Telegram 57, July 7, transmitted a memorandum from the Turkish Government informing the United States that Turkey had decided to reevaluate the advisability of changing the exchange rate system due to the favorable effects on prices of the National Protection Law. In the Embassy's view of the Turkish Government's recent action, the Law would not make an important contribution to correcting Turkey's balance of payments problem. (*Ibid.*, 782.5–MSP/7–756)

[4] The IMF proposals focused on reestablishing price stability and adjusting exchange rates.

sovereign right and sole responsibility make decision it considers in its best national interest. However Allen pointed out if Turkey disregards considered recommendation IMF and US authorities and rejects program, Turkey should not expect come to US for help to solve resulting difficulties.

Ambassador Gork said he believed some misunderstanding existed. Application national protection law in recent weeks had changed situation from that existing at time agreement reached with IMF and Turkish Government merely wished discuss changed situation. He had no indication Government did not intend eventually carry out IMF recommendations, perhaps in exactly same form they now exist, but it wished discuss new circumstances with IMF authorities. IMF might be able convince Turkish Government recommendations should be instituted in present form. Gork said could not understand why IMF unwilling hold further discussions. (This refers to July 7 conversation Gork with Cochran.) [5]

Department officer pointed out his understanding Cochran and IMF officials fully aware present conditions in Turkey and did not consider situation had changed in any way to invalidate recommendations made late May. National protection law had been under discussion for some months and its probable effects had been taken into account by IMF in making present recommendations for multiple rate structure.

Gork gave impression he did not know in detail what lay behind his Government's desire for delay but implied perhaps it feared announcement such time would have adverse effect on Turkish public opinion. Implication was rate changes could be made palatable only if accompanied by simultaneous announcement larger aid from various US sources.

Ensuing discussions with Ergin elicited information his instructions on leaving Ankara were to work out details for implementation IMF recommendations and simultaneous announcement Washington and Turkey of new rate structure July 13. To date his instructions had not been changed and he had not been formally notified of Turkish position as outlined Prime Minister's memorandum presented Embassy Ankara.

Conversation along same lines held with Gork and Turkish delegation same day by Treasury, ICA and Cochran. [6]

You are authorized in your discretion urge appropriate Turkish officials consider very carefully adverse reaction IMF and US circles to what appears to be unwillingness face up to serious situation and carry out agreement which in view of all concerned necessary to

[5] Not further identified.

[6] No record of this discussion has been found.

improve Turkish economic situation and allow US aid make most effective contribution to lasting progress.

On July 10 Minister Finance cabled IMF requesting postponement formal Fund consideration Turkish exchange reform with period not specified.

FYI only. Nevertheless Turkish delegation instructed about same time to continue discussion with IMF staff. Believe it important Turk Government not learn we aware these instructions. Would appreciate your estimate of factors underlying Turkish tactics. End FYI. [7]

Dulles

[7] In telegram 119, July 14, the Embassy informed the Department that Menderes' decision on the exchange rate was partly a result of the influence of his associates who were opposed to the IMF recommendations. The Embassy noted that the Prime Minister's initial acceptance of the new exchange rate was a result of his belief that its inducements were greater than those contemplated by the United States and that the level of future US assistance might be based on Turkish action in this area. According to the Embassy, Menderes was more concerned about his personal popularity and "effective party control" than about stabilizing the Turkish economy. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.5–MSP/7–1456)

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344. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State [1]

Ankara, July 16, 1956—4 p.m.

126. For Hoover and Allen. I am much concerned by situation now developing result USA–IMF efforts get Turkey effect suitable currency change and stabilize her economic life (see Embtel 124, July 16). [2] Because my concern submit following:

1. In Prime Minister Menderes we are not dealing with an irresponsible carping peanut politician but with intelligent capable government leader who must answer politically for his acts.

2. In conversation reported Embtel 124 he showed no intention trying abandon proposal before IMF. Contrary wise he insisted his

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5–MSP/7–1656. Secret.

[2] In telegram 124, July 16, Warren transmitted the substance of a July 15 conversation with Menderes. According to the Ambassador, the Prime Minister expressed a desire to reach agreement with the IMF, but indicated that in his view there was an "honest difference of opinion" regarding what was best for Turkey. (*Ibid.*)

intention desire determination reach agreement with fund through further early Washington talks.

3. Emphasized he desired additional discussion with IMF based on changes caused by new national protection law, faulty preparation original proposal here, and his need understand have confidence in measure order defend it party councils, Grand National Assembly and before Turk public.

4. In conversation PM showed himself reasonable, free of carping, conscious we had not been as helpful as possible last year but grateful for what we did do and hopeful to God our present friendship "will continue for centuries". At same time stressed economic military political importance Turkey and USA proposed change.

Menderes speaks for the government which we must depend upon make Turkey strong and keep her our ally. Turks have not placed any price on various concessions made USA. Am convinced they do not want to do so but do want reach agreement with IMF.

Comment: Turk failure to reach agreement with IMF will not remove but seriously aggravate USA problem. Our position will be infinitely more difficult. For this reason I regard it utmost importance every effort be made bring IMF Turks together on basis assuring minimum essential conditions for continued effective implementation both internal external phases stabilization program.

Warren

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345. Letter From the Ambassador in Turkey (Warren) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Ankara, July 28, 1956.

DEAR MR. HOOVER: May I refer to Embassy telegram No. 124 of July 16. [2] It is one of several which we have sent on the subject of the IMF–Turkey efforts to work out proposals to meet Turkey's urgent foreign exchange and financial problem. Both IMF and the Department are behind the proposals. So is the Embassy. In fact, we in the Embassy are doing and will continue to do all we know how to get Turkey to go through with, to accept, and to implement the

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5–MSP/7–2856. Secret; Personal.
[2] See footnote 2, *supra*.

proposals. I am still hopeful that the joint efforts of the IMF, the Department, and the Embassy will bring about Turkey's acceptance and implementation. We will trust that it will be an acceptance and implementation which she believes in and will support. If so, the economic experts consider that Turkey will be headed for an ultimate escape from her economic and financial difficulties. If not, I am afraid that the Departmental, the Washington attitude may be that we will "let her stew in her own juice". This fear brings me to my major concern today and the purpose of this letter:

Having studied the situation carefully since my arrival here, having assessed what Turkey already has done for the U.S.A. and what she is prepared to do for us, having been briefed in key spots in Washington, London, Paris, Weisbaden and Naples on the importance to U.S.A. of Turkey and on what her loss would mean to us and to the Free World, having tried to guess what her failure loyally to cooperate with us would mean in men and dollars, and having taken note of our entire Near East scene in the light of Nasser's latest maneuver,[3] I want to say I am convinced we cannot turn the cold shoulder if Turkey fails to accept the IMF proposals. It is true and, perhaps, proper that IMF should, in that eventuality, drop the matter. But Turkey's importance to the United States and the West is such that her failure to accept the IMF proposals only augments our danger and increases our responsibility to find some way to keep her a valuable ally. She cannot be such if her economic situation "goes to pot". It is lacking foresight to say she must go along with us whether or not we do anything. In this world in which we live today all the rules are being broken. I am sure Turkey would be forced to break a few before she collapsed economically. We must not let her go down.[4]

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[3] On July 26, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company.

[4] Hoover replied on August 24:

"There seems to be general agreement among the economists as to the things to be done. We hope the Turkish Government will do them. However, if it does not, and if its difficulties are intensified, we will not turn a cold shoulder. We still count Turkey a friend and ally. While in recent years Congress has reduced appropriations for foreign aid the amounts of economic aid extended to Turkey have been increased. Although Turkey has not received the large loan which the Turkish Government requested, the aid extended has been and is substantial and can be expected to dull the edge of Turkish economic difficulties. It is doing this at the present time, witness ICA financing of Turkish petroleum and other current requirements. I hope that the provision of this aid by the United States does not foster in the Turkish Government an unwillingness to take corrective measures. This coming week may see decisions taken that may mean much in setting up conditions under which Turkey can overcome some of her baffling difficulties. Whether this happens or not, you can rest assured of our friendly attitude toward Turkey and of our sympathetic understanding of the difficulties with which you are surrounded." (Department of State, Central Files, 782.5–MSP/7–2856)

Pardon me for burdening you with even this tremendous possibility.

With warmest regards,

Cordially and sincerely yours,

Fletcher Warren

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346. Editorial Note

On August 21, during a discussion at the Secretary's Staff meeting, the subject of economic aid to Turkey was raised. According to the notes of the meeting:

"Mr. Allen said that a full scale drive by the Turks is under way for increased economic aid. The Turks reportedly were counting on help from Clarence Randall and Thomas Dewey. Mr. Murphy asked whether Mr. Randall had made any specific recommendations and expressed the wish that the U.S. could do something more for the Turks than already had been done. Mr. Allen replied there had been no specific recommendations, with the exception that the Turks were asked to put their economic house in order." (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

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347. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Randall) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Humphrey), the Under Secretary of State (Hoover), and the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Hollister) [1]

Washington, September 26, 1956.

GENTLEMEN: Yesterday I had another meeting of the ad hoc committee [2] dealing with Turkey.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5–MSP/9–2656. Confidential.

[2] In August an interagency group composed of representatives of the Departments of State and the Treasury and the ICA, chaired by Randall, met to maintain contact with the IMF regarding the economic situation in Turkey.

Several Turkish officials[3] are in town, and all of their people are pressing hard to know what their total assistance will be in the current fiscal year. Of course, it is not unreasonable to say that they need to know this for their planning.

We face again the old dilemma. On the one hand, Turkey is important to us, both from the military and the political point of view, having recently given such staunch assistance in the Suez crisis; on the other, she still refuses to face her exchange problem. Internally, she is sticking pretty well to the fiscal reforms promised to me when I was there last February. Externally, she continues to duck the recommendations of the IMF.

We concluded that we had no alternative than to give Turkey assurances at this time that her economic aid would equal that of last year. She has already had $25 million, which was the advance on devaluation that did not come off. This, therefore, means a present assurance of $55 million more.

We will have another meeting shortly to discuss the P.L. 480 program.

Sincerely yours,

CBR

[3] Esenbel, accompanied by other Turkish officials from the Central Bank, the Treasury Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ankara University, was visiting the United States for discussions with IMF officials.

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348. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 10, 1956, 11:45 a.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Defense of Turkey

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5/11–1056. Secret. Drafted by Bennett.

PARTICIPANTS

Defense:	*State:*
Admiral Radford	Mr. Murphy, G
Lt. Gen. Fox	Mr. Elbrick, EUR
Captain Wagner	Mr. Berry, NEA
Colonel Twitchell	Mr. Wolf, RA
	Mr. Bennett, G

Following a consideration of problems involved in U.S. support for the UN Middle East operation,[2] the subject of Turkish defense was discussed. Admiral Radford expressed his serious concern over the air defense of Turkey, particularly in view of recent reports of Soviet overflights.[3] He admitted that he had no confirmed information regarding overflights but said that he is convinced that the Soviets are now operating into Syria, either across Turkey or Iran. He said that, in view of the seriousness of the situation, there is great need for the U.S. to find out what is actually going on there. Turkish radar equipment is entirely inadequate, and there is now no capability in the area to intercept the type of Soviet aircraft which would be involved in an overflight. As emphasized in a previous conversation, the Admiral and the JCS would like to make arrangements to put U.S. Air Force interceptors into the Adana Base.

Mr. Murphy replied that it really comes down to a question of judgment as to whether we should approach the Turks at this time on the question of undertaking additional USAF operations in Turkey. After taking all the factors into consideration, the Department does not believe that such action would be desirable at the present time. It is a question of judgment, and the Department's judgment is against doing it now.

Admiral Radford went on to point out that the Turks themselves have handed over to NATO responsibility for the air defense of Turkey. Under existing arrangements the Turkish general staff theoretically could not send Turkish planes up to intercept hostile aircraft; orders would have to come from the NATO commander in the area, who happens to be an American. Mr. Wolf expressed the

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[2] Reference is to the creation of a U.N. Emergency Force and its role in the Suez Canal crisis.

[3] In telegram 1055, November 8, Warren informed the Department that Acting Foreign Minister Etem Menderes had called him to the Foreign Office that morning to convey information that, according to General Gruenther and the Turkish military attaché in Washington, there had been reports of Russian overflights of Turkish territory. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.5461/11–856) On November 9, the Department informed the Embassy in Ankara that U.S. intelligence sources had no information to verify reports of Soviet overflights. A possible explanation for the reports, the Department continued, was the possibility that MIG–15's have been seen in Syria "leading to presumption that they came via Turkey." (Telegram 1058 from Ankara, November 9; *ibid.*, 782.546/11–856)

belief that the NATO Council would be greatly concerned over the prospect of NATO assuming responsibility for the territorial defense of individual member states to the exclusion of national responsibility and authority. Admiral Radford responded that without such a NATO system we could not expect to have effective air defense in Turkey or in a number of other places.

Mr. Murphy said that he found it hard to understand why other members of NATO, such as Norway, Belgium or Portugal, would object to NATO taking over the command function if, as in the present case with Turkey, a NATO member had requested the organization to do it. Mr. Wolf pointed out that the concern on the part of other nations is based on their fear of triggering action which might be based on some local situation rather than on a NATO-wide issue. He suggested that the best way to handle the matter, if we believe it necessary to put extra equipment into Turkey, would be to have SACEUR come forward with a requirements study and then make arrangements with Turkey on the basis of that study.

Admiral Radford reiterated that the Turks have shown themselves entirely inadequate in radar operations. They have some F–84 aircraft which are not suitable for intercepting late-model Soviet equipment. Radar with higher and wider coverage, as well as up-to-date interceptor aircraft, is needed if there is to be an adequate defense for Turkey and other areas in the Middle East. Mr. Gray called attention to the fact that Secretary Wilson wants a Presidential decision on the matter of the introduction of additional equipment into Turkey, irrespective of State and Defense positions on the problem.

In a discussion of Turkish concern over reported overflights it was agreed that State and Defense do not accept the Turkish point of view that overflights in themselves call into play Article 5 of NATO.[4] Mr. Murphy, with the concurrence of Admiral Radford, asserted that overflights of the U.S. would not in themselves be considered to constitute a casus belli. We would handle the matter on the basis of a violation of our air space.

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[4] Article 5 deals with the subject of armed attack against any or all of the NATO member states and the reaction of the NATO members. The article stipulated, among other things, that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."

349. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State[1]

Ankara, November 14, 1956—10 p.m.

1130. For Acting Secretary Hoover and Assistant Secretary Rountree. Paris eyes only Dillon and Perkins. Reference: Embtel 1123.[2] Following is résumé of remarks made to me by Prime Minister Menderes noon November 14 when he handed me memo transmitted verbatim text reference telegram. Menderes spoke substantially as follows:

During our last meeting (re Istanbul telegram 365 to Department)[3] we discussed my recent visit to Tehran and general situation in ME.

I have now studied situation carefully. Upon my return to Ankara, Cabinet meeting was held attended also by Turk chief of staff, Turk chief of intelligence, high officials of Foreign Office, and president GNA. We had long meeting. President Bayar presided. We discussed overall situation in light information available. We decided to make known US Government our views concerning dangers surrounding us. We decided it was serious, delicate, and important, and to send substance our views in written text (reference telegram).

Important events are unfolding around us. We need frank exchange of views with US Government. Events moving fast. Our real aim is to explain our estimate to US and to learn what US Government thinks. Our memo is for high level study in US. We eager know US views about memo, and about general ME situation. We also plan to make our views known to UK.

On November 13 Nuri Said sent me a message asking if we had any recent information and inquiring situation Turkey. We plan inform him we are in touch with US Government. Pakistani President Mirza and Prime Minister Suhrawahrdy will be in Baghdad November 16. Suhrawahrdy plans come Ankara November 19, after two days in Baghdad, with chief Pakistani General Staff who is good man and good friend. I plan to initiate Pakistani Prime Minister into Turkish problems. We will talk about BP and everything that has bearing on BP. I myself may go to Baghdad and return Ankara with

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1456. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

[2] Dated November 14. (*Ibid.*)

[3] Telegram 365, November 10, reported on a conversation between Warren and Menderes after the latter's return from Tehran. Among the issues raised by the Prime Minister were US participation in the Baghdad Pact, the Palestine problem, the situation in Syria, and Turkey's petroleum situation. (*Ibid.*, 123–Warren, Fletcher)

Suhrawahrdy and Pakistani Chief of Staff. Pakistanis need encouragement. This evident even from Turkey. They are in great anxiety.

Re Syria, we are sending air force officer as courier to Damascus for four or five days. We are also sending chief of intelligence to Beirut. In addition, we may send two or three other competent Turkish officers well acquainted with situation to Lebanon and Syria, including possibly GNA Deputy who raised in Syria.

We are certain of our information re Soviet matériel shipped through Straits to Latakia (re Istanbul's 365 to Department, paragraph 5 [4]). Turkish general staff also convinced some MIGs have overflown Turkish territory. In these circumstances US must not leave Turks in obscurity.

US Government should keep Turks fully informed so that both countries may take measures which are necessary to be taken "in due time".

We are cool-minded, studying situation with care, and of strong resolution.

Embassy Comment:

1. Memo, and Prime Minister himself on two occasions, referred to need to move "in due time". Prime Minister is as convinced of need to avoid moving too soon or too fast as of moving too late or too slowly.

2. Specifically re memo, paragraph numbered 1, it significant that Turks state categorically further violations by Soviet planes "will be met with resistance". . . . We believe this current request should be given immediate and most serious consideration in Washington, and Embassy hopes US can find some appropriate way lend Turks support on this.

3. Re memo paragraph numbered 2, we request urgent and full guidance re Syria which we may use in early discussions with Turks. We surmise Turks would like enlist US support in taking "positive measures" in Syria. In this connection, memo refers to possibility conflict "perhaps in Turkey". We believe this is guarded reference to Turkish fear Soviets may open old wounds re Hatay in order goad Syria into attempt incorporate Iskenderun strip into Syrian territory.

4. Re memo paragraph numbered 3, we request guidance re Iran similar to that requested re Syria (*supra*).

5. As emphasized reference telegram, and as he himself stated in concluding his remarks, Prime Minister was calm, purposeful, deliberate, serious. He was clearly aware gravity of ME situation without being overwhelmed by it. His attitude, and tenor his remarks, more

[4] Paragraph 5 reported that the Turks claimed to have seen Soviet tanks on board vessels headed for Syria.

than confirm my impression great value Turks as steadfast US ally this area of world.

6. . . . I am also convinced, subject to such safeguards as authorities in Washington may consider requisite, that we should take Turks into our confidence as fully as possible. They are committed to us unqualifiedly. It incumbent upon us to reciprocate in substantial measure.

7. By separate telegram Embassy is submitting synthesis information . . . re "alert measure" taken by Turkish military authorities in present crisis. These similar to measures taken by US Government and reported in Department's circular telegram 390. [5]

8. Life Ankara and so far as we aware elsewhere Turkey continues completely normal with no sign public apprehension or ruffled calm.

Warren

[5] Circular telegram 390, November 10, transmitted the text of a November 8 statement by a Department of Defense spokesman on the question of a worldwide alert for American military commanders. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/11–1056)

350. Memorandum for the Record, by the Chief, Joint American Military Mission For Aid To Turkey (Dewey) [1]

Ankara, November 15, 1956.

SUBJECT

Conversation of Mr. Norman Armour with the Minister of Defense, on 14 November 1956 (also present were: Gen. Dewey, Mr. Hitchcock, and Capt. Ali Kiziltun)

1. Mr. Armour explained the reason he was in Turkey was to get impressions on the Foreign Aid Program and that he would be grateful for any information that the Minister of Defense might care to give to him. [2] He stated that he had had good talks with Gen. Dewey and Gen. Riley and representatives of ICA and had talked with the US Ambassador in Turkey, who is an old friend of his. He

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5/11–2056. Top Secret. Transmitted in despatch 311, November 20.

[2] Norman Armour was in Turkey as a member of a Special Committee To Study the Foreign Aid Program created by S. Res. 285, July 11.

stated that he was going to Izmir tomorrow and that he will spend some time next week in Istanbul. He stated that he had heard of the fine state of cooperation between the two nations that had been reached. He stated that he had always told the same thing to other visitors. The MOD stated that he would like to have this cooperation continued. He further stated that recent developments in the Middle East were of great importance to the Turkish government and the Turkish Armed Forces. The Turks are following very carefully the developments in this area and of course are taking the necessary measures to meet any kind of development. The MOD stated that he is sure that, as MOD, it would not be appropriate for him to talk about the proper use of American Aid delivered to Turkey but he is confident that Turkish and American representatives in Turkey have talked to him in detail about this subject.

2. Meanwhile, said the MOD, he would like to mention the recent developments, especially in the southern neighboring countries—Syria. The Russians have been trying recently to develop certain strong-holds in Syria and in this way to create a dangerous threat against Turkey. The Turks could not guess right now what this situation might take in the future. He would like to say that we do not believe the developments there are for the benefit of Turkey as the Russians have been actually flying over Turkish territory carrying troops to this country. Then there are the Russian Troop movements in Bulgaria—especially the Armored Units. These actions do not give the Turks confidence that this is for the benefit of Turkey. Again, said the MOD, the equipment and armament that were taken from the French and British in Egypt have shown that the Russians have been working for along time and shows plainly by their efforts in Europe that if no serious step is taken (by the Turks) this could develop into something more serious. Again, said the MOD, the serious developments in Hungary where the Russians are ruthlessly smashing the Hungarian people who do not possess any arms or weapons; and again the fever of hate-the-free world is looking at them while the Russians are strangling them, is against humanity. These events make the Turks think very seriously—may lead to a world war.

3. The MOD stated that recent events show that in case of attack or aggression the nations will have to struggle with their own assistance and own forces until assistance and aid can come. The recent developments and the efforts of the Russians have shown us that we should study a little more carefully our defense installations like the radar installations. It is shown that Russian planes flying over Turkey at 50,000 feet are secure as Turk radars cannot detect them. The Turks do not possess this capability. Again, unfortunately, the present aircraft with the Turkish Air Force are not capable to

cope with planes flying at such high altitudes. Therefore it is necessary to greatly augment the radar equipment. It would materially increase the coverage if they could install effective radars on the Black Sea to give early warning. Gen. Dewey stated that the Turkish Air Force had come to an agreement with JAMMAT just recently on a plan which would accomplish what the MOD desired. Gen. Dewey stated that he recognized that the present best Turkish radar had little effectiveness over 45,000 ft. He further stated that he was trying to get converters for the present light weight radars on the Black Sea as their lack was now constituting a void. Gen. Dewey stated that he was aware that the Turks would like the high performance radar which would have a detection capability up to 75,000 ft.

4. The MOD said that he would like to mention about another shortage which was in the AA equipment. Recent developments have shown that they should discuss this matter whenever they can. The AA equipment is of concern and the motors, signal and communications equipment which are in their M-Day units are necessary for their armies to function. Mr. Armour stated that he would be glad to carry back with him the comments from Gen. Dewey and the Ambassador on this subject. Gen. Dewey stated that Mr. Armour had been presented the equipment situation in some detail and had been told that the Turkish Army was presently in possession of only about 50% of the equipment required for the units that were committed to NATO. Mr. Armour stated that the MOD had been very helpful to him in bringing these shortages to his attention.

5. The MOD stated that while he is speaking about the shortages he would like to emphasize and mention that they are not disappointed with the situation and with the Russians because if we study history we will see that this nation has fought against the Russians and that no time have the Russians been successful against the Turks and they will not be until such time as there will not be a single Turkish man. The MOD stated that if we study the Communism concept of activities throughout the world we will see that this philosophy is attractive to the poor and the laboring classes who think that some day they will be prosperous and happy under it. It is not this way. Why, asked the MOD, does not Communism find a good place in Turkey? The reason is because this concept and idea comes from Russia, a country for which the Turks have always had a hatred and which at no time will this country accept Communism unless it comes from another country.

6. Mr. Armour mentioned movements on the Bulgarian boundary and in northern Thrace and assumed that this segment had been under study from the internal security point of view and NATO but that he would like to ask about recent events in Syria where

equipment may have been put into Syria. Would this create the possibility of a new front and a new line, and in this case would this lead to more of an activation of the Baghdad pact and this mean that this would require equipment other than that under MDAP. The MOD stated that the information the Turks get from Syria about the troop movements and other activities are not firm but there is this point of view about their intentions: one cannot help but think that the Russians are contemplating a long range plan—maybe they will not do anything; they may join Egypt, and may encircle Turkey from the East, West and the South, so that in case of war they would be in a good position to fight against Turkey. They would be able to execute a pincers movement through Thrace and Syria. As long as the Turks are strong and can hold the Turkish Straits the Turks do not think that the Soviets can accomplish anything this way. The MOD thinks that the main Soviet intention is to descend into the Mediterranean and conduct action against allied lines of communication. The present action on the part of the Soviets will create a Southern border and require consideration by NATO. Mr. Armour stated that in a recent press release by a high Turkish official, on the way to the meeting in Pakistan, he stated that Arab countries might see the benefit Turkey had received from the Baghdad Pact and might also decide to join. Mr. Armour asked if, in the opinion of the MOD, there was any hope that other Arab countries might desire to join the Baghdad Pact. The MOD replied that the official who made the statement had been in the capacity of Foreign Minister and that he had tried to express his personal opinion to show that other countries who had joined the Baghdad Pact had been aided to a better position against the common enemy. Mr. Armour stated that if Arab countries could have a feeling that being a member of the Baghdad Pact would help them to resist Soviet aims of submerging Arab countries, then they might have more of a feeling to join the Baghdad Pact.

7. The MOD stated that he would like to comment and present his views on the Southern Border of Turkey, and to state why consideration must be given to this point. He stated that there are many solutions that could be given: first of all, the Turks could bring some forces from the Eastern Front around Erzurum to the south to compose units or activate new mobile units on this front. He felt however to do this would be a great mistake because it would cause a reduction of the Eastern Front against the Russians—the Russians possess 22 divisions in the Caucasus which could be used against the Eastern Front and it is the Soviet intention to create a suggestion and strong feeling and crisis to cause the Turks to shift and reduce their main effort on the Eastern Front—therefore they do not want to move any troops from the Eastern Front. Therefore the

Turks recognize the necessity for mobile units to protect their Southern Front. Mr. Armour inquired as to what else would be required other than ground troops and was told that the Minister referred to Motorized units.

8. The MOD stated that he thought there was another important problem which Gen. Dewey knows about which had developed a couple of days ago when Russian planes were trying to overfly Turkey. This was brought to the attention of the NATO council and they are still discussing the matter and trying to see if this overflight would constitute a violation against Turkey for an attack. Gen. Gruenther thinks that this would be a direct attack against Turkey and should be acted against by Turkish Air Forces, but he stated Gen. Norstadt has said this is just an overflight of Turkey and should not be considered as an attack. This is contradictory, the MOD thinks that they are just trying to hold Turkey so that it would not act and create a difficult situation as a member of NATO. Mr. Armour stated that he hoped so—he stated that he appreciates what he has heard today; he stated that he had re-read the tribute Gen. MacArthur had paid to Turkish Armed Forces when he said that never had he seen finer fighting men. Mr. Armour stated that this summarizes what he has heard while here and from other sources; and would like to leave this as a parting note. The MOD stated in closing that the Turks are facing the situation calmly; that they do not intend to sit idly by and watch a bad situation develop, but whatever they do they will act in coordination with NATO and especially with the United States.

L.R. Dewey
Major General, USA

351. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) [1]

Washington, November 19, 1956.

SUBJECT

Turkish Memorandum of November 15, 1956 [2]

The Turkish memorandum describing the dangers with which Turkey is now beset and asking how we intend to cooperate with her, makes essentially the following principal points:

(a) Turkey describes herself as being "stabbed in the back," and expects at the very least active undeclared and local warfare on the part of the USSR in the Middle East.

(b) The Turks are deeply concerned over the adverse developments in Syria and over the exposed position and military weakness of Iran.

(c) Turkey feels that it should warn the USSR on overflights but lacks the aircraft potential to make her warning effective; it desires United States support in a warning to the Soviet Union.

(d) Turkey feels a general need for appropriate action, coordination of efforts and exchange of information to meet the Soviet threats.

(e) High level United States consideration and comment on the foregoing is urgently sought. The British have been informed by the Turks of this approach.

There follows for your information our preliminary reaction to this Turkish approach.

(a) As we see it, the Turkish estimate of the situation indicates that the Turks are more concerned than the circumstances warrant. It is clear that, associated with their pessimistic view of developments, is a Turkish feeling that there should be a fuller exchange of views on our respective estimates of the situation. To meet that problem we believe arrangements should be made for a weekly or bi-weekly exchange of intelligence information with the Turks in Ankara.

(b) The Turks are deeply worried over their Iranian and Syrian flanks and over Turkey's possible isolation and encirclement. Their concern over Iran is in the context of our failure to make a commitment for Iran's defense, through the mechanism of the Baghdad Pact, similar to that for Greece and Turkey's defense through

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.82/11–1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Jones, Williams, and Rountree.

[2] Transmitted in telegram 1123 from Ankara, November 14. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11–1456)

NATO, and Pakistan's defense through SEATO. If we are not going to join the Baghdad Pact, the development of alternative means for providing security assurances to Iran, and thus reassuring Turkey, must be given active and high-priority consideration. Among the alternatives are direct bilateral arrangements or through SEATO. As you know, this matter is being given urgent study by the Department and joint discussions with Defense are to be held on Monday.

(c) Turkish concern over Syria is in the context of Russian penetration there. We feel that their note is an invitation to the discussion of positive measures toward effecting a change of government in Syria. The Syrian situation is being urgently evaluated here and, based on this evaluation, we plan to convey soonest to the Turks appropriate information thereon. The question of alterations in the government of Syria and the desirability of consulting with the Turks on this matter, are also matters calling for urgent consideration. It should be noted that there is some basis to fear that the main purpose of the Turkish memorandum might be to put the United States on notice that the Turks are considering action in Syria, and thus minimize criticism on our part if they should proceed.

(d) The present Turkish concern is prompted in part by their belief that there are now numerous Russian overflights of Turkey. . . . There is a clear need for better aircraft detection facilities in Turkey and it is recommended as a minimum that current radar construction programs there under MDAP be accelerated. This is being taken up with Defense.

(e) The question of aircraft support has been raised informally by the Turks on several occasions during the last two weeks but they have not yet specifically addressed such a request to the United States. We have told the Turks that the matter of "American aircraft for Turkey" is under study. In view of the possibility of such a formal request being received soon, we believe that this general problem of detection and interception capability in Turkey should be given very high priority by the JCS.

(f) Turkey traditionally has sought to deal with the United States bilaterally on any questions where multilateral organizations are involved. To resort to bilateral arrangements of this sort out of the context of NATO would invite other NATO countries to request similar bilateral arrangements. The Turks appear to feel rebuffed over NATO's refusal thus far to interpret overflights of Turkey as a basis for invoking Article 5 of the NATO treaty, and would seem now anxious to obtain satisfaction from us.

(g) We do not believe that we should accede to the Turk request that we give public support to any warnings that they give to the Russians on the question of overflights. It would be imprudent to give such warnings in the absence of what we regard as definite

confirmation, and in any event we should not give such bilateral assurances out of the context of existing NATO arrangements.

(h) Since the British have been informed by the Turks of this approach to us, we should perhaps consult with the British before responding. [3]

[3] On November 20, MacArthur sent the following memorandum to Hoover:

"I mentioned to the President this morning the recent memorandum we had received from the Turks, which he had seen. I said we were actively studying what we could do to meet the Turkish apprehensions, and said that specifically we were tentatively thinking about having weekly or bi-weekly intelligence exchanges with the Turks in Ankara; we were thinking about strengthening their radar screen; that while we did not believe it desirable to join the Baghdad Pact, we were thinking about some kind of a declaration which would be helpful not only with the Turks but with the Iranians, Iraqis, and Pakistanis; and finally, that we had asked the Department of Defense to study the question of whether additional US interceptor aircraft might be made available to the Turks. I made clear that our study was still in the preliminary stage but we had the problem under active consideration." (*Ibid.*, 782.5/11–2056)

352. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, December 10, 1956—9:19 p.m.

1339. In reply to memo contained in your 1123[2] you should deliver following memorandum to Prime Minister Menderes at earliest opportunity.

"The Turkish Memorandum of November 14 has been given most careful study by the United States Government. The United States fully appreciates the potential dangers to which the Turkish Government has referred, and wishes to assure its Turkish allies once more of the steadfastness of its friendship and of its earnest desire to consult regularly on such matters of mutual interest and concern.

The United States is glad to note that the Turkish Government in its memorandum has posed its grave questions in the light of the long standing Turkish-American relationship and the common problems of the NATO alliance. The plans that are to be made and the

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1456. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Williams and Jones. Repeated to Moscow, London, Athens, Paris for USRO and Knight, Rome for McSweeney, and Tehran.

[2] Dated November 14. (*Ibid.*)

action that is to be taken should of course be fully consonant with the interests, plans and actions of NATO.

The United States agrees with the Turkish view regarding the potential dangers of a Soviet policy of encirclement and isolation. Already the American Ambassador in Ankara has transmitted to the Turkish Government an estimate of the particular dangers in Syria. The United States would like to maintain hereafter an exchange of information and views on this subject, both bilaterally and in the North Atlantic Council. It is noted that the Turkish memorandum refers in some detail to the situation in Syria. The United States would be interested in learning more precisely what the Turkish Government might have in mind.

It has also been noted that various reports of actual Soviet penetration into Syria in the form of military personnel and quantities of Soviet military equipment, particularly aircraft, have considerably exaggerated the actual situation as we understand it to be. Discounting these exaggerated reports, there nevertheless remains a situation which is the cause of serious concern, the main factor at present being the apparent influence of military elements in Syria who seem to be favorably disposed toward the Soviet Union, and the tendency of the Syrians to look to the Soviet Government for support.

It is obvious that the Soviet Union has capitalized upon the Egyptian situation to increase the fears of the Syrians that hostile forces are threatening them, and to claim that the Soviets are their primary source of security. This presents a situation which is difficult to cope with, but it is our estimate that it will be far easier to deal with it as there is a withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt and an increase of confidence that hostilities will not recur. In these circumstances the atmosphere for a change in the trends in Syria might be more propitious.

The dangers that face Iran are likewise clear to the United States Government. The United States has, in its communiqué of November 29, 1956,[3] already made clear its stout support of the Baghdad Pact and the grave view the United States would take of a threat to the territorial integrity and political independence of the members of the Pact. Moreover, it should be clear to all that if Iran again becomes the object of aggressive Soviet designs as it was in 1946 the United States will, as it did then, lend its influence and full support to United Nations action to check aggression. The determination of this Government to cooperate fully with the United Nations in such matters has been so amply demonstrated in Korea that it does not require further elucidation. We are, of course, continuing substantial economic and

[3] For text of the U.S. statement, issued by the Department of State as a press release, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 10, 1956, p. 918.

military aid to Iran and shall demonstrate in all feasible ways our interest in the welfare and security of that country.

In dealing thus with the problems of the flanks of Turkey, the United States does not underestimate the central problem of the defense of Turkey itself. Appreciating the need for more effective air defense measures, the United States is prepared to explore ways to contribute to the solution of this problem.

Regarding the 'coordination of cooperation' in NATO, the United States Government reiterates to the Turkish Government its resolution to join its allies in taking the action called for under the North Atlantic Treaty against armed attack on Turkey. Agreed NATO procedures, in our view, cover the measures for coordinating action under the treaty.

In setting forth these views and intentions, the United States Government wishes to express once more its appreciation for the frankness and spirit of confidence which have marked the Turkish Government's Memorandum and to assure the Turkish Government of its willingness to undertake further consultations upon these problems of serious mutual interest."[4]

Hoover

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[4] On December 18, in telegram 1442, the Embassy replied to this telegram:

"Anticipate Turk authorities here may approach U.S. re promise to Menderes that U.S. prepared expiore ways contribute to solution problem more effective air defense measures for Turkey.

"Would appreciate guidance as to response to be made any such approach particularly with reference when, where and who Turks should consult." (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–1856)

In telegram 1438, December 20, the Department informed the Embassy at Ankara:

"Defense is studying possible measures to assist Turkey in air defense. Until present study completed specific guidance must be delayed.

"Meanwhile if Turks raise question report fully but do not take initiative at this time in discussing matter with them.

"Defense concurs." (*Ibid.*, 782.5/12–2056)

353. Memorandum of Discussion at the 316th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 14, 1957 [1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1 and 2.]

U.S. Policy Toward Turkey (NSC 5510/1; NSC 5610; NSC Actions Nos. 1486, 1560 and 1624; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs", dated December 5, 1956; NSC 5708; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U.S. Policy Toward Turkey", dated March 11, 1957 [2])

In the course of his briefing of the Council on the reference report (NSC 5708), Mr. Cutler summarized much of the paper, read the sections containing the Planning Board recommendations in their entirety, explained the Financial Appendix, [3] and summarized the basis on which the Planning Board had arrived at its recommendations. He also pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved these recommendations. General Twining said that he had no further comments to make. (A copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

At the conclusion of Mr. Cutler's lengthy briefing, the President said he was puzzled by the statement on page 3 that Turkey was required to maintain forces to protect her southern flank. Was she apprehensive of invasion from that quarter? Mr. Cutler and Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Turks were much alarmed over the development of Soviet influence and the build-up of forces in Syria.

Mr. Cutler then asked Acting Secretary of State Herter if he had any comments to make. Secretary Herter replied that the State Department approved the recommendations in NSC 5708, and that

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on March 15.

[2] Neither NSC 5610 nor 5610/1 is printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series) None of the NSC Action Nos. cited here is printed. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action) NSC 5708, "U.S. Policy Toward Turkey," February 26, is *ibid.*, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5708 Memoranda. The memorandum for the NSC from its Executive Secretary transmitted the views of the Joint Chiefs on NSC 5708. (*Ibid.*)

[3] Not printed.

he had no further comments to make. He understood, however, that Mr. Hollister had some comments.

. . . . . .

Mr. Cutler pointed out that paragraph 4–d of NSC 5708, while it advised against using the rate of military build-up as a lever to force progress toward Turkish economic stability, did indicate that the rate of military build-up should continue to take account of Turkish capabilities to absorb and support the military program.

Mr. Hollister then directed the Council's attention to paragraph 15, which indicated that economic aid of between $100 million and $200 million annually through FY 1960 would be acceptable for planning purposes. Mr. Hollister expressed strong objection to the figure of $200 million. He pointed out that $100 million annually was the most we had ever given the Turks in the past, and warned that we could not keep on adding new assistance programs if we did not make cuts elsewhere.

Secretary Wilson said that he was well aware that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt rather strongly about the need for maintaining Turkish armed forces at the levels that they had recommended. Nevertheless, Secretary Wilson believed that the Turks might well be better off with a smaller elite force. This would release other soldiers for useful activity in support of the Turkish economy. Accordingly, he thought it might be desirable to take another look at the force levels which were being maintained by Turkey.

The President pointed out that it would be extremely difficult to achieve the creation of an elite force in Turkey because of the low level of education. Mr. Cutler observed facetiously that what was lacking in Turkey were the advantages of a Harvard education. It was pointed out by other members of the Council that it was precisely this lack which made the Turkish soldiers such tough fighters. The President expressed strong agreement (laughter).

Mr. Cutler then pointed out that if changes in Turkish force levels were to be contemplated, these changes would have to be negotiated through NATO channels. He thereupon asked Mr. Hollister if he thought that paragraph 15 should be revised to indicate more precisely a U.S. objective of keeping U.S. economic assistance to Turkey at a level not exceeding $100 million annually. Mr. Hollister indicated that he certainly did think the paper should specify this, and that it ought to set forth very clearly how poorly the Turks had performed in the past with respect to their promises to undertake necessary economic and financial reforms.

General Twining indicated that he, like Secretary Wilson, had a feeling that the Turks might be able safely to make a slight

reduction in the level of the armed forces they were currently maintaining.

The President stated that our policy papers on foreign assistance should state that if the countries we are assisting refuse to do anything whatever to put their own houses in order, we would have to alter our own U.S. position. Help to such countries ought to be conditioned on their willingness to do at least a little something to help themselves if the United States is footing the bill. There were a number of definite steps, continued the President, that the Turks could take in the direction of economic and financial stability. We have been pointing out these steps for years. If the Turks still refuse to take some of these steps, the President was not sure that they could be described, in the words of NSC 5708, as "staunch allies" of the United States. The revised paper on Turkey should therefore say in effect that the United States "assumes" that the Turks will take these steps.

After further discussion of this problem, the President told General Twining, who was about to see General Norstad, that he should suggest that General Norstad try to persuade the Turks to accept a lower level for their armed forces.

With respect to modifications of the present paragraph 4–d on the rate of military build-up, the President suggested wording to the effect that our military assistance program to Turkey is "based on the assumption that Turkey will make some progress" toward economic and financial stability.

. . . . . .

The National Security Council: [4]

a. Noted and discussed the draft report on the subject contained in NSC 5708, prepared by the NSC Planning Board; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 11, 1957.

b. Directed the NSC Planning Board to prepare for subsequent Council consideration a new statement of policy on Turkey, [5] to supersede NSC 5510/1, in the light of the discussion at the meeting; with particular reference to:

(1) Prompt discussion with General Norstad as to the possibility of achieving a reduction in the NATO-approved force levels for Turkey, in phase with availability of advanced weapons to the Turkish armed forces.

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[4] Paragraphs a–b and subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1682, approved on March 17. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

[5] Document 359.

(2) Provision of economic aid of not more than approximately $100 million annually, unless Turkey takes reasonable steps toward stabilizing the economy and a realistic rate of exchange.

(3) Making clear that the entire U.S. assistance program to Turkey is based on the assumption that Turkey will make progress toward economic stabilization and a realistic rate of exchange.

[Here follow items 4–6.]

S. Everett Gleason

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354. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State [1]

Ankara, March 22, 1957—10 p.m.

2183. From Richards. [2] Mission met yesterday afternoon for about 2 hours with Turkish Prime Minister, acting Foreign Minister, Minister Defense, Minister Finance, Foreign Office SecGen and other Turkish staff. Atmosphere friendly, easy. Prime Minister who had just returned from attending naval maneuvers eastern Aegean aboard *Forrestal* was in excellent mood.

Prime Minister opened by giving brief review of ME situation, Russian attempts take advantage recent crisis and role BP. He stressed GOT fully aware importance we attach to BP and considers US "two-thirds member" but is fearful that without full US adherence enemies of Pact will broadcast propaganda that US not fully interested.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2357. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Tehran, Karachi, Kabul, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli, Beirut, Athens, Rabat, Tunis, New Delhi, Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Rome, Tel Aviv, and Jidda.

[2] On March 12, Ambassador Richards left the United States for a 57-day mission to the Middle East. Richards visited 15 countries as part of an effort to explain the President's January proposals on economic and military assistance to countries in the Middle Eastern area. Richards visited Turkey between March 20 and 23.

With respect American doctrine,[3] Prime Minister stressed his government not trying get lion's share for Turkey but rather is primarily interested in ME security. He did, however, state that US should look to declared friends first, consider second those states which are uncommitted but working for same ideas and should disregard third group composed of those states opposing efforts buttress ME security. GOT realizes, Prime Minister continued, great wisdom inherent doctrine to help everyone possible but in politics hard choice must be made.

I replied by stressing great importance US government and people attach to Turkey, and to Turkey's forthright and steadfast position in free world collective security system. I spoke of Turkey as strong rock of ME, eastern anchor NATO, and western anchor BP. I brought warm personal messages from King and Prime Minister Libya both to Turkish Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister, and I mentioned King's reference to "little Russia" alongside Libya in addition to "big Russia" farther away.

Re US adherence BP I understood great desire have US join but stated that there were certain considerations which conditioned present US decision this regard.

Re American doctrine, I stated that it meant what it said, as Turkish Government and people well aware, but that certain other governments might not be so conscious of US intentions re ME security. Re priorities as among friends, fence sitters and others, I said that we understood his views but that we also feel encouragement USA government to weaker governments in ME would have tonic effect on all. A relatively small portion of aid to weak country might create new friend who could join old friends in area. In any case, I added, formulation American doctrine in effect tantamount to US adherence Baghdad Pact since it comprises even further commitments than adherence itself would involve.

At this point, Prime Minister interjected that fully appreciative thought GOT was of great value doctrine, and thought his awareness might appear inconsistent with GOT desire USA adherence BP,

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[3] On January 5, President Eisenhower in a statement before a joint session of Congress requested legislative approval to authorize military and economic assistance to countries in the Middle Eastern area that requested aid. The measures that the President proposed also included the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States "to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism." The President's message, introduced into the House of Representatives on January 5 as H.J. Res. 117 and into the Senate on January 9 as S.J. Res. 19, was approved by Congress and signed by Eisenhower on March 9. The Middle East Resolution became popularly known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. For full texts of the initial resolution, and its amended version, see *AFP: Current Documents 1957*, pp. 783–830.

there really no contradiction because other countries do not have same comprehension as Turkey, and might say in effect that those not fully with us are against us.

I then stated, on confidential basis, willingness US upon invitation from BP Council to join military committee. I said Prime Minister free to notify other Baghdad Pact members this effect on confidential basis.

Underlining financial limitations of plan and extent of area to be included, I referred to regional planning projects including railroad to Iran, Istanbul–Karachi highway and telecommunications, adding experts could discuss these later.

I declared US willingness supplement present military program, and Captain Pitts, Defense representative on mission, explained we proposed to provide:

(1) One squadron F–100 aircraft (re unnumbered joint State–Defense message March 19 to Tripoli for Richards signed Sprague).[4]

(2) One submarine on loan.

He made clear aircraft were intended as first step toward modernization Turkish AF enabling it to expedite transition to most recent type interceptor. Turkey would be first country in NATO or ME to have this type plane. He emphasized strictly confidential nature these matters, and I added suggestion information be withheld even from BP partners. Menderes agreed saying Turkey not anxious make others envious.

Prime Minister suggested another meeting March 22 at which time he has offered (and I have enthusiastically accepted proposal) to submit certain GOT views on other countries in area which mission might visit.

No substantive information re meeting given to press.

Communiqué for issuance following meeting March 22 being prepared and will be coordinated with Turks.[5]

Warren

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[4] Not found.

[5] Transmitted in telegram 2198, March 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2357)

In telegram 2203, March 23, the Embassy at Ankara conveyed the substance of the second 2-hour meeting between Richards and Menderes. The conversation dealt with the situation in the Middle East, focusing on the situations in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Afghanistan. (*Ibid.*) Richards met again with Menderes on March 25 (telegram 2228 from Ankara, March 27; *ibid.*, 120.1580/3–2757) and with President Bayar on the same day. (Telegram 2219 from Ankara, March 26; *ibid.*, 120.1580/3–2657)

355. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State [1]

Ankara, March 26, 1957—4 p.m.

2215. Reference: Deptel 2156, March 16. [2] My considered view is that Turk Government would reckon that added sense of military security resulting from stationing combined American indigenous atomic task force in Turkey would outweigh political risks arising from propaganda charges that we were preparing Turkey to be "atomic battleground".

Our views as to Turkish receptivity of American forces, their social impact on Turkey and political and security problems that might be raised were recently set forth in my letter to Reinhardt dated March 12. [3] In addition to those views we believe the following points should be made:

(1) Receptivity of Turkish Government. The Turkish military will be receptive to the idea of stationing an American ground force with an atomic capability in Turkey for substantially the same reasons that they were receptive to the stationing of a USAF all weather fighter squadron and radar unit here. They consider that a ground atomic capability is required for the survival of Turkey and would realize that under present conditions too only way in which such atomic capability could become available to Turkey quickly would be through the stationing of appropriate US forces in this country. The Turkish Government is aware that it is going to receive 2 Honest John battalions under the FY 57 program. The Turkish military will know that these 2 Honest John battalions will be inadequate to provide the degree of fire support essential to effective defense. They will estimate that the addition of the atomic capable force under consideration will greatly enhance their defensive capability and for that reason will look favorably on the offer. The proposal that the American unit be phased out of Turkey in FY 60 will serve to reduce such reluctance as the Turkish Government and people may have to permit foreign military forces, as such, to be stationed on Turkish territory. If the weapons and the equipment brought in by the American force will ultimately be made available to Turkey, as well as the permanent installations developed in

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56382/3–2657. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to Athens for principal officer only.

[2] Telegram 2156 solicited the Embassy's views on the Turkish Government's receptivity to the idea of stationing American forces in Turkey and to the idea of an atomic task force in the country. (*Ibid.*, 711.56381/3–1657)

[3] The text of Warren's reply to Reinhardt's letter was transmitted in an unnumbered despatch, March 12. (*Ibid.*, 711.56382/3–1257)

support of them, and if the stationing of the American force is utilized to provide on the job training for Turkish personnel, the attractiveness of the offer to the Turkish Government would, of course, be correspondingly increased.

(2) Social impact on Turkey. As indicated in paragraph 3B in my letter to Reinhardt mentioned above although the corrosive influence necessarily arising from the presence of foreign troops is comparatively negligible in Turkey at the present time, it can be expected over a period of years gradually to grow in Turkey as it would any where else. A force of the size contemplated in the reference telegram, of course, accelerates this corrosive influence, moreover the higher standards of living which would be enjoyed by the American personnel would probably pose increasingly difficult problems as Turkish personnel are actually phased into the unit. Such impact in our view could best be minimized through selection criteria which would screen carefully American personnel to be sent with the force to Turkey and through US Command supervision after arrival here.

(3) Political and security problems. We do not expect significant internal political objection to the proposal that an atomic capable US unit be stationed in Turkey. Several weeks ago the Soviet Chargé here called on the Deputy Secretary General at Foreign Office and subsequently on the acting Foreign Minister regarding the alleged establishment of a US atomic base in Turkey which he said he had read about in an Istanbul newspaper and also in an Iranian newspaper. The response he got from the Foreign Office was that if such a thing were true, a base of this type was established for the NATO purpose of defense.

We do not envisage any unusual security problems for military units armed with conventional weapons; in the event atomic warheads are stocked in Turkey certain security precautions in regard to storage will become necessary. These security precautions will necessitate screening off certain areas to Turkish personnel and provision of American guard units. We anticipate no problem with the Turkish military on this and in so far as the Government is concerned we are confident it can be handled satisfactorily with the Prime Minister.

Warren

356. Editorial Note

On April 10, during the Secretary's Staff meeting, Ambassador Warren, in Washington for consultation, briefed the participants on the situation in Turkey, According to the notes of the meeting:

"Ambassador Fletcher Warren briefly reviewed US relations with Turkey. He said three factors stand out: 1) the Turkish feeling of friendship for the US and American people; 2) the accompanying feeling of solidarity with the US and Turkey's willingness to gear its foreign policy with ours; and 3) the realism of Turkey's appraisal of the events occurring around it. He called attention to the strength Turkey draws from its heritage and the respect it enjoys from those nations which were formerly parts of the Ottoman Empire. He said he believes the US must continue to extend assistance to the Turks if they are to continue to maintain their important strategic position.

"Mr. Murphy asked whether, in the Ambassador's opinion, the Turkish Government would be prepared to reply to the recent Soviet threats that countries which permit the stationing of US atomic units on their soil will be obliterated in a nuclear war. Ambassador Warren said he felt certain the Turks would make such a statement if the US desires such." (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

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357. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) [1]

Washington, April 12, 1957.

SUBJECT

Call of Ambassador Fletcher Warren, April 12, 2:30 p.m.

Ambassador Warren has spent a very active two weeks in Washington and saw the President for about ten minutes. He has also seen the Secretary very briefly, Governor Herter, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Dillon, Mr. Bowie and others within the Department. He had appointments with Mr. Randall, Mr. Hollister, Mr. Humphrey and Mr. Burgess, Mr. Larson, Mr. Benson, Mr.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5–MSP/4–1257. Secret. Drafted by Brewster.

Sprague, and Mr. Wisner. He has also met with Mr. Cochran, IMF, Mr. Black, IBRD, and Mr. Waugh, EX-IM Bank.

Call on the President

Ambassador Warren was particularly pleased to have had the opportunity to see the President and to be in a position on his return to Ankara to convey personal greetings from the President to President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes.[2] He may wish to pass on to you what was told him by the President. With reference to Cyprus, the President suggested the Ambassador tell Prime Minister Menderes not to be so sticky on the Cyprus problem; a solution among reasonable partners should be possible.

Cyprus

The Ambassador feels it important to continue close consultations with the Turks on the Cyprus problem and will personally convey the US Government's reply to the Turkish aide-mémoire of April 4[3] immediately upon his return to Ankara.

Destroyers for Turkey

The Ambassador recognizes that there is no likelihood of the US going along with an increase in the NATO force goals for destroyers from eight to twelve. The present NATO ceiling is eight. Should the UK-Turkish arrangements for obtaining four destroyers on a long-term credit not materialize, the US Government may have to consider replacing the four UK Hunt class destroyers on a one a year phased schedule.

Economic Measures

Ambassador Warren has heard from many quarters concerning the need for the Turkish Government to take measures to put its economic house in order. The Ambassador has recognized this need but has pointed out that Prime Minister Menderes, as a politician with an election coming in May 1958, is unlikely in the next year to take measures Washington authorities consider adequate.

Ambassador Warren's Concerns

Ambassador Warren is very concerned at the attitude he has found in many quarters in Washington to the effect that the Turks are always asking for assistance from the U.S., i.e. $300 million loan,

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[2] According to Eisenhower's Appointment Book, Warren met with the President at the White House on April 9 from 10:55 to 11:02 a.m. (Eisenhower Library, President's Appointment Book)

[3] The Turkish aide-mémoire is not printed, but see Document 238.

additional destroyers, more PL 480 wheat, an increase in the US support for their defense budget from 240 million TL to 314 million TL, an additional $30 million in 1947 FY aid, special treatment on the $4.2 million interest payments which have fallen due. He states that the Turks have accepted negative replies in the past and will continue to do so, but Ambassador Warren is sincerely concerned that these turndowns will lead to a deterioration in U.S.-Turk relations to the point where the US will not be able to obtain what it wants from Turkey when it wants it. He hopes that Washington authorities have taken into full account the implications of continuing to maintain pressures on the Turks by refusing additional help. He is concerned lest the Turkish officials begin placing a price tag on the facilities that country is offering the US and about the impact such a move might have on U.S.-Turk relations. He is however fully conscious of the fact the aid legislation may have rough sledding on the Hill. He simply hopes that Turkey will receive a fair share of whatever aid the Congress appropriates.

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358. Memorandum of Discussion at the 328th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington June 26, 1957 [1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–3.]

4. *US Policy Toward Turkey* (NSC 5510/1; NSC 5610; NSC Actions Nos. 1486, 1560, 1624, and 1682; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain US Aid Programs", dated December 5, 1956; NSC 5708; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "US Policy Toward Turkey", dated March 11 and May 24, 1957; NSC 5708/1 [2])

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the contents of NSC 5708/1 (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting), and

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on June 27.

[2] For text of NSC Action No. 1682, see footnote 4, Document 353. The memorandum of May 24 transmitted the views of the JCS on NSC 5701. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5708 Memoranda) NSC 5708/1 is identical to NSC 5708/2 (Document 359), except for paragraph 28, which is discussed above. The remaining actions and documents are identified in footnote 2, Document 353.

called special attention to the only paragraph in dispute—paragraph 28, reading as follows:

"28. During FY 1957 and FY 1958, continue to support Turkish force levels of 20 8/3 divisions, 64 combatant ships, and 21 air force squadrons. The total military aid program for Turkey for the period FY 1957–60 should provide for such advanced weapons as the Honest John, the Nike, and the F–100, for appropriate conventional equipment, and for recurring maintenance costs. The United States should review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces, appropriately revise Turkish force levels in the light of NATO requirements. [In such review, consideration should also be given to the role of Turkish forces under the Baghdad Pact.] [3]

He indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to delete the third and fourth sentences of the paragraph, on the ground that these sentences had been put into the policy paper to satisfy a requirement (NSC Action No. 1682) to query General Norstad as to the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey in phase with availability of advanced weapons to the Turkish armed forces. Mr. Cutler pointed out that General Norstad had been queried by the Joint Chiefs, and had reported to them his view that it was neither practicable nor desirable at this time, from the military, political or psychological [illegible] of view, to initiate a proposal for reducing NATO-approved Turkish force levels. Nevertheless, Mr. Cutler expressed the opinion that it would be sensible to leave in paragraph 28 a portion of the third sentence, reading "in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces, appropriately revise Turkish force levels in the light of NATO requirements." He then asked Admiral Radford to comment on this suggestion.

Admiral Radford pointed out that he had not been present at the previous Council discussion of the Turkish policy paper, but that Mr. Cutler's suggestion was all right with him. Secretary Wilson shared this view, and pointed out that he did not agree with the advice that General Norstad had given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford said that it would be very difficult at the present time to initiate any reduction in the NATO-approved Turkish force levels, but he had no objection to leaving in paragraph 28 the phraseology suggested by Mr. Cutler. Secretary Wilson expressed great anxiety about the expenses which were being incurred in Turkey and in similar areas by the Department of Defense.

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[3] Brackets in the source text. A footnote following the brackets on the source text reads: "Budget proposes deletion."

Admiral Radford then expressed great doubt as to whether it was necessary to include the detailed description of the advanced weapons which, according to the text of paragraph 28, we would be supplying to the Turks. It seemed questionable to Admiral Radford whether NSC papers should go into such detailed specifications. It was accordingly agreed to remove from paragraph 28 the specific reference to modern weapons, and to substitute general language therefor.

Secretary Wilson expressed agreement with Admiral Radford's position, and the President, looking around at the members of the Council, predicted that some day they would all come to believe him when he said that NSC policy reports acted upon by the National Security Council should not be transmitted in their verbatim form to the subordinates of the members of the Council or to our diplomatic establishments abroad.

After further discussion by Secretary Wilson and other members of the Council, Mr. Cutler suggested that paragraph 28, including the portions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to delete, should remain in the policy paper. The President agreed to this suggestion, and made inquiry as to the size and character of over-all US assistance to Turkey. He said he wished the relevant facts in the case in order to write a personal letter to General Norstad. In the ensuing discussion, Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford pointed out with emphasis that despite the costs, our assistance to Turkey was certainly one of the better bargains for our money. The President said he did not doubt this, but that Turkey, a poor country, could get along better with a smaller and more efficient force. Mr. Cutler requested Admiral Radford to supply him with the facts requested by the President for his use in writing to General Norstad.

It was agreed to delete the final sentence of paragraph 28, as proposed by the Bureau of the Budget.

The National Security Council: [4]

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5708/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1682–b; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including their comments on General Norstad's recommendations regarding a possible reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey, transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 24, 1957.

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[4] Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 1741. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5708/1, subject to the revision of paragraph 28 to read as follows:

"28. During FY 1958, continue to support Turkish force levels of 20 8/3 divisions, 64 combatant ships, and 21 air force squadrons. The total military aid program for Turkey for the period FY 1957–60 should provide for appropriate advanced weapons, for appropriate conventional equipment, and for recurring maintenance costs. The United States should review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces, appropriately revise Turkish force levels in the light of NATO requirements."

Note: NSC 5708/1, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5708/2 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the US Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

[Here follows item 5.]

S. Everett Gleason

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359. National Security Council Report [1]

NSC 5708/2 *Washington, June 29, 1957.*

STATEMENT OF US POLICY ON TURKEY

General Considerations

1. In the post-war period, Turkey has taken on particular importance in US efforts to build a position of strength in the Near East. It is strategically located astride the Bosphorus–Dardanelles water passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and has contiguous land frontiers with Russia and Bulgaria. Aware of Turkey's strategic importance, the USSR has exerted political pressures on Turkey and, more recently, offered economic assistance. However, Turkey has rejected these overtures and has remained aligned with the West.

2. Turkey has granted extensive military facilities to the United States which have great strategic value. SAC facilities in Turkey extend US capabilities to mount effective air strikes in the event of

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC Memoranda. Top Secret. Transmitted under cover of a note by Lay to the NSC, June 29.

hostilities with the USSR. Turkey is a link in the chain of US military global communications. Facilities within Turkey have also been granted to the Navy. In addition, the headquarters of the NATO Commander Allied Land Forces Southeast Europe and of the 6th Allied Tactical Air Force are located at Izmir.

3. Turkey is consistently endeavoring to broaden and strengthen its ties with Western Europe and the United States, and is an active member of the United Nations and NATO. Turkey's military contribution in the Korean action was outstanding. At the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian countries, Turkey boldly defended Western democratic principles in the face of Chinese Communist maneuvering and Asian neutralist activities.

4. The Turkish Government has played a very active part in the creation of two regional organizations to bolster security and stability in its area, the Balkan Pact and the Baghdad Pact. The more far-reaching in geographic impact was the Baghdad Pact formed in 1955. Turkey played a vigorous and skillful role in the organization of the Baghdad Pact, in which the United States saw the embodiment of the "Northern Tier" concept. Turkey has subsequently played a leading role in the activities of the Baghdad Pact and has actively urged the United States to adhere to the Pact and give it greater military and economic support.

5. Turkey can exert considerable influence on certain countries of the Middle East, both through the Baghdad Pact and independently. Turkey has taken an outspokenly pro-Western position in Middle East affairs and has therefore helped to stiffen opposition to ultranationalist and pro-Soviet influence in the area. The Turkish Government has maintained an open distrust of President Nasser and has countered sharply Egyptian propaganda efforts to weaken the Baghdad Pact. In the Suez Canal controversy, Turkey has stood firmly at the side of the United States. Turkey has viewed with particular concern growing Communist influence in Syria.

6. Because of the involvement of NATO countries, the United States has a serious concern in the long-standing dispute over the future political status of Cyprus. The population of Cyprus is ⅘ of Greek, and ⅕ of Turkish, origin. Since 1878, Cyprus has been a British colony, in which currently the U.K. maintains a large military force. Because Cyprus is so near the Turkish mainland, and because of concern for the ethnic Turkish minority, Turkey strongly opposes the desire of Greece that the Cypriot population be granted self-determination (which would inevitably result in a union of Cyprus with Greece). The United States has continued to emphasize to the Turks, the Greeks, and the British the need for flexibility in their positions to permit a solution of the problem.

7. Turkey is undergoing one of the most extensive social and political revolutions of modern times. Politically, it is the most stable country in the Middle East. In addition to strong leadership, the stability of Turkey derives in large part from the broad agricultural base of the country, in turn founded on a wide and effective land distribution system. A democratic form of government with a multi-party system is evolving and Western cultural concepts are being developed. But despite its great progress, the transformation of Turkey from a backward oriental despotism to a fully democratic institution is far from complete. Strong limitations on freedom of the press and restrictions on the right of political assembly reflect authoritarian leanings within the government. Strong control by the government of enterprise, its actual operation of certain major economic activities, and its control of labor inhibit the growth of a stable industrial middle class.

8. Turkey is in the throes of intensive national development which poses serious problems both for Turkey and for the United States in US efforts to assist Turkey. In addition to its military program, the Turkish Government has been attempting to carry out a program of economic growth far in excess of its resources. The gross national product has increased; and the roads, harbors, power plants and factories which have been built should increasingly contribute to Turkey's economic strength. However, Turkey's foreign exchange resources are now virtually exhausted and a heavy external debt has been contracted. Some of the investment that has taken place has been misdirected and there appears to have been a considerable flight of capital from the country. Inflation is serious and the exchange rate of the Turkish lira is unrealistic. As internal prices rise and Turkey's credit standing deteriorates further, it becomes increasingly difficult for Turkey to compete in Western markets.

9. Thus far the Turkish Government has made only limited progress toward restoring economic stability. As a result of US refusal in 1955 to provide a $300 million loan without prior economic reforms, recommendations by the International Monetary Fund in 1956, and pressures generated by internal economic and political developments, the Turkish Government imposed some limitations on new investment, bank credits and prices. However, after exhibiting some restraint through the fall of 1956, the Turkish Government has returned to a policy of increased developmental effort. Moreover, Turkey has not developed a comprehensive program which, based on effective utilization of total internal and available external resources, could effectively achieve a reasonable degree of economic stability. Basic measures, particularly a revaluation of the Turkish lira and a slowing up of the development program generally, are required. But it must be recognized that the Turkish Government, especially as the

elections approach, is unlikely to undertake fundamental economic reforms. Nevertheless, continued US efforts may have some influence on Turkish economic policy and may stimulate efforts to stabilize the economy, even in an election year.

10. In relation to US aid, the United States must face three possible courses of action by the Turks: (a) a continuing refusal to slow down its investment program, to stabilize the economy and to take the necessary corrective action to remove the disparity between internal and external prices; (b) inconclusive and insufficient actions in these directions; (c) effective actions in these directions. The consequences of either of the first two courses of action will mean continuing balance of payments problems, a slacking off in new foreign credits, both governmental and private, inability to make payments on present heavy foreign indebtedness, shortages of imported items and internal inflation, and external resources requirements which the United States, even if willing, would be unable to meet from limited foreign aid resources. The third course of action could eventually result in greater Turkish economic strength and stability.

11. Stabilization of the Turkish economy is required in the mutual interest of the United States and Turkey. However, should categorical conditions be attached to the extending of US aid, the Turkish Government might well reject these efforts as an unwarranted intrusion on Turkish sovereignty. Furthermore this action could have the undesirable result of imposing a severe strain on U.S.-Turkish relations and thus could possibly defeat its own objectives. If the United States can influence the Turkish Government toward economic reforms, it will be through persuasion and leadership.

12. The Turkish Government has committed Turkish ground and air forces to NATO wartime tactical command, and its naval forces under national command are assigned NATO missions in time of war. The NATO-recommended force goals, and the US force goals for Turkey, which are substantially identical, are designed primarily to carry out the following missions: To resist direct Soviet attack as part of a concerted allied defense, to withstand an assault by satellite forces, to protect the vitally important Straits, to protect Turkey's southern flank, and to maintain internal security. Forces capable of achieving these missions should also be capable of providing some support to Turkey's Baghdad Pact neighbors, Iran and Iraq.

13. Turkish military forces are deeply patriotic, well-disciplined, and physically tough. The condition of the Turkish defense establishment has been greatly improved as a result of the US military aid program. Yet much remains to be accomplished before Turkish

military forces will be capable of carrying out their missions fully. A serious problem impeding a substantial improvement in the Turkish armed forces is the low level of education and technical training which generally prevails throughout the country, for which selective remedies can be provided in the case of the armed forces. This limitation impedes the absorption of additional matériel, which is required if the Turkish forces are to attain the level of effectiveness currently envisaged. Recently the Turkish Government has expressed grave concern over the increasing threat of Soviet penetration into the Near East, and has requested additional support to meet this threat.

14. As concerns military aid to Turkey, two pertinent US studies have developed the principal military-economic considerations. The US European Agencies Team has estimated that, to permit the Turkish armed forces to be strengthened in accordance with two alternative plans, a US military aid program of either $500 million or $950 million will be required in Fiscal Year 1957–60. The Prochnow Report discussed these alternatives and a modification of one of them, estimating the amount of aid necessary to accomplish minimum US military objectives on an austere basis at $727 million during the four-year period. This estimate, however, was based on an earlier (generally higher) pricing system in the Department of Defense. It provided for some modernization of the Turkish Army in conventional weapons, but did not provide for advanced weapons such as the Honest John, the Nike, and the Century-series fighter aircraft.

15. Over-all military planning for the defense of NATO is based on the provision by the United States of advanced weapons to NATO members. Accordingly, it is in the US interest to provide for Turkey such advanced weapons as are essential to accomplish the NATO mission in Turkey, taking into consideration the availability of US resources and Turkey's technical capabilities to absorb such weapons. The provision of such weapons in Turkey may remove the feeling of disappointment held by Turkish leaders regarding fulfillment of the US 1954 commitment for military aid, and also may afford the basis for a joint revaluation of Turkish military requirements.

16. The United States currently bears all dollar costs for military maintenance of the Turkish armed forces and will probably have to continue after FY 1960 to bear most of these costs. There is little likelihood that Turkey could bear these costs in the light of the present Turkish economic situation and continued heavy domestic pressures in Turkey to devote increases in production to improve living standards and investment for further development.

17. So far as Turkey itself is concerned, passage of the Joint Resolution on the Middle East has not added to the guarantee of support which Turkey now enjoys by virtue of its membership in NATO. Nor have Turkish military requirements, which are established in NATO, been reduced by passage of the Resolution. Any US effort to reduce military aid to Turkey below present levels would have, in present circumstances, a disillusioning effect in Turkey.

Objectives

18. Continuance of Turkey's independence, territorial integrity, identification with the Free World, and will and ability to resist Communist invasion or subversion.

19. Continued Turkish cooperation in NATO and in strengthening other Free World regional security arrangements.

20. Continued maintenance of Turkish armed forces capable of resisting direct Soviet attack as part of a concerted allied defense, withstanding an assault by satellite forces, protecting the vitally important Straits, protecting Turkey's southern flank, and maintaining internal security; thereby also assisting Baghdad Pact defense.

21. Continued access by the United States and its allies to Turkish resources and military facilities necessary for the preservation and further strengthening of the Free World.

22. Improved Turkish relations with Greece, the Arab States and Israel.

23. Achievement of a stable Turkish economy which can support an increasingly greater share of its defense expenditures, while maintaining investment outlays at realistic levels.

Major Policy Guidance

General

24. Assist Turkey in developing the long-term economic and military strength which will assure its independence and counteract Communist attempts at penetration and subversion.

25. Continue to encourage Turkish recognition of the fact that the United States regards the security of Turkey as an important part of the security of the Atlantic Community and intends to develop an increasingly effective defense posture with Turkey within the resources of the two countries.

26. Continue to deal with Turkey as a NATO partner, and as a country capable of leading a bloc of Middle East countries ready to further collective security arrangements.

27. Deal in a friendly yet realistic manner with the Turks, making clear that the entire US assistance program to Turkey is based on the assumption that Turkey will make progress toward economic stabilization and a realistic rate of exchange.

Military Assistance

28. During FY 1958, continue to support Turkish force levels of 20 8/3 divisions, 64 combatant ships, and 21 air force squadrons. The total military aid program for Turkey for the period FY 1957–60 should provide for appropriate advanced weapons, for appropriate conventional equipment, and for recurring maintenance costs. The United States should review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces, appropriately revise Turkish force levels in the light of NATO requirements.

29. The rate of military build-up should not be used as a lever to force progress toward Turkish economic and financial stability. The rate of military build-up should continue to take into account Turkish capabilities to absorb and support the military program.

30. The broad objectives of our military aid program should be communicated to the Turks at an appropriate time. However, because of the limitations imposed by annual Congressional action and changing military concepts occasioned by the continuing development of more modern weapons, specific commitments should be made only on an annual basis.

31. Be prepared beyond FY 1960 to carry most of the dollar costs of military maintenance of the Turkish armed forces, estimated to be about $100 million annually for the forces as then equipped, exclusive of the costs of modernization.

Economic Assistance

32. Encourage the Turkish Government to take more effective actions to stabilize the economy and establish a realistic rate of exchange in order that Turkey's own resources as well as US assistance can be more effectively utilized and progress made toward the creation of a stronger economy.

33. Provide economic aid of not more than approximately $100 million annually, unless Turkey takes reasonable steps toward stabilizing the economy and a realistic rate of exchange.

34. If Turkey proves willing to take reasonable steps toward economic stabilization and to establish a realistic rate of exchange, be prepared to provide special supplementary aid if necessary to assist in cushioning the initial impact of the readjustment in the rate

of exchange, and subsequently to assist Turkey in the maintenance of a reasonable rate of economic development within the limits of the country's absorptive capacity.

Turkish Relations with the Free World

35. Encourage Turkey to continue its active participation in regional security agreements.

36. Extend appropriate encouragement to Turkey in its efforts to establish good relations with the Arab States and Israel and to exert such influence as might have a stabilizing influence on those states.

37. Continue to exert influence on the Turkish Government to reach an accord with the United Kingdom and Greece for a settlement of the Cyprus question.

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360. Letter From the President to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe (Norstad) [1]

Washington, July 15, 1957.

DEAR LARRY: I have been very much concerned with the adverse economic situation existing in Turkey—a situation that is aggravated by the amount of military force being maintained in that country.

Turkey has, of course, been extremely anxious to maintain and even increase her military strength and has insistently urged the United States to give her more, rather than less, financial help toward this end.

When negotiating with us she always pleads "NATO force goals." At the same time, our bilateral aid program for Turkey in effect sets the level of the Turkish contribution to NATO defense.

I have studied your letter dealing with this general subject and I am quite sympathetic with your views. [2] In fact, even if you should

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary Records, 1952–61. Top Secret.

[2] Presumably a reference to a July 8 memorandum from Cutler to the President, entitled "NATO Approved Force Levels for Turkey", and initialed by the President. (*Ibid.*, Papers as President, Administration Series, Box 31, Lauris Norstad (3)) According to a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the JCS from Cutler, the President had requested at the June 26 NSC meeting that Admiral Radford provide him with information with which he could write a letter to General Norstad concerning force levels in Turkey and other countries. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.5/7–957)

find yourself in complete agreement with my own feelings in the matter, hereinafter expressed, it would be improper for you to make any official or public statement to that effect, or, as NATO Commander, to make any official recommendation to your superiors that directly concerns the internal affairs of one of NATO's members.

However, there are certain facts of life that must be recognized if we are to carry on a collective security program effectively and continuously.

1. One of these facts is that the nuclear power of the United States is the indispensable element of Western collective security, although it must be supported by those other elements of political and military strength and unity needed to deter the Communists from attempting to take over Western lands by political action or limited military power.

2. We must insure that military organization and force programs within each allied nation are properly related to the impact of advance weapon systems and to the contribution of the whole security apparatus to the security of the individual member nation.

3. We must make certain that each recipient country is technically capable of absorbing, maintaining and exploiting advanced material and new weapons systems, as well as such conventional forces as may be required for the joint strategy, and that it carries its fair share of the economic burden of collective defense. I repeat that such force levels must take into account the first two facts I have stated above.

4. We must likewise always remember that the resources of the United States are not unlimited; moreover, the sustained economic health and vigor of the United States is important to each one of the NATO nations.

Review of Turkish force levels for the past ten years reveals that in 1947 the Turkish armed services consisted of some 41 divisions of widely varying active strength and effectiveness, seven fortress commands, small armored and other supporting formations, an air arm totalling roughly 300 operational aircraft and a small navy. Total mobilization strength was about 600,000 men. By 1951 a reorganization led to 19 6/3 active divisions, 11 air regiments and 25 ships. Under NATO aegis, Turkish goals for active forces have since increased to 20 8/3 divisions, 41 air squadrons and 64 ships. Divisional strengths are roughly comparable to those obtaining in the 1947 time period.

Now the significant feature of the Turkish force picture is found in the fact that although the job to be accomplished has remained essentially unchanged, and although Turkey has reaped significant benefits in terms of the overall security provided by NATO, modernization under our military assistance efforts and protection afforded by the growing United States nuclear retaliatory capability,

her force goals have increased. This to me represents an illogical end result which requires careful reappraisal.

I am aware of the impact upon local sensibilities that can result from an attempt to reduce United States supported force levels. On the other hand, it is essential that our limited resources be applied in such fashion as to achieve the greatest possible security for least cost. In this connection, one of my principal responsibilities to the American people is to insure that hard-headed economies are observed in connection with these same security expenditures. Failure on my part to do this could easily result in the collapse of our entire aid program. Exercise of this responsibility leads me to question the need for conventional forces in Turkey of the size now maintained, and our wisdom in supporting these levels.

You will appreciate that while my discussion has focused on Turkey, the same general philosophy applies in varying degrees to the total range of our military assistance programs.

Greece provides an important example. We must search diligently for more effective application of our resources, recognizing once again that highly expensive and complex modern matériel cannot be injected into the replacement stream without positive indication that the recipient country is capable of its employment and maintenance and that it is, in fact, militarily required as against simpler, less expensive items.

We need to see if we cannot, consonant with security, reduce overseas indigenous forces supported by military assistance and persuade our allies to place more reliance on our flexible nuclear capability to protect them from attack. At the same time, we must not foster tendencies on the part of our allies to let down in their support of their appropriate share of the deterrent, weaken the political foundations on which our security is based, or jeopardize the ability of ourselves and our allies to apply limited force effectively and in ways best calculated to avoid local hostilities broadening into general war.

It will not, of course, be feasible to single out any one country and impose economies by precipitate unilateral action. Instead, we must point toward phased reductions attuned to careful assessment of collective requirements under the impact of modern weapons systems. The phasing of these reductions will undoubtedly have to vary in relation to the situation in each country concerned. There are different domestic political factors involved in each case. The economic capability of each country also varies, and no standard rule can be established which would cover all. We must make a major effort to persuade those allies whose economies will not support currently programmed military establishments to give greater weight to the nuclear deterrent and get them to try to develop smaller yet

more powerful forces that will meet the requirements of collective security.

To give practical expression to these ideas a program of real education will be essential. The fact that we, in the United States, must be prepared to make do with less than we have had in the past is, of course, an essential aspect of this undertaking and should serve as one convincing argument to others. If we are to help increase the military ability of our allies to perform as members of the collective security team, we may well be faced with the choice between reducing our expenditures in support of conventional contingents among the allied forces in order to increase strength in modern weapons and techniques or of reducing our expenditures for advanced weapons for our allies. The question is how we can best go about this without loss of political and military strength of our collective security arrangements. In such a choice, we believe the first alternative by far the better.

This letter is for the purpose of giving you an appreciation of the thinking in the American Government and to elicit your comments as to the soundness, from your point of view, of the objectives I have so roughly outlined. I know you are now making a study for the North Atlantic Council on the balance of nuclear and conventional forces. If you find yourself in general agreement with the thoughts herein expressed, I should like your ideas as to how we could set about a gradual correction of the existing situation. If, on the other hand, you do not agree with the contents of this letter, I should like you to give me a memorandum of your approach to the same difficult problem, bearing in mind the same "facts of life" that I mentioned at the beginning of this letter.

With warm regard,

As ever, [3]

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[3] The source text is not signed.

361. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, July 26, 1957, 9 a.m. [1]

OTHERS PRESENT

General Norstad
General Goodpaster

General Norstad said he wanted to talk to the President about the latter's recent letter to him [2] concerning the level of Turkish forces. He said he intended to reply in seven to ten days. [3] He expected to send a rather long, official letter, and accompany that with a shorter letter of personal comment on the really serious aspect of the problem.

He said that the Turks feel that they were given assurances by Governor Stassen of a $1 billion program; Menderes, in addition, believes he was assured of $200 million a year in discussions with State and ICA last year; in addition, Ambassador Richards, during his tour through the Middle East, promised them a squadron of F–100 aircraft.

The President said that by maintaining programs of this size we are making it impossible for a country like Turkey to achieve a viable economy—unless we plan to continue defense support for decades into the future. It is clear the Congress does not intend to provide as much money as these programs contemplate. The result can only be collapse and economic depression in Turkey. He stated how much he admires the Turks, but recalls that Pakistan, Korea and others are in the same situation. We must review these programs because the money is just not going to be provided. He is simply trying to be forehanded in the situation. He thought our efforts must be to get them closer to handling their own affairs. He recognized that, on occasion, people have given them hopes or even promises that shouldn't have been given. General Norstad said the problem is how to sell this matter to Menderes. The wrong approach might result in a political "explosion." The President thought it was definitely up to the United States representatives to do this, and felt that General Norstad should not have to do it.

General Norstad said that the 1960–62 study he is preparing might provide an opportunity. He felt that Turkey has, relatively, a stronger defense position than the other sectors of NATO, and that some reduction in forces could be contemplated on this basis. He felt that, if he could pitch his study to reductions resulting from cuts in

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.
[2] *Supra.*
[3] Dated August 14. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

the Aid bill, he might be able to advise as to where cuts could be made with least adverse effect. The President said he thought that our authorities should suggest that the Turks go to General Norstad and ask where they should make cuts. General Norstad indicated that the problem is an extremely important one, since we want very strongly to keep Menderes on our side. The President recalled that people here wanted to put the burden of the matter on General Norstad and that he had written the letter himself in order to avoid this. He felt that some change has to be made. He suggested that the Turks should not be permanently dependent on outsiders. General Norstad, however, thought that they had no prospect of being able to support substantial forces any time soon.

The discussion then turned to Germany, and General Norstad said he thought the Germans would meet the force build-up requirements once they have gotten past the election. The Chancellor told him recently that the trend is still running in his favor. The Germans are taking a very arbitrary stand on disarmament. The Chancellor is campaigning on his support for NATO as a basic issue, and the Germans think that disarmament is contrary to NATO. They would actually like to suspend the disarmament talks until the election is over.

General Norstad then said that he was here to appear before the Appropriations Committees on the Mutual Security Bill. His main point would be that, with regard to the Mutual Security Act, the United States is getting a lot of security for this $2 billion annual expenditure—security which it could not replace by any available alternative means.

In closing, General Norstad repeated that this letter regarding Turkey should be coming in within a week or ten days. He had simply wanted to have this advance discussion on the problem.

G
Brigadier General, USA

362. Memorandum From the Secretary's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Cumming) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, August 7, 1957.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: *Tactical Shifts in Turkish Foreign Policy*

Although some officials of the Turkish Government have privately professed to see in recent Turkish-Soviet developments a softer policy on the part of Premier Menderes toward the Soviet Union, these developments appear to be superficial tactical shifts designed primarily to increase Turkey's bargaining power with the United States. In addition, domestic political considerations, particularly the fact that the Menderes administration is faced with elections next March if not before, have probably influenced recent Turkish-Soviet relations. Short of endangering national security, Turkey will continue to follow tactics which might obtain from its allies a preferential treatment of its problems and requests.

However, it is significant that even Turkey, which is historically, ideologically, and pragmatically committed to a cold war against the USSR, is willing to take advantage of a relaxation in that conflict in order to increase its maneuverability in its relations with the United States.

Domestic political considerations are involved because the Menderes administration is committed to an ambitious economic development program. Turkey's need of long-term loans or grants has forced it to broaden its commercial contacts because its previous defaults in payment of credit have limited the availability of foreign exchange. Economic necessity is thus forcing Turkey to accept almost any offer that will provide needed capital and equipment. When a Turkish aid request for a glass factory was turned down by the US, the quasi-governmental Turkish Iş Bank turned to the USSR and in July 1957 received credits of about $10,000,000 for the establishment of two glass factories in Turkey with repayment to be made in goods.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.82/8–757. Secret. Drafted by Elaine D. Smith, Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa.

363. Editorial Note

Throughout September and October, amidst Syrian and Soviet accusations that Turkish troops, with the support of the United States, were concentrating on the Syrian border in an effort to topple the Syrian regime, Turkish-Syrian relations reached a new low, which threatened a new crisis in the Middle East. In a letter of September 10 to Turkish Prime Minister Menderes, Bulganin alleged that Turkey, in cooperation with the United States, was preparing an attack on Syria. Responding to the Soviet letter, Menderes denied the accusations charging that the Soviets were using the Syrian question for their own ends. In an October 9 interview with the *New York Times*, Khrushchev accused Secretary Dulles of provoking Turkey to attack Syria. The following day the Department of State denied the Soviet charges. Finally on October 16, during a press conference, Dulles noted that if the Soviet Union attacked Turkey the United States would not confine itself to a "purely defensive operation." (Department of State *Bulletin*, November 4, 1957, pages 708–714)

The verbal assaults between the United States, the Soviet Union, Turkey, and Syria were accompanied by military and diplomatic maneuvers. On September 21, a Soviet naval squadron visited the Syrian port of Latakia; on October 5 the United States guided-missile carrier *Canberra* and other Sixth Fleet vessels arrived in Izmir. On October 13, it was announced in Cairo and Damascus that troops were being sent to Latakia to support the Syrian defense effort. Moreover, the Syrian Foreign Minister brought the matter to the attention of the United Nations requesting on October 16 that the General Assembly place the issue on its agenda. After considerable discussion between October 22 and 30, the General Assembly agreed to take no further action. Syria and Turkey agreed.

364. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France [1]

Washington, September 17, 1957—6:15 p.m.

Topol 723. You should convey following information to Spaak, stressing matter obviously one requiring exceptional secrecy. You should not take initiative in proposing private session of NAC but you should leave it to Spaak to decide whether he considers matter warrants such special restricted meeting for purpose of imparting information to Perm Reps.

US takes very serious view situation in Middle East arising out of developments in Syria. We judge that Syria has become or is about to become base for military and subversive activities in ME . . . . We understand that this same view is taken by Governments of all five nations bordering on Syria. Latter are deeply concerned over threat to their security represented by impetuous pro-Soviet Syrian regime. Hostile and provocative attitude toward its neighbors adopted by Syrian Government, together with close connection of latter with Government of USSR, reinforces their fear. Already subversive agents carrying explosives have been infiltrated into the Lebanese territory from Syria.

This situation seems to carry a special threat to Turkey against which Turkey has taken certain defensive military precautions. The Soviet Union seems however to treat this as a threat against itself and has itself publicly threatened Turkey suggesting that it will mass troops on the Turkish border.

Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement of September 10 [2] indicates a reversion to the old measures of attempting to terrorize nations of free world and break down their will to defend their independence and sovereignty. Reinstitution of this policy takes on new meaning when one considers that impetuous . . . Khrushchev is now in control of Soviet Government, there having been removed from authority individuals who, while pursuing same Soviet objectives as Khrushchev, were cool and calculating and fully aware of risks involved.

US has informed Turkey that in the event the latter is attacked by Sino-Soviet bloc US will come to its assistance with armed force. In addition US has decided that in event of need US would immediately reactivate MEEOC to meet effects of any interruption of flow

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.54/9–1757. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell, Dulles, and Elbrick.

[2] For text of Gromyko's statement, see *AFP: Current Documents, 1957*, pp. 1038–1039.

of oil to free world markets which might result from closure of trans-Syrian pipelines or Suez Canal.

US will continue to deploy Sixth Fleet in eastern Mediterranean. [3]

Murphy

[3] In Polto 662, September 20, Frederick Nolting, Minister Counselor at Paris, informed the Department that he had conveyed the substance of this telegram to Spaak. Nolting reported that Spaak believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union "would push its policy" in Syria or anywhere else in the Middle Eastern area to the extent of provoking a war. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.54/9–2057)

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365. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Turkish Ambassador (Ürgüplü) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Henderson), Department of State, Washington, September 19, 1957 [1]

SUBJECT

Turkish Ambassador's Initial Call on Mr. Henderson

. . . . . .

Ambassador Ürgüplü felt the main problem now affecting East-West relations was the Arab-Israeli problem. He expressed his serious concern at Israeli's constant population growth and felt that its need to expand territorially would continue to exacerbate the Arab-Israeli problem.

As to Turkey, the Ambassador pointed out that although anti-Russian feelings are very strong among the people, the situation cannot be taken for granted. The high cost of living, the shortages of imported commodities, and the heavy defense expenditures are affecting people's thinking. Although most recent USSR economic offers have been turned down by the Turkish Government it is a question as to how long these offers can be resisted.

The Ambassador concluded by stating that he wanted to be frank and paint an honest picture of the situation as he saw it personally. The Turks will not be discouraged and will effectively

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.82/9–1957. Secret. Drafted by Brewster.

resist the Russians, but it is now a fact that the USSR is in the Middle East."

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366. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, October 18, 1957—9:15 p.m.

1268. Embtel 1140. [2] You should speak to Turks along following lines regarding tactics in face of Syrian complaint in GA: [3]

1) We desire closest collaboration with Turkish Government and Turkish delegation New York on this issue.

2) We believe we should make every effort to turn this matter to our advantage and to point up the threat to independence of Syria arising from indirect Soviet aggression and to security of ME arising from pile-up of Soviet arms in Syria. We also believe that outright Soviet threat against Turkey, and reported Bulgarian military movements on Turkish border if latter substantiated will lend themselves to exploitation.

3) Debate will of course give opportunity make clear that charges of aggressive intent made against Turkey, and allegations that US attempting to foment war against Syria, are entirely unfounded.

4) Our tentative thinking regarding tactics in GA, prior to ascertaining attitude other countries, is that we should work for reference of this matter to SC as organ of UN charged with primary responsibility for consideration of items involving alleged threats to peace, and better able to exercise responsibility on continuing basis.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/10–1757. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Rockwell. Repeated to USUN.

[2] In telegram 1140, October 17, Warren reported on an October 17 conversation with Esenbel regarding forthcoming U.N. proceedings on Syria. According to the Ambassador, Esenbel believed that the time for the U.N. debate had arrived and that the United States and Turkish Delegates should work "closely together." Warren solicited instructions from the Department regarding a reply to Esenbel. (*Ibid.*)

[3] On October 15, in a memorandum for the agenda of the General Assembly's Twelfth Session, Syria requested that, in view of the concentration of Turkish troops on the Syrian border, violations of Syrian air space, armed raids into Syrian territory, and shooting on the border, the General Assembly place the item on its agenda. For text of the Syrian memorandum, see U.N. Doc. A/3699.

We believe that in this matter we should follow orderly procedure. See Charter Art. 11 (2).[4]

5) We have in mind introduction of resolution whereby Assembly, after discussion, would decide to refer Syrian complaint to SC with request that Council determine scope of investigation which should be made. Assembly may, however, insist on seeking itself to direct the investigation.

6) We would like urgently to receive views of Turkish Government regarding desirability of an investigating committee being despatched to area. If such a body were to go forward we would hope it might be composed of non-permanent members of SC. Although Syrian complaint calls for a UN group to investigate situation on Syrian-Turkish border, we are considering whether it would not be desirable for such group to be authorized also to investigate armaments situation in Syria and situations on Soviet-Turkish and Turkish-Bulgarian borders with particular reference to possible military movements. Soviets and Bulgars would probably not accept investigating group.

7) You should emphasize to Turks that these views are entirely preliminary, that we have not yet had an opportunity for full consultation with other delegations, and that we have reached no final determination with regard to procedure. We would welcome urgent and continuing consultation with Turks.

Dulles

[4] Article 11, section 2, of the U.N. Charter noted that the General Assembly might discuss any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member of the U.N. Security Council, or by a nonmember state. For text of Article 11, see 59 Stat. 1038.

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367. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, October 20, 1957—3:35 p.m.

1285. For Ambassador. Request you seek early appointment with Menderes and inform him that we should like current exchange of views regarding Syria in light of recent ME developments.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10–2057. Secret. Drafted by Rountree and signed by Dulles.

You should inform GOT that our evaluation of Syrian situation has not changed and that we remain deeply concerned extent to which Syria has subjected itself Soviet influence. We aware situation in Syria continues to be deep concern to the other Arab states, although for political reasons their concern has not been made public.

Soviet-Syrian motives in recent extensive anti-Turkish propaganda and in charges that US prodding Turkey to military action against Syria difficult evaluate. We would appreciate Turkish estimate and specific comments upon these charges which are totally unfounded insofar as US concerned and, we believe, insofar as Turkey is concerned. However, we hope that GOT agrees that in view of recent developments, particularly in UN, no action should be taken which enemies of Turkey could use as attempt to demonstrate that charges have substance. In particular, we would suggest that every effort be made to insure that Turkish forces now located along Turkish southern border be deployed in such way as to minimize possibility of incidents arising from their disposition.

You should tell GOT US looks forward close consultation between our two governments with respect to tactics for handling Soviet-Syrian charges at UN. Separate messages being sent this connection.

Dulles

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368. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State [1]

Ankara, October 23, 1957—2 p.m.

1192. At 4 p.m. October 22 I saw Prime Minister Menderes for purpose exchange views on Syrian situation called for by Deptel 1285. [2] Minister State Zorlu and Foreign Office Secretary General Esenbel were present as was General Mead. [3] Menderes and Zorlu were worn down from hectic campaigning for election October 27. Menderes had spoken for 2 hours in Ankara speech just before conversation with Mead and me. Day before he spoke for 2 and ½

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10–2357. Secret; Niact.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Major General Armistead D. Mead was designated as an officer for consultation with the Turkish Government regarding matters of military assistance.

hours in Istanbul. His voice was affected. I have never seen Zorlu so tired. Nevertheless the 3 gave careful attention to what Mead and I had to say. Menderes states he was not up to date and was glad learn recent developments from me.

I set forth my presentation along lines laid down Deptel 1285. From time to time Menderes would interrupt me for short discussions of points. When I finished I summarized my understanding of what the 3 (Esenbel, Zorlu, Menderes) had said. They indicated their approval. Here are the principal points I mentioned in my summary:

1. GOT wants an exchange of views as requested by Washington.

2. Turks consider that the danger is greater than ever in Syria and must be even more closely watched.

3. GOT will not make any move without closest consultation with Washington.

4. GOT particularly wants closest consultation with Washington with respect tactics of handling Syro-Sov charges in UN.

Comments: Turks did not go into motives of Syro-Sov charges but our conversation made it entirely clear Turks consider Syria as acting under Soviet guidance. Russia's age-old desire to reach warm water is sufficient motivation in Turkish minds for any USSR anti-Turk move.[4]

The conversation also made abundantly clear to me that Turks realize that Syrian situation is so great concern other Arab States. Menderes and Zorlu showed themselves fully aware of ticklish situation now facing Turks. I believe we can be assured that in light of recent developments Turks are not going to take any action which enemies to Turkey could use support Syria-Sov charges in UN.

Prime Minister showed GOT's interest in Arab feeling by stressing satisfaction which his Government has in getting in close touch with King Saud. He intimated that both President Bayar and he might if invited go separately to see Saud after next Sunday's

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[4] In telegram 788, October 19, Ambassador Thompson reported from Moscow that the Soviets were "genuinely concerned" about preventing the overthrow of the Syrian Government. The Ambassador expressed doubt that Soviet interests in Syria were in themselves of "sufficient importance" to warrant the risks involved in recent Soviet actions. Thompson noted that among Soviet objectives in the Middle East were the desire for expansion toward the Persian Gulf and a desire to break the "chain of US alliances" around the Soviet Union. The Ambassador added:

"The key to both these objectives would appear to be Turkey, which has received considerable Soviet attention in recent months. In addition to the blatant carrot and stick approach to Turkey it seems likely that recent Rumanian proposal for a Balkan Pact may have had as its primary objective the political isolation of Turkey. I suspect Soviets have hoped that their blustering attitude would cause US to waver in support of Turkey with consequent softening up of Turkey for direct Soviet approach to the country. While their actions could be explained as preparation for an attack on Turkey I consider this most unlikely." (Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10–1957)

election. Zorlu should be there October 23. Turkey will try take advantage Saud's offer mediation and to use that off in UN debate on Syrian charges.

Have no doubt GOT intends stay in closest touch with USA not only on UN debate and tactics but also on ME situation generally. Menderes said he would be giving full personal attention these matters after elections.

Warren

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369. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Turkish Ambassador (Ürgüplü) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree), Department of State, Washington, October 23, 1957 [1]

SUBJECT

The Turkish-Syrian Problem in the United Nations

After delivering a personal letter [2] from the Turkish Prime Minister to the Secretary, Mr. Urguplu turned to the current UNGA debate on the Turkish-Syrian border problem.

The Ambassador reported that Mr. Sarper, former head of the Turkish delegation at the UNGA, had arrived to assist Mr. Esen, present head of the Turkish UNGA delegation, and had reported there was yesterday at the UNGA a great deal of confusion and lack of coordination among our friends, while the neutralists were close to Gromyko. He expressed the view that the delay in the debate was unfortunate in that it afforded the Syrians and the Saudis an opportunity to get together; that we have failed to take advantage of

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.833/10–2357. Confidential. Drafted by Jones.

[2] The letter expressed Menderes' appreciation for Dulles' remarks at a press conference on October 16, in which the Secretary indicated that if there were an attack on Turkey by the Soviets, "it would not mean a purely defensive operation by the United States, with the Soviet Union a privileged sanctuary from which to attack Turkey." For the full text of the Secretary's comments, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 4, 1957, pp. 708–714. Forwarding a copy of Menderes' letter to Eisenhower, Dulles informed the President, "Here is one person who seems to have liked my press conference of which you read the transcript." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)

King Saud's embarrassment over Syria's refusal to mediate; and that our delegations should work more closely together.

Mr. Rountree, after agreeing that it was important for us to consult and establish a concerted position by Friday, then went on to explain why the United States felt that it had been desirable at yesterdays's UNGA debate to concentrate on the Saudi offer. He said that there were two principal reasons for this. In the first place, it was consonant with the Secretary's position that this was a regional problem; this had prompted him to defer his plan to put in a resolution that would refer the matter to the Security Council and call for an investigation that would be broad enough to include the activities of the USSR. Within this context it was logical to accept the Saudi offer,[3] particularly in view of the fact that Syria had declined the Saudi offer under circumstances that were a measure in themselves of the extent to which Syria was under Russian influence. The second general consideration was the forthcoming Turkish elections. Because of the preoccupation of top Turkish officials with the election, it was felt that it would be better to defer any debate on this subject until they were over. Mr. Rountree said that these tactics had been partly successful, that Mr. Lodge was now working on the statement that he would make Friday, and that our delegation would be in active contact with the Turkish delegation in New York. Later in the conversation, Mr. Rountree assured the Ambassador that he would telephone to New York to assure that effective liaison was maintained between our two delegations.

In the course of the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador made a number of other observations. He urged that we coordinate with the British, but went on to deplore the excessive British reliance on Nuri Said in recent years. It had, he asserted, the effect of alienating from the West other Iraqi leaders who could have been useful to us. He also expressed a deep distrust of Arabs generally, citing particularly the chain of events and public statements following King Saud's recent visits to Damascus and Beirut. In the course of a plea that the United States should join the Baghdad Pact, he suggested that Iraq might be allowed to leave the Pact. When Mr. Rountree pointed out that this would be regarded as a major victory for Nasser, the Ambassador discounted this, asserting that this could be neutralized by the United States joining the Pact, and could be further neutralized by the way it was conveyed to the Arabs. Throughout the discussion, the Ambassador's comments carried overtones of not only the need for more effective liaison among our friends, particularly at the United Nations at the present time, but

[3] Documentation on King Saud's interest in mediating the Syrian-Turkish dispute is in Department of State, Central File 682.83.

also that we could and should be doing a great deal more among the Arab states.

370. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) [1]

Washington, October 27, 1957.

SUBJECT

Turkish Elections

There are three principal possible outcomes of the Turkish elections on October 27.

1. A Democrat Party (DP) victory with a reduced majority (perhaps 400 deputies of the 610 in the new Assembly);
2. A DP victory with an increased representation (510 deputies or more);
3. A defeat of the DP through a victory of the Republican People's Party (RPP), or the RPP and Freedom Party (FP) jointly.

The consensus is that a Democratic Party victory is probable but not certain and that the most likely outcome is a reduced Democratic majority in the Grand National Assembly. Our Embassy in Ankara has reaffirmed this estimate in its most recent cable of October 26. [2]

This memorandum is limited to an assessment in broad terms of how a DP victory, whether by a narrow or large majority, might affect Turkish actions, and what a defeat of the DP by the RPP, or the RPP–FP might augur.

A DP victory with a large majority would be construed as a personal victory for Menderes and his policies. In this instance, Menderes probably would continue his present foreign and domestic policy lines without significant change. On the basis of past experience, it is doubtful if he would use the prestige of such a victory to liberalize the press and assembly laws, effect significant economic reforms or make compromises that would foster a solution of the Cyprus problem.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/10–2757. Confidential. Drafted by Brewster and Jones.

[2] The Embassy's estimate was in telegram 1238, October 26. (*Ibid.*, 782.00/10–2657)

In the case of a DP victory with a small majority, there is no reason to believe that there would be a change in the field of foreign affairs. On the domestic side, internal political struggle would be intensified and Menderes might react vindictively to the loss of prestige of a significantly reduced majority. An assessment of how he would be likely to deal with domestic problems would have to await a tally of those DP candidates elected since the degree of loyalty of the party deputies and party discipline would bear on the degree of political support within the party Menderes would receive for the continuation of present domestic policies. Even in the case of a victory with a reduced majority, Menderes may not consider himself seriously handicapped because the DP, both through earlier resignations and the selection of the present deputorial candidates, has lost a number of the outspoken critics of Menderes within the Democrat Party. Thus, even with a reduced majority, Menderes may feel that he has a larger loyal core of Democrat Party members in the new GNA and can safely press on with present policies.

A victory for the RPP, whether alone or in cooperation with the FP, would result in a difficult period of transition. During that time, positive action on major issues, domestic and foreign, might be difficult to obtain. In its campaign the RPP has promised to (1) amend the constitution and create an upper chamber in the GNA; (2) abolish repressive legislation; and (3) hold elections in May 1958 under new electoral laws. If these measures are undertaken, it may create an unsettled situation in Turkey for the immediate months ahead.

In foreign policy matters, the RPP under Inonu can be expected to continue the present Turkish Government's pro-Western line. However, Inonu may again display the high degree of independence which has characterized his career since 1923. He may also be more intractable on the Cyprus problem. He has been critical of Menderes for advocating partition as a solution to the Cyprus question, claiming that this policy is a retreat from that of maintenance of the status quo or reversion of sovereignty to Turkey.

The economic policies of the RPP under the leadership of Inonu (or of an RPP–FP cooperation) may be expected to be conservative. Inonu will probably be prepared to consider reducing the rate of investment, initiating stabilization measures, and introducing more planning in Turkey's economic development. There will be, however, a temptation to step up imports over the short-run to meet critical consumer shortages and solidify the government's position with the

electorate, particularly if new elections are held in May 1956 [*1958*] as promised.[3]

[3] On October 27, general elections for the Grand National Assembly were held in Turkey. Menderes' Democratic Party received 421 seats; the Republican People's Party, 173 seats; the Freedom Party, 4 seats; and the Republican National Party, 4 seats.

371. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State [1]

Ankara, November 13, 1957—7 p.m.

1395. When on a few minutes notice I saw Prime Minister this morning for first time since elections about an urgent matter (Embtel 1379 November 12 [*13*] [2]), he began conversation by saying he wanted mention to me a matter that would be known only to him and me. (We were alone for entire conversation.) He said during next few days he will be making up his new cabinet. During many past months he has found pressure on himself for handling foreign affairs to be far too much. He must have a competent Minister of Foreign Affairs, one who has his confidence. Etem Menderes already has an appropriate portfolio (Minister of Public Works) and lacks the experience demanded of a competent Minister of Foreign Affairs. The only member of the Grand National Assembly with the required knowledge and experience to be Foreign Minister who has Prime Minister's confidence is Minister Fatin Rustu Zorlu. Menderes added that he had been told variously that Zorlu as Minister of Foreign Affairs would not be pleasing to the US. He stressed how important it is that he be relieved of the pressure from the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and how essential it is that the Foreign Minister be one who could loyally and enthusiastically support his policy of fullest cooperation and collaboration with USA. He asked me what I thought about his appointing Zorlu.

I said I was of course speaking without consulting my government and made clear that what I said must be considered in that

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.13/11–1357. Top Secret; Niact.

[2] In telegram 1379 Warren informed the Department that Menderes did not attend the reception for Italy's President as the Ambassador had expected. Warren noted that he would find the first opportunity to talk to the Prime Minister regarding his suggestion about deployment of troops upon the completion of maneuvers. (*Ibid.*, 782.54/11–1357)

light. I continued, however, by stating I thought I knew my government and American people and expressed myself thus:

1. The US would want him to select his cabinet on basis of appointment men of his confidence able and competent to carry out his policies.
2. I had found Zorlu able, intelligent, cooperative and friendly to USA during recent months.
3. The only reservation I could think of which might occur to Washington was whether Zorlu might harbor resentment toward US because of his failure to get the $300 million loan some years ago.

Menderes replied he could assure me that Zorlu harbors no such resentment. On the contrary, Zorlu came back and reported to him that he not get the loan for $300 million but he did get immediately $30 million which was what Turkey then and there seriously needed.

Prime Minister continued that Zorlu not only harbors no resentment but that he is friendly towards the US, believes in the US, champions the present policy of closest relations with the US, and will do everything possible advance the closest most friendly relations between two countries.

Menderes then said that a few days will elapse before he will complete his cabinet. He suggested that I convey this message to the Department. I am sure he would like the Department's reaction within 24 hours if that be possible.

Comment: I trust the Department can approve what I have said to the Prime Minister. Lyon, Collins [3] and I agree that it would be a great mistake for the USG to indicate any objection whatsoever to Zorlu. Furthermore, I am convinced that this development can put Zorlu definitely on our side for the entire time that Menderes supports us. I would like to have Zorlu as enthusiastic in his support of the USA position as is Prime Minister Menderes. [4]

Warren

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[3] V. Lansing Collins, Counselor at Ankara.

[4] In telegram 1591, November 14, the Department informed Warren that it "fully" agreed with his views and approved the way in which he had handled the conversation with Menderes. The Ambassador was instructed to inform the Prime Minister that the United States had "high regard" for Zorlu. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.13/11–1357)

372. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador's Residence, Paris, December 18, 1957, 10:30 a.m.[1]

USDel/MC/31

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*Turkey*
The President	Mr. Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey
Mr. Rockwell	Mr. Fatin Zorlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey
	Mr. Nelih Esenbel, Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office

SUBJECT

Egypt

The President asked Prime Minister Menderes whether he thought there were any signs that Nasser was becoming uncomfortable in his relationship with the USSR. The President had a feeling Nasser might be seeking to disentangle himself from the Russians.

The Prime Minister commented that Nasser was always gambling. He thought he was merely seeking time to consolidate his position.

The President said that Nasser must give convincing proof of a change of heart. Mr. Zorlu commented that the yardstick in question must be Jordan. Nasser should stop trying to overthrow the Jordan Government. The President agreed. He said that we would continue to support Jordan and that no doubt if Egypt or Syria should attack Jordan, we would invoke the American Doctrine on the grounds that the attack was carried out as a result of Communist domination of the attacking country.

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[1] Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, 1956–1959. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell. Eisenhower was in Paris to attend the NATO Heads of Government meeting, December 16–18.

373. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador's Residence, Paris, December 18, 1957, 10:30 a.m.[1]

USDel/MC/33

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
Mr. Rockwell

Turkey
Mr. Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey
Mr. Futin Zorlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey
Mr. Melih Esenbel, Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office

SUBJECT

Syria

Prime Minister Menderes said that we must not accept a fait accompli in Syria. The President thought that there might be some possibility of hopeful developments there. He knew how staunchly Turkey had opposed the Communist penetration of Syria. Mr. Menderes said that Turkey was gratified by the way the United States had stood by Turkey. The USSR had not failed to notice this.

Mr. Menderes commented that Nuri Said had just been in Turkey and had said that his recent talks with the President and the Secretary in Washington[2] about Syria had been most satisfactory.

Mr. Menderes said that Turkey had no illusion about NATO's abilities to be helpful in the Middle East. NATO was divided, but US policy must continue strong in the Middle East.

The President asked what Mr. Menderes thought of the military situation in Syria. The Prime Minister said that the Russians have sent Syria more arms than Syria can use. The Soviets have not made Syria into a Communist satellite yet, because they are afraid of public reaction in the Arab world. They have put their hand on Syria, however, and can come in at any time.

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[1] Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, 1956–1959. Secret. Drafted by Rockwell.

[2] On December 5 and 10, Nuri discussed the Arab-Israeli conflict and related matters with Dulles in Washington.

374. Memorandum of a Conversation, Turkish NATO Delegation Headquarters, Paris, December 19, 1957, 4 p.m.[1]

USDel/MC/37

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary
Mr. Rockwell

Turkey
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes of Turkey
Mr. Futin Zorlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey
Mr. Melih Esenbel, Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office

SUBJECT

Economic Assistance to Turkey

Speaking on behalf of the Prime Minister, Mr. Zorlu said that Turkey needed US support to help it overcome its economic difficulties. Turkey was grateful for what the US had already done. She was now taking measures to improve her budgetary situation and control inflation, and hoped the US would help her in this task. The US should speed up the current aid which has not yet been received, and give increased aid in addition.

The Prime Minister said that, with US help, in around three years Turkey would be in very good shape. Russian pressure made it more urgent than ever that Turkish economic measures be successful. The three-year drought had been a severe blow. The problem of the increase in population was also involved, added Mr. Zorlu.

The Secretary said that he was aware of the statement Mr. Menderes had made to Ambassador Warren about the measures the government would take to stabilize the economy.[2] He would look into this matter in response to the Prime Minister's request that he give it his personal attention.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.8241/2–3157. Secret. Drafted by Rockwell.

[2] In telegram 1648, December 12, Warren informed the Department that in discussions with Menderes on December 10, the Prime Minister had requested the Ambassador to inform his government that Turkey was taking steps to "lower price structure" and to "stabilize Turkish money". Menderes also noted that the recent elections had revealed an increase in "Communist pressures" on Turkey. (*Ibid.*, 782.5–MSP/12–1257)

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